Territory and territoriality in a globalizing world

"In his book *The Significance of Territory,* Jean Gottmann explored the importance to evolving societies of the division of the earth's surface into bounded territories associated with sovereign states. He identified the contemporary situation as one of considerable fluidity, with territory losing its importance at some scales but retaining it at others. His treatment focused almost entirely on the scale of the nation-state, however – on the significance of territory for nations. In this essay, I build on Gottmann's ideas, 30 years after they were presented, to suggest how that fluidity has developed and how different scales have become important in the use of territoriality strategies."

Ron Johnston

The author is a Professor in the School of Geographical Sciences at the University of Bristol. His main research interests are in electoral, political and urban social geography and in the history of human geography. His interests in territoriality have focused on the balkanization of local government in the USA (as in his 1984 book Residential Segregation, the State and Constitutional Conflict in American Urban Areas) *and electoral redistricting (see his 1999 book* The Boundary Commissions: Redrawing the UK's Map of Parliamentary Constituencies*), as well as general essays on the relative lack of concern with bounded spaces within human geography. Professor Johnston has published widely on the history of geography, notably in his book* Geography and Geographers *(sixth edition, 2004).*

Introduction

In his book *The Significance of Territory*, Jean Gottmann (1973) explored the importance to evolving societies of the division of the earth's surface into bounded territories associated with sovereign states. He identified the contemporary situation as one of considerable fluidity, with territory losing its importance at some scales but retaining it at others. His treatment focused almost entirely on the scale of the nation-state, however – on the "significance of territory for nations" (GOTTMANN, 1973, p. ix). In this essay, I build on Gottmann's ideas, 30 years after they were presented, to suggest how that fluidity has developed and how different scales have become important in the use of territoriality strategies.

Theories of territory and territoriality

Despite it being a key geographical concept, territory – or bounded space – has not attracted the degree of attention accorded to other aspects of space and spatiality (JOHNSTON, 1997; STOREY, 2001). Few followed Gottmann's lead, for example, and only a small number have explored the related strategy of territoriality. In this first part of the paper, Gottmann's work is summarized, along with that of the two geographers who have done most to build on the foundation that he laid.

Gottmann and bounded territories

In the Preface to his book, Gottmann (1973, p. ix) defines territory – from the standpoint of a political geographer – as "a material, spatial notion establishing essential links between politics, people and the natural setting". It is important to geographers, he argues, because it is "the unit in the political organization of space that defines, at least for a time, the relationships between the community and its habitat on the one hand, and between the community and its neighbors on the other": those relationships are viewed as "closely related to the human striving for security, opportunity and happiness" (p. x).

Security is the foremost purpose for which territory is divided into bounded spaces, Gottmann argues (1973, p. 7), both security against outsiders (the prime purpose) and security within the community, which are provided respectively by the nation-state's foreign and domestic policies. The second purpose is accessibility, fencing "a territory off to control the access of outsiders to its land, people, and resources" (p. 8), while at the same time allowing its own citizens access to all parts of the territory. With greater accessibility comes greater diversity of the space within the bounded territory. Gottmann (1973, p. 14) sums up these purposes as follows:

> ...the space accessible to human activities may be described as continuous but partitioned, limited though expanding, diversified but organized. The reasons for accessibility and organization, both willed by man and largely controlled by him, are rooted in the desire to provide as much opportunity as possible – to pursue the "good life." However, organization also intends to regulate access and opportunity, avoiding the threat of situations that may be contrary to the accepted interests of the community. In this respect, it concurs with partitioning in an over-riding concern for security.

Thus the division of the earth's surface into bounded territories endows such spaces with two main functions:

> ... to serve on the one hand as a shelter for security and on the other hand as a springboard for opportunity. Both security and opportunity require an internal organization of the territory as well as a subsequent organization of its external

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

relations. An element of conflict is built into the functions of the territory, and behind them looms a contradiction in the purposes of territorial sovereignty and of political independence: the search for security will often clash with the yearning for broader opportunity. The former calls for relative isolation, the latter for some degree of interdependence with the outside.

Such a division of the functions of territory into prospect and refuge has been developed in other theories of space – as in Appleton's (1975) work.

Much of Gottmann's discussion of these functions of territory concentrates on the evolution of the system of territorially-defined sovereign states and their growing importance in the regulation of "national economies" (p. 86) – undertaken in order to promote "national happiness". This necessarily followed the achievement of national security within those bounded territories:

> Before economic aims could be emphasized in constitutional laws, the states of western Europe needed to achieve a fair degree of internal security: security in the physical sense both for individual inhabitants and for the political structure of the country. This required enough protection in the daily routine of life and work to assure survival and the reaping of the produce of the land: it meant, therefore, some order and policing (p. 92).

Thus the state had to ensure control over its territory, and stamp its authority thereon, before it could create the conditions wherein economic growth could take place: once people felt secure, they could focus their lives on the "search for happiness" through wealth-creation. States increasingly became involved in this: having ensured security, they then could become involved in activities which assisted wealth-creation – such as education and public health (the foundations of the welfare state, p. 100).

Security could never be taken for granted, however. Conditions changed, and territorial sovereignty was challenged – not least by developments in military technology and aviation (p. 127). Attitudes to the bounding of territory altered – as with changes to the law of the sea and the zones around nation-states' shorelines that became recognized internationally as within their spheres of influence (STEINBERG, 2002). Boundaries became increasingly important – and frontiers less so: the former were more likely to be demarcated and defended. They were increasingly used as screening devices, where entry to and exit from a state's territory is controlled, but such control became increasingly difficult with the expansion in trade and in population movements (both permanent and temporary).

Sack and territoriality

Gottmann's treatment of territory and spatial partitioning was significantly extended in a seminal work by Sack (1986) on territoriality.[1] For Sack, bounded territories have significant advantages that make them very important – perhaps even necessary – for the exercise of power (by the state and other institutions), hence his focus on the concept of territoriality (a term not employed by Gottmann). Territoriality is defined as (SACK, 1986, p. 19):

> ... the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.

Territories are bounded spaces, for which features of the "natural landscape" may or may not be used in the definition of boundaries: territoriality becomes involved when those boundaries are used to mold behavior. Modern states need to do this in order to facilitate the major functions as identified by Gottmann – providing security and advancing happiness. And such molding – which involves regulating what people can and cannot, must and must not, do – is much facilitated by three characteristic features of territoriality:

- it involves a form of classification by area;
- it can be communicated through territorial markers; and,
- its boundaries can be used as a means of interrupting interactions.

Power can be exerted over a defined area by a territorial nation-state using such strategies, with that power applying to all persons within the area. The exercise of power over people is very substantially assisted by the application of territorial strategies – hence its universal adoption by nation-states and its widespread use by a wide range of other organizations, which deploy it as a means of facilitating their organization/control of people widely distributed over space. Territoriality is a spatial concept that is fundamental to state operations – and hence to contemporary society, given the apparent necessity of the state (JOHNSTON, 1982 and 1990).

Taylor and containers

Taylor (1994 and 1995) examined the importance of territoriality to the contemporary state, in the context of four main functions:

- *Waging war* – what he terms the *state as a power container;*
- *Managing the economy* – the *state as a wealth container;*
- *Stimulating national identity* – the *state as cultural container;* and,
- *Delivering welfare* – the *state as social container.*

Until the late 20th century, the arena for these four functions largely coincided in space – the territorially-defined nation-state undertook them all for the same area. But modern developments have fractured that simple map of territoriality and power. As power containers, states continue to be the main actors in a world of warring states – but individual states rarely go to war alone now, choosing to do so in alliances with others; events in the USA on 11 September 2001 led to the declaration by its president of a war on terrorism in which the focus was only on territorially-defined states to the extent that they were seen as the loci within which terrorism was organized and fostered (JOHNSTON, TAYLOR and WATTS, 2002).

As *wealth containers*, however, individual nation-states are becoming less important; they are being replaced by groups of states, containers at larger scales incorporating a number of separate states – to which they have ceded some of their national sovereignty, the better to promote wealth and happiness (as with the European Union) within a secure geopolitical base. At the same time, there is a growing sub-state movement, whereby global city regions are assuming quasi-independent powers in wealth-promotion (SCOTT, 2001). Some of the state's functions as social containers are passed to such super-states also, though others are retained with the "traditional" containers. Culturally, however, individual states are being fragmented into smaller *cultural containers* – a trend which is less discussed, and is the focus of a later section.

Taylor thus identifies what he terms a triple-layered territoriality, with the different functions operating at separate spatial scales:

> ... the state as power container tends to preserve existing boundaries; the state as wealth container tends towards larger territories; and the state as cultural container tends towards smaller territories (TAYLOR, 1994, p. 160).

The social role merges with the cultural. (Nevertheless, as Paasi (2002) argues, this cession of some economic and social functions to a higher-order "government" can create problems of regional identity.) In his second paper, Taylor (1995) con-

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

centrates on the larger scale operations of territoriality, and its contemporary restructuring. In the economic sphere, for example, larger new (quasi-) states are being created to enable producers within individual states to compete more effectively in regional and global markets, whereas in the cultural and social spheres, smaller states are being created (as in the partitions of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). States still exist and deploy territoriality as a major strategy for control and regulation, with power elites continuing to exercise their domination over bounded territories (the only model of power that they recognize!). But, says Taylor (1995, p. 14), the system of bounded nation-states will eventually wither away:

> ... [they] are sure to be abolished in any viable sustainable world. The competition engendered by states in their territories is ultimately a route to doomsday.

As actors in the economic sphere, therefore, states may disappear – and en route to that disappearance will experience major declines in their power and influence – but the division of the earth's surface into bounded spaces where territoriality continues to be exercised – what Taylor terms internationality – may be sustained:

> In the past, cultural differences have been maintained without political and growth imperatives, so that internationality need not be compatible with a sustainable world.
>
> There are now many hundreds of nationalist movements claiming separate territories in order to sustain their cultural identity.

****

The cumulative work of Gottmann, Sack and Taylor has led to greater appreciation of the role of space, and in particular of bounded spaces or territories, in the exercise of power (JOHNSTON, 1996 and 2001). Territoriality is a strategy adopted by all of the nation-states which have claimed sovereignty. Possession of a bounded space has been a sine qua non of their sovereignty, and establishing power over that space, through territorial strategies. Without it, they have been unable to ensure their security and hence their ability to work with and for their citizens to promote wealth and happiness; but of course territoriality is a necessary though not sufficient condition for that success. Not surprisingly, therefore, the mosaic of states became the major set of actors in world affairs – exercising political, military, social and cultural power (MANN, 1984) – and much social science focused on that mosaic: for geographers, the most important world political map was that showing the boundaries of the recognized sovereign states, which between them – by mid-20th century – had exhausted the habitable earth and were spreading their power onto the oceans (STEINBERG, 2002).[2] So extensive has this focus on states as territorial containers become, that Agnew (1994) has argued persuasively that geographers have fallen into a territorial trap, over-emphasizing the division into a mosaic and under-playing the other ways in which space is mastered and manipulated.

New containers and cultural territoriality

Territoriality remains an important strategy for nation-states in a variety of contexts, however, and new ways of employing the basic strategy are being devised in response to changing contexts. For example, in early 2002 the United States decided to use its military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as a prison camp for those suspects captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere during its war against terrorism. Guantanamo Bay is not part of the sovereign territory of the United States (i.e. it is not part of one of the federal states), and so the US Constitution does not apply there. Nor do the Constitutions of any other nation-states – including Cuba – and this has allowed the nature of the detention to differ from what would be permitted under the American or any other national legal system. International law – such as the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners and the Human Rights Convention – does apply, but the nature of its provisions is highly contested and, like most other international law, there is no effective mechanism in place to ensure that a state adheres to those provisions. Thus a bounded space is being deployed by the US administration with a territoriality strategy outside the mosaic of nation-states, setting an important precedent which other governments wishing to ignore national and international laws may well follow.[3]

Another recent example of the use of territoriality to create "safe areas" wherein people can be isolated – though created in very different circumstances – is Srebrenica. This Bosnian town was one of six declared a "safe area" in 1995 by the United Nations in its efforts to end the civil war there, but the Bosnian Serb army was able to extract more than 7,000 Muslim males from within the territory, almost all of whom have not been traced since. This was one of a number of "safe havens" proposed in the 1990s at a variety of scales as a counter to policies of ethnic cleansing (another, much larger, was in the Kurdish-occupied areas of Iraq and Turkey). They were presented (Ó TUATHAIL, 1999, p. 126) as:

> ... demilitarized areas which require the prior consent of the combatants in order to be established. Safe areas were conceived as humanitarian islands of relative peace and security in a sea of warfare ... [which] required that the international community be politically and militarily neutral in their establishing and administration of these zones ... [comprising] territories of UN-governmentality ... [where] the international community could avoid taking a side ... [strengthening] its ability to carry out its "humanitarian mission" yet without imperiling its neutrality and the supposed moral authority that derived from this.

In the six Bosnian safe areas designated by UN Security Council Resolution the role of the UNPROFOR forces was to be peacekeeping only; their task was not to oppose aggression, but simply to "deter" it, and they could only use their arms in self-defence (indicating to Ó Tuathail (1999, p. 127) that the UN's mandate was "to itself and not to the refugees, civilians and soldiers fighting for their lives in the besieged enclaves"). The policy failed, because the Serb army was able to achieve its goal of ethnically cleansing the Bosnian Muslim males, despite the presence of a Dutch force in the town – and in 2002 an independent report concluded that the Dutch army, along with other UNPROFOR forces, failed to make the "safe area" safe, because of a flawed policy. The Dutch cabinet resigned en masse as a consequence of this failed attempt to apply a territoriality strategy: they lacked the ability (and/or will?) to deploy the power which a successful strategy provides.

Territoriality strategies have rarely extended beyond the land borders of individual nation-states, in part because of the difficulties of enforcing power over oceanic areas (and also over air space, especially at high altitudes) and in part because there has been little incentive to do so, as long as freedom of peaceful transit through ocean spaces was feasible. Increasingly, however, states have been treating the oceans as not just spaces to be traversed but also as sources of resources, animate and otherwise. Through the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea they have been able to extend territorial control beyond their shorelines into the adjacent seas into Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), initially occupying a 12-mile band out from the shore but now extending for 200 miles. Management of the resources in these areas, notably the fisheries but also

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

mineral resources on and below the sea-bed, has involved what Steinberg (2002, p. 172) calls the "territorialization of ocean-space," and recent international agreements give the relevant states the power to regulate the exploitation of highly migratory species and straddling stocks, not only within their EEZs but also in the adjacent areas of the high seas. Slowly, therefore, the oceans are being incorporated within state territories, and activities there are subject to territorialization strategies – although this is contested by some states, which prefer an international regime rather than a further mosaic of national regimes (JOHNSTON, 1992; CASTREE, 1998).

Within the oceans, too, there are new quasi-territoriality strategies. For some decades, small countries have attracted wealthy immigrants because of their low rates of taxation: they act as "tax havens". There is now an ocean cruise liner, "World", which comprises a set of "apartments" that are bought by individuals at high prices (£1m plus). They can join and leave the liner as it cruises around the world as they wish; if they live on it for long enough each year, they avoid being liable for tax in any country. This development was foreseen more than two decades ago (KEITH, 1977).

Territoriality remains a control strategy exercised by nation-states in a range of spheres, therefore. And this viability extends to a range of sub-state scales, where the strategies are deployed by other actors. Indeed, it is increasingly used to sustain and promote differences within societies.

The new suburbia and cultural containers

One of the arenas in which there has been considerable creation of new cultural-social containers in recent years is suburbia – especially, though far from exclusively, in the United States. The nature of that country's main agglomerations was the subject of one of Gottmann's most cited works – *Megalopolis* (GOTTMANN, 1961) – although this particular aspect of its spatial organization received little attention from him in the chapter on "Sharing a partitioned land". He noted the proliferation of local governments and discussed some of the proposals for overcoming the problems created (or exacerbated) by administrative fragmentation, but no more.

One of the enduring features of cities over the last two centuries has been the segregation of various social groups into different parts of their residential fabric. Some groups of people wish to distance themselves from others, for a variety of cultural and social reasons – which are frequently translated into economic rationales too. In particular, high status social groups try to distance themselves from their assumed social "inferiors", to avoid contact with them in their neighborhoods – both informally and through formal institutions such as churches, clubs and, especially, schools. They want a purified social space, where they can escape from the "unwanted" (and, often, largely unknown) and instead live among those they wish communion with (TUAN, 1998). They do this by developing separate residential areas, from which the "unwanted" are excluded by the operations of the housing market: their social "inferiors" cannot afford to live there. Such distancing has been particularly marked with regard to ethnic groups. Members of dominant groups (economically and politically if not numerically) wished to live apart from those with other ethnic identities – a process much assisted by housing market operations if the different ethnic groups were unevenly successful in the labor market – whereas some members of disadvantaged groups (who may also have been discriminated against in the labor markets and elsewhere) chose to cluster together for security and community protection.

But the operation of the housing and labor markets was sometimes insufficient to achieve the degree of segregation desired, and so further mechanisms were sought, using bounded spaces and territoriality strategies. Certain groups were denied access to particular areas and were confined to living in certain districts only. Such a strategy was not new: Jews had long been prescribed to living in defined ghettos in European towns and cities – with the markers on the streets indicating the boundaries of such ghettos still visible in some (such as Dubrovnik); and the South African apartheid policy allocated every individual to a racial category and then clearly indicated which spaces that person could and could not enter, let alone reside in (CHRISTOPHER, 1994).

In the United States, segregation of racial groups has been a particular goal of the majority of members of the dominant – white – group for much of the country's history. In some cities this was initially achieved by explicit ghettoization: blacks were confined to prescribed areas only. But this was illegal after the passage of the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution which comprise the Bill of Rights, and other stratagems had to be devised. One was the use of restrictive covenants: property owners in an area would agree neither to sell nor to let their homes to black persons, thus creating zones from which blacks were excluded (GOTHAM, 2000). Such covenants had a legal status: they were not unconstitutional, since the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution only prevents the state apparatus from treating races unequally ("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). But the country's courts could not be used to enforce such covenants – and sanction those who broke them – since that would involve the state acting unconstitutionally.

Restrictive covenants had only limited value, however, and so for much of the 20th century an alternative stratagem was employed, using the planning powers devolved in most states to local governments, and the balkanization of such governments that was typical of most states and their metropolitan areas. This was a territoriality strategy: bounded spaces were used to promote the goals of a section of urban society only (JOHNSTON, 1984).

In most metropolitan areas – as Gottmann showed – expansion of the built-up area was for some time linked to expansion of the local government unit serving that area, resulting in authorities with extensive areas and large populations. But as the richer elements in the population (virtually 100 percent white) began to move away from the high density, increasingly polluted and crowded, inner cites into the suburbs – a shift facilitated by transport developments – they opposed these extensions of the urban local government, and instead used the liberal incorporation provisions in most states to create new, totally independent, municipalities. Thus the original authorities became encircled by a ring of separate municipalities, many of them small: expansion was blocked, and the original urban local authorities were "fossilized" as the "central cities" – invariably the largest all-purpose local government units within the metropolitan areas, but slowly decreasing in their relative (and then, with depopulation, absolute) size. Furthermore, the central city and the suburban ring became clearly differentiated socially and culturally: the former contained the metropolises' concentrations of the poor and the blacks; the latter contained the rich, who were predominantly white.

This territoriality strategy involved more than just the all-purpose local governments – the municipalities. Other local government units, most of them serving individual purposes only, were involved, including the school districts, the separate local governments which provide public education for the population within their territories. In most states, the areas beyond the central cities would have comprised a mosaic of such districts, many with only small populations, created to serve a dis-

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

persed rural population. While the central cities were expanding, many were amalgamated into the metropolitan area's main school district, but with the creation of the suburban municipal ring, such amalgamations became much rarer. Instead, the suburbanites either decided to retain the existing, small districts, or created their own, separate from those serving the central city areas.

The suburban areas thus became a complex mosaic of overlapping, small local governments, and they were joined by a range of other special districts, created to provide a range of particular public services, such as fire fighting. In all of these, the rationale was strongly linked to a territoriality strategy: the separate areas were used to promote the interests of those who lived within their boundaries to control not only who, if any, could join them there but also what their tax contributions should be, as well as what it could be spent on.

The core of these territoriality strategies involved the municipalities' planning powers. In most states, control over land use is devolved to local governments, which use this power to determine what activities can and cannot be practiced on any piece of land. Thus, for example, the residents of high income suburbs could prevent any industrial or commercial development in their territories, simply by not zoning for areas where they could operate. Furthermore, they could use the planning regulations to influence strongly what sorts of people were able to purchase properties within their territory (or major components of it), and so engineer its social composition. They did this not by explicitly excluding blacks – or members of other "undesirable" groups – since that would be unconstitutional. Instead they used the zoning provisions to create residential environments which were low density and thus unaffordable to large segments of the population – including blacks, most of whom were relatively poor.

Such exclusionary zoning brought advantages other than those involved in manipulation of the density and costs in local housing markets. The governments of the various municipalities could also decide what services they would provide to their property taxpayers. Many decided to provide few, on the grounds that people should be able to make their own choices through market provision; some provided none at all directly, but contracted with either other municipalities or private companies to provide those considered desirable (such as garbage collection and public utilities). In this way, their tax rates were low. Furthermore, their residents were not required to contribute through their taxes to the costs of providing a wider range of services across the full metropolitan area for those poorer than themselves, who tend to take more out of the public purse than they put into it, the classic redistribution of wealth from rich to poor which characterizes most welfare states. And, because of the social engineering of their residential mosaics, they were able to ensure that the local schools were characterized by the children of high income, white families only – considered a very desirable goal in the process of child socialization.

The balkanization of American suburbia was thus deployed to promote the cultural and economic goals of high income Americans, who were able to optimize their tax bills relative to their demands for public services, opt out of contributing to the wider provision of public goods, and engineer the social milieux of their neighborhoods and schools.[4] Such behavior was idealized as the public sector equivalent of the market economy for private goods and services (TIEBOUT, 1956), although the choices available to those able to afford suburban America were denied to many of their poorer counterparts. Territoriality was used to create white-only, high-income residential areas, promoting the perceived interests of those groups through residential separation – and also in free-riding on others' taxes; those who lived in the suburbs but used central city facilities (and perhaps worked there too) were able to do so without making any contribution to their provision through the local tax base, so that the poor subsidized the rich.

Exclusionary zoning and its associated consequences – such as segregated schools – has been challenged in a variety of ways, notably through the Courts (JOHNSTON, 1984). Some successes have been achieved, but the white citadels of American suburbia have certainly not fallen to an invasion, other than where the residents have been prepared to sell up and move on – and out (POULSEN, FORREST and JOHNSTON, 2002). Furthermore, new stratagems have been devised, again using territoriality, to sustain the cultural separation that characterizes suburban America.

Fortified communities

Those new stratagems involve what is becoming increasingly referred to as "fortification", the creation of communities – with or without separate municipal status – that are walled- or fenced-off from their neighbors, with gates on the access roads, many of them manned to allow the careful control of entrance and exit which Gottmann associated with the creation of borders around sovereign nation-states. Again, such "gated communities" are not new, as Luynes (1997) shows,[5] but the form has become extremely common in recent decades, especially in the states with above average rates of growth – Arizona, California, Florida and Texas, for example. Security and accessibility characterize such communities, just as they did sovereign states employing territoriality strategies, with these two characteristics being associated with privacy and exclusivity. Of these, security has come increasingly to the fore in the rationale for such communities: the fear of crime and the breakdown of civic trust lead households to seek greater protection, which the spatial separation of a territoriality strategy offers, especially when the boundaries are not only marked but also difficult to cross and policed (as with closed-circuit television as well as manned gates). They offer residents control over their social milieus, security in the face of concerns about crime, sustained property values (and thus enhanced marketability), and distancing from the areas where civic society has apparently broken down: they are sold by realtors as offering privacy and seclusion, safety and security, a sense of community, and a prestigious image for their neighborhood (LUYNES, 1997, p. 191).

Such communities have been given the hybrid term Privatopia by McKenzie (1994) to reflect their combination of the privatism so characteristic of American suburban life styles with the utopian ideals of garden cities. A great number of them have their own governance additional to that provided by local governments. Such governance involves what are usually termed homeowners' associations; these not only manage the communities – upkeep of the landscaped public spaces, for example, as well as providing the surveillance and other services – but also set a range of conditions on what residents can and cannot do with their homes (some of them apparently trivial, relating to the keeping of pets, the hanging out of washing, where cars can be parked, even public kissing) (BLAKELY and SNYDER, 1999). All are designed to ensure a high quality of life according to criteria set by the management companies – and the householders involved in their management. They offer a response to the increasing culture of fear – and whether they are safer places "objectively" matters little if their residents (potential as well as actual) believe them to be so, and they are prepared to pay to live in them. Thus, as Blakely and Snyder (1999, pp. 153-154) summarize the situation:

> Neighborhoods have always been able to exclude some potential residents through discrimination and housing costs. With gates and walls, they can exclude not only

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

undesirable new residents, but even casual passersby and the people from the neighborhood next door. Gates are a visible sign of exclusion, an even stronger signal to those who already see themselves as excluded from the larger mainstream social milieu.

So such places "... wall out crime or traffic or strangers as well as ... lock in economic position".

For Knox (1994, p. 173), they involve the creation of a "caste society with utter social separation of the rich"; to Harvey (1996) they are "a form of contracted fascism"; and to McKenzie (1994, pp. 186-187) they suggest the emergence of "a gradual secession from the city ... [by the] ... successful ... [leaving] places of squalor for which ... nobody will accept responsibility". All of which adds up, according to Luynes (1997, p. 201), to "a cancer in the body of the city". That cancer, according to Blakely and Snyder (1999), is multi-functional. Whereas the main rationale for some gated communities is security, for others it is either prestige (living in a high income enclave) and/or lifestyle (living in a county club enclave, for example, or a retirement community where there is segregation by age as well as income). But in all cases, high incomes are necessary, and they buy a purified space, clearly demarcated from the remainder of society.

Gated communities may be the main locales of suburban development in the contemporary United States (so much so that they become the dominant urban form in science fiction: Stephenson (1992) termed them "Burbsclaves", city-states with their own constitutions, borders, laws and police-defence forces). But they are certainly not peculiar to that country – as perusal of the property pages of the higher status ("broadsheet") newspapers in many countries will show. For the UK see, for example, "Private property, keep out" *(The Times*, 28.11.1998); "Location, location ... security" *(The Times*, 27 March, 2002); and "It's the great gate debate" *(The Sunday Times*, 13 January, 2002). And in South Africa, similar communities have emerged to replace the legalized residential segregation that characterized apartheid. Hook and Vrdoljak (2002, p. 196) call them security-parks, developments which combine the prestige, security and life-style characteristics of US communities in:

> ... walled-in "community" living space that accommodates the homes of a typically elite and homogeneous group ... combining the luxury amenities of a high-class hotel with paramilitary surveillance and protection technology in an effort to separate off exclusive and desirable living areas from the city at large.

They – like counterparts in Brazil (CALDEIRA, 1996a and 1996b) and elsewhere – offer secure "socially homogeneous environments for upper-class citizens, upon whom they are seen as conferring high status" (HOOK and VRDOLJAK, 2002, p. 196).

Northern Ireland example. A new cultural territoriality?

The importance of the map of sovereign nation-states is changing. Those states are no longer the secure containers for separate development that they once were, as distance is continually annihilated by time, as technologies for the transmission of messages and the delivery of weapons make their boundaries increasingly impervious, and as the emergence of a new neoliberal world economic order challenges nationally separate strategies.[6] Thus, according to Dalby (1998, p. 134):

> Boundaries and identities are not what they once supposedly were. Lines of demarcation around precisely defined sovereign states are an increasingly unconvincing description of contemporary political life and an unconvincing answer as to how politics ought to be thought and practiced. States persist, often violently, but trans-national flows of trade, communications, media, finance, crime and culture suggest that in the information age politics can no longer be understood in terms of locations, places, boundaries and state sovereignty.

As Taylor (1994 and 1995) has argued, however, this argument is valid insofar as it refers to the state as a power container and as a wealth container, though for a caution not to take the dissolution of those containers too far, see Dicken (1993). But the state is a social-cultural container as well, and in this context it continues to operate very much as a well-bounded space when this is seen as in its "national interests" – as exemplified by the Australian government's refusal to accept "boat people" refugees in 2001,[7] and the contemporary concern over asylum-seekers in the UK and other parts of the European community. Territoriality is still a major strategy available to states when and if they choose to employ it – which they do, especially though not only in the cultural-social spheres.

Furthermore, as argued here, territorial strategies are increasingly used within states by powerful groups as means of promoting their social-cultural interests – and often their economic interests too – by creating mosaics of bounded places. Los Angeles is often cited as the archetypal metropolis where this is most advanced (SOJA, 2000), but it is far from uncommon in a wide range of countries. In many of these new containers, forms of governance are practiced which are independent from those of the sovereign states (and their constituent local and regional governments): they are, in effect, private governments accepted by and not contravening the major principles of national governments. People, in much smaller groups than Gottmann thought feasible in his discussions of the power-wealth containers, are creating their own complex mosaics of separate territories, within which behavior is controlled and to which entry is carefully monitored. As Massey (1999) argues, they are part of a strategy of "sameness" by which individuals and groups counter the promotion of difference in many explicitly multi-cultural societies by withdrawing into their own homogeneous enclaves socially and culturally – if not also economically. To Marcuse and van Kempen (2000, p. 249) these are exclusionary enclaves, part of a new spatial order characterized by "strengthened structural spatial divisions with increased inequality among them and increasing walling between each". The residents of those enclaves operate in a global economic system and, apart from the separate workplaces that most of them move to, are independent of other geographical locations in their "home" cities: they live "in" those cities, but are not parts "of" them. Marcuse and van Kempen expect the absolute and relative importance of such enclaves to increase rapidly in coming decades, containing individuals who are part of a global economic community but who live increasingly secluded social and cultural lives – despite their commitment to the national identity developed within the larger space of which theirs is but a small part, and in many cases (notably the American) a commitment to a form of democracy from which they have significantly withdrawn.[8]

Conclusion

Territoriality continues to be a widely-deployed strategy, therefore, in an increasing range of contexts and situations. Gottmann was a pioneer of the examination of bounded spaces, and other theorists such as Sack, Soja and Taylor have built on that foundation. The potential for further work is great – given the importance of the strategy in the spatial structuring of a globalizing world.

Notes

1. Interestingly, Gottmann is not referred to in Sack's (1986) book.
2. The one part of the earth's surface excluded from this exhaustive

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

coverage has been Antarctica, for which there is an international treaty that recognizes state's territorial claims but over which there is very little exercise of state power.

3. An interesting other, though very different, example of this is the ocean cruise liner "World," which comprises a set of "apartments" that are bought by individuals at high prices (£1m plus). They can join the liner as it cruises around the world as they wish; if they live on it for long enough each year, they avoid being liable for tax in any country.
4. Although such strategies were most commonly used by groups promoting exclusive residential suburbs, they were not confined to such uses. In Los Angeles, for example, there are municipalities zoned almost entirely for commercial and/or industrial use only, thus allowing their owners to avoid contributing to the costs of the wider metropolitan infrastructure (Soja, 2000), and conflicts over municipal extensions often involve issues relating to the desirability of some commercial uses being within a municipality (and contributing to the tax base there: Walton and Johnston, 1989).
5. I live in one, created in the 13th century.
6. Although those challenges are always being countered by states, especially the more powerful – as with the US decision in February 2002 to place large tariffs on steel imports from many (especially Third World) countries in order to protect its own industry.
7. This refusal was clearly popular with the Australian public, and undoubtedly assisted the country's right-wing government unexpectedly win re-election in 2001. The refugees were sent to a number of small Pacific Island states, with the Australian government in return agreeing to pay off part of their national debt.
8. It may be, too, that the citadels in which they work are increasingly secluded. This has happened in the past, with the "sealing off" and surveillance of all would-be entrants to the City of London during times of enhanced terrorist threats, a practice that could spread to many other cities after 11 September 2001.

References

AGNEW, J.A. (1994), "The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory," *Review of International Political Economy*, 1, pp. 53-80.

APPLETON, J.H. (1975), *The Experience of Landscape* (Chichester, Wiley).

BLAKELY, E.J. and M.G. SNYDER (1999), *Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States* (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution).

CALDEIRA, T.P.R. (1996a), "Building up walls: the new pattern of spatial segregation in São Paolo," *International Social Science Journal*, 147, pp. 55-66.

—— (1996b), "Fortified enclaves: the new urban segregation," *Public Culture,* 8, pp. 303-328.

CASTREE, N. (1998),"International environmental problems: can they be solved?" *Geography Review,* 12, pp. 28-37.

CHRISTOPHER, A.J. (1994), *The Atlas of Apartheid* (London, Routledge).

DALBY, S. (1998), "Globalisation or global apartheid? Boundaries and knowledge in postmodern times," *Geopolitics*, 3, pp. 132-150.

DICKEN, P. (1993), "The changing organization of the global economy," in R.J. Johnston (ed.), *The Challenge for Geography. A Changing World: A Changing Discipline* (Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 31-53.

GOTHAM, K.F. (2000), "Urban space, restrictive covenants and the origins of racial residential segregation in a US city, 1900-1950," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 24, pp. 616-633.

GOTTMANN, J. (1961), *Megalopolis: The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).

—— (1973), *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia).

HARVEY, D. (1996), "Cities or urbanization?" *City*, 1-2, pp. 38-61.

HOOK, D. and M. VRODLJAK (2002), "Gated communities, heterotopia and a 'rights' of privilege: a 'heterotopology' of the South African security park," *Geoforum*, 33, pp. 195-219.

JOHNSTON, R.J. (1982), *Geography and the State* (London, Macmillan).

—— (1984), *Residential Segregation, the State and Constitutional Conflict in American Urban Areas* (London, Academic Press).

—— (1990), "The territoriality of law: an exploration," *Urban Geography*, 11, pp. 548-565.

—— (1992), "Laws, states and superstates," *Applied Geography*, 12, pp. 211-228.

—— (1996), "Jean Gottmann: French regional and political geographer extraordinaire," *Progress in Human Geography*, 20, pp. 183-193.

—— (1997), "Geography in a restructuring world?" *GeoJournal,* 42, pp. 9-16.

—— (2001), " Out of the moribund backwater: territory and territoriality in political geography," *Political Geography*, 20, pp. 677-693.

——, P.J. TAYLOR and M.J. WATTS (2002) , "Geopolitical change: Introduction to Part III," in R.J. Johnston, P.J. Taylor and M.J. Watts (eds.), *Geographies of Global Change*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Blackwell).

KEITH, K.M. (1977), " Floating cities: a new challenge for transnational law," *Marine Policy*, 1, pp. 190-204.

KNOX, P.L. (1994), "The stealthy tyranny of community spaces," *Environment and Planning A*, 26, pp. 170-173.

LUYNES, D. (1997), "The fortification of suburbia: investigating the rise of enclave communities," *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 39, pp. 187-203.

MCKENZIE, E. (1994), *Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press).

MANN, M. (1984), "The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results," *European Journal of Sociology,* 25, pp. 185-213.

MARCUSE, P. and R. VAN KEMPEN (1999), "Conclusion: a changed spatial order," in P. Marcuse and R. van Kempen (eds.), *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order* (Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 249-275.

MASSEY, D. (1999), "City life: proximity and difference," in D. Massey, J. Allen, and S. Pile (eds.), *City Worlds* (London, Routledge).

Ó TUATHAIL, G. (1999), "The ethnic cleansing of a 'safe area': the fall of Srebrenica and the ethics of ungovernmentality," in J.D. Proctor and D.M. Smith (eds.), *Geography and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain* (London, Routledge), pp. 120-131.

PAASI, A. (2002), "Bounded spaces in the mobile world: deconstructing 'regional identity'," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 93, pp. 137-148.

POULSEN, M.F., J. FORREST and R.J. JOHNSTON (2002), "From modern to post-modern? Contemporary ethnic segregation in four US metropolitan areas," *Cities*, vol. 19, no. 3 (June), pp. 161-172.

SACK, R.D. (1986), *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

SCOTT, A.J. (ed.) (2001), *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

SOJA, E.W. (2000), *Postmetropolis* (Oxford, Blackwell).

STEINBERG, P.E. (2002), *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).

STEPHENSON, N. (1992), *Snow Crash* (New York, Bantam Books).

STOREY, D. (2001), *Territory: The Claiming of Space* (London, Longman).

TAYLOR, P.J. (1994), "The state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system," *Progress in Human Geography*, 18, pp. 151-162.

—— (1995), "Beyond containers: internationality, interstateness, interterritoriality," *Progress in Human Geography*, 19, pp. 1-19.

TIEBOUT, C.M. (1956), "A pure theory of local expenditure," *Journal of Political Economy*, 64, pp. 416-424.

TUAN, Y.-F. (1998), *Escapism* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press).

WALTON, W. and R.J. JOHNSTON (1989), "The politics of municipal annexation: A California case study," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 80, pp. 2-13.

This content downloaded from 136.186.80.72 on Thu, 01 Feb 2018 04:29:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms