VOLUME 70, NUMBER 420/421, MAY/JUNE-JULY/AUGUST 2003

EKISTICS
ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ

the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS



THREE DOUBLE ISSUES:

1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought
(no. 418/419, Jan./Feb.-Mar./Apr. 2003)

2: From megalopolis to global cities
(no. 420/421, May/June-July/Aug. 2003)

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(no. 422/423, Sept./Oct.-Nov./Dec. 2003)

2

In the steps of Jean Gottmann

EKISTICS: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

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The Athens Technological Organization (ATO) is a non-profit organization established in 1958 to further technology and scientific research on any subject which can contribute to the improvement of human living conditions, technical and economic development and the training of people capable of pursuing these purposes.

Athens Center of Ekistics (ACE)

Upon its establishment in 1958, ATO started ekistic research and educational programs and later on in 1963 established the Athens Center of Ekistics (ACE) to foster a concerted program of research, education, documentation, and international cooperation related to the art and science concerned with the development of human settlements. In the domain of documentation in addition to its library, ACE publishes the following two journals:

- Ekistics, the Problems and Science of Human Settlements, and
- The Ekistic Index of Periodicals, as well as
- A series of research reports and monographs documenting its following four major research projects:

– "The City of the Future"
– "The Capital of Greece"
– "The Human Community"
– "The Ancient Greek Cities"

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●

World Society for Ekistics (WSE)

The Society – an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) in consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC) – is a nonpolitical and nonreligious body with limited membership, formed to study man's patterns of living and their physical expression in the past, present, and future. The aims and objectives of the Society are:

- To promote the development of knowledge and ideas concerning human settlements by research and through publications, conferences, etc.;
- To encourage the development and expansion of education in ekistics;
- To educate public opinion concerning ekistics, thus stimulating worldwide interest and cooperation;
- To recognize the benefits and the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the needs of human settlements, and to promote and emphasize such an approach.

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EKISTICS
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VOLUME 70, NUMBER 420/421, MAY/JUNE-JULY/AUGUST 2003

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HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

In the steps of Jean Gottmann

Three parts in three double issues

- **Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought** (no. 418/419, Jan./Feb.-Mar./Apr. 2003)
- **Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities** (no. 420/421, May/June-July/Aug. 2003)
- **Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world** (no. 422/423, Sept./Oct.-Nov./Dec. 2003)

Guest - editor: Calogero Muscarà

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities

EKISTICS / ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Volume 70, Number 418-423, January-December 2003

In the steps of Jean Gottmann (three parts)

General introduction

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought (vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003)

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities (vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003)

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world (vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003)

The papers in the three double issues of vol. 70 were solicited, compiled and edited by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor for this volume. P. Psomopoulos undertook the final editing of the whole in consultation with the guest-editor and the authors. R.J. Rooke provided editorial assistance, Alex Freme-Sklirou proofread the texts, Niki Choleva was responsible for typesetting and graphics, and Despina Moutsatsou for the final dummy from a maquette by the editor.

EKISTICS / ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Volume 70, Number 420/421, May/June-July/August 2003

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 2 of 3

General introduction

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source*: Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

The papers in this double issue – the second of three double issues of vol. 70 on the general subject "In the steps of Jean Gottmann" – were solicited, compiled and edited by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor for this volume. P. Psomopoulos undertook the final editing of the whole in consultation with the guest-editor and the authors. R.J. Rooke provided editorial assistance, Alex Freme-Sklirou proofread the texts, Niki Choleva was responsible for typesetting and graphics, and Despina Moutsatsou for the final dummy from a maquette by the editor.

To the Reader

As is stated in the tables of contents (pages 130 and 131), the papers solicited and compiled by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor, for the special volume of Ekistics (vol. 70) entitled "In the steps of Jean Gottmann," are organized in three parts, in three corresponding double issues of the journal with the following sub-topics:

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought
(vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003);

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities
(vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003);

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world
(vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003).

The present issue is Part 2.

The reader interested in the contents of the entire volume should refer to Parts 1 and 3 of which detailed tables of contents are given on the two pages that follow (pp. 249 and 250).

EKISTICS / ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Volume 70, Number 418/419, January/February-March/April 2003

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 1 of 3

General introduction

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source*: Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

The papers in this double issue – the first of three double issues of vol. 70 on the general subject "In the steps of Jean Gottmann" – were solicited, compiled and edited by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor for this volume. P. Psomopoulos undertook the final editing of the whole in consultation with the guest-editor and the authors. R.J. Rooke provided editorial assistance, Alex Freme-Sklirou proofread the texts, Niki Choleva was responsible for typesetting and graphics, and Despina Moutsatsou for the final dummy from a maquette by the editor.

EKISTICS / ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Volume 70, Number 422/423, Sept./Oct.-Nov./Dec. 2003

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 3 of 3

General introduction

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source*: Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

The papers in this double issue – the third of three double issues of vol. 70 on the general subject "In the steps of Jean Gottmann" – were solicited, compiled and edited by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor for this volume. P. Psomopoulos undertook the final editing of the whole in consultation with the guest-editor and the authors. R.J. Rooke provided editorial assistance, Alex Freme-Sklirou proofread the texts, Niki Choleva was responsible for typesetting and graphics, and Despina Moutsatsou for the final dummy from a maquette by the editor.

General introduction

Bernice and Jean Gottmann at a vacation hotel in Eilat, Israel during the summer of 1993.

The editor's page

● The completion of this volume of *Ekistics* makes the guest-editor, Professor Calogero Muscarà, and myself really proud and happy. We are also relieved for having fulfilled, albeit partially and belatedly, a longstanding commitment, and are deeply grateful to all those who have joined us in this tribute to Jean Gottmann who has marked our lives since we first came across some of his thoughts. I remember Calogero Muscarà telling me what a struggle he had to go through for many years obliged to work in universities and other research institutions, without real interest, in physical geography, when his main interests were history and social and political sciences which were "more appealing for the explanation of life." It was only in the mid-1950s when he discovered Gottmann's book *La politique des États et leur géographie,* that he began to understand how effectively geography could be connected to his real interests. The long period of close collaboration, both nationally and internationally, between Gottmann and Muscarà, which started 20 years later in 1977, only ended with Gottmann's death in 1994 but Muscarà's keen interest and personal involvement in promoting Gottmann's thought never ceased. I myself, an architect-planner, already fully engaged in ekistics,[1] and a close collaborator of Constantinos A. Doxiadis,[2] will never forget the day I first met Gottmann in the early 1960s and how avidly I absorbed the relevance of his remarks on the complexities involved when trying to apply the interdisciplinary approach needed in assessing conditions for planning action. And this continued during all the years and on all the occasions I had the good fortune to be with him.

● I think it is appropriate here to remind readers of Gottmann's long involvement with ekistics – with Doxiadis for the first 15 years and thereafter with the rest of us.

His first contact with Doxiadis was in 1960. Three years later, in 1963, an abstract of a paper by him appeared in *Ekistics* for the first time. He first joined the activities of ekistics in 1964, at the Delos Symposion (Delos Two) – the annual week-long conference held on board ship at the invitation of Doxiadis, focusing each year on the discussion of a major theme. Since then, further to his participation in several Delos Symposia (1964, 1968, 1969 and 1972) Gottmann was one of the founders of the World Society for Ekistics[3] of which he became the third President from 1971 to 1973, and never stopped being actively involved in ekistics until the end of his life.

Referring to the mutually gratifying relation between him and Doxiadis, Gottmann[4] writes that his "colleague in the study of settlements and of the modern urban evolution, and a personal friend" – who also "knew and valued the power and lasting quality of ideas expressed in written words and symbols that outlive stone and style" – had in his overall effort two priorities:

• "to search for a widely publicized consensus on the present needs of human settlements, established by free and thorough discussion on an international and pluridisciplinary basis: the universality and complexity of the problems called for a broad spectrum of participants in the debate and in the agreement; this was attempted and largely achieved by the Delos Symposia and their Declarations from 1963 on"; and,

• "to further settlement analysis and planning on the necessary scale," develop ekistics – "a general body of theory, again on an interdisciplinary and worldwide basis ... a permanent, evolving and spreading scientific approach to the study of and action for human settlements."

The association of these two men, both so much ahead of their time, was profound, mutually enriching, and inspiring.

Naturally, the *Ekistics* journal was always an open forum for Gottmann and his thought. We have published many articles by him[5] on a wide variety of themes, and also reports on and abstracts of his contributions to discussions in the international meetings or other programs of the Athens Center of Ekistics, such as the Delos Symposia. Furthermore he acted as guest-editor for three issues of the journal, the last being in 1990.[6]

● But we have never had the opportunity for such a comprehensive – though not exhaustive – presentation of his life and thought as in the present case where we have the privilege to host again and walk in the steps of this unquestionable authority together with so many distinguished scholars, having as a guide in this itinerary Calogero Muscarà,[7] a very dear friend and colleague, and a real admirer and "disciple" of Gottmann. Muscarà, our world expert on Venice, further to being known for his exceptional contribution through research, teaching and writings to the wide field of geography and its relation to human settlements planning, became a member of the World Society for Ekistics many years ago on the strong recommendation of the great Master, and he is a participant in its meetings, and a regular contributor to *Ekistics.* Who could be better qualified to act as guest-editor for such an endeavor?

I will not expand here on the contents or the structure of the present volume of *Ekistics.* This task is so brilliantly fulfilled by the guest-editor in his introductory statement and his notes preceding each of the three parts into which the papers are divided. In this respect, the reader may also refer to the Ekistic Grid for each individual paper, and the Anthropocosmos Model on p. 391.

I would like, though, to stress how rewarding it is to know that whatever this effort represents it is only a step in a long process with a really substantial past and promising future. The agenda proposed for further action and the involvement of the younger generation in this process give us grounds for hope.

● In closing, let me be personal and appeal for the kind understanding of Mrs Bernice Gottmann for my initiative in using, without her permission, the photograph opposite this note. After all, on every occasion since we first met, whether as their guest or their host or simply a participant with them at meetings, not only in Athens, Oxford or Italy but the world over, Jean and Bernice were always together. So why shouldn't we feel that we are all together on this occasion as well?

P. Psomopoulos

1.See back cover of the journal.
2. Architect-Planner, 1914-1975, founder of ekistics and President of the Athens Center of Ekistics.
3.See inside front cover of the journal.
4.For all quotations in this paragraph, see J. Gottmann, "The ekistic philosophy of C.A. Doxiadis: a personal appreciation," *Ekistics,* vol. 41, no. 247, 1976, pp. 383-385.
5.See *Ekistics,* nos. 89, 107, 123, 155, 167,174, 203, 204, 219, 233, 243, 247, 264, 272, 302, 314/315, 316/317 (see also pp. 405-408).
6.See *Ekistics,* nos. 274, 299 and 340/341 (see also pp. 405-408).
7.See biographical note of the guest-editor's introductory statement on the following page.

From the global network of megalopolises to the political partitioning of the world

The guest-editor's introductory statement

Calogero Muscarà

The author, guest-editor for the three double issues of this special volume of Ekistics, *is Professor of Urban Geography at the University of Rome La Sapienza. He has been a member of the Commission Permanente de Géographie Politique chaired by Professor Jean Gottmann. He chaired the Working Group on Geography of Transport of the International Geographical Union from 1980-1988. Professor Muscarà's scientific interests have always focused on the epistemology of geography. He has researched issues on the geography of development and on regionalization, especially regarding its relationships to the dynamics of urbanization. Of his numerous publications, his latest book is on the paradox of federalism in Italy. He is a member of the World Society for Ekistics.*

• From Paris to Ekistics: The validity of a great geographical theory

This special volume of *Ekistics* began in a very simple way. In 1996 an important symposion devoted to the thought of Jean Gottmann was organized at the Sorbonne by Paul Claval, George Prevelakis and André-Louis Sanguin. Jean Gottmann was one of the greatest geographers of the 20th century. The title of this meeting made explicit reference to the Gottmannian concept of "iconography" and to the way in which it could apply to the identity of Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conference attracted many researchers to Paris, not just experts and admirers of Gottmann's thought. There were also numerous young scholars, who discovered the thought of the great geographer evoked by the political events of the time.

In truth, as George Prevelakis writes for this special volume, the outcome of the Paris conference on current European issues was not entirely convincing. Although dedicated to Gottmann and his thought, the Paris conference focused more on research concerning single European cases after the recent political events. There was at least one exception though; the quest for a unified European iconography – an issue that Gottmann would have attributed to a need for security, as opposed to the possibility of maintaining a variety of European iconographies – in Gottmann's perspective could have been an indicator of Europe's strength.

But there is no doubt that the greatest appeal of the conference for researchers interested in the distribution of humans in space had been the opportunity to verify in the light of recent events in the political geography of Europe the validity of a modern theory of the relationships of human communities with territory. That important studies on the matter would be published for a wider readership than that of the Paris conference seemed thus a good reason to propose to the Editor of this journal to host them in *Ekistics*, although some of the papers in English had already been published.

Therefore it seemed to me that it would be of interest to return to the initial proposition of the Paris conference, emphasizing not so much the single cases of Europe in the light of Gottmann's political thought, but on the contrary the validity of the ideas of Gottmann in the light of European events, without concerns of a geo-political nature having to resolve single cases. The initial interest of the Paris conference regained importance by showing that it was necessary to read again the work of Gottmann to measure its validity in terms of the contribution it could make to the explanation of the European concerns that emerged after the collapse of the Berlin wall.

Many papers, especially those presented in the first part of the Paris conference, would certainly have been of great interest to a Society such as the World Society for Ekistics (WSE) and to a journal such as *Ekistics* devoted to the theories of the human occupation of inhabited space. It would also have been a way to remember that Jean Gottmann had been President of the World Society for Ekistics and had collaborated assiduously with the journal since the 1960s. The publication of the papers of the Paris conference turned then into an occasion to measure the validity in time of this theory and to verify to what degree and in what way it had kept on developing. The request to the authors was to publish the studies presented in Paris or to write new studies on the same matter, but expressly focusing

on illustrating the thought of Gottmann became the new spirit of the special issue. At the same time it also became legitimate to address the same request to all the partners of *Ekistics.* And the result was that all the contributions are new.

• A second impulse

The second impulse for a publication on the thought of Jean Gottmann came from the consideration of what had happened above all in Anglo-Saxon geography after the disorientation produced by the collapse of the so-called *new geography.* The whole validity and modernity of the thought of the great master consists in the fact that, in those same years in which American geography denounced the *"exceptionalism"* of French geography, Gottmann too was aware of the necessity to overcome the *"exceptionalism"* proposed by French geography, and this was confirmed by the important considerations of Maurice Le Lannou. For the *"exceptionalism"* the interest of geography is in the specific cases and not in theories. But the differences between the thought of Gottmann and that of the *"new geography"* were very relevant. Perhaps for excess of abstraction the "*new geography"* proposed, as other sciences, a widespread use of statistics and, above all, mathematics. But, not long after 1953, the year in which this American experience began, numerous scholars of the *"new geography"* started to recognize its limits. And sooner or later the *"new geography"* was abandoned.

Unlike the American experience that, for excess of abstraction, would quickly be shown inadequate, Gottmann completed the paradigmatic turn by reapproaching the geography of the French school. Indeed he succeeded in bringing geography – a discipline whose existence is justified by the need to explain the variety of the inhabited world – close to the epistemological way with which historians have brought history closer to the other human and social sciences. This is testified by the interesting interview that Gottmann granted to the historian Miloš Perović. In this interview it emerges how much for the Oxonian master human geography remains a discipline that is not epistemologically different from all other forms of knowledge in the intent, confirmed in the conclusions, to provide some references of a practical nature. But geography is methodologically different; first of all because it draws the proof of its statements from the historical reality of territories; and secondly for the attention, similar to that of history, that combines the rigor in the documentation of facts and circumstances with the caution towards conclusions that are too simple and easy.

A few essays of this volume help us to understand this contribution of Gottmann. This is an aspect that Pavlos Tzermias, a historian interested in the relationships between history and geography, reflects well in its articulations and references. And it is also noticed in the articles of John Agnew or Luca Muscarà, who underline the connections that intervene between the various parts of the thought of Jean Gottmann. In other words we are in the presence of a real new theory that justifies the judgment that Gottmann deals with a new anthropocosmos and ekistic model parallel to the one proposed by Constantinos Doxiadis.

• The geographical theory of Jean Gottmann

In the context of these considerations, the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the death of Jean Gottmann – the third motivation for the preparation of the present volume of *Ekistics* – is a duty and homage to his thought and the continuous flowering of the studies that he initiated. But it is also an opportunity to recognize in an appropriate way the remarkable place of Gottmann in the history of the geographical thought of the second half of the last century, which is the fruit of his work on *Megalopolis* or of his contribution to the solution of the epistemological problems of geography.

First of all it is important to consider the theory he elaborated to explain the relationships of man with geographical space, a theory he formulated in a famous essay of 1948 *(De la méthode d'analyse en Géographie humaine)* and in the chapters on geography (1) and on regional geography (8) of his book *La politique des États et leur géographie* (1952). But it is necessary to clear the field from a possible misunderstanding, i.e. the conviction that this theory is just a political theory. If someone thinks that the geographical theory of Jean Gottmann is political because it is proposed and formulated in a book on political geography, the reading of the book helps to clarify this point. The tendency to the *compartimentation* (partitioning) of space is as diffused as the tendency to the *centralisation* and to the creation of *"carrefours"* (crossroads). It is in the *carrefours* that we find the temple, the castle and the market, i.e. the points of departure of the city since antiquity (religion, politics and economy). But *centralisation,* i.e. the tendency to serve parts of the space starting from a center, lives together with a tendency to divide the space for services or to give identity to a territory which a people considers its own. This *"service partitioning"* lives always together with *circulation* (movement), the first great strength working on the world surface to deplace raw materials, products, men and ideas. The *"political compartimentation"* (partitioning) (states, regions but also empires or federations) is the answer to that other big strength working on the Earth, i.e. that coming from the world of ideas, values *(iconographies)* and myths, rites and liturgies to restrain the tendency to the *"service compartimentation"* (service partitioning) that is perpetually moving.

That is not just a political theory but a general theory of the human occupation of the Earth's surface. And, since the human activity that Jean Gottmann confides to geography is to live together – in the accessible and humanized space – with other men and nature, this theory appears to me a true ekistic theory or even a new anthropocosmic model after the model of Doxiadis.

From a casual encounter with a great geographer interested in society and geography, this volume became an occasion to revisit this scientific theory measuring its congruence with the problems of the following years, that is with subjects in which both the World Society for Ekistics and this journal have always been interested.

• The three parts

However the subdivision of this volume of *Ekistics* into three parts does not correspond to the above theories. Although more than one article was eligible to be included in more than one part, I made an effort to bring together:

- in the first part (vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003), the studies that directly or indirectly contribute to the explanation of the thought of the great master; this part is concluded by Jean Gottmann's complete bibliography first compiled by Lord Patten and subsequently updated by Luca Muscarà;
- in the second part (vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003), the studies on the particular form of regionalism that Gottmann attributed to contemporary urbanization that speak of "megalopolis"; this part also contains those articles that investigate the political dimension of the city and concludes with a revisitation of contemporary urbanization in an attempt to evaluate the forecasts of both Gottmann and Doxiadis;
- in the third part (vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003), a collection of papers in which the authors question whether and how the cognitive tools proposed by Gottmann facilitate the understanding of the evolution in contemporary geography in terms of change, partitioning and centrality.

Acknowledgements

With tender salutations I desire to turn here to Madame Bernice Gottmann to thank her for her kindness in accompanying me in the task I have undertaken, assuring me of her collaboration and support. In this respect I already had the opportunity to appreciate the proximity on the occasion of the Paris conference, and other occasions to renew my acquaintance with so many people born in the long years when I had the good fortune to accompany Jean Gottmann in his "transhumance" and in his scientific meetings.

My thoughts go to Jean Laponce, Ron Johnston, Christian Lagarde, Yasuo Miyakawa, Michel Phlipponneau, François Gay, I.B.F. Kormoss and Alan Henrikson, Jean Bastié, Dov Mir, Jean-Robert Pitte and all the others who have been able to collaborate with me on this volume of *Ekistics.* I wish to thank them for their encouragement.

My particular thanks are due to Panayis Psomopoulos whom I wish to publicly embrace for the trust he has shown me before and during the preparation of this special volume that would never have been able to materialize – not even to be conceived – if I had not had the good fortune to be able to count on such an intelligent and careful, willing and generous friend, affectionately sensitive to my worries, my doubts, my hesitations. I owe my gratitude to him for encouraging me to undertake such an enterprise and giving me the peace of mind with which I have been able to solve the numerous problems of a guest-editor. It is to him that I also owe my gratitude for the help of his close collaborators who supported me in the course of this tiring effort. My thanks go to every one of them, starting with R.J. Rooke and Alex Freme-Sklirou, in the hope that success will smile on the whole enterprise.

Finally, with the modesty that always accompanies a relationship between father and child when practicing the same discipline, I cannot close this preface without mentioning the assistance of Luca Muscarà and all the trouble he has taken to provide day-by-day assistance during these two years of work. The greatest reward that can be attributed to him is to recognize the work he has been able to do and continues to do to complete the analysis of Jean Gottmann's thought which has gone a great deal beyond what I have been able to complete myself in previous studies and also on this occasion.



Fig. 1: Jean Gottmann with Calogero Muscarà in Rio de Janeiro, August 1982.

Acknowledgements

With tender salutations I desire to turn here to Madame Bernice Gottmann to thank her for her kindness in accompanying me in the task I have undertaken, assuring me of her collaboration and support. In this respect I already had the opportunity to appreciate the proximity on the occasion of the Paris conference, and other occasions to renew my acquaintance with so many people born in the long years when I had the good fortune to accompany Jean Gottmann in his "transhumance" and in his scientific meetings.

My thoughts go to Jean Laponce, Ron Johnston, Christian Lagarde, Yasuo Miyakawa, Michel Phlipponneau, François Gay, I.B.F. Kormoss and Alan Henrikson, Jean Bastié, Dov Mir, Jean-Robert Pitte and all the others who have been able to collaborate with me on this volume of *Ekistics.* I wish to thank them for their encouragement.

My particular thanks are due to Panayis Psomopoulos whom I wish to publicly embrace for the trust he has shown me before and during the preparation of this special volume that would never have been able to materialize – not even to be conceived – if I had not had the good fortune to be able to count on such an intelligent and careful, willing and generous friend, affectionately sensitive to my worries, my doubts, my hesitations. I owe my gratitude to him for encouraging me to undertake such an enterprise and giving me the peace of mind with which I have been able to solve the numerous problems of a guest-editor. It is to him that I also owe my gratitude for the help of his close collaborators who supported me in the course of this tiring effort. My thanks go to every one of them, starting with R.J. Rooke and Alex Freme-Sklirou, in the hope that success will smile on the whole enterprise.

Finally, with the modesty that always accompanies a relationship between father and child when practicing the same discipline, I cannot close this preface without mentioning the assistance of Luca Muscarà and all the trouble he has taken to provide day-by-day assistance during these two years of work. The greatest reward that can be attributed to him is to recognize the work he has been able to do and continues to do to complete the analysis of Jean Gottmann's thought which has gone a great deal beyond what I have been able to complete myself in previous studies and also on this occasion.



Fig. 1: Jean Gottmann with Calogero Muscarà in Rio de Janeiro, August 1982.

In the steps of Jean Gottmann

Guest-editor: Calogero Muscarà

Part 2

From megalopolis to global cities



Fig. 2: Jean Gottmann at home in Oxford, during one of Calogero Muscarà's visits in the early 1990s.

From megalopolis to global cities

Introduction by the Guest-Editor

Calogero Muscarà

The text on these pages is a brief introductory note by the guest-editor on the contents of Part 2 of the present issue.

Introduction

● The following section springs from an interview of Jean Gottmann by **Miloš Perović** about the Northeastern U.S. megalopolis – clearly an occasion to recall the great geographer's theories on the social and physical characteristics of contemporary urbanization. It is no coincidence that the interview concludes with the recognition that "one lesson is of general and lasting portent: the white-collar revolution driving the modern city toward a 'quaternary age.' The basic transformation of society under way will recast urban life to befit new needs that are difficult to imagine." But if the lesson Gottmann draws from the study of contemporary urbanization is that the white-collar social revolution and the introduction of a quaternary economy are changing our way of living and building the city, the answer he gives Perović recalls the whole philosophy that inspires his thought: "Megalopolitan size and density may cover very different levels of wealth, living standards, and modes of life." Considering the megalopolis of the Northeastern United States as a model would be wrong; however, it does provide evidence of the major transformation in progress. From the first to the last question, the interview deals specifically with the Northeastern U.S. megalopolis, for which Gottmann defines boundaries as well as its characteristics and morphology.

Why then consider Perović's interview a point of departure for the articles of this section? The best answer to this question comes from the essays themselves. Although Gottmann highly recommends putting every megalopolis and urban area in its own historical and geographical context, the authors believe that he has discovered a useful model for examining contemporary world urbanization. For example, in the interview Gottmann devotes particular attention to the exclusion of states like Georgia, Virginia, and the Carolinas from the Northeastern megalopolis. Dealing with an analogous process in Europe, he wrote that the English megalopolis must be distinguished from the European one for cultural reasons.

Two articles deal with this same theme.

● **Mami Futagami** studies how the region of Appalachia became an extension of the Northeastern megalopolis. History did not help Appalachia enter the megalopolis, but not for those cultural reasons that made Gottmann draw the boundaries of the megalopolis at Washington, DC. Its inclusion is explained by the federal aid policies that helped the peripheral fringe develop.

● **Rita Colantonio Venturelli** and **Andrea Galli**'s essay poses the question of whether the Italian region Marche could enter the potential Mediterranean megalopolis predicted by Gottmann in the area between Italy and Provence. The two authors, who refer to the studies of the Italian economist G. Fuà, conclude that the Marche should be excluded. My question then is whether the considerations proposed by the two researchers can be traced to the structural principles set by Gottmann to define the megalopolis of the United States.

If the call to the theme of megalopolitan limits helps us understand how for Gottmann the physical attributes of contemporary urbanization are not isolated, this concept appears even more explicit in the following essays.

● **François Gay**, an old friend of Gottmann's and dedicated follower of his ideas on harbors and the "hinge" function of the megalopolis, concentrates on the history of Le Havre after globalization. "The case is clear," he writes. "Geographers need to rehabilitate the notion of territory, and more precisely the notion of infranational territory as a counterpoint to globalization. *Man wants to be someone but comes from somewhere.* Spinoza, according to Jacques Lévy, tells us that man has a 'natural need for civil status' that is linked to the feeling of being active within a close-knit community."

● For **Michel Phlipponneau**, Gottmann's theories regarding megalopolitan attributes help us to understand why a process analogous to that of the Northeastern United States did not develop on the European Atlantic coast. He writes, "How do we

explain that the European shoreline, which Megalopolis's founding fathers left, characterized by demographic and economic stagnation, by the scattering of men and activities, and by limited urbanization, contrasts with the extraordinary dynamism of the North American shoreline? The 'European Megalopolis,' this 'Blue Banana,' as it appears on the night satellite surveys, lies well behind the shoreline, from London to Milan, on that European isthmus where the flows of continental trade prevail on the maritime flows linked to the Atlantic seaboard."

- Also for **Lawrence D. Mann** the focus lies on the eastern coast of the Atlantic Ocean and on Europe. In his experience of the Spanish and French Basque country he finds that political conflict constitutes the greatest obstacle to the development of a potential megalopolitan area.

In short, these articles share a single belief: the megalopolis is never just a physical change in the form of urbanization; it is also a social, economic, cultural, and political process that anticipates and relates to that of globalization, and represents the evolution of the Alexandrine model for interpreting geographic space.

Case studies

The three essays that follow do not directly address the megalopolitan dimension of Gottmann's thought. In a few cases the authors do not even refer specifically to his ideas. But it is not difficult for students of Gottmann's theories on contemporary urbanization to identify references to Gottmannian studies, such as that of the capital city/state and those of political behavior/urbanization or population urbanization/movements, all cited in the bibliography, or those found in *Since Megalopolis* or *La Città Invincibile* (*The Invincible City*).

- **Jacqueline Lieutaud**'s article comes first not because she refers to Gottmann but because she addresses the theme of the image of the city by looking at the Universal Exhibitions and increasingly frequent Olympic Games of the global world. The "image," she writes, "is a necessary item for the city. The image is helpful to the city because it often becomes a mainspring for local development as an efficient tool for urbanism." Now "the image of the city is even becoming a target representative of cultures and ideology as a whole, as has just been demonstrated in New York, on September 11."
- Using the example of Turkey, **Ruşen Keleş** carefully examines the relationship between migration and the geographical distribution of immigrants within a city and its effect on political behavior. He seems convinced that "realities of social and economic structure, including the characteristics and patterns of urbanization, deeply affect political development." And "in countries where rapid, unbalanced, and disorderly urbanization tends to assemble populations in major urban centers, unemployment, feelings of relative deprivation, and the manipulation of formally and informally organized political groups exert a certain impact upon rural immigrants, alienating them from centrist parties." As a result "social, economic, and political factors tend to nourish the growth of extremist or fundamentalist movements."
- Finally **György Enyedi** and **Krisztina Keresztély** study the relationship between the capital city and the state in the four stages of recent Hungarian history, from the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire to the present. The authors observe the sequence of a "dichotomy of 'openness' and 'closedness'" that refers to Gottmann's reflections on capital cities. They also confirm John Agnew's and François Gay's theories on the role of "territoriality" in Gottmannian contemporary urbanization. As Enyedi and Keresztély write, "National governments either supported 'modernization' by opening the country to foreign, especially Western, influences or tried to rely on internal potential, emphasizing national traditions and values."

On global cities

We close our urban section with the paper by:

- **István Béla Ferenc Kormoss**, of the College of Europe, who examines demographic perspectives in an analysis of the Gottmannian forecasts. Beyond paying homage to the great geographer, Kormoss recalls that similar concerns of urban concentration to those of the Northeastern U.S. megalopolis emerged in the Rhine-Scheldt-Meuse Delta of northwestern Europe, which was more confined by space but was divided by the national borders of five states. Reconsidering it today in the light of available statistical information, he concludes that "thirty years after my study on the megalopolitan urbanization of Europe, it seemed appropriate to paraphrase the same issue in a larger context." Europe is a confirmation of Gottmann's vision, as well as the belief that this is the form and character of contemporary urbanization in the world. In this sense Kormoss's accurate statistical analysis serves to close this section on urban geography.

An interview with Jean Gottmann on urban geography

"... one lesson is of general and lasting portent: that is, the white-collar revolution driving the modern city towards a 'quaternary age.' The basic transformation of society under way will recast urban life to befit new needs which are difficult to imagine. Our thinking about cities is far too conditioned by the difficulties of the evolution and the illusion of a paradise lost in the time of our fathers that would have been ideal for our children. An ancient philosopher said that Megalopolis was the 'city of ideas that determines the material city we really build.' In practice we know that material forms and processes inherited from the past restrict our thinking. This is in interplay between the spirit and the material world with which we have to live, but we can live better with it once we accept the evidence of change and the imperative need to use the power of imagination."

Miloš Perović

The author is Professor of History of Modern Architecture at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade, received his M.Sc in architecture and town-planning in Belgrade and at the Athens Center of Ekistics, Athens, Greece, and his Ph.D at the Faculty of Architecture, University of Belgrade. He is the author of many books including Computer Atlas of Belgrade *(Belgrade, 1976, second edition in Serbian and English as* Research into the Urban Structure of Belgrade, *Belgrade, 2002),* Lessons of the Past *(Belgrade, 1985), four volumes on the history of modern architecture in the world 1750 to present,* Serbian 20th Century Architecture: From Historicisim to Second Modernism *(Belgrade, 2003), and numerous articles published in scientific and professional journals. He has had one-man exhibitions of his experimental town-planning projects in Ljubljana (1977), Zagreb (1978), Belgrade (1978), Paris (1981), Dublin (1981), and at the Gallery of the Royal Institute of British Architects in London (1986). He has lectured at New York University, the Institute of Fine Arts (New York), Princeton University, Columbia University (New York), Ohio State University (Columbus), Athens Center of Ekistics, University of Cambridge (UK), and the Royal Institute of British Architects. The text that follows was one of several interviews of Dr Perović with selected participants in the Delos Symposia (internatiional meetings on board ship organized by the Athens Center of Ekistics, 1963-1972) first published in the journal* Sinteza *(Ljubljana) and later in a separate book entitled* Dialogues with the Delians *in both Serbian and English, Ljubljana, 1978.*

• **Perović:** Studying an incredible concentration of people and activities along the eastern seaboard of the United States composed of large and growing metropolitan areas, suburbs and satellite towns, you reintroduced the term Megalopolis, coined by the Arcadians founding a new city state and lost already in antiquity, giving to it new meaning and importance as the "cradle of a new order in the organization of inhabited space." How has the modern Megalopolis grown up? What is its dynamics of urbanization?

• **Gottmann:** Your question raises several points. May I begin by outlining the process of growth that brought about the modern American Megalopolis which I studied in the late 1950s along the northeastern seaboard of the United States, that is from Greater Boston to Greater Washington, with New York City at its center. When the first European explorers gave the first description of it, in the 16th century, this area was only sparsely settled by rather primitive Indian tribes. European settlement started in a permanent way in the 17th century, and from its beginning it took on an urban shape. The British and Dutch settlers who came there were financed by English or Dutch companies, and required to send back industrial goods that could be produced in that part of the New World. Thus, the purpose of settlement was from the origin industry and commerce, meaning urban form and seaport activity. In the 17th century, although some rural settlement with agricultural pursuits developed steadily along the seaboard and the main river valleys, the major nuclei concentrated a large part of the population of European origin in seatrading towns, located at good harbor sites.

From this foothold on the edge of the wilderness a large migration developed, which generated the transcontinental march of the American nation to the Pacific coast. True, there were also early English settlements south of the Potomac River. The southern settlements seemed to have attracted a somewhat different type of Englishmen; they established a few seaport cities but developed less industry, preferred a plantation type of scattered settlement, growing such staples as tobacco and cotton for export, and using Negro slaves to till the land. From the very start there was considerable contrast in the density and economic base of settlement between the two parts of the seaboard, north and south of the Potomac. It is because these two regions of the British colony developed differentiated in some respects conflicting and in some respects complementary systems of interests that the Federal capital, which had to co-ordinate and keep the two systems working together was located at the junction of these two economic and historical areas, at Washington on the Potomac.

This heritage from the colonial period determined a differentiation which made me decide that the Megaiopolis I was studying did not extend southwards beyond the metropolitan orbit of Washington, DC. As you see, my definition of Mega-

lopolis is not only one of form, but also of function and of social order. The functions are firstly economic, but as a result of the kinds of economic activity and of labor force required for that activity, these functions also became social at an early stage. Cities in the northern parts of Megalopolis, dominated by puritanical settlers of the Protestant faith, such as Boston, for instance, refused from the beginning to allow the importation of slaves into their midst. The first reason invoked was that slave manpower would compete for employment with unskilled white laborers. But in fact much deeper cultural forces, emphasizing the freedom of the individual, were at work. It was the region I now call Megalopolis that led the fight in America for the abolition of slavery.

The trading seaports scattered from Massachusetts to Chesapeake Bay, while competing among themselves, formed a sort of "economy hinge" of the North American continent. Standing at the contact of the high seas and of a gradually developing continent, these hinge cities linked two great networks organized largely through their endeavors: the maritime trade of America on the one hand, and the development of the continent inland on the other. From period to period the main weight of American interests oscillated from sea trade and overseas ventures to inland pursuits and back again. Whether the circumstances threw open the door of the American economy towards the outside or turned it inwards largely depended on decisions made in the string of eastern cities. They alone had enough capital, skill and authority to elaborate policies and profit by carrying them out. Once formed, the hinge benefitted from whatever general trend prevailed in the American economy. The major cities took the lead in the 18th century as the most successful seaports. Financial and cultural centers, that is, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, remained the major urban centers in the United States until the end of the 19th century.

It is only in the 20th century that other cities in the center or west of the United States outgrew them in size. New York City remains, however, the leading transactional and information center of North America, and Greater Boston maintains a clear leadership as an intellectual center. In the southern reaches of Megalopotis, Washington, DC, the Federal capital has since 1800 been the seat of essential policy making and, in recent times, has assumed an increasing role in economic and social affairs, with the greater impact of the Federal administration on the life of the country.

Because of these antecedents the major cities in Megalopolis and a number of smaller cities around them became during the period of the Industrial Revolution the logical location for large-scale manufacturing development. Since the 1880s the rest of the United States has been developing faster than Megalopolis in terms of industrial production. This is a normal evolution, repeated in all the other countries of advanced economy: massive industrial growth has spelled decentralization of the tools of production from the rather narrow geographical area in which this growth first started and concentrated.

Surely an extremely impressive concentration of industriai plants remains in Megalopolis, especially along the main axis of it, in between the major old nuclei. For instance, in the State of New Jersey, one can observe today a massive industrial area quite comparable to what exists around London or in the Ruhr-Cologne conglomeration, although the exact types of industries may spell a somewhat different gamut. Increasingly, Megalopolis is specializing in the lighter industries, in an incubator function within the colossal American industrial machine, and even more in the higher level of services that now employ the fastest expanding sectors of the labor force: research, government, higher education, the financial services, and the technical services to public and private enterprises. On the scale of world history this megalopolitan urbanization is rather young: it is only 350 years old at most, which is a short time when compared with the major urban centers of Europe and Asia. However, it has grown so fast and so big because it has lived with the times and kept adapting to a rapidly changing technology and society.

I think that in my outline of the historical circumstances of growth I began to answer your question about the dynamics of urbanization in Megalopolis. The two first chapters of the book on Megalopolis (published in 1961) were entitled: The Main Street of the Nation and Prometheus Unbound. May I suggest that these two symbolical expressions, if you want to put them together, describe fairly well the present and past dynamics of this spectacular urbanization. The settlers who came mainly from Europe to this part of the world were deeply imbued with the Promethean spirit so characteristic of what we usually call "Western civilization." Migration to America gave them the feeling of being liberated from the shackles inherited by the countries of the Old World, from a long past, from rather rigid social and economic structures and from set cultural patterns. In America, despite the difficulties of the beginnings, there was general belief in new opportunity, greater freedom, potentially "unlimited resources" and also deep faith in a better future. The region where Megalopolis arose went through many crises, some of them prolonged, since the 16th century origins. The settlers were not discouraged. Many of those who immigrated through the seaports or who grew up in that area proceeded farther inland, on the great march westward. But the older cities continued to direct and manage the whole process, as they still now do.

Every technique brought to this area was tried out, and many innovations, although often conceived elsewhere, were developed here into massive experiments. The first skyscraper was built in Chicago, but it was in Manhattan that the first and largest skyline arose. The inventor of television, Zworykin, was a Russian engineer who had tried in vain to convince the powerful people in Europe to use his invention for a telecommunications network; he found the support he needed in New York and retired a few years ago in Princeton, NJ, after having directed research for one-third of a century at the Radio Corporation of America. These are two small examples out of a million. In a few pages of my book I stress that Megalopolis early made itself into a great market for talent drawing personnel from Europe, from the rest of the United States, and in recent times from the whole world. Let us say that it invented the "brain drain" and succeeded in putting it to work in very fruitful fashion because the spirit of Promethean endeavor was freed from its usual bonds.

The amazing thing is that these cities succeeded in concentrating all that market of talent and varied activities in what is geographically speaking a small corner of the territory of the United States. Perhaps this is not so extraordinary when we think of the lasting concentration of talent, culture, wealth and power in Paris, in London, or in Moscow. Large cities, once solidly established, have a remarkable capacity to assume and maintain a managerial role over vast areas for long periods of time. In the case of Megalopolis this was achieved by a string of cities that competed among themselves while still specializing and working together. The 600-mile-long axis from Boston to Washington was not only the economic hinge of the continent, but also the Main Street of the American nation. "Main Street" in a city stands for a market for talent, a center for decision making, a showplace and a string of more or less specialized crossroads. The main axis of Megalopolis has been, and still is, exactly that for the United States. Main Street is also visited by a great many who do not live or are employed there, but who come to Main Street to transact business, gather information, attend a ceremony, or take some kind of recreation.

Megalopolis today still receives a large number of migrants from other parts of America, but a good deal of its dynamics is due to the movement of transients that come for short visits either from the United States or from other parts of the world, for a variety of purposes.

Finally, the Main Street of America has attracted, during the last 20 years, a massive inflow of poor Americans, chiefly Puerto Ricans and Blacks, who come to the large northeastern cities in the hope of sharing in the opportunity offered by the proximity of wealth and power and in the benefits of generous welfare. A specialist in the economics of poverty has estimated that a black family living on welfare in New York City received in 1970 about eighteen times as much as a similar family in a small town of Alabama. No wonder then that one out of seven residents of New York City in 1971 was on public welfare. One might say that these great cities had become huge refugee camps maintained at government expense, and this evolution has driven most of the middle class residents to live in the suburbs. This has been another locai aspect of the urban dynamics of Megalopolis.

• **Perović:** What is the structure of Megalopolis? What are its poles of growth?

• **Gottmann:** I described the structure of Megalopolis as "polynuclear" and "nebulous." I may also add that the region is structured around a major axis that links together the main nuclei, that is, cities such as Boston, New Haven, New York, Trenton, Philadelphia, Wilmington, Baltimore and Washington. Megalopolis is a chain of metropolitan areas, and since every metropolitan area is usualty defined as a sort of regional cell with a central city in its midst that acts like the nucleus, it is logical that "a chain of metropolitan areas would be polynuclear." This character underlines the plurality of the origin and of the process of growth. It involves rivalry and coordination between the nuclei; history is commonly made of such apparent conflicts that convey also a basic complementarity. The plurality works better and has lasted longer in the Federal system of the United States. But I am also convinced that it added to the impetus of growth and to the impact of Megalopolis as a whole on overseas as well as inland development. For instance, at the beginning of the 19th century several of the leading seaport-nuclei began building canals to carry trade inland towards the Great Plains along the Mississippi River, where settlement and agricultural production were just started. New York City and Philadelphia were the main contenders in that race of the canals westward. New York won, with the famous Erie Canal, and, consolidated its position as a leader in commerce on the Northeastern seaboard. Since that time New York kept that leadership by a variety of means and now, when freight is of less importance and abstract transactions are of greater significance for a commercial center and for urban development, New York has consolidated its leadership in this respect.

As a city and metropolitan system, New York is a much bigger nucleus than any of the other cities strung along the main axis of Megalopolis. However, the other cities are also of considerable importance to Megalopolis and to its system of outside relations. This is certainly true in the case of Washington, DC, the Federal capital; of Philadelphia, a very large industrial and financial complex; and of Boston, which besides its cultural leadership remains an important seaport, and industrial and financial center.

While describing the major nuclei I began speaking, I suppose, of the "poles of growth." To be frank, I never have very much liked this expression which has become popular recently to designate certain focal points on the development plan of areas as yet little developed. Megalopolis is certainly not an area that we could call empty or "developing." True, it adds four to five million inhabitants every decade to its total population, and it is one of the major receiving areas of American internal migration. It is growing in different directions. However, it would be difficult to designate a few places as major poles of growth. The density of population and of land occupancy in the corridor along its main axis is constantly thickening. These filling-in and spreading-out effects occur, as usual, with greater speed, at a higher rate, in the sectors that were not densely urbanized previously.

Nevertheless considerable growth also continues in the central sectors of the major nuclei, such as Manhattan, central Boston, and Washington, DC, itself. This growth may be difficult to assess in terms of figures of population or even employment because the new development in the old central nuclei is not so much residential, as aimed at serving the needs of transactions, recreation, and collective rituals of transient visitors who reside not in that city but in the suburbs or even far away, and many of whom do not have their main employment in that city either.

Look at what is developing in the Back Bay area of central Boston with new office buildings, large hotels, department stores and such expanding institutions as universities on the one hand and the headquarters of Christian Science on the other. Is this a pole of growth? If we answer in the affirmative, we cannot support that assertion by population or employment figures. Manhattan is another example. "New York is Very Much Alive," as the title of a recent book puts it, if we judge by the building that goes on in Manhattan and the movement of people in its streets and buildings. However, as is well known around the world, Manhattan is losing population, even some employment, and has recently been given a reputation that frightens away crowds of would-be visitors. Nevertheless, in the last three years, at the peak of that crisis, more new office floor space was built there than in the previous 20 years when New York dominated the world economy; besides the office towers, several new theaters were opened, and more towers of both lower income and luxury apartments arose.

However, the most impressive growth of Megalopolis has not been polarized by the major cities but has sprawled across large bands of territory in between the cities and on both sides of the axial corridor. In this way, the structure has considerably increased its nebulosity. The region is becoming increasingly a complex magma of large well-structured nuclei, set amidst areas of sprawling suburbs, smaller more or less structured, cities and green spaces, much of these forested, extending between the dense spine of the axial corridor and the oceanic shore on one side or toward the Appalachian foot ranges on the other. A few limbs of thickening density along major lines of transport jut out in different directions. Even the axial corridor is taking on a more complicated shape because of this lively growth. For instance, 30 years ago the main axis linked Boston with New Haven via the cities of Worcester, Springfield, and Hartford; that was the line of the main railway connection and of the large industrial centers in this northern part of Megalopolis.

Today it looks as if the main axis may be passing closer to the seashore via Providence and New London. Perhaps it would be more accurate for such an area, on its huge scale, to speak of axes rather than poles of growth. Dr Clyde Browning, of the University of North Carolina, has recently completed an interestlng analysis of the spatial trends of growth within the urbanization of Megalopolis from 1950 to 1970. His map, to be shortly published, shows a variety of axes of growth radiating from each of the old major nuclei. It also shows, as might have been expected, that the influence of the main arteries of transport has shifted in orienting these axes from the waterways and railways to the modern great highways. The highway and the motorcar have obviously helped the sprawl and the

spreading out of the well-structured metropolitan centers of yesterday. However, this has meant the decline of only those central cities which have not been able to reconvert themselves to the new functions that generate growth and serve transients. So that a certain selection is working itself out amidst the megalopolitan cities; those that have been able to remain or become centers of management, government, education and information are doing much better than the others.

• **Perović:** Any study of the megalopolis concept must take into account its growth, so that its boundaries are constantly changing. This is well illustrated in your book *Megalopolis*, where two different areas – one for 1950 and another larger one for 1960 – are shown on the maps. What are the limits of growth of Megalopolis and what happens to its obsolete structures?

• **Gottmann:** You are quite right in raising the question of the boundaries of Megalopolis as a region. However. thls is a rather moot point. I belong to the French school of Geography which professed that, in the study of a given region, its center, the nucleus, the infrastructure are more important than the limits. The limits must be defined because it is indispensable to know exactly what territory one is covering and also to get homogeneous data. Statistical or other data are gathered for well-defined units, as designated by administrative decision. It is with these considerations in mind that I defined the region of Megalopolis I studied. I cannot quite agree with your remark that I gave in my book two different areas for Megalopolis, one as it was by 1950 and one for 1960. The first map shows a continuous stretch of areas of metropolitan economy as it had been defined on the basis of the 1940 Census by the statistician Donald J. Bogue and adopted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1950. I used this cartographic and statistical concept as a starting point, or, if you wish, a skeleton on which I modelled my own concept of the Megalopolis region. My concept was somewhat wider, partly because, instead of the data and problems of 1940-1950, I worked with the data and problems of 1950-1960, and I knew through experience in the field that urbanization had spread and encroached on areas beyond Bogue's map. But also I included counties that did not show as metropolitan by census norms but were, in fact, in their land use and in activities, a direct adjunct of the megalopolitan axial corridor. For instance, one must remember that the census in the United States is usually taken around the first of April, so that people are counted at their main – that is, winter – residence. An area such as Cape Cod and its adjacent islands in Massachusetts appear to be rather rural and sparsely settled in the season of the census. Surveyed during the summer months, that area looks as very densely populated suburbia.

In fact, it has little economic activity apart from serving the recreational needs of a part of the megalopolitan population. The same is true of some hilly areas in New York State or Pennsylvania, such as the Catskills and the Poconos, or some of the seashore counties of New Jersey and Detaware. These areas were disregarded by Bogue for his purposes, but I wanted to include them into my concept of an expanded Megalopolis. Also it was more convenient to include the whole territory of the smaller states in Megalopolis, that is, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware and even Maryland.

This made the study of the political and administrative aspect more coherent. However, I could not do the same for the much larger and more diversified states of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, the larger parts of which were definitely not megalopolitan for reasons of both historical development and present economy.

Once I had come to this expanded outline, I stuck to it and I think that in 1975 it still fits the Megalopolis concept I had defined by 1960. It is a vast area not yet fully urbanized in the sense that it still contains some farming and wooded areas. It covers about 53,000 square miles and its population, which rose from 32 mllllon in 1950 to 37 million in 1960, is now more than 40 million. The average density is close to 800 per square mile, which is an average density found in some of the more spread-out American cities.

The limits I have thus drawn were considered too wide by some of the American experts who have studied the evolutlon of Megalopolis since 1961. Marion Clawson and Clyde Browning, for instance, have preferred narrower limits than mine to show the processes recently developing in Megalopolis. They were mainly interested in the dense growth close to the axial corridor. This shows that I have been generous or perhaps just foresighted in drawing wider limits to fit better my purposes of considering, with the fully urbanized sectors, the periphery living under the impact of the adjacent urbanization.

The real question of growth overflowing the limits stated arises chiefly at the two ends of the main axis: north of greater Boston and south of greater Washington. There has been some expansion there in rather different ways but that could be considered an extension of Megalopolis since my limits were drawn. It would be, however, a matter of rather complicated debate whether the counties of New England in the north and of Virginia to the south in which a certain amount of suburbanization has now occurred, should or should not be included in the original concept of Megalopolis. In any case even their inclusion would not modify considerably the general outline. Some commentators, such as Lewis Mumford, have accused me of announcing a Megalopolis from New England to Florida.

This is sheer nonsense. The land use and other aspects of urbanization are evolving rapidly in many parts of the United States and in some other parts of the world. This does not mean that they will become the extension of one single area, even though the area described in my study of Megalopolis may have acted as the incubator of trends that have since appeared elsewhere. South of Washington the intensity of urbanization decreases fast.

Now as to what happens to the obsolete structures of Megalopolis. They evolve also and in different ways. The formerly rural farming sectors, abandoned by their populations sucked into the urban system, have either been developed for suburban uses or regained by the forest, which is the natural vegetation cover. In parts of Massachusetts, Connecticut and even Maryland, one could find in the 1950s and 1960s old crumbling farm buildings swallowed by recent forest growth, like vestiges of disappeared civilizations. I have shown on one of my maps and in statistical material that even during the post-war decade of rapid suburban sprawl (1946-1956) the woodlands expanded in certain areas adjacent to the main axial corridor.

As to the obsolete sectors in the urbanized or industrialized areas, most of them have undergone urban renewal or redevelopment to a large extent. It used to be said that in America city dwellings told the history of settlement and of the rapid succession of different waves of immigrants; first built as uptown residences of wealthy local people, they were later occupied by successive tenants who belonged to lower strata of the economic scale and were recent newcomers; as "uptown" moved farther away from the center, blight spread to the older structures. To some extent this process still goes on, and the latest wave of newcomers has brought Blacks from the south-east states. But with the new "welfare state" trend in America, public funds are used to redevelop these grey areas and give them a new look with new buildings and better physical standards. Obsolescence sets in in really distressing fash-

ion in the old cities that do not receive many new migrants and the centers of which retain a population of only old or very poor people. Such sections can be found in the western parts of Megalopolis in the old mining and heavy industry towns, some of which seem to be fading away. This, moreover, is also experienced in old coal-mining districts of the American Middle West and of northwestern Europe.

• **Perović:** What is the economic basis of Megalopolis? And what are the patterns of change in the economic activities within the area?

• **Gottmann:** The economic base is indeed enormous and extremely diversified. The permanent characteristic of the economic base has been and still is commerce. And a long and successful history of commerce establishes in the area a predisposition for the management of private and public affairs and for the role of the intermediary, connecting link between different economic activities and the needs of different outlying regions. Thus, we cannot be surprised that, after some 300 years of successful commercial activity, the cities of Megalopolis largely base their economic activity on abstract transactions and on government. However, the economic base is also supplied by the immediate daily needs of 40 million people of whom a large proportion are well paid and who, therefore, can afford a high level of spending. Because of the economic and political status of this Main Street of the American nation, megalopolitan cities have achieved the economic and political means of paying the local people well. This is obvious even in the higher rates of welfare benefits which attract the inflow of poor newcomers from the rural South. It is also apparent in the higher scale of salaries and wages paid to employees of state and local goverments, and these are quite numerous.

Mixing curiously with relatively highly paid lower strata of society, such as the unemployed, the street cleaners and so forth, we find in Megalopolis, and particularly in the axial corridor, the largest groupings of the very wealthy in America, usually residents of suburban counties working in the central business districts of the large cities. This is found in and around Washington, DC, New York City, Boston and Philadelphia. Such concentration of wealth results from employment in a variety of activities: many of the larger multinational corporations have their roots and their headquarters, or at least an important branch of their central offices, in Megalopolis. Even General Motors, a Detroit corporation, maintains a large financial office in Manhattan. Despite a great deal of talk about moving out of New York City, decentralization has worked more for industrial plants than for office activities. In a certain number of cases offices have deconcentrated to Connecticut or New Jersey, Long Island or Washington, that is, to other locations within the Megalopolis axial corridor.

A large growth of properly industrial establishments has also happened. But these are not so much big plants manufacturing goods in series, although some such plants are still coming to Megalopolis, too, because of the enormous consumption of the local market; the main development, an important sector of the present economic base, is in the research and development (R&D) stages of industry. Research laboratories and small specialized plants in the pioneering advanced sectors of rapidly evolving industries, such as electronics or pharmaceuticals, are still crowding and multiplying in New Jersey, Connecticut, and the vicinity of Boston or Philadelphia. Megalopolis continues to have an enormous role as an incubator of new designs and fashions, whether for computers, ballpoint pens, or women's and children's wear. Perhaps the present changes restructuring the economic activities in this area are just a manifestation of the cyclical migration of industrial activity. The more I have studied this fascinating movement in Megalopolis and other heavily urbanized parts of the world, the more it seems to me that we are now witnessing another stage in a cyclical movement. Economic historians of Western Europe have shown that in the Middle Ages cities concentrated manufacturing work within their walls from the 10th to the 12th centuries. From the 14th century on and until the latter part of the 17th century an outward migration of manufacturing work developed, scattering production of goods to villages and throughout the countryside. This dispersal has been explained by the increasing burden of costs and regulations in the larger cities under the heavy hand of guilds, corporations and local rulers. This outmigration did not cause cities to lose their momentum; they continued to direct, finance, and manage manufacturing production, controlling the marketing of goods and keeping an incubator function for the new industrial technology created by the Renaissance.

In the 18th century the Industrial Revolution initiated a new cycle, regrouping manufactures, this time with factories on a large scale, in substantial cities old and new. This is continuing in the 20th century with increasing industrialization; but a new trend has signalled a massive outward migration of the large plants from major cities, scattering the work of mass production. The outward movement is again caused by the pressures of increasing costs, congestion, taxation and regulation. It is encouraged by legislation that favors decentralization towards lagging or depressed regions. Again, the large cities have kept the general control of the industrial economy and the incubator function. The recent changes in Megalopolis illustrate trends of a long-range historical cycle in spectacular fashion.

The net result of these changes has been to base the megalopolitan economy more and more on transactional work employing mainly white collar personnel. I have insisted on this evolution in my book on Megalopolis, especially in the chapter entitled "The White Collar Revolution." This is not only what economists have described since 1961 as the advent of the post-industrial society and of the service economy. It is a move away from employment in the various stages of production, whether in agriculture, mining or manufacturing, towards employment in the whole gamut of services. Even more, in the case of Megalopolis, it is a concentration of manpower in the upper stages of the services.

The old definition of services involved mainly the activities of transportation, wholesale and retail trade handling goods, and domestic services; these were the "tertiary" activities defined by Colin Clark in the 1940s. The new concentration of employment is in what I proposed to call the "quaternary occupational activities," which deal mainly in abstract transactions and need to be concentrated in selected locations. They include the higher stages of management, government, research and development, mass media and publishing, higher education, banking, insurance and all the specialized extra advice needed by modern technology and the complex structures of modern society.

While specializing in these quaternary activities, the economic basis of Megalopolis remains vast and diversified. This region still produces a substantial volume of agricultural goods, especially animal products, and an enormous variety of manufactures. It produces almost everything we can think of from airplanes and milk to aspirin and zippers. Its size, after all, is that of an average nation, and its consumption even bigger. But the main function and income are found in the quaternary sector.

• **Perović:** You stated that Megalopolis is the greatest concentration of white-collar workers in the USA and in the whole world. How does it affect land use and living conditions?

• **Gottmann:** I believe that the rising importance of the white-collar workers employed in quaternary activities was the most interesting conclusion to emerge from my study of Megalopolis. Its significance is not only in the occupational changes it involves, but in the whole restructuring of modern society of which Megalopolis has been and still is the most impressive laboratory.

It was around 1955 that the number of white-collar workers in the whole of the United States surpassed the number of blue-collar workers. Few people noticed this, although it was a great moment in world history. In 1960 I asked the International Labour Office in Geneva if they knew of another country with more non-manual than manual workers. The answer was "No, no other at present, unless you want to count Monaco. But this trend will soon spread to other countries." It was significant that the first country to have achieved a majority of non-manual workers was also at the time the largest agricultural, mining and manufacturing producer in the world. Our technology has liberated the worker from the constraints of the hard back-breaking stages of production.

The production processes, including the most complicated, have been increasingly mechanized, rationalized, automated, and fewer people have to be tied down to the machines. Mechanization has not enslaved labor as so many had forecast. White-collar work is certainly not leisure, and it can be exacting. But it is physically easier and socially it opens new perspectives of evolution to the laboring masses.

Especialiy in the rapidly developing sector of the quaternary occupations, white-collar work deals with a raw material which is multi-faceted, diversified, rather abstract, and which can best be described as information in all its forms. Whether in government, management, research, education, legal or medical practice, the essential stages consist in gathering, classifying, transmitting, analyzing bits of information.

All the decisions made by white-collar people are based on these kinds of transactions. The personnel so employed has to be competent, that is, specially trained, and responsible. Much of the gathering and interpretation of information requires team work by specialists, discussion, planning meetings, conferences, etc. All this creates a substantially different way of life, with more human contacts, more specialization, more nervous strain, perhaps more leisure but also more interpenetration of work and recreation, than for the old blue-collar categories of workers.

Indeed, the restructuring of society to adapt to the new needs of the work force has rapidly become apparent, first in Megalopolis, then in the United,States as a whole, and now increasingly in all the countries of advanced economy. First of all, it is apparent in the landscape itself, with the rise of the skyscrapers or other massive office structures, such as the dense skyline of office towers in Manhattan or the heavy government buildings multiplying in and around Washington, DC.

The rapidly swelling quantity and variety of information made available to the institutions in Megalopolis forces on the personnel the creation of more and more specialization. A self-refining division of labor constantly subdivides quaternary personnel and demands more contacts and teamwork within it. Hence the need of millions of offices close to one another, so that matters could be better discussed.

Also the need for millions of telephone lines, for Telex networks and other means of communication. Hence also the mushrooming of convention and other meeting facilities with the attendant hotels, restaurants, secretarial services and recreational facilities. To the old tradition of pilgrimage, we now add the professional collective rituals, which require special buildings and diversified equipment, including computers, museums, and libraries. The gathering of information also entails the consequence that white-collar work is often done less well by remaining in one single place. In fact, it generates an enormous and intensive traffic of people and messages within a city and between cities. Urban life for quaternary personnel is more nomadic than sedentary and, up to a certain point, people seem to love it.

Of course, our cities are not organized for this new way of life. The rise of skylines solves a few problems but compounds others. Decentralization policies increase the chaotic character of this evolution. Masses of welfare recipients, attracted to the large transactional centers by the lure of new opportunity and easy work but totally unprepared for quaternary occupations, increase the tensions within the metropolis. We must rethink what these essential changes mean for our concept and design of urban life. Most of us have not yet realized the permanence and enormity of the changes. We are still under the spell of the traditional moral rules that emphasize the virtues of physical work to achieve production.

An essential component in this transition is education. More and better education and training are required for transactional and technological work. Hence the spread and size of university campuses. By 1966 the number of people employed in a faculty and administrative capacity by establishments of higher education in the United States surpassed the whole employment of the mining industries, which are huge industries in America. By 1970 the clerical, technical and managerial personnel of manufacturing industries represented one third of their total employment. This is, of course, a general trend, not restricted to Megalopolis, but its origins and consequences may be best observed here.

• **Perović:** During the Ninth General Assembly of the World Society for Ekistics held in Athens in autumn 1974, you gave us an explanation of an age-old dilemma of town planners and city administrators about the size of human settlements, which had its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and politics. Then you explained to us the Platonic model of a city as a small, static and introvert community and the Alexandrine concept derived from Alexander the Great's political philosophy of homonoia, or in terms of human settlements, a spatial organization of various countries and by a network of large new cities as growth poles based on international trade. From your own writings I would conclude that your views are more Alexandrine in nature than Platonic. Would you explain to us how you see the opportunities that Megalopolis offers to its inhabitants?

• **Gottmann:** You are quite right in assuming that I disagree with the Platonic model. Plato visualizes a world of small, equally developed islands, within a rather stabilized economic system. There have been few periods in history endowed with stability. The experiment coming closest to the Platonic model was the isolation of Japan under the Tokugawas for 200 years. This made Japan weak and practically defenseless when, in the middle of the 19th century, foreign navies decided to open it up to trade and outside influences. In the middle of a dynamic world the isolation of a territorial unit is fraught with danger and can seldom last, unless it is a small remote corner of the world, like Bhutan.

In our time of momentous change a static model offers little interest. What country today would accept isolation with backwardness even if given a guarantee of being left alone in peace? In academic life nowadays one often meets students who enthusiastically espouse the ideal of "no growth." However, these same students are the first to protest if electric

lighting in the streets is reduced or the petrol supply in the pumping stations is restricted. They see "no growth" as the means of maintaining the comfort they derive from the latest technological and economic progress.

This is pure illusion. In the interdependent world woven by the 20th century we must turn towards a more Alexandrine type of model.

What I appreciate particularly in the networks of large trading cities created or expanded by Alexander the Great and, at other periods of history, by the Roman Empire, the British Commonwealth and other large political systems, is their recognition of the interdependence and complementarity existing in the geographical space they deal with. All these systems base their infrastructure on networks of cities. This is not only because cities spring up at crossroads of international trade and that it is difficult to conceive of an efficient large-scale trading organization operating without cities. The main point is that cities are centers of administration of the region around them, and that administration must deal with the economic life, that is, the management of production, transport and distribution of goods, services and credit, within the orbit of the city. Whether that administration is conducted entirely by public authority or with the widespread participation of private enterprise is a detail in the functioning of the system. Even if no competition is allowed within a regional or city framework, the cities and the regions themselves will compete at the same time as they will co-operate and exchange among themselves. In a world inhabited by people whose masses want comfort, happiness, the opportunity provided by freedom of movement, technological innovation and the Promethean spirit, it is in the nature of cities to direct the development of their respective regions and to ensure the communications and linkages between their region and other parts of the world.

The evolution that led to our present human condition, with the prospect of liberating the workers from the constraints of hard physical work and of attachment to the land – this same evolution has produced the huge urbanization that we are witnessing. The formation of vast urbanized regions, of which Megalopolis provided the prototype, results from all these trends. Obviously an urbanized, dense conglomeration of 30 to 50 million people cannot thrive unless it is in a network of dynamic interconnections with many other parts of a diversified and far-flung world. Its function of a continental hinge is what created Megalopolis and the formula sums up, I think, the spatial opportunities its cities developed and took advantage of.

It is very important to realize that the cities planned by Alexander, or at later periods by followers of his ideas in planning, were not simply trade centers. They were also administrative centers, and they contained a mixture of populations, a cultural mixture and an economic diversity. This pluralism enabled them to deal with problems and relations beyond their immediate vicinity. In his famous speech at Opis, Alexander developed the theme of the cultural and social pluralism he intended to foster. I think that such pluralism is deeply imbedded in the very nature of urban growth and large city life. Megalopolis owes a great deal to the variety of the waves of immigration it received. Too often urban planners picture the ideal city as a well-structured, static, homogeneous community. This may be the heritage of Platonic philosophy, of a monistic and static ideal which greatly simplifies the political problems but which has seldom been found in reality.

• **Perović:** The process of urbanization and extensive urban growth is in our time a worldwide phenomenon. Using any strict comparative definition, Megalopolis is the biggest urban agglomeration that exists today. The fact that it has an average income above that of the richest nation as a whole may demonstrate to other countries the kinds of problems which they may experience if they reach the American level of urbanization and mass living standards. To what extent are the lessons from Megalopolis applicable to other urban concentrations in the world?

• **Gottmann:** I am afraid that the American Megalopolis I studied is no longer the biggest urban agglomeration of today. In the 1970s this title can rightly be claimed by the Tokaido Megalopolis in Japan, which encompasses some 50 million people and is growing very fast. It would be extremely interesting to see impartially conducted, comparative studies of several of the megalopolitan growths existing around the world. To my mind, megalopolitan size really begins above 25 million people in a continuous area. Such formations can be found in five parts of the modern world: besides the American northeastern sea-board and the Tokaido region. C.A. Doxiadis has described an American Great Lakes Megalopolis, the Canadian extension of which is being investigated by Alexander Leman; a British team directed by Peter Hall has defined a Megalopolis-England, comprising the Southeast around London and the English Midlands; and I.B.F. Kormoss, of the Collège d'Europe, has outlined a megalopolis in northwestern Europe that covers most of Benelux plus the Ruhr-Rhineland complex. To these five agglomerations we may have soon to add a sixth, in Brazil around the Rio de Janeiro-São Paulo axis. These enumerations show, I think, that megalopolitan size and density may cover very different levels of wealth, living standards and modes of life. Perhaps some of the problems of Megalopolis are repeated in rather similar fashion in the two great concentrations on the two sides of the North Sea. Even there. however, the structures are fairly different. My study of Megalopolis dealt with a situation where sprawl was uncontrolled and even encouraged; where public transport was practically discouraged and the motor car preferred to rail transport. Planning controls and transport policies are quite different in Europe and certainly in Japan.

Despite the diversity which requires every region to think for itself and to choose its own way of life and solutions, some general lessons for other large urban concentrations can probably be drawn from the experiment of Megalopolis. One of these lessons is to recognize early enough the constraints of density when it reaches a high level for a very large mass of people. Personally, I believe that greater compactness of settlement, less waste of space and, therefore, of landscape is most desirable. Rapid transit should be organized and maintained to obviate public services and amenities, the demand for which is bound to increase in the megalopolitan conditions of education, density and size. I realize of course that many forces within the specific American circumstances made it particularly difficult to apply the foregoing prescriptions.

Finally, one lesson is of general and lasting portent: that is, the white-collar revolution driving the modern city towards a "quaternary age." The basic transformation of society under way will recast urban life to befit new needs which are difficult to imagine. Our thinking about cities is far too conditioned by the difficulties of the evolution and the illusion of a paradise lost in the time of our fathers that would have been ideal for our children. An ancient philosopher said that Megalopolis was the "city of ideas that determines the material city we really build." In practice we know that material forms and processes inherited from the past restrict our thinking. This is an interplay between the spirit and the material world with which we have to live, but we can live better with it once we accept the evidence of change and the imperative need to use the power of imagination.

Sustainable development in the frontiers of the American Megalopolis

"This study examines the issue of sustainable development in the frontiers of the American Megalopolis through an analysis of the Appalachian region, the first western frontier of the United States, to which the Atlantic Megalopolis expanded its markets and export capital. First, Gottmann's view of the Atlantic Megalopolis as 'the continent's economic hinge' is discussed in relation to the exploitation of its inland frontiers to see how the frontier economy has become deeply peripheralized through the integration with the capitalist economy of Megalopolis. The way land resources were exploited in the frontiers best exemplifies the phenomena of 'deepening peripheralization,' thus the patterns of land ownership are closely looked into. After a brief explanation of government-initiated development programs targeted at such impoverished regions for over half a century and their limitations, the study then focuses on the emerging trend synthesizing government endeavors with local initiatives for more sustainable and sound development at the community level."

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Introduction

The vast expansion of megalopolis often accompanies a large-scale exploitation of the frontiers that supply megalopolis with goods in demand on world markets and cheap labor. In certain situations, the excessive exploitation and ecological damages place the frontiers in jeopardy of sustaining balanced economies with sound ecological systems. In order to compensate for the economic gap between megalopolis and its peripheral fringes, the central government sometimes intervenes with the problem of regional development by embarking on different forms of development programs in the regions characterized as frontier economies. In recent years, however, the conventional development schemes geared only toward economic growth with external capital have been called into question. Furthermore, the need for synthesizing government intervention with local initiatives has been increasingly called for in sustaining the economic growth of impoverished regions while preserving sound ecological systems and achieving social equality.

This study examines the issue of sustainable development in the frontiers of the American Megalopolis through an analysis of the Appalachian region, the first western frontier of the United States, to which the Atlantic Megalopolis expanded its markets and export capital. First, Gottmann's view of the Atlantic Megalopolis as "the continent's economic hinge" is discussed in relation to the exploitation of its inland frontiers to see how the frontier economy has become deeply peripheralized through the integration with the capitalist economy of Megalopolis. The way land resources were exploited in the frontiers best exemplifies the phenomena of "deepening peripheralization," thus the patterns of land ownership are closely looked into. After a brief explanation of government-initiated development programs targeted at such impoverished regions for over a half-century and their limitations, the study then focuses on the emerging trend synthesizing government endeavors with local initiatives for more sustainable and sound development at the community level. It is found that the existence of intermediary structures bridging external funds and local needs is vital in achieving sustainable development in regions that are deprived of economic opportunities. Finally,

implications for public policymaking are pointed out as to how the challenge of persistent poverty in peripheral fringes of the highly urban system should be tackled.

Growth of the Atlantic Megalopolis and development of frontiers

The prominent status of the Northeastern Atlantic Seaboard of the United States in the world economy inspired Gottmann to synthesize the vast complex urban phenomena into a cohesive concept of "megalopolis." Since the publication of *Megalopolis* (1961), some other highly urbanized areas, not only within the United States but also around the world, have become noted as megalopolises in nature. The densely populated area stretching from Tokyo to Osaka in Japan, for example, being designated the Tokaido Megalopolis, has been intensely studied by Gottmann as well as Japanese urban geographers. Despite the proliferation of megalopolis in today's rapidly urbanizing world, however, the Atlantic Seaboard of North America is distinguished from any other megalopolis in the essential feature that is attributed to its unique location as "the continent's economic hinge" linking overseas venture and inland development of a vast frontier. Gottmann insightfully elaborated this point by showing how maritime activities and continental development were intimately linked, the two growths reacting on one another and spurring each other on, both contributing to the growth and enrichment of the seaboard cities (GOTTMANN, 1961).

According to the model presented by Gottmann, the Northeastern Seaboard has grown into Megalopolis by oscillating its economic hinge between maritime enterprise and inland development as it has undergone several phases of development (table 1). The basic mechanism and oscillations of the hinge have worked synergistically in transforming the northern and middle colonies of North America from a frontier of Europe to a semiperiphery, and finally to an indispensable core of the world system. Gottmann argues that the capital accumulated in Megalopolis through foreign trade and maritime ventures has enabled the urban centers of Megalopolis to control resources in the frontiers and expand their influence westward. No doubt Gottmann's great insight has enabled us to understand the processes and complexities by which the consolidation of the whole region has been brought about. However, the question of how the expansion of Megalopolis has affected frontier economies has not been fully dealt with in the study of Megalopolis, which naturally focuses on urban phenomena. However, it becomes evident that if the expansion of Megalopolis is examined from the perspective of frontiers, it presents a whole different picture of regional development.

The regional development of Appalachia, the first western frontier of the North American continent, well illustrates how the growth of Megalopolis has been interlocked with the deepening of economic dependency in frontiers. The mountainous region lies to the southwest of the Mohawk-Hudson valley lowland, extending some 1,712 km from the edge of the Catskill Mountains in New York State to the coastal plain of north-central Mississippi (fig. 1). Due to the geographic and geopolitical location of this area, it has always been susceptible to exploitation by land speculators, capitalists and firms. The region is rich in natural resources yet it has suffered a chronic depression through a successive wave of extractive activities upon the resources. Among the rich natural resources, forests and coal were by far the most significant resources to be exploited in early days.

The integration of Appalachia with the expansive orbit of Megalopolis has restructured the region in all aspects of regional life. Dunaway's empirical study (1996) shows how the integration of antebellum Southern Appalachia with the world system restructured the region at five levels for the period from 1700 to 1860, up to Phase V in Gottmann's model. As discussed in the following section of this paper, the historical processes of restructuring are clearly imprinted in the present state of Appalachia, which structurally impedes the region in its struggle to achieve a sustainable development (fig. 2).

Table 1
Shift of emphasis at megalopolis as the continent's economic hinge from the 17th century to 1960

Phase	Emphasized Activities	Major Factors	Noted Function of Megalopolis in Relation to Frontiers
I	Maritime enterprise	Triangular trade	Exporting local resources: fur, timber, fishing, tobacco, grain, flour.
II	Inland development	Increased immigration	Capital investment into land purchases and development of frontiers
III	Maritime expansion	Wars at Europe Expansion of trade to China	Economic supremacy of the Northeast through great maritime profits Westward expansion in the South
IV	Inland development	Industrial Revolution	Race between cities for the trade with the trans-Appalachian regions Improvement in transportation system, i.e., canals and railroads
V	Maritime enterprise	Lowering of tariffs Building fast sailing ships	Inland progress financed by Northeastern seaboard bankers Concentration of national credit and money management in four cities
VI	Inland development	Effect of Civil War Control of railroads	The South's reconstruction financed by the large Northeastern cities Managerial function of Megalopolis confirmed over the whole nation
VII	Maritime enterprise	Two World Wars International Financial Activities	Growing role in international banking Redistribution of functions within Megalopolis Decentralization from Megalopolis

Note: The periods corresponding to the above phases are as follows: Phase I (until around 1720), Phase II (1720- Revolution, 1783), Phase III (1783-early 1800s), Phase IV (1815-1830s), Phase V (1840-1860), Phase VI (1861-1913), Phase VII (1914-1960).

(*Source:* Gottmann, 1961, Chapter 3: "The continent's economic hinge", pp. 102-165).



Note: Appalachan Region comprises 406 counties over 13 states, which are designated by the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC).

Fig. 1: Megalopolis and its hinterland of Appalachia.



Fig. 2: Distressed counties in the United States. *(Source:* Based on 1999 Appalachian Regional Commission Data).

Structural impediments to sustainable development in the study region

As a result of the integration of Appalachia with the capitalist economy of Megalopolis, the region faces structural problems that have hindered development endeavors. The problems are found in all the economic, social and political arenas.

- First, the structural distortion is clearly seen in the economic sphere of production means, particularly in land ownership patterns. Through the above-mentioned historical process of transforming land to marketable commodities, the resource is concentrated in relatively few individuals or firms, particularly absentee and corporate holders; the majority of local families have limited access to lands and minerals (APPALACHIAN LAND OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE, 1983). The limited scope of the economic base in Appalachia is attributed to the monopolistic land ownership patterns.
- Secondly, the region is socially distorted as there is a considerable gap between the haves and the have-nots. Accounts of the existence of a clear-cut division within a society abound in previous studies of rural communities, particularly in the most impoverished region of Central Appalachia (DUNCAN, 1999, BILLINGS and BLEE, 2000). Figure 3 illustrates local residents' view of the prevailing social structure of Appalachian communities.



Fig. 3: A schematic view of the Appalachian social structure held by local non-elites.

- Thirdly, the distortion is evident in the political sphere, particularly in the form of "nepotism." It is because the political structure of Appalachia is based on control over scarce resources and opportunity; the region is so limited in opportunity for steady work and income that control over jobs determines one's wealth and power. The relationships among neighbors and kin form a "core resource for network formation" in the routine county-level politics (BILLINGS and BLEE, 2000). As a result, getting a job depends generally on several factors that are not meritocratic but nepotistic in nature: that is, family background, voting patterns favorable for corporate candidates, connections with those in power. In this way, local politics in the study region is based on a hierarchy of power with the social stratification that divides the local elite as decision makers and non-elite deprived of access to the decision-making process.
- Furthermore, it is important to understand the mechanism by which the structural distortions have been perpetuated in the region over a long period of time to the extent that local residents adversely affected by the distortions feel powerless to change the situation. Gaventa (1980) is one of the first regional scholars who have presented a theoretical interpretation of the complex mechanism that perpetuated the power structure of Appalachian society. He articulated the three dimensions of power and powerlessness interrelating with each other and thus re-enforcing the strength of the other dimensions. Once such power relationships are established, the mechanism begins propelling itself with little explicit effort to be made by those in power to prevent the powerless from contesting the power relationships; it requires much greater effort for those deprived of power to alter the situation. The sense of fatalism at the most advanced dimension is found to be still prevailing among the low-income families in an Appalachia low-income community (DUNCAN, 1999).

Regional development endeavors in the past and their limitations

In the past years the major regional development endeavors in the study region were made at two different levels:

- one was at the level of federal government, often allied with

local organizations that are coordinated and "co-opted" for certain political agenda, whereas

- the other was at the grassroots level, usually driven by community-based organizations, whose members consisted of vocal protesters, activists and concerned local residents.

Up to the late 1980s, there had been much dissonance between these two levels of development initiatives, which is attributed to the difference in their understandings of where the fundamental problems of the region reside and what means should be taken to strike down the impediments to development. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what courses of action had been taken at each level of a development initiative before inquiring into the new trend of synthesis that has emerged since the late 1980s under the umbrella concept of "sustainable development."

At the government level of development initiatives in the study region, it is the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) that has made long-lasting development endeavors since its inception in 1965. Due to the geographic characteristics of isolated highlands, the primary concern of the ARC was two-fold, i.e. how to get internally integrated, and also how to obtain better access to local growth poles, growth centers and the core. Hence, the focus of development was primarily on the development of an extensive highway system within the region that was to be well connected to the main interstate highways beyond the region. However, it should be pointed out that the ARC program has in fact transformed itself at three stages:

- the first stage (1965 to 1975),
- the second stage (1975 to 1980), and
- the third stage (1980 to today).

It was at the initial stage that the construction of the Appalachian Development Highway dominated its development agenda. As it proceeded into the second stage, however, the agency began adjusting its programs to meet other needs of the region as well. The primary concept governing the ARC development at this stage became "growth with equity," that is, human issues being strongly focused in development efforts. The ARC at this stage worked best at the height of its potential power. This is why the ARC development program, despite the emphasis on building infrastructures, is classified more appropriately as "local development type," rather than "resource development type" such as the federal program implemented by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Furthermore, since the 1980s, the program has shifted the emphasis of major development on to the development of distressed counties and increasingly employed human-based measures by directly providing resources to the individuals in need. At this stage, then, the ARC development can be considered to have entered the stage of sustainable development with eradication of poverty being the first priority on its policy agenda. As for the assessment of ARC programs, there are two very opposed views of what and how much the ARC has achieved in its prolonged existence. In general, advocates for more broad-based development approaches criticize the ARC for adopting growth center-oriented development strategies, which they consider as further cementing the present core-peripheral structure and not altering the structural distortions. In fact, it is at the grassroots level of development initiatives that such issues have been challenged and tackled.

Development initiatives at the grassroots level have grown into a significant countervailing power in Appalachia. In a detailed analysis of local initiatives by the author elsewhere (FUTAGAMI, 2002), four major epochs are identified for the development of grassroots organizing, at each of which the local initiative took a different configuration of social movement for a varying cause. In connection with the present discussion, it is the "structural reform approach" at the third stage from the late 1970s to 1980s, with which grassroots organizations for the first time tackled the fundamental problem of structural impediments on a region-wide scale. According to Gaventa's model of quiescence and rebellion, it had been considered to be very unlikely for an open conflict type of challenge to lead to any substantial and broad-based movement when obstacles were still firmly set within the social system to prevent any challenge from surfacing. In fact it was a natural disaster that created a situation of crisis, under which local residents came to face the resource-less reality of their livings, only realizing how much they were deprived of natural resources in the very places where they live. In other words, the unordinary situation of crisis helped to bring back the consciousness of inequality that had been latently embedded in the system, preventing it from surfacing and materializing as an issue to act upon. This stage witnessed the first-time grassroots organizing involving a broad range of grassroots organizations as well as local residents. The movement at this stage lasted for about a decade, probably not long enough to fully institutionalize the outcomes of the movement.

A review of grassroots movement at this stage clearly shows the potentials as well as the limitations of development initiatives at the grassroots level. The key organization to lead the movement at this stage was the Appalachian Alliance. It was formed in 1977 to deal with the aftermath of the severe flooding on West Virginia's Tug River. Upon the formation of a regional alliance, grassroots organizing in Appalachia began picking up great momentum. The Alliance succeeded in mobilizing many grassroots groups as well as a great number of local residents throughout the region, from Pennsylvania to Georgia. The initial objective of the movement was to bring up the issue of monopolistic land ownership on the political arena. The immediate cause of forming the Alliance was government failure to respond to the needs of an estimated 20,000 people, who had lost their houses in the massive flooding throughout the Central Appalachian coal region; the local government refused to seize corporate land for the purpose of providing the victims with alternative home sites. Angered at the lack of available land despite the vast land and rich natural resources of the region, citizens and activists together issued a call for a region-wide study and action focused on the very issue of land ownership distribution. Although centering on the land issue, the Alliance quickly broadened the scope of their issues, including needs for human services, environmental problems, unfair taxation, and government accountability. However, it proved later that the openness to a wider range of issues made it difficult for the Alliance to prioritize and act on an agenda.

Among the many projects the Alliance initiated in its ten-year history, the Appalachian Land Ownership Study is considered to be the landmark of grassroots organizing through the empowerment of community organizations and their leaders. A strong coalition emerged among a number of grassroots organizations, receiving project-based grants from the Ford Foundation in the private sector and the Appalachian Regional Commission in the government sector (fig. 4). As for regional-level support, the Highlander Center and the Commission on Religion in Appalachia (CORA) backed up the Alliance as region-based intermediary organizations, channeling foundation funds to the Alliance. As discussed above, the findings of the study disclosed the prevalence of absentee landownership patterns throughout the region: people living outside the counties owned 72 percent of the property surveyed. The study has had a substantial impact on grassroots organizing initiatives. In response to a call to action that would alter both the land ownership patterns and their impacts, a number of organizations that had participated in the study formed new organizations to tackle the fundamental problems of the region with



Fig. 4: A network of grassroots organizing through the Appalachian Alliance.

full strength and solid information.

The movement led by the Alliance has been highly assessed, particularly for the achievement of the land ownership study as a participatory action research. In the process of engaging in the land survey that covered over 80 counties, organizational and human networks have developed throughout the region, which has laid the foundation for further expansion of grassroots organizing. At the same time, the Alliance's movement demonstrated some weaknesses that are inherent in such a coalition type of organizing. The coalition continued to grow through the 1980s, attracting more than 30 member groups with a broad range of interests. After the remarkable success of the land ownership study, the Alliance found it difficult to form a cohesive new project due to a crisis of member autonomy in addition to competition among its members and between it and some of its members. Since the Alliance was put to rest in 1987, a region-wide grassroots movement on such a grand scale has never taken place again. Instead, grassroots organizations have become more active in formulating specific issues and acting upon them with clear-cut directions and tactics. Such efforts have materialized to bring forth substantiative outcrops to their targeted communities and the Appalachian region as a whole; the current generation of issues-based organizing movements has opened up a new dimension of local initiative. Since the 1980s the region has witnessed an outburst of grassroots organizing around multiple issues among membership-run organizations, which have developed a rich web of horizontal and vertical relations with other local and national organizations.

In fact, development initiatives at the grassroots level contributed to the region in three fundamental ways; that is, causing changes in resource, norm, or organizing. Resource is a collective concept consisting of human resource (e.g. labor, knowledge), physical resource (e.g., land, water), economic resource (e.g., monetary capital, credit), and social resource (e.g., trust and bondage as social capital). Norm governs how those resources should be organized, and what quantity and quality of changes should be brought into the targeted community or region. Each culture has developed its own mechanism of implanting norms among the members of a community through myth, value system, and ideology.

Within this context of development, grassroots organizations could perform three types of function as mediating structures to enhance the development of their community:

- First, they could affect the norm itself, often by advocating for norms for development alternative to the existing ones.
- Second, they could enhance the capacity of those various types of resources, for example by supplying goods or means to interest groups so as to improve the production of the local economy.
- Third, they could strengthen the capacity of organizing, for example by providing local organizations with some technical and managerial assistance.

In sum, a review of development endeavors at the government and grassroots levels demonstrates the point that each type of development initiative alone is not sufficient to alter the situation of the most poverty-stricken communities in the first western frontier of the expanding American economy. The experiences of major government programs such as ARC programs demonstrate that those development organizations have adopted the bureaucratic type of social system that has enabled them to carry out federally designed programs in regional settings. Consequently, their front-line organizations are of the rational type such as cooperatives supplying commodities or production means to their members, or lower-tier governing agencies that are supposed to identify the needs of local residents yet often lack linkages with real stakeholders. The bureaucratic system has often led to the situation of "government failures," in which resources tend to be either distributed too thinly over numerous areas to bring about any significant effect or in which the distribution of resources reflects the power structure of local society, thus contributing to maintaining the status quo. With such government investment and incentives, private firms were lured to relocate their factories into those rural areas. Although this has brought about economic growth by certain degrees, the outcomes of development were not evenly distributed in spatial and social terms and the progress of the regional economy as a whole cost the

region environmental destruction as the trade-off of economic growth. Hence, the situation of "market failures" was evident in these cases, as private for-profit enterprises as well as growth-oriented development agencies have caused so-called "free-rider" problems by neglecting to pay a fair share of the cost of protecting public goods.

Moreover, it has become clear that although the private nonprofit sector has become expected to play a more vital role in regional development than ever before, it cannot replace the roles played by the government sector or the for-profit sector. As shown in the case of many Appalachian impoverished communities with limited social capital, nonprofit grassroots organizations alone are not able to mobilize resources sufficiently and effectively enough to bring up the volume of production at the local level while advocating the needs of local residents through the initiative of organizing community. The "nonprofit failure" refers to such inherent limitations of nonprofit organizations, particularly the financial and managerial aspects of their operation.

Therefore, any operation pursued by a single sector without paying due regard to its impacts on other aspects of development is doomed to end with some type of "failure," sooner or later. That is why development through partnership among diverse sectors of a society has drawn increasing attention as an alternative model for developing impoverished communities in rural areas as well as neighborhoods in inner cities. Namely, an alliance needs to be formed among diverse sectors, and their collaborative efforts have to be synthesized through a mechanism of an alternative social system in order to achieve sustainable regional development. A new trend of synthesizing government and local community initiatives has emerged, which will be discussed in the remaining section in more detail.

Underlying issues in sustainable regional development

The concept of sustainable development is essentially concerned with three realms of generating mechanism (fig. 5):

- production of goods and wealth;
- reproduction of human beings; and,
- regeneration of the natural environment.

The span of the producing, reproducing or regenerating cycle differs significantly among these three components; a short-term perspective tends to govern the production mechanism of goods and wealth whereas a medium-term perspective (i.e. a generation) and a long-term perspective need to be adopted in dealing with the reproduction of human beings and with the regeneration of the natural environment, respectively. Consequently, unless the three spheres are mediated and balanced against each other, the short-term economic development for the production of goods and wealth, for example, inevitably leads to the overexploitation of resources in the human and physical spheres. Norms need to be established to govern the way these three realms of concern are balanced with each other. In other words, the norms that are compatible with the concept of sustainable development have to be institutionalized by means of legislation.

Since the 1990s, beyond the dichotomy of government intervention and grassroots advocacy, there has emerged a new trend of synthesizing various aspects of development into collaborative and comprehensive initiatives. Out of such initiatives, alternative social systems have been sought and constructed, most noticeably in the realm of local community development. Figure 6 shows the multifaceted dimensions of current movements for constructing alternative social systems



Fig. 5: Three realms of concern and the institution to govern development norms.



Fig. 6: Multifaceted dimensions of current movements for creating a new social system.

in the United States, which may be grouped into four major movements, i.e. community initiative, community organizing, political devolution, and sustainable development. It is the synergy of these movements that has become a substantive force in revitalizing impoverished communities in urban and rural areas.

Although all these efforts have come to materialize in a synergetic way since the 1990s with their current practices overlapping with each other to a great extent, they differ fundamentally in terms of theoretical orientation as well as operatiional mechanism. As figure 6 shows, each type of movement has emphasized a particular dimension of social system more than other dimensions, depending on the roles, tools, and rules conventionally assigned to each type of leading institution for carrying out the core mission. Although what characterizes the current movement is the convergence and crossover among these different types of institutions, it is crucial to understand what each type of movement has achieved and what areas still need to be developed. Hence, in the following section, the current movements for sustainable development will be examined at each dimension.

Economic dimension: Movement of community initiative

The movement of community initiative presents some model cases for demonstrating how interaction among subsystems can serve "functional prerequisites" of social systems, with the function of *adaptation* served the most successfully. In those cases, the mechanism of *economy* has worked well with intermediary organizations playing a vital role in mobilizing resources from diverse sources for attaining public goals. The movement of community initiative in the present context refers to the latest generation of the neighborhood-based development endeavors that had its origins in the war on poverty and the civil rights movement in the 1960s. For the last 30 years, the movement has grown into the Community Development Corporation (CDC) movement, first in urban centers, and later and gradually permeated into rural areas.

Starting in the early 1980s, the capacity of CDCs became strengthened and the rate of growth in the number of CDCs increased dramatically; this has been primarily due to the central role played by the large national financial intermediaries

such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), the Enterprise Foundation, and the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. Furthermore, since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new generation of "comprehensive community initiatives" (CCIs) has been funded. Supported in large part by private foundations, the initiatives aim to reform human service and collateral systems in geographically bounded communities. Although the community initiative movement has evolved by adopting various models of community development, what underlies the whole movement is the principle of making capitalism work in poor communities; the private sector has played the primary role in mobilizing resources. And it is the role of intermediary organizations that pool abundant capital from the private sector into a financial package, which is transferred to community development organizations at the local level (figs. 7 and 8).

In addition to the systematic support of community initiatives, public policies have helped to enforce the capacity of CDCs. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 has established the Community Development Block Grant, which has functioned as a significant government subsidy to CDCs. Furthermore, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 has made it a rule for financial corporations to make a fair contribution to the communities where they operate through a set amount of investment. Furthermore, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Act of 1986 has provided tax benefits to private investors for the development of low-income housing. This has enabled such intermediaries as LISC to pool capital from the private sector through its subsidiary, the National Equity Fund (NEF), which is the nation's largest nonprofit syndicator of low-income housing tax credits.

Here the focus is on the community development initiatives that have emerged in rural areas in general and the key organizations driving the initiatives in the study region in particular. Although the CDC movement is a widespread social phenomenon throughout the nation, researchers have focused mainly on the role of CDCs serving inner city residents in urban areas; little has been discussed as regards the role of CDCs in rural areas. Most importantly, rural CDCs differ from their urban counterparts in terms of capacity for attaining goals of



Fig. 7: Interaction among sectors in community initiative, and the role of intermediaries.



Fig. 8: Formulating sustainable development indicators and constructing sustainable community development across governmental and nongovernmental sectors. Note: the private nonprofit intermediaries with asterisks have served for the President's Council on SD as consulting organizations to provide information.

community development. And the social system for supporting rural CDCs is not as firmly established as in the case of urban CDCs.

The Urban Institute estimates that there are 1,700 rural community developers, accounting for some 48 percent of the 3,600 community-based developers nationwide. The first comprehensive survey of rural community developers was conducted in 1998, as part of the National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED) Fourth Census. The "Stand Up for Rural America" survey, as it was called, drew 1,079 responses from rural community developers. Rural CDCs have become incorporated more recently than their urban counterparts. The median year of incorporation for rural community-based development organizations is 1989 whereas it was during the 1970s that urban CDCs grew rapidly. Furthermore, overall support for rural development has been

way below the sufficient level. The rural community development industry receives less support from almost all sources of financial support, apart from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, than does its urban counterpart (table 2). Its opportunities for earned income are considerably smaller, and its access to credit and capital is far below its potential for generating positive returns. In other words, community developers serving rural communities exclusively receive less support from fewer sources of funding in comparison with their urban counterparts serving cities and the adjacent areas; there exists a wide gap in support structure between rural and urban development organizations.

As for the intermediary supporting system of rural CDCs, consolidating rural community-building initiatives on a national scale had lagged behind until recent years. At last in 1994, the above-mentioned Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) began to include rural CDCs as part of its network. The Rural LISC was established in the following year with three basic missions. The launching of national intermediaries such as LISC into the rural development industry symbolizes the dawning of a new phase for rural America, the area which had thus far received less attention than their urban counterparts from public policy makers, planners, practitioners, and above all, private developers and investors. Not only in the private nonprofit sector, changes seem to emerge in the government sector as well. One such change is the creation of USDA Rural Development in 1994, which is an outcome of various USDA agencies being forged into a new mission area. In attempting to reverse the downward spiral of job losses, out-migration and diminishing services in less competitive nonmetropolitan areas, USDA Rural Development is forging new partnerships with rural communities, funding projects that bring housing, community facilities, utilities and other services, and providing technical assistance and financial backing for rural businesses and cooperatives to create quality jobs in rural areas. However, from the experiences of urban community development, it should be pointed out that there is some degree of uncertainty about whether or not such categorical project-oriented types of investment can have any significant effect on the course of rural development. Namely, what is crucial for reaching the "landing-off" level of regional maturity in the development trajectory is being able or not to construct a social system that could secure a continuous flow of capital from the private sector through the pooling mechanism of financial intermediaries, with sufficient seed capital and running expenditures being provided by the government sector.

Table 2
Proportions of rural and urban community developers by sources of support

Sources*	Rural**	Mixed***	Urban
Private	(%)	(%)	(%)
Banks	29	49	49
Corporations	12	25	35
Foundations	32	44	52
Intermediaries	20	29	42
Religious Institutions	16	22	22
United Way	12	14	13
Earned Income			
Developer Fees	17	32	40
LIHTC Fees	16	25	26
Project Packaging Fees	6	9	5
Service Fees	11	18	14
Public			
USDA (All Programs)	28	22	1
US HHS (CSBG)	20	12	3
US HUD (All Programs)	59	NA	81
US Treasury Dept. (CDFI)	2	NA	1
SBA Microloans	3	7	2
State Government	39	46	37
Local Government	19	35	26

Notes:
* Sources providing $50,000, or more, in support over the four-year period 1994 through 1997.
** Community developers serving rural areas only.
*** Mixed rural and urban communities where only part of the community lies outside of metropolitan area having a city of 50,000 or more.
NA: not available.
(*Sources: Rural LISC; Rural Developments* 4, September/Fall 1999, p. 17).

Physical dimension: Sustainable community development movement

Another significant force for reconstructing a new social system is the global and national movement of sustainable community development. While the community development initiative has contributed the most to strengthening the economic dimension of fortifying a social system, the movement of sustainable development demands that the new system should be reconstructed so as to enable a balanced development between environment (i.e. ecological soundness and quality of life) and economic growth. Increasingly discussed in recent years are the benchmarks and indicators that can monitor the course of development and assess the alternative development that is environmentally sound and effectual for the enhancement of social equity. The current movement of formulating "sustainable community development indicators (SCDI)" has been taking place at multiple levels and sectors.

Sustainability requires multidimensional indicators that show the links between the community's economy, the environment, and society. Hence, sustainable indicators are designed to reflect the reality that the three different segments are very tightly interconnected. In accordance with the movement of formulating the frameworks for sustainable development indicators by the leading international and national agencies, over 200 communities around the nation have developed sets of indicators that help them foresee long-term trends of the economic, environmental, and social well-being of their communities. Consequently, there have emerged some private nonprofit organizations that serve the function of clearing house for providing communities with up-to-date information and encouraging communication among them (fig. 8).

As for constructing sustainable community development, five basic concepts of sustainable development are commonly integrated into locally applicable operations. That is, sustainable communities adopt "a long-term perspective" for decision making that is "participatory and transparent." With the recognition of the "interdependence" of economic, environmental, and social well-being, they solve problems with a "proactive prevention" approach. Furthermore, they promote "equity" between generations and among different groups in society.

The Metropolitan and Rural Strategies Task Force of the President's Council on Sustainable Development is a leading advocate in the government sector for sustainable community development. As to how sustainable community initiatives have worked in practice, the task force has presented case studies throughout the nation at three levels; that is, municipality level, organizational (or programmatic) level, and state level. A review of their case studies demonstrates that sustainable community development initiatives inevitably involve community organizing. Unlike conventional development schemes, which were focused first on built capital, then on human capital and natural capital, sustainable community development emphasizes the social capital of community, that is, connections (i.e. bonding and bridging) across sectors and levels (fig. 9). In other words, sustainable community development aims at enhancing the social capital as much as other types of community capital. That is why sustainable development is con-



Fig. 9: Four types of community capital: built capital, human capital, natural capital, and social capital. *(Source:* Hart Environmental Data, Inc. (renamed Sustainable Measures, Inc.), a diagram of community capital, partly modified to emphasize social capital among the four types of capital).

cerned with not only the physical dimension (i.e. the SDI movement) but also the social dimension of community development (i.e. community organizing). Case studies of sustainable community development have been increasingly conducted from the perspective of social capital, i.e. multiple linkages among numerous participants in community building. In fact, the questions of social capital and sustainable community development are twofold. The first question is as to how sustainable community development has activated community organizing (i.e. bonding) and networking (i.e. bridging), thus increasing the social capital of targeted communities. Then, the next question is as to how community organizing in turn has affected the social dimensions of community development. In other words, the critical questions are addressed as to what function the community organizing movement has performed and to what extent social equity has been achieved through the initiatives. Here, only a brief discussion is made as to the current trend of community organizing in the study region in relation to the above-mentioned sustainable community development movement. The analysis of case studies should take up these questions in fuller scale and scope.

Social dimension: Movement of community organizing

The social dimensions of community development are essentially concerned with the relationships and/or connections between individuals, households, organizations, or sectors. As regards the relationships between development organizations, there are two distinctive types that are most contrary to each other in terms of flow of directions, information, assistance, capital, support, or other types of services or products (fig. 10). Recent community development has contributed to building the networking type of social system. Social capital is crucial in developing the networking type of social system; it consists of networks and norms that enable participants to act together effectively to pursue shared objectives. It has been pointed out that there are two main types of social capital. One is "the type that brings closer together people who already know each other," i.e., "bonding capital," and the other is "the type that brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other," i.e. "bridging capital" (GITTEL and VIDAL, 1998). Many impoverished rural communities lack the linkage to the larger metropolitan area opportunity structure, including financial, technical, social, and political resources. In other words, bridging capital is considered to be the "weak tie" to the opportunity structure that has been poorly established and needs to be enhanced through community development efforts. Community organizing has affected social capital by enhancing bonding and/or bridging capital.

Community organizing was once considered to comprise the core element of community development. Despite the crucial role played by community organizing for the advocacy and political causes, community organizing increasingly gave way to the CDC type of real estate development during the 1970s and 1980s throughout the nation. However, in the study region, community organizing as a community development strategy has gained strength and become prevalent, particularly since the previously discussed Appalachian Alliance movement that took place from the late 1970s to early 1980s. However, at the same time, the nature of community organizing has gradually changed from what is called "confrontational organizing" to "consensus organizing" in Gittell and Vidal's terms. By confrontational organizing, they mean the type of organizing that usually involves political confrontation in one way or another, in order to advocate reforming the inequality or other kinds of flaws systematically embedded in the social system itself. The goal of the movement is to change "the system." As the previous discussion demonstrated, the study region has experienced a series of confrontation organizing to reform the system itself since the second stage of the local initiatives movement, with varying degrees of success or failure.

Since the late 1980s, as political devolution proceeded in many areas of public policy, the role of community organizations has increasingly gained importance in facilitating social development at the local level while the role of federal govern-



Fig. 10: Relationships among organizations: Hierarchical vs. networking.

ment has changed from a direct doer to an indirect supporter. It is this change of political climate in which the alternative development scheme through public-private partnership has gained popularity and credibility as legitimate and feasible ways of meeting multiple often-contradicting needs at the same time. With the idea of private-public partnership becoming a norm of development, the nature of community organizing as community development strategy has changed. Namely, consensus organizing has become a social phenomenon more prevalent than ever before.

On the other hand, according to Gittel and Vidal, consensus organizing differs fundamentally from confrotational organizing in the sense that it aims at not only strengthening internal ties through the development of neighborhood leadership and community-based organizations but also facilitating mutually beneficial relationships between local community-based organizations and the larger metropolitan-area support community. Consensus organizing has increased in the study region at two levels. At one level, there have emerged renewed interests and interventions by nationally based financial intermediaries (e.g. Rural LISC) and the federal government (e.g. Kentucky Highland Empowerment Zone). On the local side this has meant the emergence of new associations and entrepreneurs with a broader social interest than self-interested groups and individuals. At another level, grassroots organizations themselves have begun extending their connections with the national organizations with which they had not been connected before. Through the newly established channels, the community-based organizations have become better connected with new sources of funding, staffing, and technical assistance.

The increased emphasis on consensus organizing, however, does not necessarily mean the disappearance of confrontational organizing. In fact, the confrontational type of community organizing is still strongly pursued among some leading grassroots advocacy groups and organizers in the study region. Instead, consensus organizing should be envisioned as de facto movement toward achieving practical goals, given the constraints and potentials of the development factors surrounding rural low-income communities. This rationalization for pragmatism has much to do with the political dimension of community development that partly reflects distinctive characteristics of the American federal system. This point is briefly discussed in the following section with particular focus on the rationale for private-public partnerships.

Political dimension: Movement of public-private partnership

Community-based partnerships have become one of the key principles in such newly launched comprehensive community development initiatives as the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program. The idea behind the community-based partnerships is that the communities entitled for the 10-year federal EZ/EC funds are required to use the money to secure commitments of additional dollars from state and local government and the private sector. The partnerships to be created through the process of carrying out a strategic plan are envisioned as increasing the degree of coordination and collaboration among public, private, and nonprofit entities in support of zone-improving projects and programs. The concept of public-private partnership emerged in the late 1970s in the United States as a reactive course of political movement against the "big government" thesis undergirding the "Great Society" system that prevailed in American politics in 15 years between 1965 and 1980.

According to John et al. (1996), the American political system has undergone changes in governance type, and there has been a general shift from interest group governance to civic governance in the arena of public policy. Civic governance functions on the basis of a so-called "shadow community," which crosses over the boundaries of public and private, and nonprofit and for-profit to carry out the public's business in an effective way. New Federalism and devolution are the attempt to shift the American form of governance from interest group governance to civic governance.

As is evident from the analysis of sustainable development initiatives at four dimensions of the social system, the concept of sustainable development has dramatically changed our approaches to development issues. It has become clear that regional development should be considered not only in the economic context but also in the social and environmental contexts at the community level. Moreover, it is the institutional context that lays a basic foundation to building a new social system. Ultimately, it is the "capacity" of people for action that has to be enhanced at the local community level.

Conclusion

The idea of regional development as a policy agenda in capitalist economies was an outcome of the New Deal era in the 1930s when the central government intervened in the market by defining the nature and extent of its economic growth and designing a strategic program of action for the achievement of those goals. The Tennessee Valley Authority program became a prototype of resources development based on a river valley at this initial stage of government intervention. Indeed, this was a watershed in development thinking particularly in the United States where the existence of a moving frontier with abundant resources had planted faith in laissez-faire as part of the national mentality. Since then, however, the history and practice of regional development have been marked by continuing tensions between "free market" and "interventionist" paradigms.

From the present analysis, it has become clear that the market, government, and nonprofit sectors alone have failed one way or another to meet the compounding challenges of sustainable development, that is, economy, ecology, and equity. A new framework for sustainable regional development has to be formulated. The central issue is the formation of a social system that would enable all the market, government, local communities, and individuals to participate in the decision-making, constructing, and managing processes of local social development. The key to the ultimate goal is the role of development organizations; it is considered to be more desirable for such organizations to be tied to the existing social organizations at the local level. In the targeted regions in this study, there has evolved a new trend in synthesizing government intervention and local initiatives since the 1990s. Whether or not the evolving synthesis is able to meet the newly emerging challenges for regional development depends on the degree of integration among the socioeconomic sectors and individual actors as well as on the nature of development organizations. Further research should be conducted to evaluate the development outcomes to be performed by these development organizations.

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Marche region, a "marginal" area in Italy: Participation in and exclusion from the Mediterranean megalopolis

"At a distance of some decades, Gottmann's conceptual framework has substantially been proved valid and confirmed by the analysis of the Mediterranean megalopolis, even though economic, social and environmental conditions have arisen which have on the one hand favored an overall process of growth, and on the other resulted in urban 'deconcentration.' Such phenomena can be interpreted as events within a more general urbanization process, although at the same time they may serve as indicators of the specific modalities of the process itself."

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The characteristic features of Marche

In the wake of Jean Gottmann's renowned work on the American East Coast (GOTTMANN, 1961), at the end of the 1970s a group of, prevalently Italian, researchers carried out a broad interdisciplinary study and advanced the hypothesis that a "Mediterranean megalopolis" might be preparing to arise in Northern Italy (MUSCARÀ, 1978). The study aimed at ascertaining the existence of the preconditions required for the establishment in Northern Italy down to the southern borders of Emilia Romagna of a form of development affecting not only the land but also the economic and social sectors in line with Gottman's "megalopolis" concept. The results were consistent with the simultaneous presence of a series of favorable conditions: structural economic indices, the urban and territorial geographic organization, and the presence and organization of higher-level services (advanced tertiary, or the so-called "quaternary" sector).

At a distance of some decades, Gottmann's conceptual framework has substantially been proved valid and confirmed by the analysis of the Mediterranean megalopolis (fig. 1), even though economic, social and environmental conditions have arisen which have on the one hand favored an overall process of growth, and on the other resulted in urban "deconcentration." Such phenomena can be interpreted as events within a more general urbanization process, although at the same time they may serve as indicators of the specific modalities of the process itself.

Regardless of the geographical scale selected by the researchers and of the urban development dynamics at work – which eventually did not allow the megalopolis to materialize completely – the research did not predict how Marche, which lies on the edge of this area (fig. 1), would be affected by this process. This study case can thus be of interest both:

- to investigate how different land dynamics can coexist within the process of megalopolis formation; and,
- to identify the specific forms of innovative evolution that have been at work in this area.

The causes of the specific character which the process of megalopolis formation has exhibited in Marche are multiple: they can be summarized with the fact that this region did not appear to possess all the traits and features that characterized the area involved in that special form of conurbation. Indeed, the views expressed more frequently, especially by research-



Fig. 1: Location of the study area – (a) Marche Region; (b) Mediterranean Megalopolis.



Fig. 2: The provinces of Marche Region – Pesaro, Ancona, Macerata, Ascoli Piceno. The urbanized areas are represented in black, the agricultural areas in medium grey and the wooded areas in dark grey.

ers in economics and sociology, stressed the similarities between the model observed in Marche and the area of the North-East Center (NEC) (fig. 2) of Italy, substantially neglecting the study of the relations between this region and the Po valley megalopolis. The NEC model has inspired a large body of economic as well as geographical and urban policy studies, including seminal contributions by the late Giorgio Fuà, as witnessed by the copious literature (see for instance FUÀ, 1980; FUÀ and ZACCHIA, 1983; ZACCHIA, 1987; FUÀ, 1999).

The NEC model, already foreshadowed in geographical studies by the identification of the features of what was called "*Italia di mezzo*" (intermediate Italy) (MUSCARÀ, 1967), essentially hinges on a combination of pre-existing social conditions and subsequent industrial development of local small and medium-sized enterprises, which resulted in a type of growth that characterized north-east and east-central Italy, from Veneto to Marche. Whereas in Northern Italy the small and medium-size family-owned enterprises, deeply rooted in the rural economy and its social order, gradually began to experience the type of evolution and land transformation that could have led to the formation of a megalopolis, or a similar outcome, Marche remained anchored to the NEC model.

The specific issues at work in this part of the land refer to a special form of transition from a system characterized by interactions and exchanges between organization of the rural areas and the small farming centers, which were well structured and endowed with a definite social and cultural identity but poorly interrelated to the larger urban centers, to one prevalently polarized around the larger towns, especially close to the

coast (GOTTMANN, 1978). It is based on these reflections that the relative stability of Marche's land can be understood, as can the specific manner in which it has succeeded in participating in a wider growth process that probably has the features of megalopolis formation.

The economy in Marche: Industry and agriculture

The strong processes of urban polarization observed in other areas have not taken place in Marche. For instance, the number of inhabitants in the main towns of the province has remained comparatively stable, whereas the high-productivity industrial areas have followed the decentralized organizational model. This evolution has no doubt been favored by land morphology and by the spontaneous formation on the coast of *carrefours*, as if echoing the concept of "teniapolis" introduced by Gottmann (GOTTMANN, 1978).

The complex social and economic situation which these different factors contributed to shaping in north-east and east-central Italy eventually evolved in line with the concept of "homogeneous areas of production" (LAMONICA, 1999). This resulted in an integrated development model characterized:

- geographically, by a number of areas devoted to specialized productions (with the presence of both manufacturing industries and a constellation of ancillary industries); and,
- socially, by the preservation of close bonds with agriculture.

This evolution was marked by the phasing out, since 1964, of the sharecropping system, the traditional economic mainstay of the region. This process freed a large labor force, as witnessed by the fact that in the 1980s employment in agriculture was down to one sixth compared with the 1950s, plummeting from 60 percent of the entire labor force in 1951 to less than 15 percent in 1985 (ZACCHIA, 1987).

The balance between rural population and resources ensured by sharecropping over the centuries had been deteriorating for a long time. Its decline had been initiated in the 19th century by a series of intrinsic and extrinsic causes. The agricultural crisis of the first half of the 19th century was precipitated by the fall (by 30-40 percent) in wheat prices brought about by cheap American and Russian wheat in the late 1880s. Nonetheless, the economic backwardness of Marche in that period was mainly due to the conservatism that marked much of the prevalent sharecropping system, which stifled all technical and entrepreneurial innovation. This system had for centuries ensured stable accommodation and the means for a generally dignified subsistence (PACI, 1987) for a large portion of Marche's population as well as the attentive and consistent care of the land, which, impoverished by centuries of intense exploitation, had become fragile in several respects. The 1964 law banning all new sharecropping contracts and providing for the phasing out of existing ones started a process which in a few years obliterated sharecropping.

A large proportion of the labor force thus made redundant was hired by small and medium-sized family-owned industries that were prevalently located in the hilly areas of the region. Being thus spared actual migration, the workers maintained close ties with their land and their rural origins. This situation is reflected in economic data such as the high incidence of part-time contracts and also the quality of labor relations, which generally eschewed social conflict (FUÀ, 1999). Added to the earnings from their work on the land, the salaries allowed the former sharecropping families to achieve a quality of life that they deemed adequate. This, in turn, allowed them to continue their work on the land and to live in the country, where accommodation was abundant. Indeed, in the early post-war period the rural farmhouses eventually inherited by the former sharecroppers were estimated at 100,000 (ANSELMI, 1985).

The situation was quite different in the mountain areas, the farthest from the sea, which for many years underwent a process of depopulation and desertion of fields and rural settlements. The historical gap between poor, inland mountain areas and medium- and low-altitude hilly areas, which originally opened under the sharecropping system as the gap between mountain areas with typically small individual farms and community use of land and woods on one side, and wheat and multi-culture hilly areas on the other, widened in the course of a period that has aptly been called "fractureless industrialization" (FUÀ, 1983). This gap persists to this day as an unsolved, crucial issue.

Marche's distinctive model of development was not, however, without drawbacks; indeed, it produced considerable consequences on environment and landscape quality which are now plain to see, especially in the low- and mid-altitude hilly areas which were its core. In the "mixed" farming family, several of whose members typically hold jobs in the industrial or the service sector, farming now tends – in terms of importance – to come after such other activities (FUÀ and ZACCHIA, 1983). With farm management ceasing to be a priority, the decisions regarding production are delegated to the upstream and downstream enterprises. In practice, in the framework of the NEC model the persistence of the bond with the land has entailed a number of adverse consequences such as the acceleration of soil erosion processes, increased load of chemical pollutants, flattening of the landscape eco-mosaic, dwindling of biodiversity, and relinquishment of some of the traditional rural buildings.

The process of modernization of the agricultural sector now taking place in Marche, albeit more slowly than in other regions, compounds this evolution. Modernization was required in the first place in order to raise unitary yields (especially of cereals) and meet the growing demand fuelled by national and (especially) European farm policies aimed at raising production. A further reason was to counter the changes that were profoundly affecting the productive, social, economic and cultural order of the rural areas: the shrinking of arable land due to the expansion of urbanized areas, the desertion of marginal farmland (especially in mountain areas), and falling employment figures due to the diffusion of labor-saving technologies, of which mechanization is but the most striking.

Such deep economic and social transformations experienced by the rural areas, typical of the "phase of structural changes" (FABIANI, 1991) in agriculture, were thus in line with the evolution of rural society under the pressure of industrial development. They gradually pushed the region's farming sector towards an industrialization that was accompanied by the multiplication of capitalist enterprises which were characterized by high capital and low labor inputs, or were the inevitable consequence of, and the necessary support to, these changes.

At the time of this evolution, Marche was deeply marked by four centuries of sharecropping, which had revolved on the three pivots of farmhouse, land, and family, and had survived the Second World War. In 1951, sharecropping still accounted for 55 percent of farms and 70 percent of arable land, whereas capitalistic enterprises employing hired labor were a mere 4 percent and farmed less than 1 percent of the land. Thirty years later (ISTAT, 1982), the latter were not much more numerous, but they farmed 26 percent of the land. The long domination of sharecropping slowed the modernization of Marche's agricultural system, which in the first post-war decades remained weighted by a marked technical backwardness, especially in the agronomic sector. In the 1980s, the level of industrialization eventually approached the national average in

terms of saleable gross production, whereas labor productivity exceeded the Italian rates, owing both to declining employment figures and to the rising technological level of the technical inputs – indeed, Marche's farming machine assets are among the more substantial in Italy.

Policy favoring industrial districts, agricultural development and urban networks

When, in the recent past, Italian industrial policy embraced the concept of "district" in Marshall's sense (SORI, 1999) as the basic articulation of the organization of production, Marche's agricultural system was already nearly ready for it. This regards the features described above as well as others, among which infrastructure – albeit this was among those awaiting completion (BALLONI, CUCCULELLI and IACOPINI, 2000). It is also interesting to note that the passage to the district economy was characterized by the rise, as in the whole of Italy, of new forms of enterprise, "the new protagonists," with the transformation of hierarchical relationships into exchanges within "collaborative networks" of structured groups of enterprises (BALLONI and IACOBUCCI, 2000).

The network concept appears suitable not only to describe the relationships among enterprises, but also the nature of the productive structure *latu sensu* (i.e. including the farming sector), of cultural relations, scientific development, and the organization of telematic services.

Indeed, the agricultural sector itself is taking a more integrated view of its role in the processes of development that involve the land. In fact, beginning in the 1990s the reference framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) changed radically as the problem of excess agricultural production escalated and issues came to the fore regarding the role of farming in the environment-land system, issues that can be subsumed under the concepts of "ecologically compatible agriculture" and "sustainable rural development."

Already in the 1980s, the CAP had had to grapple with problems caused by the traditional policy of agricultural incomes protection, which was effected almost exclusively through the support of produce market prices and had involved the introduction of increasingly restrictive production quotas. Farmers reacted by "passively adjusting," based on the signals from the markets and the European support measures, as well as in relation to the available technology.

In Marche, the farming model based on cereals and stock raising (alfalfa and wheat rotation, breeding of Marchigiana cattle, abundance of manure), which had gradually, if at times haltingly, become established since the second half of the 19th century, was disrupted when the CAP began to subsidize milk producers rather more than meat producers and to promote cereals and industrial crops; at the same time, technological development was driving agriculture towards a greater use of chemical fertilizers, greater labor productivity by raising the levels of mechanization, and the elimination of rotation feed crops in favor of industrial feeds based on cereals and oilseeds (soybean, sunflower). In practice, the CAP-shaped farming was standardized to the models of industrial development, it was ever more specialized, concentrated in space, and intensive, with labor increasingly replaced by capital inputs. The previous, varied agricultural landscape gave way to a dull land, poor in life forms and species.

The MacSharry reform of 1992 (EC Reg. 1765/92) began the CAP's restructuring by progressively reducing support for agricultural prices and offering financial compensation to farmers who agreed to change their productive strategy, signally by withdrawing considerable areas from cereal cultures ("set aside"). A series of concomitant measures (EC 2078/92, EC 2080/92) are witness to the change in the philosophical and conceptual approach to the CAP. This change broke the social pact with farmers, which had characterized the European approach to farming since the 1950s and had pledged them to supply the whole range of agricultural products and at the same time look after the land.

Subsidized farming prices aimed at reducing the income gap between urban and rural populations as well as at preserving the well-established functions of the agricultural sector, which traditionally absorbed large amounts of labor (including excess labor from other sectors) and represented an important political-electoral reservoir (BUCKWELL and SOTTE, 1997). In the 1990s, however, the elements on which this pact rested disintegrated: aggressive farming methods and excess of high-energy inputs (e.g. fertilizers, pesticides, weed killers) had an adverse impact on land, air, and water. Yields increased wildly, resulting in excess production, employment figures plummeted, thus also squeezing the vote reservoir, and consumers woke up to the issues of the quality and healthy nature of agricultural products; finally, new forms of farming began to become established, some unrelated to the land (landless farms) and others prevalently directed at supplementing non-farming incomes (part-time farms).

All of this indicates that a new pact between farmers and society is sorely needed, a new system aimed at boosting the competitiveness of the agricultural and food-producing sectors without recourse to protectionist measures, and at improving the relationship between farming and land with a view to better protecting the environmental resources, enhancing their value, and re-qualifying products (BUCKWELL and SOTTE, 1997). Over the last few years, the CAP has acquired a closely integrated character and has begun to highlight the local, specific features of the various areas. It is also acknowledging and rewarding the role played by farmers in environmental and landscape protection and in the enhancement of their value within projects aimed at the balanced development of agricultural and non-agricultural activities in rural areas (sustainable rural development). Such new policy elements are currently being implemented in Marche (though not easily or rapidly) in the framework of the regional plan for rural development (PSR). Its provisions, though largely confined to the strictly agricultural sector, span several years (2000-2006) and may thus be expected to direct effectively the future evolution of the region's countryside.

The core of the current debate in agriculture has therefore shifted from product quantity to its quality, specifically to the need for enhancing the bond between specific areas and their typical products. Farmers are also being stimulated to acquire entrepreneurial skills loosely related to production (externalities, multi-functionalities), like the promotion of rural tourism. This form of tourism is characterized by an interest not merely in agriculture, but also in the landscape (cultural and natural), culture (traditional and diffuse museums, customs, traditions, civilization, art and literature, wine-making and gastronomy), as well as in their harnessing for leisure activities.

In this framework, an analysis and evaluation of the resources of rural areas (activities which, alas, have not consistently inspired planning at the various levels) should aim at enhancing the value of the individual resources as well as of their synergies (e.g. ecologically compatible agriculture and protection of the environmental equilibrium, productive activities and agricultural landscape, historical and architectural heritage, rural tourism). For instance, what would be the chance of success of rural tourism, hence of farm economy diversification, in an area lacking typical products and quality certification? The real challenge thus lies in the concurrent availability of a series of elements: quality food products, a valuable agricultural land-

scape, theme itineraries, cultural and recreational initiatives connected with the local traditions, and whatever else is apt to attract a large and varied public, especially to areas that have remained excluded from the process of agricultural industrialization, i.e. inland hilly and mountain areas.

Such new interest in the development of agriculture *latu sensu* (i.e. including its non-productive functions) could make some traditional activities (like mountain stockraising) more competitive and lead to the establishment of a system of networks (related to ecology, culture, naturalistic activities, the landscape) integrated with the local territory that can restore the link between more and less economically developed areas.

This type of network, clearly an aspect of the concept of material and virtual networks, is consistent in various features of the Mediterranean megalopolis, such as past and present infrastructure, services, and urban extension, whereas in the case of Marche's marginal areas the material networks appear less solid.

More recent geographical studies (DEMATTEIS, 1999) have shown that, if one excludes the scanty, large-meshed urban structure resulting from the historical arrangement of rural settlements, Marche is in fact closely connected to the more substantial network system of central-northern Italy. Thus, despite the considerable differences between the northern, central and southern areas of Marche (which indeed originally consisted of four distinct administrative regions), the overall character of this region appears once again elusive, strongly biased towards innovation (especially of a technological and entrepreneurial nature) under some respects, and under others still solidly bound to a development model that is largely local.

Decentralization and globalization: New prospects for the urban system of Marche

If these characteristics (which stem from its belonging to a local model) have allowed Marche to evolve in a distinctive way, also eschewing some of the adverse consequences of the post-industrial model of development, they are also irresistibly drawing it into the global growth process. The problems this entails from the strictly urban standpoint are those connected with overall sustainability. Although many of these problems are shared by the vast majority of urban areas, they also exhibit specific local features (HALL and PFEIFFER, 2000).

Exclusion from the megalopolis that failed to arise in Northern and Central Italy, or anyway from an evolutionary process characterized by specific conditions, has, as mentioned above, penalized Marche in the decades in which this process was at its peak. One instance of this is the unbalanced growth of the road infrastructure, which in turn produced a disequilibrium in land use and demographic concentration between coastal and inland areas that hampered economic growth, brought deterioration of the coastal environment, and led to the cultural isolation of mountain areas.

Nonetheless, elements have recently been emerging that allow one to make a different assessment and to consider the consequences of this exclusion even positive in some respects. Indeed, where urban development is concerned, a sum of factors has prevented the formation of large, congested urban areas. And even though Ancona has been legislatively qualified as a "metropolitan area," the minor towns included in such an area have maintained their autonomy, participating in the overall development but preserving their social cohesion and cultural identities.

This also applies to areas outside the metropolitan zone, for instance the area along the Pesaro-Urbino road, where the different municipalities, far from being passively sucked in, have contributed to creating the embryo of a functional, rather than structural, network. These processes of reorganization, albeit not giving rise to urban concentrations, have nonetheless prevented the depopulation of those areas and their evolution, always possible, into degraded peripheries.

It may thus be safely stated that this social and economic system, though not producing outstandingly successful areas, has been able to create an island of comparative stability capable, by virtue of its considerable ability to restructure, of nimble reactions to the changes in the world economy despite its close ties with it. The shoe-manufacturing industry concentrated in the provinces of Macerata and Ascoli Piceno, the manufacturing area around Fabriano and Iesi, and the concentration of furniture manufacturers around Pesaro are witness to this ability (SORI, 1999) (fig. 2). In these and other instances, the passage from one economic phase to the next has been ably negotiated by connecting the industrial economy to a network of services, thus enhancing product quality and their added value (LAMONICA, 1999).

Further positive consequences are related to land organization. Indeed, whereas the early phase of urban concentration along the coast, favored by the Adriatic infrastructural bundle, resulted in the depopulation of the mountain areas, things changed again after a period of stabilization, with repopulation of the areas immediately inland, the eventual recovery of many areas abandoned by farmers, and a renewed awareness of the need for preserving the agricultural landscape and enhancing its value. These areas are important for the local economy, signally for tourism, and will become even more so if the processes of ecologically compatible re-qualification of agriculture can in the future take place in a balanced, sustainable manner.

Conclusion

Thus, once again Marche is an area of transition between the geographical North and South of Italy as well as between its different social paradigms, half-way between a "fast-paced" and a "slower" lifestyle, between a secluded agricultural past and a networked future. Its equilibrium can become more stable or weaker depending on the political choices which the local governance shall make to manage the local complexities and their connections with the global economy. However, to exploit these features to the best, this governance needs to become culturally more aware and to take part in the new processes without confining itself to recording them.

The first and foremost issue to be addressed is infrastructural development, which has also been penalized by Marche's comb-like morphology, and which should establish a connection to the main national and international traffic routes (REGIONE MARCHE, 2000). This should not only be accomplished at zero environmental cost, but should also be seen as an opportunity to establish an organizational model able to enhance the quality of the region and of its people's life.

The strengthening of the existing network requires a cultural growth capable of exploiting the interdependences between local situations and global requirements and the reinforcement of the economic structure by the creation of centers of excellence that can sustain the high-technology drive of productive activities. This should however also be mirrored in tangible improvements in urban quality through better architecture and management of the resources of urban areas. That which has so far been lacking in Marche's process of development is the most profound of the revolutions caused by urbanization (GOTTMANN, 1978), something that in Gottmann's opinion occurs in the fields of aesthetics and the art of living. Gottmann inherently connects this transformation with the development



Fig. 3: Good Governance: a wide concept with sustainable development as its core objective (*Source*: Hall and Pfeiffer, 2000, modified).

of the "quaternary" sector as the central element in the new urban economy.

This growth should aim at establishing a suitably articulated governance resting on some essential principles: co-existence of subsidiarity and solidarity, introduction of new forms of partnership between local administrations and society, the identification of priorities, decentralization, improvements in ecological efficiency, and implementation of a truly ecologically compatible urban management (fig. 3).

It is thus essential that the parameters underpinning the choices of a governance thus articulated correctly value the transition areas, which are indispensable for the consolidation of the "central" areas within an overall process of growth which should envisage, and indeed seek, an ever closer connection between economic requirements, social needs, and the preservation and support of environmental quality.

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Jean Gottmann first joins the activities of Ekistics

The 1964 Delos Symposion

Jean Gottmann chairing a morning session of the Symposion on board ship. Left: Margaret Mead.

General view of the closing session of the 1964 Delos Symposion (Delos Two) at the ancient theater on the island of Delos (21 July, 1964).

In the footsteps of Jean Gottmann: From Le Havre to harbors between globalization and the quest for identity

"The case is clear: geographers need to rehabilitate the notion of territory and more precisely the notion of infra-national territory as a counterpoint to globalization. Man wants to be someone but come from somewhere. Spinoza, according to Jacques Lévy, tells us that man has a 'natural need for civil status' which is linked to the feeling of being active within a close-knit community."

François Gay

The author has had a double role as professor (regional and urban geography) and as a specialist of problems of town planning. He was influenced by the thinking of Jean Gottmann. As a teacher he taught first history at Lycée François 1er in Havre (1946-1962), then as professor of Geography in the University of Rouen and visiting professor in various US Universities: Southern Illinois, Arizona State, etc. He has published articles or books on Normandy, Benelux, Italy and the United States. He directed the review Etudes Normandes *(1974-2003) and was researcher or consultant on various committees of town planning (Basse Seine, Rouen, Ville Nouvelle-Val de Reuil).*

Introduction

As an introduction to this article entitled "In the footsteps of Jean Gottmann," I would like to briefly conjure up some personal memories. I hope they will shed light on the great personality of this master and friend since 1946. They also explain my choice of subject for this discussion on globalization, cultural identity and local development, paying special attention to Le Havre and to its estuary which I had the opportunity, long ago and on numerous occasions, to help Jean Gottmann get to know.

Jean Gottmann and Le Havre

I came to know Jean Gottmann on a personal level because of my links with Le Havre, in a time (long past) when Jean Gottmann used to go, as he called it, "on his transatlantic transhumances" which were then under the control of the TRANSAT liners between Le Havre and New York. This was the period between 1946 and 1955 (figs. 1 and 2).

Then a teacher at the Lycée François 1er, I had sent a letter to Jean Gottmann, courtesy of Armand Colin Publishers, to praise his two articles published in *Annales de géographie* and in *Annales ESC,* particularly MER ET TERRE *esquisse de géographie politique en 1947* and which had appeared to me as two tokens of the strong renewal of French geography in the immediate post-war era. I discovered much later that geographers as varied as P. Pinchemel, J. Bastié and others had had the same reaction.

Jean Gottmann replied immediately in his elegant style and said "I'm taking the boat from Le Havre to the United States: we must meet." And so we did. Many circumstances made it possible for us to meet on numerous other occasions subsequently, particularly through my father, then an officer on the "Liberté," who looked after the geographer during his many trips on the French Line.

At my request, Jean Gottmann gave several talks at the Chamber of Commerce of l'Ecole Supérieur de Commerce in Le Havre where I also used to teach. As time went on, Jean Gottmann wrote many articles for a new review on maritime economy published in Le Havre and called *La revue de la Porte Océane.* I was involved in the editorial side of the review, along with A. Vigarié who was, on an intellectual level, one of its main driving forces (fig. 3).

It was in this pioneering review, whose originality lay in its field of studies, namely maritime economy and port ecology as well as in his conferences that he experimented with many of his ideas on the relationship between cities and harbors, a theme which is today prevalent among geographers and planners. Proof of this is the Association Internationale Villes-Ports which is currently based in Le Havre (GOTTMANN, 1948, pp. 11-16), The same applies to the megalopolitan phenomenon which he used to describe as a "key region" in the North East of the USA (GOTTMANN, 1951, pp. 9-14 and 11-20) (figs. 3 and 4).

I think Gottmann really liked the city and the harbor of Le Havre, "Porte Océane," gateway to America. It was there that he could satisfy his taste for the open sea, an opening onto the world which would be one of the main features of his vast knowledge.

Because of its unique cosmopolitan character, Le Havre brought him in contact with an entire tradition of which he felt he was somewhat the inheritor. This tradition was personified by two prominent figures from Normandy, both of whom influ-



Fig. 1: Location of Le Havre in Europe.



Fig. 2: Le Havre – City core in construction in 1958 or 1959.



REVUE DE

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PRIX 80 FRANCS

MARS 1951

André Gide africain — J. de Guerchy

Mer et Terre
La region charnière de l'économie américaine — J. Gottmann

Echanges internationaux
Les problèmes actuels du commerce international - II — F. J. Gay

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L'ÉCONOMIE MARITIME AU HAVRE ET DANS LE MONDE

Mer et Terre
La région charnière de l'économie américaine
J. Gottmann

Fig. 3: Cover of *Revue de "La Porte Océane,"* 7th year – no. 71, March 1951, containing in the section "Mer et Terre" an article by Jean Gottmann on "La région charnière de l'économie américaine" (see also fig. 2).



La région charnière
de l'économie américaine

Jean GOTTMANN

CROQUIS DE LA RÉGION CHARNIÈRE

ETAT DE NEW YORK
BOSTON
NEW YORK
PHILADELPHIE
WASHINGTON
BALTIMORE
OCEAN ATLANTIQUE

Fig. 4: The beginning of the article by Jean Gottmann on "La région charnière de l'économie américaine" and a page-size map entitled "Croquis de la région charnière" and signed (bottom right) "J. Gottmann 1951" (*Source: Revue de "La Porte Océane,"* March 1951).

enced him greatly: A. de Tocqueville and A. Siegfried. Gottmann had indeed collaborated for a while with the latter, as he recalls in his contribution to our special edition of *Etudes Normandes*, dedicated to this geographer from Le Havre (*Etudes Normandes,* 1989, no. 2).

For Gottmann, Le Havre represented contact with big international trade, which he subsequently analyzed with great foresight in his book *Marchés de matières premières* (GOTTMANN, 1957). He was curious about everything: I can still see him jotting down the results of his observations in his small "omo-ring" notebooks during the meetings I organized for him, when he would write down an idea or a piece of information which he was so clever at incorporating into his lectures, which always contained a wealth of information gleaned from his own experience.

In Le Havre, he was at the crossroads of some of the major themes that constituted his work, which we often discussed either in Normandy (fig. 5), in Oxford (figs. 6 and 7) or in the United States. Thus, we talked about the geography of harbors, incorporating the very complex notion of "gateway." He had indeed for several years been leading the Commission of Harbours of the International Geographic Union. National planning/planned development was also one of his concerns, as illustrated in the work he published in 1952 at Armand Colin on the subject of *Land Use Planning: Regional Planning and Geography.* Moreover, he encouraged me to give my first talk

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Fig. 5: Jean Gottmann with the author's students in Rouen, June 1976.

Figs. 6 and 7: Jean Gottmann with François Gay's students on a visit to Hertford College, Oxford.

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on this theme at the IGU congress in Washington in 1952. Finally, he found in Le Havre an interesting starting point for analyzing the urban phenomenon in a city which is three times "born": at its creation in 1517 by King François 1er, following a sudden expansion at the end of the 19th century and, above all, because of the reconstruction that took place after the *tabula rasa* of 1944.

It was indeed in this city, as early as 1946, that a series of research seminars and thought processes began in areas close to those broached in this symposium. They began by exploring a theme that Jean Gottmann would later refine with the notion of "iconography." Thus, in 1946, on the initiative of the Institut Havrais de Psychologie des Peuples, a journal was published which dealt with this particular field of study and which incorporated the stereotypes and images of peoples. Jean Gottmann wrote a report of this journal in the prestigious American periodical *Geographical Review* (GOTTMANN, 1948b).

Not long afterwards, within the same intellectual circle, the *Cahiers de Sociologie Economique* were launched, again in Le Havre. They specialized in areas largely inspired by Jean Gottmann's thinking and have been mentioned earlier: harbors and harbor ecology, on the initiative of A. Vigarié; forms of new urbanization; unequal development.[1]

Finally, amongst all the theories that could so easily be applied to a harbor city such as Le Havre, there was an exploration of the concept of territory, the originality of which A.L. Sanguin demonstrated better than anybody else in his book *La géographie française à l'époque classique,* and which resulted in Gottmann's important work *The Significance of Territory* (GOTTMANN, 1973) following his remarkable portrayal of *Virginia at Mid-century* (published by Henry Holt in 1955).

Harbors between globalization and the quest for identity

The contradiction between the unique nature of territory ("Platonist isolationism") and globalization ("Alexandrine cosmopolitism") was a recurring theme in our conversations (GAY, 1994a). He felt strongly in his own life the tension between universalism and the quest for cultural identity.

A great traveller himself, he was a citizen of the world, straddling two continents, increasingly fascinated, towards the end of his life, by the Far East. But he was also very interested in his own cultural roots, steeped in a great Greco-Latin culture. People around him knew how important his regular trips to Athens (with Doxiadis), Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa were to him.

Thus, Jean Gottmann was a pioneer in analyzing the tension between the global and the local, between networks and territories, between the need for roots and the desire to cross over borders. Harbor cities, because they were immersed in the global economy and because of the strong roots of their leader groups, were privileged grounds for studying these notions further.

Using Le Havre as an example of a modest harbor city on a world scale but a significant one in terms of the aforementioned tension, we used to discuss these various themes, and I now set out to explore their geographical impact. Even though he explores the divisions which are *internal* to territory in greater details in his other works, Jean Gottmann makes a very insightful analysis of the link between territory and sovereignty in his book *The Significance of Territory.* There he stresses how territory has to cope with the inequalities of space.

Globalization and territory

- **Globalization:** This is not the place to analyze the phenomenon of globalization, a process whose description was refined by Jean Gottmann when he described it at work in the big metropolis networks which he called – and this is an example of his extensive knowledge – the "Alexandrine system." Globalization has indeed become a favorite theme of politicians, essayists and the media, even though its *complexity* has not yet been fully grasped. Jean Gottmann clearly demonstrated that the globalization of the world economy should not be reduced to the speeding up of such a phenomenon as the movement of people, goods, ideas and currency (GOTTMANN, 1983).

The *world net* and the *internet* are only the most recent and most spectacular signs of this phenomenon. But there is continuity in the processes, which leads to a sharp lowering of the cost of transporting goods, linked to the huge expansion of marine traffic and harbors as well as to the transport of various goods "in bulk" by container. For many products, the cost of transport within national boundaries over a distance of 300 miles is higher than transporting the same products internationally over thousands of miles.

Thanks to computerization (Le Havre was indeed one of the first harbors to become computerized), documents circulate faster than the corresponding goods and the latter can change hands several times during transportation. On the subject of "networks of networks" in the virtual cyber world, Paul Virilio, the fashionable sociologist, was only transposing Jean Gottmann's vision when he described "the phenomenon of the virtual city, a sort of world-wide hyper centre of which the megalopolises are only the outskirts, the periphery."

The "compression" of time thanks to digital systems goes hand in hand with the compression of space due to advances in telecommunications and, more generally, advances in transport.

During my meetings with Jean Gottmann we spoke of the "negative side effects" of this evolution: the temptation to think only in terms of flows and networks and to neglect concrete spaces – the local, the regional. We spoke also of the consequences of the lack of spatial or temporal reference points for populations requiring accommodation, a space for accommodation, time for accommodation. And above all we spoke of the development of generalized individualism, as defined by Tocqueville, especially with reference to the United States where he was about to witness this phenomenon at its worst.

Another negative side effect is linked to the increasing complexity of the interaction between movements and networks. A complexity to which we often add complication through the introduction of ever more numerous rules and regulations.

This is one of the causes for the "world disillusion" as analyzed by P. Gauchet, with its corollary reactions: the feeling of powerlessness, leading to irresponsibility.

- **Territory:** The "counterpoint" to this tendency, which at times seems inevitable and which reduces territory to an entanglement of increasingly virtual movements, should indeed be the promotion of territory – local or regional. Territory is the ideal space for accommodation, an intermediary between the global and the local, that is, a space that can more or less be controlled.

The imperialism of universality – which goes hand in hand with the ebbs and flows of the modern world – discards those reference points that are indispensable to mankind. Without the geographic reference point of territory, we risk witnessing – as a reaction against the excesses of individualism – the "withdrawal of communities" and its negative side effects, leading to the decline of the nation-state, the latter often being too vast a

space whose identity is hard to perceive outside its (relative) linguistic identity. This is particularly obvious in the United States: what project is capable of transcending individualism other than a collective dream – the American *dream* (in other places it will be the welfare state ...)? Here, the overriding need for an identity is expressed through one's clan, blood, religion, sexuality, "district" – i.e. the various "tribes" and "gangs" that cohabit local streets and pavements. Many lament the excesses of "communitarianism" Anglo-Saxon style.

The case is clear: geographers need to rehabilitate the notion of territory and more precisely the notion of infra-national territory as a counterpoint to globalization. *Man wants to be someone but come from somewhere.* Spinoza, according to Jacques Lévy, tells us that man has a "natural need for civil status" which is linked to the feeling of being active within a close-knit community.

This rehabilitation of the local (regional) is all the more indispensable because this discussion of the local versus the global is also one of the aspects of the looming "social division" which seems to have become more of a *geographical division.*

There are those who live in the cyber world, who travel between conferences and symposiums, who surf the web, who are at ease with networks and who are aware of the latest fashion from New York or London; and there are those whose horizon is more "limited" and who confine themselves – or are confined – to the boundaries of their clan, their ghetto, i.e. spaces which are too simple, not diversified enough, which are *caricatures of the local.*

And so there is an increasing risk of a rift between people who belong to *several* networks and those who are locked into a single space, reduced to the dimensions of clan or identity. Such people only see the negative effects of globalization (relocation or shutdown of a factory, etc.) or of its most immediate form: Europeanization.

Territory is thus battling against globalization and its negative side effects: destruction, loss of identity, negative images of what is "the local." The sociologist Laki Laïdi recently remarked that "the more global the processes, the more localized the reactions."

Quest for identity

But can the return to a more widespread sense of cultural identity, one that is more complex than the communitarianist identity (which *is not* essentially territorial, with all the exchanges and the complexity that that involves), be part of the process of adapting to globalization, or better of improving local development?

The destiny of harbors and harbor cities – apart from the big megalopolises which are part of the "Alexandrine cities" dear to Jean Gottmann – seems to be a good example of the conflict between the global and the local, of the way in which this conflict has been weakened, sometimes dismantled; whereas the big megalopolises, despite having their own share of problems (probably under-estimated ...), have on the other hand managed to seize the opportunity given to them by globalization.

The more modest harbor cities like Le Havre seem to be a good example of this fundamental cultural challenge. Theoretically, these cities had all the tools they needed to soften the impact of globalization. Indeed, they were rich in dynamic leader groups turned towards internationalization. The sea and what constitutes "maritime identity" were calls to collective adventure beyond the diverging interests of the social classes. During the 19th century and up until the middle of the 20th century, the patriciate of both town and harbor were united in action. "Maritimity" also meant that the cities were a melting-pot of different populations. In Le Havre, for instance, there were Cauchois farmers, Breton sailors, entrepreneurs from Alsace, white-collar workers from Britain, etc. Thus a true "harbor community" had been created (BAUDOIN and COLLIN, 1989).

A romanticized version of this collective adventure was recently described by a novelist from Le Havre (nephew of the geographer Marcel Hérubel) in his family saga: *La Maison Gelder* (HÉRUBEL, 1995).

Le Havre had become a city of innovations in several different areas: technical (the screw ship, navire à coque en fer), economic (the future cotton and coffee trade), social (the first labor exchange in France, the first hygiene committee), sportive (the first football club), etc. The last provincial merchant bank was based in Le Havre. All in all, Le Havre knew how to reconcile what Vigarié called harbor internationalism with a strong feeling of identity based on the uniqueness of its situation. After the Liberation of France, an urban architect from Le Havre suggested it became a free city like Hamburg!

There were, however, a series of obstacles that impeded growth and innovation – obstacles born out of the downturn of Le Havre's role as a harbor.

For years, trade in Le Havre slowed down industrial development beyond the processing of colonial produce. According to A. Maurois the port of Rouen and cotton were unaware of each other's existence.

Nevertheless, the harbor represented a source of wealth, offering people a way up in society through job opportunities that required limited training. As with all important harbors, the strong sense of local identity was linked with a set of specific characteristics dependent upon its maritimity, thus specific jobs, mainly masculine ones, requiring non-transferable, specialist skills, such as sailors, dockers, forwarding agents, would create particular ways of working and irregular employment, not to mention the trade unions in the class struggle – which was all the more rigid because of its strategic position ("the strategic strikes").

As in so many other harbor cities, there was no university for a long time, however an innovative approach to education (the first girls-only secondary school, etc.) and intellectual creativity, led to intellectual initiatives in the Protestant tradition such as a training school for overseas managers. However, the weakening of the local economy and the identity crisis did not start with the recent acceleration of globalization. The first symptoms had already appeared before the Second World War, when a series of government decisions (the Oil law in 1928, autonomy status for maritime ports, etc.) revived the old tradition of public power first incarnated by François 1st and Colbert. As early as 1966, A. Nicollet and I were writing about the consequences of Le Havre's individual characteristics in *Les Cahiers de Sociologie Economique.* Recently, John Barzmann and Madeleine Brocard have also analyzed this return to the tradition of state control reinforced by its "autonomous" status adopted in 1965-1966 (BARZMANN and BROCARD, 1996).

For many reasons, but particularly due to a certain weakening in the local patriciate, links between the town, the harbor and the Chamber of Commerce have been breaking down, which have been less controlled by the traditional notables. The two World Wars, particularly the second one, led to many a rupture and trauma. It can be said that a crisis in transmission occurred after 1950; any individual identity is also a legacy based on signs and monuments. Memory and heritage, two key components of how a community perceives itself, have been affected even if, in Le Havre as in other cities which were destroyed, people relied on those politicians who stayed there during the war, despite the bombs.

The rebuilding took place under the leadership of a presti-

gious Parisian architect, A. Perret, and although he followed national guidelines, some innovative ideas were put into practice, despite the economic shortages of that time (in particular the rather original rebuilding of some blocks of flats in co-ownership).

The growth of the global economy, however, took off very quickly with the expansion, led by the government, of heavy industry and MIDA. The success of the big multinationals was even greater with the development of containers after the first oil crisis. More and more, the harbor became a mere link – and the most fragile link because it was the most "static" one – in the worldwide chain of logistics. Big companies, such as Maersk or Evergreen from Taiwan, for example, could not tolerate more than a two-hour delay for their network of ships around the world.

Although bigger harbors such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg got stronger, their management methods are greatly integrated into their environment and the surplus inherited from a huge urbanization increased, the more medium harbors suffered belatedly first from the oil crisis and then from the global economic crisis.

The big harbors tried to exploit their maritime image – even when the part played by the harbor was undergoing a relative setback – through the renewal of its waterfronts and fallow lands (GAY, 1986). Examples abound: London, San Francisco, New Orleans, Hamburg, Boston. The role of international trade has become detached from the harbor (New York teleport in Staten Island, etc.) but keeps its cosmopolitan wealth: its cultural and linguistic plurality (GAY, 1994b).

The case of Copenhagen is a typical one. During the European Year of Culture, it was quite clear how strongly it was orientated towards *Container expo.* There are more and more important maritime events which lead to great urban developments: Barcelona (Olympic Games), Genoa (Christopher Columbus year), Boston (Garden Festival), etc.

The toughest blow to Le Havre was the loss of its liners: the laying up of the "France," sent into exile at the "quai de l'oubli" ("the quay of oblivion"), was a real tragedy which, now more than ever, is an integral part of its image as a harbor. The pre-1914 emigrants have been replaced by stowaways looking for hiding places in containers ...

Faced with such exogenous forces, the feeling of identity – which now only prevails in a few contested social groups (such as the dockers) – has given way to defensive behavior, a sort of withdrawal.

As early as 1966, in the *Cahiers de Sociologie Economique*, we were talking about a "besieged mentality" or an "obsidinal mentality": against the State and the multinationals, against Rouen (albeit a poorly-off rival), against the "Préfecture" which seemed to assert its authority from 1982 onwards, and even against decentralization. Le Havre suffers from being nothing more than "the biggest 'sous-préfecture' in France." Confronted with the decline in the shipbuilding industry, for instance, the struggle for employment is very often a lost cause.

Protecting the local heritage has turned into a sort of nostalgic withdrawal (epitomized by the crisis which followed the laying up of the "France"). As often happens with cities going through an identity crisis, the heritage and museum vocation, even if it is justified, is also a disguise or at least an excuse for a "momentary lack of imagination." The powerful maritime identity of yesteryear is no longer turned towards conquest and innovation but towards leisure activities, as characterized by the development of regattas. The "longing for the shore," analyzed by Alain Corbin, is manifested in the necessary and successful improvements to the beach and yachting harbor. The sea, which used to be part of a collective adventure, from sailor to shipowner, and which used to involve the whole city, has been reduced to an individual experience. Thus, the bourgeoisie of Le Havre was thrilled by the solitary achievements of Paul Vatine, who disappeared at sea in 1999.

One might almost regret the fact that nowadays local innovation, which still exists, concentrates on cruise ships: the Club Med and the Windstar will not help us forget the "France" (now the "Norway") or the collapse of the shipbuilding industry.

The harbor, or at least the *avant-port*, is still an amazing site but as it became more remote from the city, it has lost the affection that it had in the past. The effects of globalization together with the over-expansion of the ship industry now make it look colder, more impersonal. Nor are the belvederes the objects of any attention any longer (the belvedere of the fort of Saint Adresse where I used to take Jean Gottmann is now nearly deserted).

The harbor has always been a noisy, smelly and messy place, but it has also been a place of poetry (albeit gloomy) and the picturesque. It has been the subject of novels (*Le Tramway des grands basins* by R. Las Vergnas) and of films such as *Quai des brumes*. Today, it has become an "environmental issue" and conjures up images of "smelly" factories. It is of interest only for the preservation of its "natural resources," which have been adopted by the local population for the pursuit of their leisure activities.

Finally, the latent social division threatened to be exacerbated by a spatial division, with each group withdrawing into their own area. The city became a place of numerous split identities, divided and for a long time reinforced by council policies. The city center, which is now off-center and too linear, does not participate in the integration of disadvantaged communities. Even the *Maison de la Culture*, created by Malraux, has become both a stake and a weapon in the conflict. Only the city's sporting identity, thanks to the presence of the local football club (*march on Le HAC!*), seems to keep afloat, thereby benefitting the old club ...

A policy of image building of the city using pretty pictures has for some time replaced the need to assert its own identity. Communication has at times won over creativity. However, even though the maritime identity of Le Havre seems to be weakening and its internal image fading away, paradoxically its external image remains strong – linked to memories of the past (the liners) and to its belonging to the region of Normandy – and relies on the organization of big popular events (the *Armada de la Liberté*, the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy landing, etc.). Of course, there is a risk that the harbor image be linked to *"circulation"* (defined by Gottmann) as it used to exist in the past. This is how many Western European harbor cities (Bristol, Swansea, La Rochelle) tend to react, organizing an ever increasing number of nostalgic events: Brest 96, the starting point for many a yacht race (the *Route du Rhum* starting from Le Havre), the *Armada* of the century in Rouen in 1999, etc. In short, it is difficult to make the transition from an endogenous development to an acceptable exogenous one.

And thus there is a link between globalization – which dissociates the harbor from its numerous commercial and transfer activities – and the identity crisis. The latter is itself linked to the difficulty of setting up an ambitious and truly collective territorial – regional – project. Thus, in conclusion, the following questions have to be raised:

- Can the feeling of identity be a factor not only of growth but of development?
- Can one rely on an iconography – albeit dated – to give local development a fresh impulse?
- Are factors such as the breaking-up of traditional harbor activities (referred to nowadays as "dry ports/docks" ...) and the delocalization of management services absolute constraints? (figs. 8 and 9)

One wonders, when observing the social crisis affecting all "classical" harbor cities, and even the biggest ones like

Fig. 8: Partial view of Le Havre in the second half of the 20th century (in 1965).

Fig. 9: Partial view of Le Havre in the second half of the 20th century (in 1965).

Fig. 10: Recent general view of Le Havre. In the foreground the new city core with the waterfront to compare with the photograph taken in 1959 (fig. 2). In the background the new maritime industrial area with the extension PORT 2000-2006 in progress.

Antwerp and Rotterdam, where the very cosmopolitan nature of the population leads to reactions of rejection – as seen during the 2002 elections, especially in Rotterdam.

There are many handicaps, all the more so when one knows how the State disengages itself – through privatization – from the responsibilities that it traditionally used to take on, and when one is aware of the harbor's dependency on public orders (shipbuilding, arms, etc.). The result is of course a reduction in the financial resources of the harbor cities and autonomous ports

However, the weakness of France's desire to invest in its "maritime" heritage seems increasingly surprising at a time when the country suffers from the negative effects of policies which are too exclusively continental in nature – in terms of the congestion of overground transportation – but which open up new opportunities in the field of the redistribution of traffic/transport thanks to *feeder* and *international coastal navigation*. Finally, the negative effects of concentrating such activity around Paris are already well known, whereas the ubiquity of the "transactional city" (Jean Gottmann) offers new opportunities thanks to computerization ...

In short, the question is this: where is the best place to exploit the opportunities offered by globalization? One can certainly find it in a local setting. The territorial feeling centered around the presence of the estuary is defended and illustrated in a multidisciplinary periodical from Le Havre, significantly entitled *Revue d'Ici*. In Le Havre, this feeling also benefits from the role of a young university: this creates a sense of "social connection" and has chosen both to position itself clearly as "maritime" and to get strongly involved in local development (Maison de l'Estuaire, Centre for Research on Logistics, etc.). Despite the threats towards "de-maritimization," the outward signs of which Vigarié analyzes, there are certain advantages to thinking in terms of what is local (fig. 10).

However, it might be advisable to broaden one's frame of reference by conjuring up a larger and stronger external image, essentially that of Normandy as a whole, with a myriad of links with the rest of the world. In France, is there not a fundamental choice to make between a maritime perspective and a local perspective, the latter being the "run for your life" option in the face of crisis and Parisian domination?

Nowadays, major harbors admittedly do not exist without the backdrop of an attractive city but they cannot exist either without being integrated into a genuine *regional* strategy, which is that of the big Hanseatic cities. It is only on a regional level that one can acquire the level of *complexity* and solidarity that are impossible to achieve on a purely local level.

This very brief analysis of an example of the de-structurization of a territory by the emergence of the global leads us to reflect, of course, on the lessons we must learn from those infranational territories which have best succeeded in withstanding the effects of globalization or, even better, which have taken

advantage of it.

There are many examples abroad of the fact that condemned territories do not exist but instead that there are territories without projects and that success comes as much from added value as from high technology. Entire regions of "Middle Italy," the region of the *decentramento produttivo*, from Emilia-Romagna to Venetia, are well known examples. In all these cases, local services are developed within an appropriate territorial framework: small enough for a common project to emerge, big enough for complementarity and solidarity to establish themselves (GAY and WAGRET, 1997).

A geographical analysis of all those territories with a strong identity would be required in order to analyze its part in local development and to evaluate the role of iconographies, mentalities, traditions, of the communication of values, of the coming together of all doers, of the role of institutions and the way in which networks (European, worldwide) and territories – which Jean Gottmann showed were inseparable – link together.

Conclusion

Guided by Jean Gottmann's strong intuitions and following in his footsteps with the example of Le Havre, one can conclude that to develop a territory in the complex sense defined here is to give it a constructed identity. Thus, it becomes indispensable – to try and reconcile iconography and the challenges of maritime transportation, or globalization – to look further into the notion of *territory*. Here again, Jean Gottmann's thinking can help: what interests us here is that the framework can no longer be the harbor city on its own, with all its implied "insularity." One can go beyond it by strengthening the links with a particular network (for instance, the network of the International Commerce Centers or that of the International Association of Harbour Cities). But one cannot belong to a network without having a basis in a territory large enough to reach a certain level of complexity, of diversity, of spatial solidarity. In the face of globalization, territory is – much more than the local – a good space for *accommodation* as defined at the beginning of this article.

As early as 1982, I tried to show that harbors could not exist without being strongly integrated into the *regional* (GAY, 1982).

The strategic framework seemed to be that of the Basse Seine, if not that of Normandy as a whole, with its strong external image. The two major German harbor cities of Hamburg and Bremen, which are also *Länder*, get some of their strength from a powerful decentralized territorial position. To a large extent, the harbors of Benelux also show that being integrated into a solid territorial reality is a strong basis for "thinking globally and acting locally."

By striving to draw a link between the traditional *iconography* of the harbor and a more modern image – with the background of globalization with which it has come to terms – Le Havre is succeeding in creating an innovative synthesis, with the city rediscovering its traditions and experiencing a new sense of pride. In order to help build its modern image, Le Havre can rely on an ambitious territorial project named *Port 2000* (2001-2005), which has already spectacularly transformed the look of this harbor city (FRÉMONT, 1997)

This reconciliation between tradition and modernity, expressed in the resolutely contemporary urban development program and the innovative use of the old docks (where Le Havre is about to build a very modern Casino!) resulted in the city recently winning the much coveted award of *City of Art and History*.

Fully engaged in an innovative program of urban development because of its links with the cities of the *Normandie Metropole* network, Le Havre is showing us that the feeling of belonging and being integrated in the local and the regional – very far from being incompatible with globalization and maritime internationalization – is in fact an asset in today's world economy. A great harbor cannot exist without a great city and a great region.[2]

Thus, a harbor city like Le Havre, so frequently visited by Jean Gottmann, is a good illustration of the innovative concepts of this great geographer, who captivated me from our very first meeting.

Notes

1. *Cahiers de Sociologie Economique et Culturelle,* Le Havre, 1996, no. 26.
2. On all these points see two special issues of *Etudes Normandes* (Université de Rouen), no. 1 (2000) and no. 3 (2000), and our synthesis in the same joumal, no. 2 (1997).

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Iconography and circulation on the Atlantic seaboards: Europe and North America

"How to explain then, that on the European shoreline, the starting point of Megalopolis' founding fathers, a demographic and economic stagnation, a scattering of men and activities and a limited urbanization, contrast with the extraordinary dynamism of the North American shoreline? The European Megalopolis, this 'Blue Banana,' as it appears on the night satellite surveys, lies well behind the shoreline, from London to Milan, on that European isthmus where the flows of continental trade prevail over the maritime flows linked to the Atlantic seaboard."

Michel Phlipponneau

From his appointment as a lecturer in 1950, the author has spent all his academic career within the Department of Geography of the Université de Haute-Bretagne à Rennes, of which he was acting Head for a long while, until his retirement in 1984, when he became an emeritus fellow. After his doctorate thesis in 1955 and a short stay at Chicago and Northwestern Universities, in 1956 he met in Princeton Jean Gottmann who was then putting the first touches to his major work Megalopolis. *Jean Gottmann was to play a decisive role in directing the young Breton geographer towards research work in applied geography. In France, applied geography suffered from severe backwardness until the publication of* Géographie et action. Introduction à la géographie appliquée *(1960). Forty years later,* La Géographie appliquée: Du géographe universitaire au géographe professionnel *(1999) showed the way covered on a national and worldwide scale. Michel Phlipponneau was chairman of the Commission on Applied Geography of the I.G.U from 1968 to 1980. He was himself an actor in regional planning in Brittany and abroad as an expert for the United Nations, and at a political level as a departmental and regional Counsellor and as Deputy-Mayor of Rennes and President of the Urban District.*

Introduction

Jean Gottmann being one of the most significant authors of *Ekistics*, a half a century long and faithful friendship brings me to quote a few exchanges of ideas that were to be published in the *Proceedings of a Symposium on European Iconographies.*[1]

Considering, as a Breton geographer, the spatial distribution of men and activities in the great urban areas on both sides of the Atlantic, I had been wondering for a long while about the striking opposition between the North American and European seaboards. In 1956, I had the opportunity to visit Jean Gottmann in Princeton. He was already working on *Megalopolis* and devised it as the model of urbanization which would prevail on a worldwide scale at the dawn of the third millennium. I was on my way back from a three-month stay in Chicago where, within its universities, its business schools and main companies, I had been looking for new ideas and methods which could contribute to the revival of the Atlantic European seaboard, its "Finisterres," and in the first place Brittany, from where, due to the lack of modern equipment and activities, a growing number of young people were then moving towards the hinterlands.

Jean Gottmann had encouraged me in such research work, while well established French geographers were then hostile to the first research works in "applied geography." "Carry on, be determined in urging geographers to action and application ... on behalf of our discipline, for the sake of Brittany and for the progress of facts and mankind" was what he wrote to me, in his dedication of *La politique des États et leur géographie* and following an analysis in the *Geographical Review* of the first research works in regional planning achieved by young French geographers.[2]

The North American Atlantic seaboard: Mobility and iconography

In 1956, answering my questions about Megalopolis, Jean Gottmann observed that the ancient Megalopolis, founded in the 4th century BC, in the heart of the Peloponnese, did not match the ambitions of Epaminondas, probably because of a lack of movement. The commitment to symbols, images, thoughts, iconography, while inducing a compartmentalization which limits movement, stops growth.

On the American shoreline of the Atlantic, it is definitely movement, as a factor of change and transformation, that leads to a tremendous urban development. But iconography itself adds its own effects: it ranks in the front row mobility, pioneer spirit, and the image of a perpetual advance of the "frontier."

With the arrival of successive floods of migrants, some ports are building up the cores of an implantation, at first limited by the Appalachians. They are used as ground bases for the conquest of the Wild West, but also to capture external markets. From the end of the 18th century, the largest North American fortunes are linked to the leading maritime trade companies, the Civil War ensuring the commercial supremacy of the northern ports. After the two world wars, the assumed leadership of World Trade leads to the United Nations headquarters being based in New York.

At the ultimate stage of the westward march, the Californian megapole has experienced a marked economic growth linked to the Pacific Zone countries, and on the opposite seaboard, the "Tokaido Megapole," the subject of Jean Gottmann's last research, concentrates 40 percent of a population whose activities rely mainly on maritime trade. These megapoles act like

hinges between oceanic and continental flows.

If the factor mobility is essential on the North American East Coast, iconography does not show as a factor of resistance to change and innovation. On the contrary, it gives itself advantage to mobility. At the top of the social hierarchy comes the stratum of the Descendants of the Mayflower. The Statue of Liberty welcomes flows of immigrants, ready to blend in a melting pot, marching westwards and adding new spangling stars to the Banner. The symbolism of the skyscraper and of the car, shaping the urban structure and the way of life, shows that iconography is not by itself an obstacle, but a major component of the Atlantic megapole.

After the publication of *Megalopolis*, Jean Gottmann was of course bound to compare urbanization, as a whole, in Northern America and Western Europe.[3] If he admits that, in the United States, town planning and architecture owe a lot to the European schools, from the British garden city to the German Bauhaus and the Cité Radieuse of Le Corbusier, he also specifies that North American urbanization shows original forms and structures which tend to spread all over the world. In 1964, Jean Gottmann wonders about the phenomenon in his famous article "Why the skyscraper?"[4] If the skyscraper is definitely born in Chicago by the functional use of a metal skeleton, seen by G. Eiffel as a work of art, it is indeed in Manhattan that the skyscraper will acquire its symbolic value, since it gathers all the factors explaining its success. To meet the needs of a civilization based on immaterial transactions, it is essential to bring together numerous specialists, clients and decision makers. As defined by Jean Gottmann, the main objective of the World Trade Center twin towers was: "a one-stop service and information center for world trade." On September 11, 2001, world terrorism could not have chosen a better target.

But the challenge will be taken up, not only because of the material advantages offered by the skyscraper, but also for its symbolism, the same that motivated the cathedral builders, a work of art related to an art of living, a both social and aesthetic permanent feeling, more especially at night with its tinted glass walls. My wife and I can well recall the night tour of Manhattan we were invited to by Bernice and Jean Gottmann, our shared enthusiasm for the golden light of the Seagram Building framed in dark bronze and the silvery light of the Union Carbide Building framed in glinting stainless steel. And in the 1960s, this ultimate expression of a new Gothic architectural style had not yet been achieved.

The second novelty is due to the sprawling structure of the megalopole, the skylines of urban cores occupying less space than the huge suburban individual housing units. Even before the generalization of the automobile, the daily commuting movement was already more developed than in Europe, and the difference is increasing with the systematic use of at least two cars per family, until growing traffic and parking difficulties command resort to rapid mass transit facilities. The structure of these individual housing suburbs is often modelled on the British garden city pattern; more original and typically North American is the loose structure of park cities, keeping or recreating the original forest cover.

But if the differences are well marked between North American and European models, they are even more marked if only considering the two shorelines. How to explain then, that on the European shoreline, the starting point of Megalopolis' founding fathers, a demographic and economic stagnation, a scattering of men and activities and a limited urbanization, contrast with the extraordinary dynamism of the North American shoreline? The European Megalopolis, this "Blue Banana," as it appears on the night satellite surveys, lies well behind the shoreline, from London to Milan, on that European isthmus where the flows of continental trade prevail over the maritime flows linked to the Atlantic seaboard.

The European seaboard: The golden age of mobility and the decline, as the result of the continental blockade

Would iconographic elements have introduced, by a partitioning, such an obstacle to movement and change, that the modernization of activities failed to take place on the shoreline, being carried out well behind, on the European isthmus? With the difference that, with the American shoreline, the place of arrival of dynamic immigrants prepared for the conquest of a new continent, the Atlantic Ocean has for long blocked the flows of people coming from Eurasia. Some remained stuck there, and the iconography of the Basque nation depicts a good example of partitioning, to which the division between two states did not even put an end, even though many Basque people migrated across the Atlantic. Others sought, through meridian coastal navigation, to resist the invaders coming from the continent. The Celts remained, with their specific characters, in their "Finisterres," from Scotland to Brittany and Galicia. These meridian coastal trades, dating back to the Neolithic, could explain the shared elements found from North Cape to Gibraltar.[5] They affect the farm-running system, the scattering of human settlements, the multiplicity of small-sized towns, service rather than production centers and, in terms of human behavior, religiosity, individualism and naturally the maritime vocation which plays an essential part.

It is this maritime vocation, which ensures, until the end of the 18th century, the dynamism of the Atlantic seaboard, high densities of rural population, combining industry and agriculture, a concentrated network of towns and seaports. For a start, coastal shipping gains in importance, overflowing the Mediterranean, the North and the Baltic Seas. Then, from the 15th century along comes the intercontinental maritime trade, which will later prevail. From Glasgow to Cadiz, the Atlantic seaports are amassing wealth, livening up their hinterlands, and the rural industries are working for export. The states consider their maritime provinces as the ground basis of their colonial policies, but this does not prevent the seaports from developing their commercial relations, even during periods of war.

This Golden Age, well analyzed by the Breton historians, is broken off by the Continental Blockade policy, whose consequences mainly affect the French maritime seaboard. Discontinuity is a source of weakness. It is not the rivalry between the seaports of the Atlantic seaboard and their areas of influence that explains their decline, but rather a national centralizing policy which gives priority to the capital city and the continental regions, richer in coal and iron deposits, thus more qualified for modern industries. The facilities offered by the railroad networks can easily be accounted for. In France, it is in Le Havre and not in Brest that the transatlantic traffic is concentrated. The decline of the French Atlantic seaports results in the decline of the industrial activities of their hinterlands, and in the high density rural areas leads to intense migratory movements, disastrous for a region like Brittany.

If the British Atlantic seaports are making headway until the Second World War, it is mainly those of the London area as well as the continental ports of the North Sea that know a tremendous development, linked to the industrialization of the European isthmus and the growing needs for oil, while the Mediterranean ports continue to forge ahead after the opening of the Suez Canal, despite the end of the colonial era. Consequently, the European Atlantic seaboard, with its discontinuities, its migratory flows, either internal to the European continent or external, in the case of Ireland, cannot match the development of the North American seaboard, which despite US government restrictions remains largely a land of immigration.

There is no doubt that in a region with a strong maritime

iconography, such as Brittany, the sea will always arouse individual vocations, or overseas settings up. But it does not come to collective actions. The Breton diaspora, well scattered, with brilliant successes, does not weigh much compared to the massive migrant contingents that ranked Paris as the first Breton town, while back in Brittany, the emigration of young people causes the deterioration of the demographic situation and the possibilities of recovery.

From the Breton revival to the "Arc Atlantique"

It is by relying on an old cultural and historical collection and a maritime iconography, by launching the slogan "Export your production instead of losing your workforce" or the one aimed at manufacturers "Establish your plant in the land of your holiday," that the Bretons managed to score ahead of most French regions, to take control of their own future. In the 1950s, with the C.E.L.I.B. (Comité d'étude et de liaison des intérêts bretons) a new regionalism is setting up, turned towards economic concerns and in the first place on to the priority to assign to an opening-up of Brittany the measures and means to overcome the "curse of distance," to restore the circulation flows essential for a revival of the region. This psychological transformation, initiating an economic recovery, has spread to other regions with an undefined iconography, and has, in the end, prompted the State to give up its continentally orientated concentration policy, responsible for the decay of the Atlantic seaboard.[6]

The links are close and mutual between cultural and economic concerns. The Bretons are strengthening them with the other Celtic nations, multiplying twinnings, cultural and musical festivals. If the European Community, by organizing a vast continental territory, accentuates the peripheral situation of Brittany, the latter still trusts the community to help reduce its handicaps, for "it starts from the Ocean." And when the E.C. is enlarged to include Great Britain and Ireland, while the Breton Shipping Line reactivates the trans-channel links, the C.E.L.I.B. sets up, in 1973 in Saint-Malo, the "Conference of the maritime peripheral regions" which wants to use the "Atlantic Stream" to reopen the meridian traffic links. With the entry of Spain and Portugal and the development of the ferry traffic, it is the whole Atlantic seaboard which is affected. In 1989 in Faro, near Cape Saint Vincent, from where Henry the Navigator used to launch his caravels, the Conference of the maritime peripheral regions adopts a resolution to promote cooperation and the multiplication of exchanges between the regions of the "Arc Atlantique."

The image given by the "Arc Atlantique" has a considerable impact on the media and arouses an abundant and mainly geographical literature.[7] In the meantime, in the popular consciousness, as well as with academic researchers, economic and political officials, the elements of a once neglected maritime culture are surfacing again. Sailing, ocean races, old ships meetings are renewing an iconography which does not induce a partitioning, but on the contrary gathers these Atlantic regions, by relying on movement.

But meridian circulation between peripheral regions conflicts with the usual reticence of the decision makers. Should one take the risk of improving ways of communication, when the actual traffic is rather weak, even non-existent? Can these same ways, by themselves, create traffic? On the maritime level, ferries have restored this traffic from Great Britain to Spain, but the Eurotunnel is a severe rival. Will the support of the European Funds, for the program "Atlantis" which intends to boost coastal shipping traffic, or for the program "Arcantel" weaving an electronic information network, allow a revival of the seaports? The project of the "Estuaries Motorway " took more than 25 years to be achieved, and the completion of an "Estuaries High Speed Train" remains a myth. The air links, initiated by pilgrimages and the development of tourism can only expand with the establishment of business flights. They are increasing in number; nevertheless, although for the external balance of Brittany, Great Britain and Spain hold a good position, traffic remains weak.

However, the links between the "Arc Atlantique" and the London-Milan megapole must be largely improved, and unfortunately intercontinental trade with the latter is still avoiding the Atlantic seaports to the benefit of the estuary ports of the North Sea. Can one imagine Brest or Nantes becoming main "feeder" ports for Europe, in order to avoid the pollution risks in the Channel and the North Sea, or that a new intercontinental airport, based in Nantes, serves as a "hub" for the European sky? One can always dream, but such perspectives are highly improbable.

Does one have to regret that the European Atlantic seaboard did not become, and has very few chances of doing so, a megapolitan area? Shouldn't a development plan for the "Arc Atlantique" keep a major spatial characteristic inherited from a faraway past? An urban and seaports scattered network, with a regular spacing out of small and medium-sized towns, often hosting cultural, academic and scientific activities which are usually reserved for a metropolis? This original spatial structure would be jeopardized as much by a linear urbanization of the shoreline as by a metropolitan concentration.

From an architectural and aesthetic point of view, the skyscraper does not have its place on this side of the Atlantic Ocean; even the towns rebuilt after 1945 did not seize the opportunity, and the isolated attempts, such as the Brittany Tower in Nantes, appear shocking in centuries-old urban skylines. The quality of the environment, surroundings adapted to the "civilization of daily leisure" as opposed to the "Weekend civilization" should take a great place in this concept of the "Arc Atlantique." This concept, based on an ancient iconography, gives the image of a well balanced and dynamic whole, with multiple circulation flows and junctions. But Jean Gottmann himself wondered: "If circulation is the principle of movement and iconography the principle of stability, are they, in fact, in such continuous opposition?"[8]

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Political aspects of planning the Basque coastal megalopolis

"Jean Gottmann's concept of the megalopolis has proved to be very useful in conceptual-level planning for the Basque coastal megalopolis. This is especially clear if a modicum of functional theory is added to the concept, as we have done."

Lawrence D. Mann

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Foreword

When Jean Gottmann identified the incipient "megalopolis" of the eastern coast of the United States, he restored needed scholarly neutrality to the concept of the large, complex, socio-culturally consistent, economically-integrated, and multi-jurisdictional urbanization phenomena.[2]

Long before formalizing his approach to the megalopolis in North America, of course, Gottmann had anticipated the idea with regard to the European continent. He pointed out a number of large linear complexes of multiple metropolitan regions there (GOTTMANN, 1962b). His work has stimulated that of many others during the past four decades.

The nature of the megalopolitan "community"

Gottmann's "megalopolis" went far beyond the mere facts of physical and demographic size of the urbanization phenomena involved. He touched seriously on the economic and political facets, in a way that other writers of the period had not done. He was far less complete, however, on the important cultural facet. Even more critically, he limited discussion of interaction to rather obvious matters of transportation and communication.

Had Gottmann been so inclined, he might have made use of a rather complete social science theoretical framework, which was then in vogue, in dealing with the megalopolis. I refer here to the functionalist "general theory of action" that had been advanced by Talcott Parsons and others in the post-World War II decades. The advantage of this approach was its potential unity of the social and behavioral science formulations.[3] Its disadvantage – and undoubtedly a reason why Gottman ignored it – was its fundamental abstractness, its stubborn unwillingness to unambiguously "anchor" itself in empirical reality. That would make the approach largely worthless to Gottmann's fundamentally empirical geography.[4]

The most important exception to this excessive abstractness is not well known, and I doubt that Gottmann ever encountered it. That was Parson's own formulation of the theory of the empirical human community as an "ecological" entity with empirical counterparts of each of the four main theoretical components of the interdisciplinary social science framework.[5]

Thus "adaptation" (economy at the national level) was empirically manifest in gainful employment at the local community



Fig. 1: Structure of a potential megalopolitan community (theoretical and empirical).

level. Similarly, "goal attainment" (polity at the national level) is, empirically, jurisdictional decision making in the local community. Moreover, latent culture and personality become housing with emphasis on child-rearing and education, locally. Finally, "interaction" ("society" at a national level) are manifest in local transportation and communications – but also in sheer social relationships of residents.

By implication, any sub-national physical and demographic area would potentially have all of these four facets, and their subsets. Any region would be an aggregation of such communities, and also at some level itself a community. A metropolitan region would be intermediate: more specifically anchored in the different categories, like a local community, but also more general, more a national system.

The theoretical importance of this approach lies in the nature of the original abstract constructs, and especially in the interactions among them. They are fundamentally the basic problems that any located human grouping must solve. (Parsons calls them "functional prerequisites," without which the grouping could not survive). Thus "work" and economy are responses to the need for some environmental modification. Similarly, jurisdiction and "polity" stem from some minimal need for group-wide decision making. And the various kinds of interaction respond to the basic need for the movement of information, goods, and people among the individuals and groupings of the whole. The dynamic of the system comes from the way that these four constructs – or rather their empirical counterparts at any level – interact with each other. Figure 1 tries to indicate this, with emphasis on a megalopolis, but its real importance is at the level of a metropolitan area.

This potential structure of a megalopolitan community is shown in the diagram (fig. 1), like the larger sub-national regions, because of its physical size and multiplicity of communities involved.

Present spatial structure of the Basque region

Almost contemporary to Gottmann's initial analysis, Doxiadis and Papaioannou (1974) explicitly included this area as one of Europe's "axes of megalopolitan development" after 2010 (fig. 2). They say they studied it as one of the "axes" of urbanization in Europe: one extending northward from about Lisbon, Portugal, to Bordeaux, France – perhaps the Basque homeland at the time of Greek and Roman contacts – and, vaguely, thence toward Paris (see their figure 121, page 303, as well as descriptive text on page 373).

Note that the actual area seems supportable today only from about Santander or Bilbao, Spain to just north of Bayonne, France. (The linear urbanization dynamic north Braga, Portugal and extreme northwest Spain is simply not in evidence. And the coastal area north of Bayonne has only a vacation-home relationship to Bayonne, and only for several kilometers. To claim that the Grand Landes pine forests are inevitably destined for urbanization during the next several decades, all the way to Bordeaux, would be reaching beyond credible trend.)



Fig. 2: The Basque homeland and the megalopolitan system in Europe, 2000. (*Source:* Doxiadis and Papaioannou, 1974).



Fig. 3: Euskadi, the Basque Homeland – General reference map. (*Source*: Philippe Gloaguen et al. (eds.), *Pays Basque (France, Espagne), Le Guide du Routard* (Paris, Hachette, 2002).

• **Fundamental traditional structure:** The fundamental historic spatial structure is one of hamlets, villages and small towns serving livestock and family farming holdings, in a very rough topography, organized by small river valleys extending from the Pyrenees to the coast. That coast is organized into a number of fishing and trade-oriented ports, mostly quite small but in some cases growing to a serious urban scale due to the hinterland trade areas and size of fishing operations. The rivers are also useful in identifying the importance of fishing ports.

• **Superstructures upon the traditional pattern – Mercantile commercial superstructures:** Upon this traditional spatial structure were built even larger cities in some of the ports, with the expansion of mercantile capitalist commercial activities, or at least agricultural service center functions. In the French Basque region, such a hierarchy of service centers is rather truncated and distorted, both by the topography and by distortion due to the size of some large ports. In Spain, there are two interior metropolitan centers of several hundred thousand residents each that do perform the functions described by Christaller for Southern Germany. These are Iruña (Pamplona) in Nafarroa (Navarra)[6] and Gasteiz (Victoria) in Araba (Alava).

• **Superstructures upon the traditional pattern – Industrial superstructure:** In the very late 19th and early 20th centuries, major manufacturing activities developed in a few of these commercial centers (fig. 3). Baiona (Bayonne) and its industrial suburb, Bukale (Boucau), is the main concentration in France. There was some, but considerably less, industrialization in small interior cities such as Maule (Mauleon-Sainte Marie). In Spain, major manufacturing developed in Bilbo(Bilbao), to a more limited extent in the industrial suburbs of Donostia (San Sebastian), and on a still smaller scale in a number of other smaller interior cities.

• **Superstructures upon the traditional pattern – Leisure superstructure:** Finally, upon the traditional structure and the mercantile, and industrial superstructures, leisure, tourist, and retirement activities have further urbanized some very attractive locations. This process started in the mid-19th century at Biarritz, France and a few decades later in Donostia (San Sebastian), Spain. Initially, this was largely a small scale aristocratic phenomenon; but waves of the wealthy soon followed. After World War II, the phenomenon has affected many more places, has reached lower into the socioeconomic structure, and has become international in scope. But it will be well to summarize the potential urban settlement structure for the



Fig. 4: The Basque polycentric system of capitals and network of medium-sized cities. *(Source 1:* Eusko Jaurlaritza/Gobierno Vasco/Basque Government, Lurralde Antolamendu Etxebizitza et Ingurugiro Saila/Departamento de Ordinación del Territorio, Vivienda y Medio Ambiente, *LAA/DOT, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoko Lurraldearen Autolamendurako Artezpideak/Directrites de Ordinación Territorial de la Comunidad Autonoma del País Vasco.* The Department, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2001 (In Euskadi and Spanish). *(Source 2:* Fundación Metropoli, ProyectoCitiesProiektua, and Eusko Jaurlaritza/Gobierno Vasco/Basque Government, Lurralde Antolamendu Etxebizitza eta Ingurugiro Saila/Departamento de Ordinación del Territorio, Vivienda y Medio Ambiente, *EUSKAL HERRIA.* Euskal Jaurlaritzren Argitalpen Zerbitzun Nagusia/Central Publishing Services for the Basque Government, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2002).

Basque region as a whole.

That can easily be accomplished in the abstract. Think of an irregular pentagon, with the five metropolitan areas at the angles (fig. 4). The sides are thus described by the following external lines: BAB (Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz) Metro/Donostia (San Sebastian); Baiona (Bayonne)/Iruña (Pamplona); Donostia (San Sebastian)/Bilbo (Bilbao); Iruña (Pamplona/ Gasteiz (Victoria), and Gasteiz (Victoria)/Bilbo (Bilbao). There are potential internal lines as follows: Bilbo (Bilbao)/ Iruña (Pamplona); Donostia (San Sebastian)/Iruña (Pamplona); and Gasteiz (Victoria)/BAB. One apparent "internal" line would be BAB Metro/Bilbo (Bilbao), but this apparent line is really external to the pentagon. It is not even a land connection, being almost entirely over the Bay of Biscay. The metro areas or large cities at the five angles of the pentagon are, except for one, surrounded by more or less well-articulated rings of suburbs and related to more or less well-developed hierarchical hinterlands of smaller cities, towns and villages. Each of these large center cities has about 200,000 residents – except for Bilbo (Bilbao), which has nearly three times that number, and the BAB metropolis. The five urban nodes are interconnected by good highways and railways, including limited access turnpike-autoroutes on the BAB-Bilbo (Bilbao) axis, and there are limited access highways between other nodes. BAB/Iruña (Pamplona) is the sole exception, and discussions are under way to choose an alignment for that limited access highway. All of these roads are subject to further straightening and improvements, as well as potential additions of light rail in the same corridors. There are plenty of agricultural and other open spaces in the interstices between the external and internal axes. The region is well endowed with wilderness areas and agricultural and grazing lands.

The "Eurocity Basque" initiative

In 1993, the then Biaona (Bayonne)/Angelu (Anglet)/ Miarritze (Biarritz) Metro District (in France) and officials in Gipuskoa (Guipúscoa) province (in Spain) began brainstorming about the idea of a linear megalopolis that was forming along the coast between the two metropolitan areas. The discussions were from a background of cooperative work between the two ports, Baiona (Bayonne) and Donostia (San Sebastian), and

they were inspired by the outlook of the European Community.

The specific impetus was the quasi-academic discussion of the "Eurocity" phenomenon of cities across the, now relaxed, international borders. One identified branch of the identified "Eurocity" was the "Atlantic arc," from about Bordeaux to about Bilbo (Bilbao). The "Eurocity Basque" was to be just the border portion (the 50 km from Baiona (Bayonne) to Donostia (San Sebastian) about 50 km deep) of this larger urban, multi-nodal structure. The logic behind selection of just this area – as opposed to Bordeaux-Bilbo (Bilbao), Baiona (Bayonne)-Bilbo (Bilbao) or merely what we called above the "border mini-metropolis" was never made entirely clear.

However, the initiative did receive some encouragement from authorities in both France and Spain in the early years. Most impressive was the naming of this idea as a "pilot project" by the French Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Regional Planning (D.A.T.A.R.). There was also an expression of support from the General Council of the Atlantic Pyrenees *Département.* (No parallel encouragement was offered by the Spanish central government, however, and support from the Basque government appears to have been muted.)

The initiative was promoted to municipalities in a number of forums and workshops. There followed several years of staff work, with personnel provided by the local and (in Spain) provincial governments. A "White Book" was produced, a multilingual website developed (www.eurociudad.com), and an international agency of sorts was established. Actually, they simply re-named the "Trans-Border Observatory" into "Trans-Border Agency for the Development of Eurocity," which was set up as a private entity. The key years of activity were between 1998 and 2000. Since then the initiative has obviously declined in intensity.

A fairly ambitious agenda of activities was produced for 2001, but most of that seems not to have been realized. No such agenda appeared for 2002, and only one "summer school" on the idea was held in mid-2002. A recent scholarly examination of the idea by Gabriel Sansinenea, a Spanish Basque geographer, has been published.[7] His account ends in mid-2001, when optimism was still high.

However, Sansinenea made it clear why no sustained regional and metropolitan planning could be expected from this venture. He says:

"... this trans-border project does not lack creativity or good intentions; but, for now, it involves only a document lacking in judicial value, that has to be implemented. And what is more important, it has to become socially integrated. For that we count on the European context, which is supporting the idea in many respects. But this will never be enough unless we can count on social understanding in both the public and private sectors" (SANSINENEA, 2001).

There is a rather naïve quality to both the "White Book's" discussion of government and Sansinenea's own conclusions. The major defects of the "Eurocity Basque" promotion were the following:

- The area selected is probably not the right one to fit with the logic of "Eurocity" discourse. It probably should have included the entire "Atlantic arc," or at least the portion from about Baiona (Bayonne) to Bilbo (Bilbao), and it should have been deeper into the regional territory, 100 km, thus including all of the metropolitan areas. The border mini-metropolis should have been singled out for special attention, rather than treating it as an adjunct of the Donostia (San Sebastian) metro area.
- The "international agency" should have been established, not as a private entity of a Spanish province and a French "metropolitan community" that together lack any jurisdiction at all over a key portion of the implied territory. Rather, some kind of an international treaty would be required. The French General Council of the Atlantic Pyrenees *Département* (or any possible future modification of it) could not be one of the parties to this agreement even if it wanted to, which it apparently does not. That is because that level of government, in France, is merely the local office of the national government. There is a proposal by the current French government to seriously decentralize to the regions, including the Aquitaine in this case. Should that happen, and if the region were authorized by the nation to do it, then that region could be a signatory to setting up an international agency. The situation in Spain is different. The Spanish government has already given all regional planning authority to the Basque Autonomous Community, as well as to other areas, including Navarra. What it has not done is to authorize such communities to enter into any international treaties, and it is unlikely to do so under the present Popular Party Government.
- Rather that elaborately spelling out a "strategy" for the Eurocity in the regional context, the "White Book" should have built these considerations into what the present planning agencies, or some modification of them, could do. While the strategic thinking is that the "White Book" may be valuable in future regional, megalopolitan and metropolitan planning, it has the disadvantage of being an outside offering that may well encounter resistance within the corresponding agencies.
- There should have been more attention to serious planning and less to promotional devices such as the website and the "White Book."

Existing metro-megalopolitan planning in the Basque Country

Planning in both Spain and France has rather smoothly evolved toward the common approaches to urban and regional planning that have been advanced by the European Community. In that approach, it is assumed that all countries will have national economic, social, environmentally protective and culturally protective plans. They will also have regional plans that are, as Sansinenea puts it, "the spatial expression of economic, social and ecological policy" (SANSINENEA, 2001). Regional spatial plans stand higher than urban planning, which is conceived of as limited to municipal areas in scope, while regional planning applies to metropolitan and larger areas – up to the nation, or even Europe as a whole. The content of regional spatial planning is "basic for a coordination of existing public administrations, trying to obtain balanced development of regions, of their income, their urban design, etc."

The objectives of such regional spatial planning in the European context (fig. 5) are to:

- develop a balanced, polycentric urban system that strengthens association with rural areas;
- reinforce the polycentric development of the territory with integrated systems of transportation and communication, assuring accessibility;
- develop and conserve the cultural and natural heritage of the territory.

On the French side of the Basque Region, there is one agency that potentially could plan for the entire three provinces. That is the Urban Planning Agency for the Atlantic Pyrenees *Département.*[8] This agency was created only a few years ago at the behest of the *Département* Council, and it has proved itself an invaluable source of economic, demographic, and mapping studies as well as local plans. (It has done major work for the BAB metropolitan area.) This is despite its chronically understaffed situation. It currently has a multidisciplinary team of three architects, three geographers, one economist, a documentation specialist, a land surveyor/computer specialist and



Fig. 5: Regional planning strategy, autonomous community of the Basque Country: "The Regional Model" with links to adjacent areas in Spain and France. *(Source 1:* Eusko Jaurlaritza/Gobierno Vasco/Basque Government, Lurralde Antolamendu Etxebizitza et Ingurugiro Saila/Departamento de Ordinación del Territorio, Vivienda y Medio Ambiente, *LAA/DOT, Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoko Lurraldearen Autolamendurako Artezpideak/Directrites de Ordinación Territorial de la Comunidad Autonoma del País Vasco.* The Department, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2001 (In Euskadi and Spanish). *(Source 2:* Fundación Metropoli, ProyectoCitiesProiektua, and Eusko Jaurlaritza/Gobierno Vasco/Basque Government, Lurralde Antolamendu Etxebizitza eta Ingurugiro Saila/Departamento de Ordinación del Territorio, Vivienda y Medio Ambiente, *EUSKAL HERRIA.* Euskal Jaurlaritzren Argitalpen Zerbitzun Nagusia/Central Publishing Services for the Basque Government, Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2002).

two secretaries.

It is headed by an experienced French planner, of architectural training, who was formerly in a parallel Toulouse agency. The agency functions as a kind of public consulting firm, responding to requests from its own Departmental elected councilors and to local government elected officials to do whatever research for planning or planning that may be desired. The current workload includes maintaining a "Territorial Dynamics Observatory" consisting of atlases, a rental observatory, a diagnostic study of businesses, socio-economic analyses of residential migration, and of specific localities.

A second area of work is called "the territorial fabric" including studies such as an approach to public schools for the Department, and specific small town and village studies. The third area of the workload is planning per se, which includes "the territorial dynamic" (studies of the "urban spot" or, less negatively, urbanization footprints, transportation times, population densities, and community facilities). Included in this category too are the studies of the Adour/South Landes urban forms and activity zones, residential mobility, and local urban plans and related studies. A fourth area of the agency's workload is called "decision-aids and mastery of works." These are interpretative exercises to sharpen the results of quantitative studies into findings that elected officials can use in deciding what to do.

Included are materials on the interior Pays Basque, sports practices in schools, transportation infrastructure (for the BAB metropolitan area), and some local exercises. Finally, the workload includes several miscellaneous local projects. It is an impressive agenda for an agency of this size and maturity. It would be premature to suggest that a planning agency of this character and orientation would be appropriate to future joint regional planning with planners from the Basque Autonomous Community. More than half of the workload of the Atlantic Pyrenees agency is dedicated to projects outside the Pays Basque, for the Department also includes the entire Béarn cultural region, with its larger and more dynamic Pau metropolitan area.

Moreover, its mission has been stretched to deal with all of the areas of the Adour River basin – that is all of the southern Landes Department. So probably no more than one third of the agency's workload can be expected to be concentrated on the Basque area.

But even those projects that do concentrate on this part of the Department seem to be quite insensitive to Basque culture, including language. There seems to have been no effort to assure that Basque-speakers are included among the key agency personnel, and apparently only French language place names are used in their work – even in Basque-speaking communities they have studied. (This may well be a legal requirement since the agency is really a unit of the French national government, simply allocated to this Department.)

Finally, this agency may be moved to another level to be consistent with the large-regional emphasis of the newly elected French government. It would not be surprising to see these research and planning functions transferred to Mont-de-Marsan or Bordeaux, to the regional government of the Aquitaine Region.

There are planning agencies in each of the larger municipalities, but none of them is capable of leading area-wide planning of the kind that is likely to be required. This has become clear with the "Eurocity Basque" project that was launched with great fanfare about five years ago as a joint venture of the City of Biaona (Bayonne) and the provincial government of Gipuskoa (Guipúscoa), complete with an expensive and, initially, well-maintained website.

By last year and the present year, however, it has become clear that the initiative has lost much of its steam. Only one annual project is now on the advertised agenda: an annual summer school to discuss the "Eurocity Basque" idea (see below). The second agency to be discussed is the BAB metropolitan planning agency, staffed by professionals provided by the three constituent cities. This agency did not have enough personnel to carry out the key transportation planning study, and had to turn to the Departmental agency for that important task. In time, the BAB planning agency should be able to do all of its own work. However, it does not deal with a wide enough scope to be able to work effectively with the agency or agencies from across the Pyrenees for megalopolitan planning.

The third agency, in the Basque Autonomous Community, the key agency, is the Department of Regional Planning and the Environment (*Ordenación del Territorio y Medio Ambiente* in Spanish; *Larralde eta Ingurumena* in Euskera), a ministerial-level agency of the Basque government. It seems to be adequately budgeted and staffed, with plenty of architect-planners, geographers, hydrological engineers, environment specialists and support personnel. The way functions have been allocated to this agency, however, it is not appropriately staffed with economists and other social scientists for studies of efficient settlement structure. These disciplines are concentrated in other ministries, notably those of "Finance and Public Administration" and "Industry, Commerce and Tourism," for economists, "Housing and Social Affairs," for sociologists, and "Transport and Public Works," for civil engineers.

The Department of Regional Planning and Environment appears to have its workload divided approximately equally between regional planning and environmental studies and issuing permits. Regional planning consists of mapping and related services and participation in an international "Project Cities," plus major newer functions in the sectoral regional plan for riverbanks, and a geographic information system as a service to municipal planning. The riverbank studies and plans include several different aspects, ranging from hydrology to studies of riverfront urban places.

In brief, the Basque Autonomous Community has made a good start at the kind of megalopolitan planning that will be required in decades and centuries ahead. It is particularly important that the environmental aspects be well founded. The neglect of the efficiency facets of settlement structure is to be regretted. However, the needed inputs from economics and the social sciences can easily be added later on by any number of inter-ministerial arrangements.

Required Basque megalopolitan planning

What kind of planning will be required to make the Basque settlement structure keep pace with the likely pattern of urban development most likely to evolve in coming centuries? Let us take as a point of departure the "model" of the demographer Joel A. Cohen, which he put forth about four-and-a-half years ago.[9] Here it is:

A century from now, humanity will live in a global garden, well or badly cared-for. The majority of people will live in cities, surrounded by extensive thinly-populated zones, for nature, agriculture and silviculture. Globally, between 100 and 1,000 cities of between 5 and 25 million people each will serve the desires of their residents, for food, water, energy, collection of wastes, political autonomy and natural and cultural amenities. Some cities will serve populations that desire to live only with other people who are ethnically and culturally similar to themselves. Other cities will serve populations attracted by ethnic and cultural diversity. Various cities will earn changing reputations by being favorable for youth, raising children, working, or retirement. The efficiency and quality of services provided by

cities will depend on the quality of their administrations, on the behavioral abilities, and the courtesy of their populations.

Cohen foresaw that many contemporary rights and obligations will be supplanted by markets. One example will be permits to permanent residence in specific cities. The prices of these rights will probably be added to real estate prices or rents. Cities will compete with one another for market rewards for public goods offered. The rights to leave any city or region will have to be balanced against the rights to move to specific cities and nations. Social and individual values will determine the point to which markets will be permitted to intrude into relationships that were previously determined by culturally traditional methods. He sees women largely freed from child-bearing and child-rearing roles as the average woman comes to have two, one or no children in a longer lifetime. Women will intensify their demands for more significant roles. Implications are increased educational and.employment opportunities. The aging of population will increase dramatically and among the aged, women will outnumber men 2:1. Whole new social arrangements will develop among the elderly.

In Cohen's projection, growth of the world's human population will end sometime in the 21st century, but some regions will continue to be net importers or exporters of people. Growing pressure for migration from poorer countries to richer ones will stress countries that are culturally xenophobic – as well as those traditionally receptive to international migration. The result will be many frictions until human beings learn more courtesy and tolerance. Interracial mixed marriages will produce a whole spectrum of skin coloration in many regions.

Cohen's forecast of the bio-physical environment is especially important for our purposes. He says the continental shelves of Asia and other landmasses will be developed to provide food, energy and perhaps residential space. The partly depleted stocks of most marine species will be carefully managed, to an extent far beyond the limited "farming" of seafood that exists today. Those woodlands and forests that survive the growth of population and economic exploitation of the 1920-2050 period will be preserved as educational and touristic curiosities. Many of these will also be meticulously managed for fibers, food, pharmaceuticals, and recreation.

The simple agricultural ecosystems of today will be replaced by others of great complexity. Biological controls and the optimizations of farmers will maximize production, while the pesticides and herbicides will be almost entirely eliminated. Inputs to agriculture required for food and energy will be derived from human, animal, and industrial wastes – replacing many of the fertilizers and organic combustibles of today. Undesirable effluents, such as eroding soil or agricultural drainage with pesticides and fertilizers will be eliminated or converted into productive inputs for industrial or urban uses. Also managed will be the atmosphere. Rights to add carbon dioxide, methane and other chemically significant trace gases and particulates will be negotiated in the open market, for services that natural ecosystems provide. Governments will recognize the potential of the atmosphere and of many other services that ecosystems provide, to produce taxes that will support other public services. Gases will be manipulated as part of the production of foods and management of wild flora and fauna. An example is genetically engineered bacteria that will manipulate production of agricultural methane. Flora and fauna will be revalued as it is realized that we do not know how to multiply old woodlands, coral reefs, and the diversity of living forms. The genetic resources of nature and aesthetic amenities will be more and more highly valued. Conservation movements will gain renewed force, in collaboration with commercial enterprises.

The intensive management of continents, oceans and the atmosphere will require massive improvements in the collection and analysis of data and, especially, in our concepts. A century from now, we will live on a land totally interconnected electronically ("a wired earth"). Land, air and the sea will be continually monitored. Just as the meteorological stations, on the earth and in satellites, of today, we will monitor the atmosphere, the oceans and terra firma of the next century with networks of sensor stations at all heights and depths.

Mathematical models of the earth, the air, and the sea will try to predict major events, such as El Niño, hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, plumes of hot water from cracks in ocean floors and principal ocean currents. The models will improve with increases (at least a million-fold) in computational power during the next century. The models will integrate not only the atmosphere and ocean surfaces but also human populations and populations of other biological forms (including domestic animals, trees, cereal products, and infectious diseases), economic reserves and flows (including all natural resources, information and flows of information – scientific, literary, artistic, folklore – and family, social, institutional, and political constraints and resources). Integral models will include factors outside human control such as solar flares, and will represent, without predicting, human decisions. Despite improvements in software, concepts and administration, the earth will still bring surprises. Geophysical surprises spring from being more conscious of what the planet does, of instabilities inherent in geophysical systems, as described by the mathematics of chaos theory, as well as from additional human impacts. Included in these "surprises" will be a continuing stream of human illnesses due to infection from newly-discovered viruses, as well as from the continuing increased densities at which the human population will reside.

As concerns economy, culture (and politics):

Economies will increase their integration. Cities are going to concentrate the talent and resources required for international commerce. Almost no product complex will be conceived, financed, designed as to engineering, produced, sold, used, and taken out of use within the boundaries of a single political unit. Businesses will learn to profit from the eternity of atoms, designing products for use, return and regeneration. Governments will find that an increasing percentage of the power to control the economic welfare of their citizens will reside outside their political boundaries. Economic integration will give profit to those who can recognize the comparative advantages of other societies. Information will become more and more valuable. Those who can create, analyze it, and manage data bases will be the winners. Information technology and economic integration will grow hand in hand. Culture will penetrate everything regarding the population, the environment, and the economy. The productive and reproductive roles of men and women, for example, will define which biological materials are seen as food and which not, and its form as demanded by consumers in the economy.

Early suggested modification to the Cohen model

Soon after the publication of Cohen's vision, the present author produced a critique of it.[10] He pointed out some conceptual problems in Cohen's formulation (partly confirming, as Cohen had predicted, that some of the hardest problems of the future would be conceptual). Nothing is to be simple in this planning. One important implication of this refined conceptual analysis is more urbanization, into even larger metropolitan areas. Mann estimated that there would be, globally, even more and larger metropolitan areas, even though the population of the earth will be slightly declining. The hinterlands around each of them will be rough hierarchies of service-providing outlying cities, towns, and villages rather than the homogeneous low-density areas Cohen anticipated.

Finally, rather than the unrelieved rational globalization of Cohen's vision, Mann foresaw strong pockets of traditionally dominated metropolitan regions. He noted that Cohen's vision evokes the "God is dead" of Jean Paul Sartre in the late 1940s and the parallel "Ideology is dead" of American futurists of the 1950s – both of which we now know to have been vastly overstated. Evidence is to be found in the resurgence of fundamentalist ideologies and related regional ethnic political movements in various parts of the world. Some versions of the Basque nationalist ideology have to be included in this probable traditionalist backlash.

All this, as a minimum, must be reflected in Basque megalopolitan planning if it is to accomplish what it needs to in our complexly urbanizing world. There will be political constraints on how much of such planning can be adopted, as well as how much of what is planned can be implemented by specifiable government agencies and private firms.

Politics as obstacle to Basque megalopolitan planning

All regional planning, including megalopolitan planning, is politically problematical – if only because a multiplicity of governments are involved and the implementing agencies are not the same as those doing the planning. It is always important to involve governments at a high enough level, for otherwise the plans may be made and no government is in a position to implement those plans.

In the case of the Basque region the politics are necessarily more difficult. It could be conceivable that there might be some day joint planning by the Spanish and French nations for this region. But that is not within the realm of reality because of the increasingly strong political will of the Basques in both countries for meaningful independent national status and the rejection out of hand of this proposal by authorities and majorities in both of the dominant nation states. In Spain, the Franco era, for 40 years from the Civil War to the mid-1970s, and more recently the Aznar Popular Party regime have practiced overt or nearly overt suppression of Basque aspirations for independence. For some periods they have moved positively to attempt destruction of Basque culture. Only a brief interlude of the Socialist Government in the 1970s and 1980s offered a semblance of limited autonomy to the Basques. On the French side, the policy since the Revolution has been equally suppressive of any Basque aspirations for even limited autonomy, although this policy has been more subtle in its expression and conduct (see CASSAN, 1997; GOYHENETCHE, 1979). Since 1959, ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatsuna,* or Basque Homeland and Liberty), a terrorist organization, has responded by waves of multiple assassinations and violent property damage (see LOYER, 1997).

ETA and Basque political parties and interests

Barbara Loyer (1997) has studied the resulting geopolitics in some depth, with strong emphasis on the Spanish *Pais Vasco.* Loyer's analysis of the party structures and, especially, the critical interplay with the terrorist organization, ETA, stands as definitional of the geopolitics of the region. She correctly anticipates the way that ETA would become the agenda setter in the early years of the 21st century. Her discussion of the relations between the Euskal Herrriok (now Batasuna) party and ETA is still required reading for anyone considering the attacks on that party by the center-right Popular Party government and by the courts today. Since one version of this party is strongly active in France, Loyer's analysis is also necessary to understand the recent Basque vote in the French presidential and parliamentary elections. Her book stands as definitional of the complex political problems of the Basque region.

The political units and parties Loyer identified are:

- Basque intellectuals;
- The Basque Church;
- Basque business, industrial and banking interests;
- ETA itself;
- The, variously named, political party closest to ETA. In her writing it was called Herri Batasuna; later it was Euskado Herriko; now it is just Batasuna; then complexly related to a spin-off party then called Euskadiko Ezkerra, which has since been re-absorbed into the main body;
- The Basque Nationalist Party, created by Arana in the late 19th century and now in power in the Basque Autonomous Community;
- The Eusko Alkartsuna Party, close ally of the Nationalist Party, whose differences from it are probably more apparent than real;
- The Spanish Socialist Party and its local Basque Socialist Party branch;
- The Spanish Right, in the form of the Popular Party;
- The localized parties, Alava Unity, the Navarra dominant right, etc;
- The various "victims" and "peace" organizations.

Classification of parties and interests in Basque politics: Basque nationalism dimension

Although it seems never to have been done in print, Basque interests, including political parties, are subject to a rather straightforward classification according to several dimensions. The first of these is their position on Basque autonomy. On one extreme, on this dimension, are the two *"Españolist"* (a somewhat disparaging, but quite descriptive, Basque term) parties: the Popular Party and the Socialists. Though the Socialists were once favorable to some autonomy for the Basques, and still defend limited autonomy superficially, their recent position has seemed virtually indistinguishable from that of the Popular Party. However, beneath the surface, there are strong voices in the Popular Party who would prefer to revoke all Basque autonomy – or else make it meaningless by putting a non-Basque right-wing government in political control of the Basque Region. At the other extreme on the nationalism dimension are ETA and Batasuna, whose positions are virtually indistinguishable: Total nationhood for the Basque Homeland, including Navarra and the French areas, now, at any cost, regardless of cost in human life, including their own. The Basque Nationalist Party and Eusko Alkartsuna are almost at the same extreme on this dimension, especially since mid-July, 2000, except that they are more rationally *posibilist*, willing to proceed opportunistically over future years and decades. (They also differ on the violence issue; see below.) All other parties and interests in Basque politics are somewhere between these extremes.

Violence dimension

ETA, of course, stands at one extreme, on this dimension. They are quite prepared to precipitate as much violence as they can to terrorize the Spanish nation, neighboring regional societies such as the Catalans, Arragons, and Gallegos, the French (so far mainly police), and ethnic Basques themselves (especially police, and businessmen, some innocent bystanders, and clearly bordering on acts of violence against members of the Basque Nationalist Party). At the other extreme are members of "victims' " organizations, and members of the Socialist Party, especially the vulnerable local elected officials. However, Basque business interests, the Basque Nationalist Party, is also strongly oriented against violence, as

is the Eusko Alkartsuna Party. Again, all other parties and interests fall somewhere in the middle, though Basque society in general is heavily anti-violence.

Radical Marxism issue

Quite apart from where they stand on the other dimensions, the parties and interests vary on where they stand on radical Marxism. ETA and Batasuna stand near one extreme on this dimension, though not always consistently so. The United Left is inclined this way as well, but their willingness to work with the Basque Nationalist Party shows that this is at least partly rhetorical. The Socialists of course are sort of non-radical Marxists, favoring massive public ownership and social programs favored by other European "new" socialists. But they are not at all radical in fact. The Basque Nationalist Party has had, historically, elements of radical Marxism, but these seem to have largely disappeared in the play of electoral politics. Still, they favor public ownership and social programs not noticeably different from those of the Socialists – except that the Basque clergy is more influential in the Basque Nationalist Party. The Popular Party, on the other hand, is fiercely anti-Marxist and pro-private enterprise, though not with any very articulate economic logic at the political level. (There are some right-wing free enterprise ideologues in the Popular Party, but they are influential only at the margin.) There is some slight hint of social programs related to the strong Catholic orientation in Spanish and Basque cultures, but these are marginal within the Popular Party – the Catholic influence being closer to *Opus Dei* than to the social orientation of recent popes. Finally, Basque businessmen, as with businessmen everywhere, are at the extreme against radical Marxism.

Domestic well-being agenda dimension

The final dimension has to do with how well developed are the ideas about what should be done in the Basque Country, if independence were ever attained – or indeed if it never were to be. ETA stands at one extreme on this dimension, for it has practically no visible agenda at all on these matters. Some of its critics claim there is a hidden "ethnic cleansing" agenda, whereby all non Basque-speakers would be gradually forced to leave the territory. I find no evidence to support this hypothesis. More likely, to me, is that ETA is so concerned with life-and-death matters that mere well-being of the population pales into insignificance. At the other extreme are the Basque Nationalist Party and Eusko Alkartsuna, who have proved their commitment to a strong domestic well-being agenda, despite being confronted by the most distracting kind of politics from all sides. The Socialists have a strong domestic well-being agenda, on paper, but it presupposes the disappearance or fundamental weakening of Basque nationalism. That is not really in the cards, for the Basques have been struggling against domination by non-Basques for 4,000 years; and they are more firmly nationalistic today than ever before. So the Socialist domestic well-being, as concerns the Basque Country, must be seen as merely rhetorical. The Popular Party seem to hold no articulate domestic well-being agenda other than: "Be good Spaniards and let the market work to make you happy." All other positions are intermediate.

The "bottom line" on political impediments to Basque planning

How could there be any viable political climate for Basque metropolitan or megalopolitan planning, given the ETA violence and associated maneuvering of the *"Españolist"* parties and other forces just described? One would be tempted to say that such politics are simply not possible in the foreseeable future, and many writers have effectively come to this conclusion. However, the successive governments led by the Basque Nationalist Party since 1999 have shown that it is in fact possible to build a strong domestic agenda, including meaningful regional economic and environmental planning in what has to be seen as one of the most hostile environments for reasonable decision making in recent human history. Moreover, they have made advances in housing and social policy as well. The fact remains that the hostile politics of the Basque Country is the main impediment to good planning of metropolitan areas and their polycentric incipient megalopolis. But accomplishments in the past three years do offer the basis concrete hope that such planning can be done.[11]

Conclusions

Jean Gottmann's concept of the megalopolis has proved to be very useful in conceptual-level planning for the Basque coastal megalopolis. This is especially clear if a modicum of functional theory is added to the concept, as we have done. The result is that emphasis on the entire-community planning needs to be at the metropolitan level, intermediate to municipal and most contemporary European regional spatial planning. At the metropolitan level, there needs to be attention to the bio-physical environment, the demography and then to the "system" of economy, polity, culture, and interaction. The megalopolis must be seen as a linear clustering of metropolitan areas. Megalopolitan planning needs to concentrate on the interactions among these metropolitan areas, in accordance with the tastes and well-being of the several metro entities – and to planning the interstices between them.

The existing spatial structure of the Basque Country lends itself to this kind of megalopolitan planning. We identify five metropolitan areas of importance, the existing and potential linkages among them, and the appropriate treatment of the interstices for environmental protection and agricultural productivity. It is in these interstices that the key strengthening of the settlement of smaller places needs to be planned – a key part of megalopolitan planning as we have come to understand it.

There exist in the Basque Country, in both the Spanish and the French parts, agencies that are promising both for metropolitan and for megalopolitan planning. These agencies are not yet, however, properly oriented to the most likely pattern of urbanization to emerge in this and successive centuries. The kinds of planning that will be required are clearly suggested.

The particularly violence-anchored and hostile form of political activity that characterizes the Basque Country must be seen as the most important obstacle to good metropolitan and megalopolitan planning. However, the remarkable efforts of the current Basque government hold promise that, even in this extreme political climate, good metropolitan and megalopolitan planning can still be advanced.

Notes

1. This paper grows out of my work during the past several years on the question of Basque planning. I have presented several papers on the subject at Ekistics meetings: (1) "Euskal Herriok Ekistica," June 2000 (Čelákovice, Czech Republic); (2a) "Basque Planning and the Future of Human Settlements in Europe's Western Pyrenees Region: Updating the Euskal Herriok Ekistika Project," October 2001, (Berlin, Germany) [Revised April, 2002]; (2b) "Basque Planning and the Future of Human Settlements in Europe's Western Pyrenees Region," May 2002 [a derived short-paper]; (2c) "Completing the Transition of Ekistics to the 'Applied Science of Human Settlements'," May 2002 [a derived short-paper, with revisions]; and (2d) "Summary Conclusions and Synthesis for the Future of the Basque Homeland and Other Regions," May 2002 [a derived short-

paper, with revisions]. Some portions of Items 2a-2d have been published in *Ekistics,* July-December 2002.

2. The original conception was that of Patrick Geddes' "conurbation," which included some positive but many negative consequences of towns growing together, including that of the metropolitan region. The focal phenomena were physical, but social, economic and even political aspects were at least recognized. The treatment of these same phenomena was as unambiguously negative in the various writings of Lewis Mumford, from *The Culture of Cities* (1936) to *The City in History* (1959). Gottmann restored a measure of even-handedness and added new depth to the economic, political and communications dimensions of these phenomena.
3. See the listing of items under "Theory of Action Framework" in the references that follow.
4. My own early efforts to empirically anchor Parsons' theory is contained in my (1954) "Patterns of Status Perception: An Empirical Test of Theory-Based Hypotheses," Undergraduate honors thesis, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University. I met with only limited success. The "theory of action" approach, along with other functionalist theories, has of course since fallen out of fashion. I put it forward here merely to provide a kind of checklist for looking at the structure of the megalopolis – without accepting the functionalist assumptions. This is considered by more recent philosophers of science as the only legitimate use of systems theories in the social sciences (see Berlinski, 1975).
5. See Parsons (1959) and, to a more limited extent at the national level, Parsons and Smelser (1959) and Parsons et al. (1956).
6. A note on place name usage in this paper: I have tried to put the Basque (Euskara) name first, followed in parentheses by the French or Spanish name. This usage is extended to provinces and to rivers. For interim source, I have used Eusko Juarlaritzako Hezkuntza Sailak onetsia (1994). My ultimate authority on Basque place names, however, has been "The Whole Basque Place-Name List," available on the internet at www.geocities.com/CollegePark/5062/topo2. It is identified as having been compiled by *Euskaldunon Egunkaria,* a Basque daily newspaper and approved by Euskalitzindia, the Basque Language Academy.
7. See Sansinenia Ichaso (2001).
8. This agency is currently being studied, and interviews are not yet complete. What may appear to be conclusions stated here are still hypotheses. Complete evaluation of this agency will be provided in a revision to the present paper, or a subsequent one.
9. Joel A. Cohen, "A global garden in the 21st century," in Phi Beta Kappa, *Key Reporter,* Spring, 1998. (Based on a talk by Cohen to the syndics of Columbia University in March 1997 at Biosphere 2, Oracle, Arizona, USA.
10. Lawrence D. Mann (1998), "Planificación del Futuro Urbano de las Américas," in his *Conferencias sobre Planificación Comparativa en las Américas.* Tucson, Arizona, and Panama City, Panama, Programa Arizona-Panama. This document is available in Spanish from the author or through the Program office, College of Architecture, Planning and Landscape Architecture, University of Arizona.
11. While I do not cite each of the multitude of newspaper references supporting this narrative, the original references do exist and are available on request. The reader can get many of them on the web, at www.elpais.es, under "temas," and then "La Ofensiva Terrorista" or "ETA". Supplementary information is at www.elcorreo.electronico.es and www.eldiariovasco.es, plus eldiariodenavarra.es. For the French Basque area, see www.sudoest.fr and www.semainebasque.fr. All are, however, in the Spanish or French languages, respectively.

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City image and major international events: A new tool for urban strategy and planning

"Image is a necessary item for the city. ... the image is helpful to the city because it often becomes a mainspring for local development as an efficient tool for urbanism. Actually, the place of the city is growing more and more in a worldwide life where borders are waning. The image of the city is even becoming a target representative of culture and ideology as a whole, as has just been demonstrated in New York. So, image and mediatization are becoming weapons. This could be a turning point in the running of the image function because the overmediatization of events, as has been shown after 11th September, appears risky for the countries aimed at or for witnesses as well."

Jacqueline Lieutaud

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Introduction

In the era of the Web and of an economically globalized planet, Image and City are closely linked. But this is in fact a very old phenomenon, that was born before the invention of photography and that remains continuous through time. Globalization and promotion through the media reinforced these links, and nowadays, without an image, a city has no chance to play any economic role and therefore to evolve in a positive way. The awareness of this topic led to strategies by local actors being set up, as Jean Gottmann anticipated. But if strategies became a nearly trite fact owing to their generalization, it is still interesting to show how it has been possible to reach that stage. Actually the Image-City pair altered its links, as is exemplified here by the links between great international events and cities.

For more than a century now, universal fairs and Olympic Games have been closely linked with the image of the European cities where they were born, and where they have attracted many visitors. However the structures that were built for this purpose were ephemeral: in fact the city legend remained almost only associated with the image of these prestige events.

The modern Olympic Games, born in Athens more than a century ago, had an impact akin to these events, but more unequal owing to their specificity. The functional buildings constructed for these events such as stadiums, swimming pools, visitors' and sportsmen's accommodation halls have survived. But owing to their utilitarian appearance, they were later absorbed in an anonymous way into the spreading of the urban fabric. As for the Winter Games, they unevenly upgraded the mountain ranges where they were held, being conditioned by the presence of snow and technical trails. These Games enhanced the values of some existing resorts, but the difficulties of use of these peculiar sports infrastructures by average skiers, even the difficulties of access to them, kept them in the background of the main international touristic orbits.

During the 20th century, with progress in air transport, these great European events became worldwide events and attracted more and more visitors. Their promotion through the radio, the media, and above all TV, is broadcast through satellites in a almost worldwide manner. The image of the city where the event is held is continuously broadcast during several weeks. On the one hand, if this phenomenon happens again regularly, the gap between the events lasts a sufficiently long time to avoid any saturation effect. On the other hand, every city cannot welcome these events, owing to the number of people attending, and owing to the numerous infrastructures with important technical skills as well as high financing levels required. So, down to the 1990s, the choice favored cities from developed countries, as they were synonymous with modernity, and in a way "rewarded" the social and economic growth of the nation. Therefore, to welcome these events is still significant. The links with the city are as strong as before, but the image of these events has been altered and their impact changed.

There is a wealth of information on this theme of Image, City and Development, so it is impossible to touch on it entirely. We try here to show the evolution in the last 150 years. After considering in the first part the image of universal, cultural and sporting events in the pioneer cities, we analyze in the second part the change of utilization of these events that became a tool of urban planning from the international events of Spain in 1992 onwards, with the Universal Exhibition of Seville in the spring and the Olympic Games of Barcelona in the summer. The third part of this paper displays some further thoughts about the generalization of the use of the City Image notion.

From the Universal Exhibitions in the 19th century only the image remained

The Renaissance allowed the European city to link back with the antique heritage and urbanism, but only a few large cities will be able to spread the inventions of the Industrial Revolution, displaying them during Universal or International Exhibitions. From the beginning in 1851 onwards, just about 30 of them have been held. The trading side, as it was stemming from the great fairs of the Middle Ages, seems to have been strongly hidden by industrialization in the 19th century. As far as these events gather crowds, their aim is obviously to buy, but even more to marvel at technical innovations and their implementations in the realms of science, Arts and daily life. They appear as the reflection of the will of contemporary societies towards modernity, but their course enhances the prestige of the city where they are held. They exemplify the competitive spirit, ambitions, and even rivalries between organizer countries as well.

Universal Exhibitions

The "Exhibition of Nations," held in London in 1851, was the first of this kind and the only one held in Britain. It was tremendously successful and acted as a "shop window" for Victorian prosperity and imperial grandeur (figs. 1 to 5). The rival city,



Figs. 1-5: The Crystal Palace, built by Joseph Paxton for the Great Exhibition held in London in 1851.

Fig. 6: Paris – Universal Exhibition, 1867 and 1878.[1]

Paris, organized six Universal Exhibitions in 1855, 1867, 1878, 1889, 1900 and 1937, as well as an International Colonial Exhibition in 1931 (figs. 6 to 11).

The site of these exhibitions stayed marginal in the city itself for a long time. At the beginning they were installed in a landscape garden. But, owing to their success, they covered a more and more important surface to welcome increasing participation. They were therefore located in large free areas inside the urban fabric, and then in the near surroundings. However, no new districts were created because the exhibition halls were intended to be destroyed. Modernity was inside as well as outside, and every pavilion tried to testify the know-how of its country. Some buildings were doomed to show the most modern techniques, and even became an example of modern or avant-garde art. The first one was the Crystal Palace (figs. 1 to 5), built in Hyde Park by the architect Joseph Paxton for



Fig. 7: Paris – The Trocadero Palace and the construction of the Eiffel Tower for the exhibition of 1889. (*Source:* Durandelle, *Travaux de construction de la Tour Eiffel, 1888.* Paris, Editions Hazan, 1989).



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Fig. 8: Paris – Universal Exhibition, 1889.[1]

Fig. 9: Paris – Universal Exhibition, 1900: Pont d'Iéna and Eiffel Tower.[1]

Fig. 10: Paris – Exhibition of Modern Decorative Arts, 1925.[1]

Fig. 11: Paris – International Exhibition of Arts and Crafts (Arts et Techniques) in Modern Life, 1937.[1]

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the 1851 exhibition. The concept of this glass and iron building was so audacious that many people thought it would collapse before its unveiling. It was in fact so successful that it survived the exhibition. It was moved to Sydenham in the southern London suburbs, until it was destroyed in a fire in 1936.

In Paris few buildings of the eight exhibitions survive, because they were destroyed each time to build a more modern work than the former one. Nowadays only the Grand Palais and the Petit Palais remain (figs. 12 and 13), as they were built on the Champs Elysées for the 1900 exhibition, as well as the

Fig. 12: Paris – the Grand Palais built for the 1900 exhibition.[1]

Fig. 13: Paris – the Petit Palais built for the 1900 exhibition.[1]

Palais de Chaillot that replaced the Palais du Trocadero already built on the same hill of Chaillot for the 1878 exhibition. One could even mention the building of the Colonial Museum erected at the Porte Dorée. But the most famous building is still of course the 1,000 feet high tower of Gustav Eiffel (fig. 7) for the 1889 Universal Exhibition, that remains the symbolic

Fig. 14: Paris – General view.[1]

Fig. 15: Paris – General view with Pont Alma and foreign pavilion.[1]



Fig. 16: Paris – View from the Trocadero towards the Eiffel Tower.[1]

image of Paris, even overshadowing that of the Royal Squares or of the famous palace of Versailles (figs. 14, 15 and 16).

During these periods the city enjoyed great hustle and bustle and the metropolitan underground was unveiled during the 1900 Universal Exhibition. Its image was spread abroad by the famous "art deco" sculptures of Hector Guimard for its staircase exits on the Grands Boulevards that contributed to popularizing the Modem Style. But, apart from these exceptions, the urban fabric was eventually little altered by the event.

Among the later exhibitions, the buildings had less impact and less survival as well. One can quote however the picture of the Brussels Atomium in 1958, or the monumental fascist style of the "Esposizione Universale di Roma" (EUR) district. This architecture, cancelled by the war in 1942, was rediscovered when this unachieved place became the service releasing zone of the Italian capital.

Olympic Games

The Olympic Games often generated very functional buildings. The construction of a marble stadium in Athens, intended to symbolize in a luxury way the picture of the past *grandeur* of a country too often evoked through the image of archaeological ruins, appears an exception.

Those older shop-windows of modernity survived almost through visitors' tales filled-with-wonder, paper clippings and some photographs yellow with age.

Continuity of progress obliterated the older evidence as time went by. The Eiffel Tower itself should have been destroyed but its handsome and still modern silhouette allowed it to remain. So these events did not upgrade urban planning, but rather crowned the social and economic expansion of the most developed countries of which the city in which they were held was the symbol. The picture of the city was enriched by these temporary exhibitions that rounded off for a short while the variety of its cultural and artistic life. And the city kept above all the memories of these events long after they disappeared.

International promotional events: New stakes for the city

Universal Exhibitions, like the Olympic Games, are becoming planetary events and enjoy growing success for modern transportation systems which allow millions of visitors to attend them. On top of the works linked with the events, circulation and welcoming need new constructions, as the old buildings are insufficient. However the temporary and luxurious aspect is lessened and has become more touristic and lighter. From now on, the cost of fulfilment is carefully considered, avoiding running up colossal debts, even if budgets increase regularly. As an example 8 billion francs were planned for Lille if its candidacy had been retained for the 2004 Olympic Games. From the 1980s onwards, the event progressively implies urban planning, and from the 1988 Vancouver event, the return of investments is systematically strived at.

From temporary district to urban planning

In 1985, the universal exhibition of Tsukuba in Japan introduced a new urban concept because the exhibition site has been used again. Despite the relative distance of the district at about 60 km from Tokyo, this area became a university campus, then a new town embryo, and finally a technopole. However, this State-enforced, *a posteriori* planning proved to be awkward and expensive. That is why from now on the host city anticipates every urban project.

Actually, the gap between these cyclic events being larger than four years, a sufficient lapse of time is allowed to work out programs and to carry out works in order to get cumulative emergency grants from the different actors concerned, i.e. City, Region and State. Such a phenomenon that we can call a "planning event" appeared as a new planning tool for territorial development. It is triggered by the stakes of the exceptional promotion given by TV broadcasts of the event, because the host city becomes the symbolic shop-window for the country's know-how. So it is in everybody's interest that the image should be a positive one. The threat of any dysfunction being broadcast worldwide puts the city actors in an unusual but temporary position of strength. It is increased by the existence of a target date which is of course the beginning of the Games: this fact does not allow any extension of the date, as is for example usual in Mediterranean countries.

Economic and mediatization globalization have increased the local impact of these events. From now on, they are made out as an exceptional opportunity for the host to further a positive economic and urbanistic impact, even in the most developed countries. Even at this stage, international selection puts into a state of rivalry more than about ten sites and sometimes involves preliminary works to reinforce the strength of a candidacy. As a case study, China, where motorways were non-existent, anticipated a motorway tract between the airport and Beijing, this town being a candidate for the Olympic Games, to reinforce the evidence of its modernity. Geographical localization of such a phenomenon even acquires a moral significance. For China, welcoming the next event is made out as an economic as well as a democratic reconnaissance signal by the international community: this obliterates the unsolved problem of Human Rights in this country.

Attraction, stakes and impacts are strengthened, but the success of such an event attracting so many people locally appears like a complex problem, or even a bet. The course of the event must demonstrate a national know-how in a broad sense. Many criteria – festivities, means of access and stay, and the need to be operational on time – will reflect the host country's image. If the event becomes a speculative product, it often appears as a challenge to be overcome for the city and the country as well.

In 1992 in Spain, both the Universal Exhibition of Seville and the Summer Olympic Games of Barcelona took place. These exhibitions happened after the Gulf War, in an uncertain economic and touristic climate. Moreover these two cities had already welcomed such an exhibition and the citizens of Seville have had to pay huge taxes for a long time to soak up their debts. In Andalusia, profitability of the deal has been *a priori* looked for, but this event soon became for Seville the main hub of local development. The same year in Barcelona, hosting the Summer Olympic Games became a local strategy of metropolitan advancement. These two cities will not remain isolated occurrences. They are the forerunners of a great urban planning development that will become widespread later.

The Universal Exhibition and the Seville urban project

In order to take advantage of this event, the space reserved by the city for the Seville Universal Exhibition was located by the town council on an island in the Guadalquivir river. This voluntary localization, in an almost virgin and unfavorable site, ought to allow the city later to spread southwards, over the river. This choice required the competent administrations to carry out infrastructure works, particularly fluvial ones, that were always being postponed for later, owing to their high costs.

The planning interventions scheduled for the event largely extend beyond the exhibition site and are meant to restructure the urban fabric as a whole. The coming of the high speed train

Fig. 17: Seville – Road network.[2]



Fig. 18: Seville – Railway network.[2]



Fig. 19: Seville – Expo '92: The new image of the town.[2]

1. Monastery of Santa Maria de las Cuevas; 2. Royal Pavilion; 3. Pavilion of the 15th Century; 4. Pavilion of discoveries: Omnimax; 5. Pavilion of Navigation; 6. Port; 7. Botanical Garden; 8. Auditorium; 9. Pavilion of the Present and the Future; 10. Carp; 11. Garden of St Andrew; 12. Pavilion of Spain; 13. Pavilion of autonomous communities; 14. International pavilions; 15. Park of the future; 16. Cinema; 17. Rowing installations; 18. Parking; 19. Olympic Stadium; 20. Athletic tracks; 21. Amphitheater; 22. Exhibition grounds; 23. Heliport; 24. La Cartuja Park. (*Source:* Exposición Universal, Seville, 1992).

Fig. 20: Seville – The site of the Exhibition. (*Source:* Seville Universal Exhibition *Isla de la Cartuja,* 1992).

with its modern technology led to the creation of a new station, modifying centrality and opening up the city. Regional airports were upgraded and numerous private investments developed hotel facilities (figs. 17 to 21).

As a whole, the city enjoyed a very positive image, even if the works had trouble being finished in time. The cost of the Universal Exhibition was 10.9 billion pesetas and was balanced by the revenues of entrance tickets and mainly the TV licence fee. The citizens of Seville did not pay any tax bills, even if the town council was not able to commit new projects during the next years. But the exhibition budget represents only 10 percent of all the commitments of the administrations in the city and 1 percent of public investment for this event, because Spain unveiled on this occasion the Madrid-Seville section of the future high-speed railway system, the AVE.

However the local urban project is here centered round the general infrastructure works. These allowed a later possible extension, although not planned, of the built-up area. In spite of an important local need, the project did not foresee social facilities or dwellings. From the beginning it was only planned to preserve a small part of the development built for the exhibition. Their aim was to offer the city an urban garden landscape and cable television buildings in order to create a regional-scale technopole, that did not exist in southern Spain.

All these fulfilments improved the position of Seville, the fourth city in Spain and a regional capital. This besides crystallized the displeasure of other cities in Andalusia that got no returns even though they participated, through regional taxes, at a level of 12 percent of the works' finances. Nor did they benefit from the consequences induced by the regional technological project which hardly worked. Seville-Granada rivalry was even stirred up following this Universal Exhibition. Furthermore the railway extension of the Spanish high-speed train has been considerably delayed due to implementation costs much greater than estimated.



Fig. 21: Seville – Site of the Exhibition (detail).[2]

The Seville case study clearly shows a new vision of international exhibitions. Thanks to their attractivity, they have acquired an autonomous image. On the other hand, many cities were degraded in the course of time, or did not reach an optimal level of development. A reversal of the initial image occurred, to a point where the event became a mainspring for making up for lost time as well as a tool of modernization for the city. The Catalonian example went further in the concern of these links between image and urban impact during the summer of 1992.

The Summer Olympic Games and Barcelona's metropolitan strategy

This use of the temporary welcome of a sort of universal fair in order to develop or to renew a city appears logical when all is said and done. But this factual development contaminated sports-seeking events to the point that it diverted them from their purpose, as was the case with the Barcelona Olympic Games.

This old city, with a very individualistic past, experienced an earlier commercial development that led it to the first financial position in Spain. The well-matched extension of the city was worked out in the 19th century thanks to the "Ensanche," a great anticipation development plan elaborated by the engineer Alfonso Cerda. But a century later, the Catalonian capital was enduring important economic and spatial difficulties. The worldwide crisis of traditional industries increased urban waste land, particularly in the harbor zone.

Downtown is saturated and surrounded by an anarchic uptown lacking in amenities, owing to the increase of often illegal self-construction. Finally, Madrid as a capital has been systematicaly favored since the government of Franco. It wants to assert itself among European capitals, and tries particularly to reduce the growth and the autonomy of its rival Barcelona, the second city in the country, that took away the strength of its position in the Mediterranean space.

Now, the international context provoked transformations in

Fig. 23: Genoa – The conversion of the old port into a reception area for cruise tourism. (*Source:* Porto Autonomo di Genova, 1998).

Fig. 22: Genoa –Intermodal traffic decentralized at Voltri. (*Source:* Porto Autonomo di Genova, 1998).



Figs. 24 and 25: Genova – Cargo activities. (*Source:* Porto Autonomo di Genova, 1998).

Fig. 26: Position of Marseilles simultaneously in the Euro-Mediterranean zone and in that of the European countries. (*Source:* Agam, "Comment faire le schèma de cohérence de Marseille 2015," 1997).

the neighboring countries. In Italy, Genoa is the main rival of Barcelona, as Naples plays a secondary role. But Genoa suffers the repercussions of the industrial crisis of the 1970s as well as of the evolution of international transport. The harbor of Genoa had to be broken up geographically, because the free space in the acropolis was unsuitable for the forthcoming container transportation, the major part of which has been decentralized at Voltri (fig. 22). The old harbor has been restructured around a ferry and cruise dock (figs. 23, 24 and 25), and around a cultural and play activity urban site as well. Otherwise the developments of the two other apexes of the economic triangle, Turin and Milan, of which Genoa was the seaboard exit, changed. Development is rather turned towards the Po valley and its delta, blocking Genoa off from its immediate hinterland. Barcelona would like to take advantage of this Italian weakening in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the French littoral appears more threatening for the future of the Catalonian city. Marseilles has been declining since the decolonization era, but a great polynuclear region is building up from Montpellier to Avignon and Toulon. This "city-region" surpasses 10 million inhabitants, approximately the population of the Ile-de-France region (figs. 26 and 27). The weight of this whole and of its abilities may well spread further, because it has a tendency to link with the Grasse-Cannes-Sophia Antipolis area.



Fig. 27: Marseilles – Euromediterranean Project 2015. (*Source:* Agam, "Comment faire le schéma de cohérence de Marseille 2015," 1997).

Fig. 28: Barcelona – The town at the beginning of the 20th century after the "Ensanche". (*Source:* Documentation Française).

Consequently, hosting the Olympic Games in Barcelona was in a context of national and international rivalry. The city jumped at this exceptional opportunity, in spite of the challenge of the Seville exhibition in the same year. The Catalonian city implemented an urban strategy assuming not only the success of the summer games, but also the setting-up of infrastructure works that will permit the city to anticipate its needs for more than 20 years, and subsequently improve its position in the process of the Mediterranean arc still in formation (figs. 28 and 29).

An urban project was developed in this way by the staff of the architect Oriol Bohigas. To carry out this ambitious project, he did not place the Games in a virgin space, but tried to insert the needed infrastructure works of the Games in the urban fabric itself, while repecting the history and the specificity of the city as well. In order to reduce costs, the Olympic Games were designed as a temporary occupation of buildings admittedly constructed to welcome them, but intended for another purpose. So, it is not a later re-use of premises, but the fulfilment of operations the aim of which is to give rise to the advancement of the economic and cultural aspect of the tertiary metropolis. The games are in fact a mere "pretext" for restructuring the city. The Games themselves will be adjusted to the metropolitan refitting program, and not the contrary.

The scheduled project is a daring one. Under the pretext of facilitating access to the Games, all major communication infrastructure as well as the internal circulation of the city have been thought about again. Two partly buried urban motorways, the first one tangentially in the North, and the other one on the coast, were planned. An optical fiber net was developed from a communications tower. The harbor has been displaced southwards to better meet the new specifications of a container terminal; a modern airport has been built by Ricardo Boffil; an extension of the underground railway has been scheduled, and so on.



Fig. 29: Site of the Olympic Games within the town of Barcelona, 1992.[3]

Furthermore, the buildings housing the Games are located in an interstitial way on purpose to stitch up again, to spread and to modernize the city. Finally, Barcelona will see its centrality in a reverse manner in order to favor the touristic continuation of the shore and give back to the city an opening to the sea (figs. 30 to 34).

In spite of the fact that some details in arrangement were scheduled in the whole city, four core sites were chosen to put this project into practice:

- Montjuich Hill is the genuine kernel of the Olympic Games. The 1929 Exhibition Stadium has been enlarged, and the buildings are scattered in a renewed park. Eventually this space was supposed to become a zone for museums and urban walking in the western part of the city.
- The Vall d'Hebron sports facilities, on the north side, are built on waste ground at the boundary between downtown and the outlying underprivileged areas. They have to be re-used as a service center for the spare time of citizens of the periphery.
- The "Diagonal" zone has a new university, sports and accommodation center. A better integration of this area has been programmed in order to extend the urban fabric westwards.
- Finally, the fourth site is in the south, known as the Poble Nou area, with the Olympic Village Nova Icaria. It was a degraded space of industrial waste land, once called the "Catalonian Manchester," separating the city from the commercial harbor. Only a third of this large renewal zone of 130 hectares had to be used as a "container" for the Olympic Village. The village was located in new six-storeyed buildings whose flats were sold as early as 1990, with prices frozen and the occupation by their owners was to take place two years later, after the Olympic Games. Two 44-storeyed towers housing a hotel and temporarily the Olympic press stand had to symbolize the new opening of the city seawards, as a reminder of the columns ending the Via Appia at Brindisi. The old trading harbor is replaced by a yachting harbor with a *promenade-croisette* of 6 km twinned with artificial sand beaches.

The opportunity offered by the events allowed financial hurdles to be overcome that would never have been accepted within the framework of usual metropolitan management, for the total amount of the works reached one billion pesetas and went together with a tax bill foreseen up to 2009. Rivalry existed between the socialist Lord Mayor and the center right-wing President of the Generalitat. The latter could only reduce the over-expensive scheduled extension of the underground at Montjuich, and thus cancel the VAL (light automatic vehicle) project of the French firm Matra. Above all the city had to struggle against Madrid's rivalry and disagreement between Catalonia and the Spanish State. The intentional inertia of the central government delayed at the very most the construction of motorways which were legally within its competence. However, this masterly project was fulfilled and brought about a true leap forward for the city.

This strategic vision of the Olympic Games upgraded Barcelona to the rank of a leading metropolis on the "Latin arc" Palma-Valencia-Saragossa-Montpellier-Toulouse. Owing to the dynamism of its financial state, its appears as a rival of Marseilles at the beginning of the third millennium, especially when the projects triggered by the Olympic Games are achieved, that is to say: the rebuilding of a harbor suitable for containers, the



Fig. 29 (cont'd).



(1)Olympic Stadium, (2) San-Jordi Palais des sports; (3) INEFC; (4) Olympic swimming pool; (5) Europe Square.

Fig. 30: Barcelona – Plan of the Olympic ring of Montjuich. [3]

Fig. 33: The two towers of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona. (*Source:* The author).

achievement of a logistic rig on the Llobregat delta and the prospective eastern urban district around the Paris-Barcelona-Madrid High Speed Train Station under construction. Considering the reorientation of the Po valley development and the difficulties of Marseilles, Barcelona finds itself as the new southern Europort.



Fig. 31: The new Ramblas and nautical sports: an area developed for the Olympic Games.[3]



Fig. 32: Barcelona – Graphic representation and maquette of the Olympic Village.[3]

Fig. 34: Barcelona – Promenade on the new artificial sand beaches. (*Source:* The author).

Image and city: A required but not riskless tool revealing a differentiated sight

These two examples illustrate the crucial importance of image nowadays. They exemplify as well the richness of this notion

and of its impacts in various topics with a spate of consequences. It appears a double-edged notion according to the item pictured as well as to the photographer: it can be a upgrading means or an urban development tool for local actors, but the stranger's judgment, especially if he is a journalist, gives a review without servility of the "roof tops."

Image and city: A major consensus tool

The image, as an information tool, is a part of everyday life. Its acuteness is greater during exceptional events. It is particularly the case during great disasters. But, when it is a foreseeable, peaceful, playful, worldwide event, and when it is long-awaited and promoted through the media, its image displays two simultaneous as well as contradictory sides. It is composed of a local tool that can be taken over to broadcast a "positive" vision and so to promote the place itself. It represents at the same time a kind of sword of Damocles with the "negative" development of what the entrants and especially reporters should do. Universal Exhibitions and Summer Olympic Games represent perhaps a particular case, but they clearly exemplify all the mechanisms of this phenomenon, reaching in this way the peak of the image notion, as an actor of urban development.

As a matter of fact, an exhibition lasts several weeks. Its image is not that of a few hours of TV broadcast in a limited place. One has to accommodate, to convey, to feed, to entertain millions of people who are expecting to find there efficiency and the most advanced standards in these topics. The spotlights include access and welcome conditions for entrants, their welfare, safety and mobility, etc. It is a global picture of the functional ability of the place, lasting for a long time, as well as in the smallest detail. The slightest dysfunction would carry some weight on the economic, diplomatic and touristic plan, for the city and for the whole country as well.

Therefore it is very hard to "make up for", or even "to reverse the situation" of a bad image, as its impact is strong and long-lasting as well. Such a heritage would have serious consequences as far as the international and domestic points of view are concerned, even towards rival cities. So it is necessary to create for this purpose a consensus of all who intervene to hatch the event and to secure its progress. Power struggles are exceptionally to the advantage of the city during the preparation of the event. The latter is aware of the fact that to lay out too much money comes down to penalizing citizens: therefore it tries to get the works taken in charge by other contributors according to the national administrative hierarchy, or even to take its revenge on the delays accumulated by the State in this field. All this could not be done in normal times, but faced with the importance of the deal, the actors are compelled to do so. The city knows the consensus will fade with the final event and that it will be impossible to get something from the same representatives for at least ten years. It requires a lot to cover this period of time in advance.

In addition to these fears, and the fact of jumping at the opportunity, the importance of the developments is made possible by conveying crowds endowed with high purchasing power, and the period between the date of the selection of the host city and the opening ceremony is long enough to have time to work out a strategy and to get the urban project fulfilled. This is the true difference between the factual operating of a "normal" use of the city image.

The prestige of the city during the 19th century was a treasury for the great international events; nowadays the latter have succeeded in reinforcing their own image which is autonomous towards the city. In spite of their temporary length their impact is so important through the vision of journalists and tourists that they are no longer – at the very beginning of the 21st century – a temporary crowning of the city, but can become a true mainspring for economic development and an efficient tool of urban planning. But it is just an opportunity, and a daring gamble. The poor crowds at the recent Hannover exhibition show that nothing is won in advance.

From 1992 on, cultural events and summer games took place downtown. This was the case in Atlanta where the core of the city had to be renewed, but where the positive image was stained by safety problems. In Lisbon, the Exhibition created a residential area, and the new bridge on the Tagus river gave concrete expression to new possibilities of expansion and restructuring of the urban area. However the universal but religious event of the Rome "Jubilee" did not arouse the interest of large-scale enterprises. The Italian state that Massimo d'Alema, an ex-communist, is in charge of, and the city itself which is run by an ecologist and leader of the left wing, claimed that they considered this event a private gathering. The Jubilee law includes poor financial means in order to give a face lift to some buildings in Rome and in stage cities for pilgrims such as Bologna. But no building was planned and most of the funds had to ensure the safety of the pilgrims and to make traffic easier in the city itself. Hovever, owing to the media success of the event, the noisy and traditional march of Italian trade unions on May 1st was banned in order not to overshadow the Catholic exhibitions. To jump at the opportunity of the development is not always understood, but the consequences of the fear of "punishment" by the image are still real.

Image and city: An unmarked strategy

So, the image can be at the service of space, ideology, or religion. Being universal, and open to almost everyone, it is used daily, in the guise of touristic or commercial advertisement. The 1980s and 1990s mark an increase in the image role and the generalization of its use for local development strategies.

However the image of the city displays various conceptions throughout the world. As an example, the "urban marketing" that appeared during the 1980s in Europe often aimed at trying to change a too traditional image of the city, thus attracting new jobs to struggle against endemic unemployment. In fact, the urban fabric takes a long time to be altered, while the image is an efficient, quick, international and actual time vector.

For many small or middle sized historical cities fallen into oblivion, it was important to show modern units as symbols of functionalism. The image is able to claim that any ancient city, up to now considered dormant, became economically dynamic, and that it carried out an attractive social and cultural transformation. The promotion through the media, financed by the town council, throws light on some recent local deals, often isolated in the urban fabric. It often displays a modern style aesthetic architecture intentionally chosen by local actors in order to be recognized easily, even if, owing to its atypism, it runs counter to the old fabric – for example, a new high-tech stadium, a school of university level, a pedestrian street ... intended to convey a "positive local changing effect."

In spite of the modesty of these urban strategies, the aims here fit into each other like a nest of dolls. Indeed the image is first directed to captivating an audience of private investors likely to bring employment thanks to having settled there. To demonstrate the dynamism of the city is to prove too, on a national and international level, that the town council can be an efficient partner for an industrial or tertiary settlement. At the same time it is to reinforce the weight of the city towards rival cities in a regional or international hierarchy. This image is also intended to give back to its inhabitants a sense of pride in their city, the final aim of which is, of course, to satisfy the voters. In this context in Europe, the image used is more and more a popular image, the ancient one usually centered on the cathe-

dral having been dethroned. The latter remains only a reference in the designation of mixed housing development zones (ZAC), called "ZAC Cathedrale," even when this local monument, as in Amiens, is a cultural site registered on the World Heritage List of UNESCO.

In other cases, the aim of the image is to "regenerate" the city through its history and patrimony as well: at the time of a global world it allows a cultural identity to be asserted. Some do it through a symbolic monument, the rehabilitation of an old district, or echoes of an historic event. So, memorial museums of local tradition, war memorials like at Peronne or in Caen, memory tourism, even a call to "memory workings" as in Berlin, grow in number. The modern side then comes from a collective aspect of "agora," from art, from building symbolism, from space regarded as sacred, from the public square, from the place.

In formerly developed countries, many cities are hit by industrial waste land, particularly in the textile and metallurgical industries. The extent and the importance of this phenomenon makes the regeneration of the city essential for its survival. Lacking private investors – as is the case in the US – Northern Europe re-uses these spaces later, for financial means are limited. For the time being, the European Fund for Regional Development (FEDER), diverted from its initial economic role, re-uses these often central lands on which central actors try to re-build the city. In some operations, FEDER can even be led astray with the addition of a small industrial waste land that enables a large-scale urban enterprise without any link with industry to enjoy such funds. In the same way, constraints linked with the use of FEDER can be used as a pretext to compel a local consensus between actors differing on the project to be achieved for fear of not getting this financial godsend.

In Southern Europe, 19th century industrialization was more limited. The same mix between plants and dwellings did not exist and only a few harbor districts had to be restructured. But the cities, being very old, have deteriorated. A few national laws voted on the occasion of natural disasters allow a true evolution, like in Naples or Venice. Mediterranean downtowns are the very opposite of the functional side of Anglo-Saxon cities. Most of them act simultaneously as residential flats and business districts, even if they are unsuited for modern traffic. For its citizens the town is perceived as space they identify with socially first and foremost, in the same manner that, in the eyes of tourists, the old medieval streets are more and more attractive in contrast to the triviality of concrete buildings.

Image and city: A differentiated perception

The image is indissociable from the city in the global promotion through the media. In Europe it displays an internal role as well, and many urbanists are looking for symbolic buildings or worry about improving the aesthetic side of city gates or of the railway station district, that are becoming new symbols of citizen social interaction. Besides these signs of recognition, some cities even use logos, such as "Montpellier, the gifted city."

Therefore the image has numerous connotations that are not always aggressive. It often appears as an efficient antidote against the anonymity of globalization. However it has its limits. The "shop window" side is in fact a "visiting card" side. Like the latter, it points out the name, address, and the enhanced value of the urban framework. But the image is not always open and may hide the genuine content: brakes upon expansion or local problems, even more lack of development as has been the case in Europe with numerous "blank" congress halls built in the 1980s to simulate a technological movement. The image was at that time that of an ephemeral and deceptive speculation, like in Montpellier, where the great ballyhoo was resting on a void, the technopolis materializing much later.

Finally, the perception of the image varies geographically according to traditions, religions and cultures. In American towns the image of the city emphazises the height record or the architecture of new skyscrapers, while on the contrary in town centers in Europe it is the lack of these that is noticed. In the past, many towns of the Third World, and particularly in South America, proudly pointed to "their" sole concrete building as a symbol of an "American way" of modernism. Very large multimillionaire cities no longer have an image, or it has become a commonplace image due to the generalization of shanty town districts between blocks of skyscrapers. Nevertheless the new concrete town of Shanghai, on the ruins of former dwellings, willing to be the symbol of Chinese economic success, appears as an iconoclastic and frightening device in the eyes of Europeans.

Conclusion

Image is a necessary item for the city. We have already seen that the image is helpful to the city because it often becomes a mainspring for local development as an efficient tool for urbanism. Actually, the place of the city is growing more and more in a worldwide life where borders are waning. The image of the city is even becoming a target representative of culture and ideology as a whole, as has just been demonstrated in New York. So, image and mediatization are becoming weapons. This could be a turning point in the running of the image function because the overmediatization of events, as has been shown after 11th September, appears risky for the countries aimed at or for witnesses as well.

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Notes

1. *Source:* www.photoart.plus.com/expos.
2. *Source:* Seville Exhibition's Organization and City Hall Infrastructure Service of Seville.
3. *Source:* Barcelona Expo.

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The periphery in the center: Some political features of Turkish urbanization

"It seems that realities of social and economic structure, including the characteristics and patterns of urbanization, deeply affect political development. In countries where rapid, unbalanced and disorderly urbanization tends to concentrate population in major urban centers, unemployment, feelings of relative deprivation and the manipulation of formally and informally organized political groups exert a certain impact upon rural migrants to keep away from center parties. As a result, social, economic and political factors tend to nourish the growth of extremist or fundamentalist movements in society."

Ruşen Keleş

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Introduction

The center and the periphery have long been key concepts in Turkish politics and also in the analysis of the political dimensions of urbanization.[1] They have had both a spatial and a socio-cultural content. There is no doubt that both meanings of the concept were closely interrelated and their interaction intensified as the communication systems in the country progressed considerably during the post-war years. Major urban centers represented the center while the rural areas have been identified as the periphery in this context. Similarly, squatter settlements and their residents that constituted almost 35 percent of urban population were regarded as the periphery as opposed to the planned sections of the major cities which were considered as the center in the true sense of the concept.

Population growth, urbanization and industrial development contribute to the creation of broad opportunities for all the countries in the world, but at the same time, they create numerous socio-economic and physical problems that cannot be resolved easily and inexpensively. Although such problems that are either created by urbanization itself or aggravated by increasing rate of urbanization concern every nation, it is the developing countries that are affected most by these processes. Turkey is no exception to this observation. Nearly two thirds (65 percent in the 2000 Census) of her population live in urban centers. The absolute number of urban residents has increased from 7 to 44 million during the last four decades. The average rate of increase of rural, total and urban populations during the same period has been 1 percent, 2.5 percent and 6 percent, respectively. The number of cities, defined as urban settlements of 10,000 or more population, has also increased from 147 in 1960 to 320 in 1980 and to 475 in 2000[2] (fig. 1). More than two thirds of the urban population live in urban centers with more than 100,000 population. Not all the



Fig. 1: Turkey – Distribution of urban centers in 1960 (a), 1980 (b) and 2000 (c).

geographical regions urbanize at the same pace mainly due to economic, social, geographical and political factors. The degree of urbanization of the Western region of Marmara is nearly 80 percent while the same rate for the regions of the East and the Black Sea is less than 50 percent (fig. 1a, 1b, 1c).

Perhaps a more striking feature of Turkish urbanization patterns is that there are deep contrasts in the internal structures of major metropolitan centers as appeared between illegally built-up squatter settlements and regularly constructed residential areas. This is an expression of the uneven income distribution in society. The percentages of the urban population living in squatter settlements in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir are 65 percent, 70 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Under these conditions, squatter settlements in Turkish cities can no longer be regarded as "marginal" because it is the planned sections of many major cities that can justify such characterization. Employment opportunities in rapidly urbanizing cities have not increased at the same pace as out-migration from rural areas and the hopes of rural migrants to find expanding job opportunities in those centers are seldom met.[3] Uncontrolled urbanization tends to increase the unemployment and underemployment rates in metropolitan centers. A migratory movement, a kind of social and economic erosion, transferring poverty from villages to urban centers, can hardly be considered as a real contribution to economic and social development. World views, attitudes and behavior of migrants are considerably influenced by poverty conditions, which also tend to have far reaching implications for public order.

How do politics and urbanization affect each other?

First of all, politics play a certain role in controlling and shaping urbanization. There is no doubt that to find rational solutions to the economic, social and physical problems created by urbanization requires either to take up and to try to remedy all of these issues one by one or to formulate and implement general policies that might have a chance to change the settlement pattern in the country in the long run, through which each of the above-mentioned individual problems can also be solved spontaneously. Urbanization policy aims to influence the shape, pace and geographical distribution of migratory movements in order to foster national development.

Even in liberal economies such interventions in socio-economic life are regarded as necessary steps for saving the future of cities. Since urbanization in Turkey following the emergence of the first squatter settlements in metropolitan centers accelerated after the Second World War, it was not before the beginnings of the 1960s that serious public policies to deal with it were formulated. The attitudes of both politicians and bureaucrats were in favor of unauthorized building activities of the squatters during the decades following the Second World War. Perhaps it was difficult to opt for an alternative policy of discouragement in a democratic and parliamentary political regime respectful of individual freedoms. As a result, even the socio-economic models aiming at keeping the farmer in his village and improving his living and working conditions in place did not attract much attention.

An amendment made to the Constitution of 1982 (Art. 23) provides that freedom of settlement can be restricted by an Act of Parliament with the aim of ensuring orderly urbanization. As in any other multi-party parliamentarian democracy it is almost impossible to restrict this freedom even to attain the above-mentioned goal. Starting from the First Five Year Development Plans, the State regarded urbanization as one of the requirements for development and encouraged a growth pole policy for a more balanced population distribution among major cities and regions. The major tools of such a policy were not repressive measures but essentially the policies of investment, tax, credit and personnel. The growth of medium-sized cities, not the giant metropolises, was going to be encouraged.

The policy of squatter settlements during the last 50 years aimed to regularize their physical layout and legal positions, to integrate them with the larger society and to meet their infrastructure needs by taking measures for the prevention of further squatting. These are the main characteristics of the policies of urbanization and squatting shaped by politicians.

But in practice, there was a false impression, as if migration from rural to urban areas was going to be encouraged. No real control was exercised over the distribution of population and economic activities within the framework of regional plans. This increased the regional inequalities and the cities faced enormous infrastructure problems. Despite the fact that all laws on squatting enacted between 1948 and 1966 banned illegal building, the number of squatter houses actually built increased from 240,000 in 1960 to 2.2 million in 2002. And the number of people living in these settlements increased from 1.2 million to 11 million. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that mainly political party interests induced decision makers to be tolerant toward squatting and this fact aggravated further the issue of unplanned urbanization. Short-range political interests have also made it difficult to protect fertile agricultural lands, forests, coastal areas and the natural values of touristic regions.[4] In other words, the supremacy of public interest over private interests in the process of urbanization was not ensured.

As to the impact of urbanization on politics, it is in order to remember some of the preliminary theoretical analyses. The first was formulated by political scientist Karl W. Deutsch. According to Deutsch, the concept of social mobilization comprising such factors as urbanization, exposure to mass media, inceasing literacy, the ratio of non-agricultural occupations and per capita national income is a precondition of political participation. As a result, political behavior is affected by social change or mobilization. This causes a differentiation in voting behavior in rural and urban areas. It is assumed that urban residents are more eager for participation in elections than villagers. This theory suggests that the higher the rate of urbanization, the higher the rate of participation in elections in urban centers. Of course, the direction of participation is as important as the density of participation. In other words, a more important question is to know for whom the urban residents will be voting. There are different views in this respect:

- Some scholars believe that the residents of squatter settlements, in other words those living in unauthorized settlements, will have more reason to vote for essentially conservative political parties encouraging them to migrate, simply because they are better off in the city as compared with village life and they have to be on good terms with existing decision makers in power in order to ensure that their shack house should not be demolished and continue to be a sort of guarantee of their social security in the future.
- A second view assumes that urbanization favors political parties with left-of-center ideologies, because rural migrants faced with numerous hardships in the cities are gradually alienated from the rest of society. Most of them become unemployed or underemployed, and the conditions of relative deprivation that they experience and the inadequacies in living conditions push them to the left of the spectrum. Thus, it is quite normal that these masses with unsatisfied needs support political parties that aim to change the status quo.
- According to the views of those in a third category of scholars, a shift to the left in the spectrum and becoming more radical occurs not immediately but from the second generation on. Because, as the new generations become more conscious

about their differences with prosperous segments of the city and their own relative deprivation, it becomes more difficult to prevent them from being radicalized. Certainly, the process of radicalization takes time. They form explosive political groups that may be manipulated by radical groups in society. Such radical elements can approach them easily for the exploitation of their anger to throw out even democratically formed governments as experienced in some Latin American countries. Findings of some surveys carried out in Turkish cities in the late 1970s and early 1980s provide ample evidence in this respect.[5]

Deterioration of the value systems under the influence of worldwide globalization as reflected in the expansion of the rent economy, development of the underground economy, decrease in respect for natural and environmental values, is no less important than the characteristics of urbanization as it affects political behavior.

Despite the fact that in theory it is generally accepted that urbanization fosters participation, the experience with elections throughout the multiparty regime in Turkey since 1946 indicates that this is not the case. In other words, rates of participation in parliamentary elections have been much higher in rural areas than in urban centers. On the other hand, voting data on past elections in squatter settlements, that can be viewed as the best indicators of urbanization, show that newly urbanized residents did not vote mostly for the left-of-center parties. It would be safer to underline that the trend does not seem straight in this respect during the last several decades. For example, in the 1973 and 1977 municipal elections, what the theory predicts was more or less confirmed in cities with relatively high urbanization rates where labor population was also high. In fact, candidates of the left parties won the mayoralties in those cities. But paradoxically, in the 1984 local elections, even in a city like Istanbul which is in the center of the most urbanized region of the country, conservative political parties were the major winners.[6] A few years later, the following municipal elections in Istanbul revealed that once again the center left Republican Party was the leading political party in both Istanbul metropolitan municipality and its lower-level district municipalities.

In the light of these conditions, it would be a safer assumption to accept that urbanization is only one of numerous factors affecting voting behavior and there may be many other independent variables that might affect the patterning of political structure and behavior. For example, political violence witnessed in such squatter settlements in Istanbul as Ümraniye, Gaziosmanpaşa, Kadıköy, during the 1970s and 1990s, has been definitely nourished by the unplanned and disorderly character of urbanization as well as other socio-cultural and economic features of society.

What have we learned from the recent past?

Contrary to the prevailing assumption of the theories, it seems that urbanization does not affect political behavior in the predicted direction. In other words, by increasing degree and rate of urbanization, electors are not inclined to vote heavily for the leftist parties. In this sense, the political and administrative influence of the periphery on major cities continues to increase. Such a trend gives the impression that the periphery plays an increasing role in the center. In the rest of this paper, we will be dealing with the analysis of the data on national and local elections during the 1980s and 1990s.

A comparison of the 1989 and 1994 local elections reveals that the most successful political party in these elections was the Welfare Party, a radical islamist fundamentalist party, which received its strength mainly from the squatter settlements surrounding central Istanbul. In table 1 a comparison can be found of the successes of the Welfare Party (RP) and the Social Democratic Republican Party (SHP) in the above-mentioned elections.

It is remarkable to observe that the majority of the right and right-of-center parties won the mayoralties in metropolitan centers and in the headquarters of the provinces and subprovinces in 1994, while the left-of-center party (SHP) gained mainly mayoral elections in relatively smaller settlements. There is a striking shift in the votes cast for the SHP in 1989 to the RP in 1994.[7] A great many factors such as the distortion imposed upon the political structure by the 12 September 1980 military intervention, general economic and socio-cultural features of the nation, differences among the techniques of organisation, operation and information works of the political parties, the ways in which their candidates are chosen, inequalities in the distribution of the benefits created by disorderly urbanization and concrete difficulties faced by the residents of different types of settlement played a considerable role in changing the voting patterns. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the fact that physical, social and cultural factors did not keep pace with rapid population concentration in cities created unsatisfactory living conditions in major metropolitan areas. Reflections of the negative consequences of unhealthy urbanization in cities even encouraged some observers to argue that "Turkey was going to be rightest in general" and the RP, an Islamist fundamentalist political party was going to be essentially "an urban-based political party." [8] In fact, the same political party won the elections not only in rapidly growing cities, such as Diyarbakır, Elazıg, Erzurum, Kayseri, Malatya, Sakarya, Trabzon, Konya, Sivas, Kahramanmaras, Sanlıurfa and Van, but in the largest metropolises like Istanbul and Ankara as well.

Table 1
Mayoral offices gained by the Welfare Party (RP) and the Social Democratic Republican Party (SHP) in the Municipal Elections of 1989 and 1994 (number of mayors)

Municipality	Welfare Party (RP)		Social Democratic Republican Party (SHP)	
	1989	Gains in 1994	1989	Losses in 1994
All municipalities	71	256	662	226
Metropolitan municipalities	1	5	6	4
Provincial municipalities	4	18	36	28
District municipalities	19	76	290	155
Rural municipalities	57	157	390	39

(Source: Erol Tuncer, *27 Mart 1994 Yerel Seçimleri, Sayısal ve Siyasal Deierlendirme (Local Elections of 27 March 1994. A Statistical and Political Assessment),* (Ankara, Tesav, 1994), pp. 15-16).

Table 2
Election results in Turkey and in Istanbul, 1950-1995 (in percent)

Year	Turkey			Istanbul		
	Center Right	Center Left	Others	Center Right	Center Left	Others
1950	53.3	39.9	7.8	52.7	24.3	23.0
1954	56.6	34.8	8.6	61.9	26.3	11.8
1957	47.3	40.6	12.1	52.7	40.5	6.8
1961	34.8	36.7	28.5	41.8	38.2	20.0
1965	52.9	28.7	18.4	53.2	29.7	17.1
1969	46.5	27.4	25.1	47.8	33.8	18.4
1973	29.8	33.3	36.0	48.9	28.5	23.6
1977	36.9	41.4	21.7	58.2	28.4	13.4
1987	45.4	33.3	21.3	51.6	39.9	9.5
1991	51.0	31.6	17.4	46.3	36.5	17.2
1995	38.9	25.4	35.7	41.3	32.6	26.1

(Source: Mustafa Sönmez, *Istanbul'un Iki Yüzü (Two faces of Istanbul)* (Istanbul, Arkadaş, 1996), p. 107).

A feature of the political history of Istanbul, as the capital city of Turkey, indicates that throughout the second half of the 20th century, center-left and center-right political parties keep losing, while parties with extreme and rather radical world views are constantly gaining strength. However, when the trend in voting patterns in Istanbul is compared with that of Turkey in general, one can conclude that the same trend is much more sensible in Turkey than in Istanbul. In table 2, one can find the figures pertaining to both Turkey and Istanbul.

The most striking feature of table 2 is that the vote received by extremist parties increased from 9.5 percent in 1987 to 17.2 percent in 1991 and to 26.1 in 1995. This figure was still around 15 percent in the 1999 national elections.[9] There is a corresponding decrease throughout the election years in the votes of the center parties either on the right or on the left. Empirical research carried out in Istanbul and its immediate surroundings reveals that differentiation in the religious and ethnic backgrounds of the inhabitants played a considerable role in pushing the electors to the extreme. It was also argued that industrial centers seemed attractive to the migrant urban poor which strived for more security in the city.[10] The fear of the migrants concerning likely clashes between their traditional value system and the changes brought about by urbanization put a certain pressure upon the newly urbanized population to rely more on religiously oriented political parties.[11]

One should keep in mind that general economic and social conditions, uneven income distribution, development policies that neglected welfare aspects of development and finally disorderly and unplanned urbanization have all exerted a certain influence upon the voting behavior of the urban poor. The level of development of settlements has an undeniable impact upon voting behavior. In fact, when we classify the districts of Istanbul into various categories of socio-economic development, we clearly see how the shares of the votes received by different poitical parties vary from one district to another. For example, the districts of Istanbul can be grouped into three different categories in this respect:

- In the first group are the least developed or the poorest inhabitants. Such districts as Sultanbeyli (70.3 percent), Esenler (46.1 percent), Bağcılar (46.1), Ümraniye (45 percent), Gaziosmanpaşa (41.1 percent), Kasıthane (40.6 percent), Eminönü (40.2 percent), Pendik (39.1 percent), Beyoğlu (37.2 percent), Kartal (36.3 percent) are the poorest settlements. The vote of the Welfare Party received from the residents of these settlements is higher than both in other parts of Istanbul and in the rest of Turkey. The majority of the population living in these districts are of rural origin and they constitute nearly one third (32.9 percent) of the city's total population.[12]
- The second category includes the most developed districts like Şişli , Kadıköy, Adalar, Beşiktaş and Bakırköy where the percentage of the votes received by the Welfare Party is the smallest. These figures for these districts are 20.6, 20.0, 15.1, 14.3 and 12.0 percent, respectively. The population of these districts is approximately 23 percent of the total population of the city.
- Finally, at the intermediate level, we find those districts that can be regarded as relatively developed, such as Tuzla, Güngören, Bayrampaşa, Eyüp, Fatih, Bahçelievler, Üsküdar, Beykoz, Büyük Çekmece, Zeytinburnu, Küçük Çekmece and Maltepe; 44.1 percent of the electors live in these districts. The total vote that the Welfare Party received in these quarters varies between 28 percent and 35.6 percent.

All this evidence suggests that the squatters' support for the Welfare Party is not necessarily indicative of an increase in support for radical Islam. Rather, it is the latest in a series of rational realignments on the part of urban squatters in an attempt to best serve their social, economic and service needs.[13] What is also true is that there is a noticeable shift in voting patterns from the center parties towards those that are far beyond the center, particularly in those cities where the great majority of the population are recent rural migrants and live in conditions of relative poverty. Therefore we can conclude that changes in voting behavior can not be taken up independently from the pace and patterns of urbanization. Several recent scholarly studies on the class structure of the Istanbul metropolitan area shed adequate light on the above mentioned differentiation in voting behavior.[14]

What can be expected in the near future?

Policy sciences teach us that structural problems of an economic and social character facing a nation can not be remedied in the short run through legal and partial interventions. It is obvious that such problems have been created as a result of a long process of accumulation of a great many economic, social and political factors and therefore their solutions may take a relatively long time.

Uneven income distribution is one of these factors. Although squatting appears to be a consequence of rapid

urbanization, the latter is more like one of the accelerating factors than the main reason responsible for the squatting process. The basic source of the squatting problem should be sought in unbalanced income distribution and in the inadequacy of the related development policies. It is an obvious fact that disorderly and unhealthy urbanization is more an outcome of working and living conditions prevailing in the rural sector than the attractiveness of the employment opportunities offered by the urban centers. Both official and unofficial estimates indicate that these poverty conditions will persist in the near future and the present rate of population growth will not be stabilized before 2025.

Both developmental features and demographic trends in the country can be controlled effectively through planning. Yet, urbanization and squatting process seem to be entirely out of public control at present. In some of the squatter settlements in Istanbul, the criminal sector known as the "land and squatting mafia" has even succeeded in replacing the authority of the public institutions to guide urban development and settlement in metropolitan areas.[15] Almost all of the political party leaders, by their encouraging statements and attitudes, have contributed, in their turn, to the persistence of the issue, in both national and local elections, in order to get the votes of the those who represent the periphery in the center.

Migration from rural to urban centers, from eastern to western regions continues and it adds to increasing regional inequalities. Unless the Southeastern Anatolian Development Project achieves its goals, the size of the periphery in major metropolitan areas may not have a chance to be minimized in the foreseeable future. Therefore, efforts to expand the scope of the regional development projects to cover the whole territory of the nation may provide some hope, because the distribution of population and economic activities between regions, metropolitan areas, cities, small towns, villages are aspects of the same phenomena and they cannot be separated from each other.

Rural migrants continue to live in cities as villagers without being adequately urbanized. They maintain their rural value systems and behavioral patterns for a long time in the city. The identity crisis they face pushes them often to radical mass actions, movements and political parties.[16] Those who look at the future with feelings of confidence are few. In the 1994 local elections, according to the public opinion polls, nearly 41 percent of the voters thought that none of the political parties participating in the elections was powerful enough to solve their economic, social and political problems; 36.6 percent of the voters believed that there was such a party and this was the Welfare Party (the religiously oriented radical party).[17]

The weak identity impression of local and central authorities plays a significant role in political instability. Increasing cleavages between center-left and center-right parties since the early 1980s, with no real difference of political ideology in their programs, pushed the hopeless rural migrants to the extremist political party that bases its relative strength on religious beliefs. Worldwide revival of Islamic fundamentalism in some regions of the world especially during the 1980s and 1990s has also influenced extremist elements largely manipulated from outside in this country. Inflitration occurred more easily in the outskirts of Istanbul and other large cities as the conditions of the periphery in the center were considerably suitable to such endeavors.

There is no doubt that the increase of the vote potential of an extreme rightest party from the youth, women and workers living in squatter settlements or from other parts of the cities can be regarded as normal in a democratic system with legally recognized political parties. However, as witnessed during social political movements occurring in such settlements of Istanbul as Gaziosmanpaşa, Ümraniye and Kadıköy, they easily become uncontrollable in joining the illegal militants protesting against the constitutional order of the state. Therefore, the limits of the freedom of the parties that seem to be sympathetic towards extremist movements are the constitutional principles that guarantee law and order in society.

Concluding remarks

It seems that realities of social and economic structure, including the characteristics and patterns of urbanization, deeply affect political development. In countries where rapid, unbalanced and disorderly urbanization tends to concentrate population in major urban centers, unemployment, feelings of relative deprivation and the manipulation of formally and informally organized political groups exert a certain impact upon rural migrants to keep away from center parties. As a result, social, economic and political factors tend to nourish the growth of extremist or fundamentalist movements in society. In order to stabilize political structure, those who have migrated from rural areas into urban centers, in other words the periphery in the center, must be integrated with the whole of society by concerted economic and social action with appropriate instruments.

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Love and hatred: Changing relations between the city governments of Budapest and the national governments

"Over the past 130 years, a dichotomy of 'openness' and 'closedness' characterized the main trends in Hungarian politics. National governments either supported 'modernization' by opening the country towards foreign, especially Western, influences or tried to rely on internal potentials, emphasizing national traditions and values. The prevailing standpoint of the government in power was influenced by its socio-political background and by its approach to the rural vs. urban dichotomy. Governments marked by 'openness' policies have always sustained the economic and urban development of Budapest. Governments following 'closedness' policies tend to bestow privileges on rural and small town areas."

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Introduction

The present paper discusses the changing relationship between Budapest and the Hungarian national government over the past 130 years. According to the different political and economic circumstances in the country, alternation of love and hatred characterized this relationship. The fluctuations of the political mainstream on the level of the central government affected the financial, social and urban policies in the capital and had a strong impact on the trajectory of metropolitan development. Through the analyses of four distinctive historical periods we explain *why* in a political system the national government supported the development of the capital city by legal and financial measures, and why this behavior turned into clear hostility in another period. Finally, we forecast Budapest's development within a unified European urban space.

In many European countries, capital cities obtain particular local administrative and managemental functions. This is also true in the case of Budapest. In addition to the Local Government Act, there is a special law regulating the co-operation of the city of Budapest and the district governments within the city. Although the city has no privilege over the other local governments of the country, the latter tend to have a different opinion. In a centralized public administration system, vital political or financial decisions are made in the capital city. Other regions and cities in the country therefore feel a strong dependence on Budapest, although they in fact depend on the central government agencies located in the capital. This situation may generate animosity and jealousy toward the capital city. Such a country vs. capital city relation is especially sensitive in a small country like Hungary, where the capital city is the only large, international metropolis. Small and less populous countries are unable to develop a complete urban system. Either they have a strong medium-sized city network with no large metropolises (e.g. Switzerland, the Netherlands) or they have one single large city and a loose medium city network (e.g. Denmark, Hungary). The dominance of a monocentric or a polycentric urban structure is a function of the historical development of each country. It depends on whether the urban explosion following the industrial revolution led to the formation of an economically and politically centralized or decentralized urban network.

The only large city has been frequently seen as a strange element in the urban system of a given country. Metropolitan

lifestyle differs remarkably from that of other towns and cities. Most of the decision-making centers in politics and business are located in the metropolis, while foreign migrants and international cultural events are also concentrated there. In the period of nation-state building, the growing and strong capital was regarded with pride because it symbolized the success of the nation-state. Nowadays, when large cities convey mostly the effects of globalization and have a cosmopolitan local society and lifestyle, their national character is frequently questioned. The uniqueness of Budapest has always caused strong reactions in the nation's sentiments.

Love and hatred in four periods

The four periods on which we focus are (table 1):

- The golden age of Budapest (1873-1918)
- The guilty capital (1918-1945)
- The socialist city (1945-1989)
- Budapest in the new democracy (1990s)

The "golden age" of Budapest as the second capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1873-1918)

The "modern" history of Budapest begins in the second half of the 19th century. In 1867, the conclusion of the Austrian-Hungarian Compromise established the political-economic foundations for the organization of the Hungarian nation-state. Alongside Austria, the Hungarian Kingdom became the co-leader of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Austrian emperor was also elected King of Hungary. With the exception of foreign affairs, finance and defence, Hungary obtained legal autonomy. In line with the main European tendencies, the stabilization of the "new" nation-state required the reinforcement of its political and economic center. 1873 was the year of the unification of the three hitherto independent cities, Pest, Buda and Óbuda, into one administrative unit: Budapest. In 1892, Budapest obtained the exceptional legal status of "capital city" and "royal residence" (fig. 1).

Table 1
Population growth in Budapest and in Hungary, 1870-2000

Year	Budapest	Country
1870	280,000	15,510,000
1890	506,000	17,464,000
1910	880,000	20,886,000
1930	1,006,000	8,685,000*
1941	1,165,000	9,316,000
1949	1,057,912	9,105,000
1970	2,001,000**	10,322,000
1990	2,017,000	10,375,000
2000	1,812,000	10,043,000

* on the reduced territory (from 325,000 sq.km to 93,000 sq.km)
** on the extended territory of Budapest with the industrial belt
(*Source:* KSH).

The establishment of Budapest as the institutional national center of Hungary served as a framework for the modernization of the capital. The development of Budapest became a "national issue." As the second capital of the Empire, it was faced with competition with Vienna to become the leading regional center of South-Eastern Europe. Following the Compromise, one of the main ambitions of the new national government was to improve the capital's economic position and to

Fig. 1: Location of the capital of Budapest in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Fig. 2: Budapest – Andrassy.

enhance its urban landscape. As a result, Budapest fell into line with the other major European capitals which, in the second half of the 19th century, owed their urban restructuring to the voluntary intervention of their central governments. Just as in Vienna, Brussels or Rome, the urban development of Budapest followed the concepts and methods of Haussmann's *grands travaux* in Paris.

The *grands travaux* resulted in urban structures similar to those in Paris (or Vienna). They embraced the opening of a large avenue (Andrássy út, part of the UNESCO World Heritage) and of two circular boulevards with homogenous housing construction, the rearrangement of the most ancient part of the city, the opening of large public squares, and the construction of high-prestige buildings to lodge new public institutions (figs. 2 and 3). They also comprised the development of basic infrastructure such as public transportation and sewage systems. The works were organized and in large part financed by the "Committee for Public Works," a special public institution for the construction and the embellishment of Budapest. Created in 1870, the committee was headed, in the first period, by the Prime Minister himself. The operations were financed through the "monetary fund" of the committee, based on long-term credit received from the central budget as well as on its right to manage the expropriations on the land concerned by the constructions. Furthermore, the strong overlap between the economic and political élites of Budapest and those of the country facilitated the involvement of "private" investors, especially in the construction of buildings along the main roads. (And it also led to an increase of speculative investment in land ...). To complement this, alongside urban constructions, the central government highly subsidized the establishment of new industries and financial institutions in Budapest.

By the turn of the century, the dominant and exclusive position of Budapest in the country was manifest at all levels. Between 1870 and 1910, the capital underwent unique urban growth: from 300,000 up to 900,000 inhabitants, becoming from the 16th the 8th largest city in Europe. After the Compromise, it was an increasingly important destination of foreign capital investment, issued especially from the other parts of the Empire. The result was the multiplication of banks and financial institutions: while in 1879, there were 7 banks that had survived the economic crisis, their number increased to 64 by 1896. Foreign investments in industrial production brought modern technologies to the dominating food and metal industries. The establishment of new factories played a role in the appearance of the first industrial suburbs around the capital. Beside economic concentration, basic differences between social and cultural structures of the country and of the capital also help explain the unique position of the latter. The population of Budapest included a high share of foreigners, attracted



Fig. 3: Budapest – Heroes Square.

by the new economic potentials of the city. This population represented the values of "modern" urban society.[1] They made up the basis of the new economic élite as well as the majority of the employees in the new economic sectors (finance, trade, industries). The Jewish population had an important share: 23 percent of the total population in 1910. Because of its openness to foreign influences, Budapest became an increasingly multicultural metropolis: an "alien" big city among other Hungarian cities retaining traditional values and social structures.

Budapest was managed by a singular administrative mechanism, different from that of other towns and cities, offering a legal framework for the direct intervention of the central government. The position of the mayor was divided into two functions: the professional mayor (*polgármester*), elected by the municipal assembly from among its members, and the principal mayor (*főpolgármester*), a political position, chosen from three candidates appointed by the King. The latter had to ensure the permanent dialogue between the city and the central government, but had only a limited role before World War I. Thanks to the above-mentioned overlap between the country's and the capital's political and economic élites, the assembly of Budapest was almost permanently in political alliance with the central government (often, the same persons were present in both bodies). Somewhat paradoxically, the common objective of this alliance, i.e. to develop the capital, led to the increasing financial and political autonomy of the city.

The Budapest Municipality was rather limited in its means in the first decades following the Compromise. It only had fairly meager real estate possessions and other revenues, and its main duty was to maintain public infrastructure. The growth of the city, however, raised the problem of social welfare and led to the appearance of the first social movements. As in other major European cities, social housing became a crucial question in Budapest at the turn of the century. This was a new challenge for central policies that used to seek exclusively the economic growth and showcase-like representative development of the capital. The new mayor, appointed in 1906 as a compromise between the social democratic and liberal forces in the capital, introduced radically new policies. With the financial support and guarantee of the central government, he launched a long-term credit policy. The city gradually "communized" (bought from the private owners) the companies managing key public utilities (Gas and Electric Railway Company) and main public services (for instance, the Municipal Bakery). In line with social policies, it realized a complex housing program, creating 5,000 new flats between 1909 and 1913. By the end of the "modernization" period of Budapest, thanks to its new acquisitions, the city had become a significant economic power, able even to sustain – up to a certain limit – political opposition *vis-à-vis* the central government.

The guilty capital (1918-1945)

The end of World War I transformed the political and geographical structure of Hungary. The Empire's defeat led to the isolation of Hungary in Europe. The 1920 Versailles Peace Treaty cut off two thirds of the country's territory and population. In 1918 and 1919, Budapest was the venue of two revolutions: the first one proclaimed the Republic of Hungary, the second one established a soviet republic. In 1920, the Hungarian Kingdom was restored, led by the Regent Horthy. The conservative right-wing administration of the 1920s turned gradually into an authoritarian, extreme-right political system in the second half of the 1930s. The political course of the whole interwar period was determined by the objective of reclaiming the territorial loss of the nation-state.

The geopolitical position of Budapest underwent a twofold transformation. Since the collapse of the common market of the Empire had deprived it of its regional role in South-Eastern Europe, its international weight decreased, yet its central importance *within* the diminished country gained in emphasis. In 1920, it accommodated 12 percent of the total population, compared to the 5 percent in 1900. Before World War I, 30 percent of the national industrial production was concentrated in the capital: this ratio rose to 50 percent over the period between the two world wars. Since the Versailles Peace Treaty detached the majority of Hungary's main secondary cities (Subotica, Bratislava, Timisoara, etc.), the concentration of the urban population also increased. The capital was the only city to manifest considerable economic dynamism even during the world crises. Immigration, coming to a large extent from the detached regions, also induced urban growth in the surrounding townships, which grew faster than any other city in the country, including the capital itself. The capital maintained its modern metropolitan society, unique in Hungary, with its high share of Jewish population (20 percent).

The nationalist political régime treated Budapest as the "guilty" city, because of its cosmopolitan values, the high number of blue-collar workers and Jewish population, and also because of two revolutions having taken place in the capital. By the 1930s, a continuous industrial suburban belt had formed around Budapest. Because of governmental fear of the "red capital," all attempts to create an administrative relationship between the suburbs and the city failed.

The central government made efforts, although with rather limited success, to add weight to the secondary cities of the country (Debrecen, Szeged, Pécs), by sustaining the development of their infrastructure. In the capital, large public development projects were cancelled almost without exception, limited to some new institutions, remaining urgent works and to plans. The majority of the urban constructions in the period consisted of housing development, realized by the private sphere. Social housing policies were reduced to urgent constructions for new immigrants. Apart from political reasons, the economic crisis also explains the reduction of public intervention.

But Budapest was not a mere "enemy" of the nation. Thanks to its remaining international reputation, it was the only city through which the cultural and political identity of the "new" Hungarian Kingdom could be represented on a European level. Accordingly, some urban development projects were launched to enhance the cultural-scientific functions of the city, for example the construction of the "Forum" in the city center or of a new university campus in the southern part of the capital. None of these, however, proceeded beyond the planning phase.

After World War I, the city of Budapest, dominated by the liberal *grande bourgeoisie* and the social-democratic forces of the previous period, found itself in opposition to the conservative government. During the 1920s, the fiscal power of Budapest was still on the increase, as communization of public service companies continued and the proper income of the city increased. To reinforce control over the "red capital," the central government gradually curtailed the capital's liberties. A succession of legislative measures concerning public administration considerably weakened the Municipal Assembly. The number of its elected members was reduced in favor of those nominated by the state. By the 1930s, all leaders of the City Hall as well as those of the major municipal companies and agencies were either nominated by the regent, or their election had to be directly approved by the national government. As a "last step," at the beginning of the 1940s, all Jewish functionaries and members of the assembly had to be replaced by Christians. Though its legal status was never suspended, by the beginning of the Second World War the city management had become almost completely subordinated to governmental control.

The socialist city (1945-1989)

After World War II, the gradual take-over by the Communist party was achieved by reforms that erased political pluralism, local autonomy, private and "decentralized" public property and other means of non-central decision making. Budapest lost its "local government" status and its management was absorbed in the hierarchy of state administration. Nationalization of land and real estate invested the government with a dominant and almost exclusive role in urban development. Urban planning became part of the central economic planning system. Since external relations were under party and government control, the international functions of Budapest – already much reduced during the inter-war period – were completely erased.

The multiplication of centralized state institutions further increased the concentrating effects of Budapest within the country. The one-party system obviated the need to consider the expectations of voters, and allowed the state to neglect the wishes of those living in regions disadvantaged by central policies. Mass industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s focused on areas with existing industrial traditions and on the new socialist towns. Hence, Budapest was highly supported by these policies. Migration from rural regions generated a new dynamism of urban growth in the capital: during these decades, the population increased by more than 10 percent. The capital was considered the main stronghold of the working class. In 1950, to empower the "red capital," the industrial suburbs were integrated within the administrative boundaries of Budapest by an arbitrary legislative measure.

In spite of homogenizing policies, Budapest retained its exclusivity and modernity compared to the rest of the country. The 1956 revolution broke out in Budapest, also illustrating the persisting tradition of the opposition of the capital to the national government. These events brought social and urban problems to the forefront of the attention of the state. Furthermore, contrary to the officially pronounced situation, the capital continued to present a unique social composition, concentrating the majority of the country's political élite and intelligentsia. Since the 1960s, the de-concentration of industries strengthened the tertiary character of the capital. By the 1980s, Budapest became the sole post-industrial city in Hungary, with an economy increasingly open to international influences.

In the 1950s, the spatial development of Budapest was entirely subordinated to "state-building," i.e. to the creation of new institutions (party and ministry headquarters), and to heavy industrialization. Central policies did not take into consideration the social and spatial-structural aspects of urban development. The development of infrastructure and housing came to a standstill, the newly incorporated suburbs remained isolated from the physical structures of the city. Strategic urban plan-

Fig. 4: Budapest – Housing estate.

ning reappeared from 1960 as a result of an acute shortage of housing in the capital as well as in other cities. The mass construction of large prefabricated housing estates followed, peaking during the 1970s. Budapest received a dominant share of these investments. Large housing estates were conceived as new sub-centers created on empty areas on the peripheries of the capital (fig. 4). Hence, housing construction was complemented by the development of basic utilities and services. Apart from these compact programs and some isolated projects, strategic urban planning did not exist. The chronic financial deficit of the state (the inefficient state-owned economy needed constant injections from the central budget) prevented any intervention in persisting urban problems, like the renewal of the historical neighborhoods or the improvement of infrastructure in the rest of the city.

Love and hatred in the new democracy (the 1990s)

After the 1989 political transition, Hungary returned to a pluralist parliamentary system and an economy open towards international influences. Beside the transition, the effects of globalization intensified the retreat of the state from the management as well as the urban development of Budapest. The successful economic restructuring and the increased political independence of the latter gave rise to the now "traditional" conflicts between the capital and the central government. Unlike in the earlier historical periods, during the 1990s the two "sides" occupied almost equal positions.

The economic rise of Budapest was based on radical privatization and on the strong presence of foreign investments. Restoration of private and municipal land and real estate properties helped to re-establish multi-actor urban planning operating under market conditions. Thanks to its strengthened economic connections, Budapest regained its international functions and re-integrated into the European metropolitan system. It became a gateway city linking Western Europe to South Eastern and Eastern Europe and is competing with Vienna and Prague to become a Central European sub-center.

The 1990 Act on Local Governments re-established the fiscal and political autonomy of municipalities. Despite administrative decentralization, the central government continued to control local governments through fiscal redistribution. Budapest has once again become a "special case." Following the Act, it is managed by a two-tier system, where the districts obtained a strong autonomy *vis-à-vis* the city (i.e. the central municipality of Budapest). Furthermore, the suburban townships have no administrative relationship with the capital. The management of the Budapest metropolitan area is therefore full of contradictions produced by the dispersed structure of local



Fig. 5: Budapest – Metropolitan area.

powers and the lack of any overarching regulation (fig. 5). Conflicts are often re-interpreted in terms of party politics and provide opportunities for intervention by the national government.

The 1990s marked a deep urban restructuring in Budapest, comparable to its "golden age" at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The urban economy rapidly overcame the transition crisis.[2] Thanks to its capacities in R&D, highly qualified manpower and attractive urban environment, the city concentrated 60 percent of all foreign capital investments directed to Hungary. Unemployment was kept at a low level and Budapest's economy has produced a 8-10 percent yearly growth of GDP (double the national average) since 1996.

Economic success was not accompanied by adequate public investments and social policy. Social housing was suspended for years. Whereas the population of Budapest has by far the highest average income in the country, one should not forget the presence of marginalized elderly people, ethnic minority groups and homeless people. Due to suburbanization and the natural decrease of its ageing population, the city lost 10 percent of its population (200,000 people) between the 1990 and 2001 Censuses.

The 1990s were characterized by a gradual separation of the city budget from the national one (during state socialism, almost the entire urban development fund was distributed from the national budget). Local revenues, based on local taxes and real estate properties, obtained a decisive role in the city's budget. In the course of this process, the vestiges of governmental fiscal control repeatedly gave rise to political tensions on both sides.

Before 1991, personal income tax remained entirely at the disposal of the community where it was collected. Since that year, a larger and larger portion of the income tax was levied by the central budget for fiscal compensation between the municipalities – and also for stimulating them to introduce local taxes. In 2000, the share of the income tax remaining for the local governments dropped to 5 percent. As 40 percent of the national income tax is collected in Budapest, the increased centralization of these revenues diminished the city's resources perceptibly.

Another conflict came from the legal responsibility of local governments, including the city of Budapest, to manage basic public services, like schools or hospitals. The running costs of these institutions are, in theory, covered by the national budget or the social security fund, but in reality, these only cover 70-75

Fig. 6: Budapest – National Theater.

percent of the costs – the remaining part has to be financed by the municipal budgets.

Conflicts between the central government and the capital are also manifest in political party preferences. In the four free elections since 1989, Budapest has always voted for the center-left (socialist and liberal) parties both in the parliamentary and the city council elections. Since 1990, Budapest has had a liberal mayor. Consequently, left-wing governments "like" the city, right-wing governments show some animosity. Furthermore, the majority of Budapest's suburban townships (in Pest County) vote for the center-right parties, increasing the difficulties of coordinated development at the metropolitan level.

The national budget no longer supports social housing, public housing stock having been transferred to the district municipalities. Budapest is also excluded from the financial support of the Regional Development Fund, which finances the compensation and adjustment of regional differences. The central government continues to promote large infrastructure development schemes, mostly in urban transportation, like the construction of new bridges, or the completion of the motorway ring around Budapest. The construction of a new campus for the Faculty of Sciences of Budapest University, a Science and Technology Park or the cultural complex of a new neighborhood still under construction, called the Millennium City Center (where the new National Theatre is already completed) also enjoy government subsidies (fig. 6). These developments may result in a new dynamism on the southern part of the banks of the Danube, currently dominated by brown-field areas.

These investments are characterized by the lack of cooperation between the state and the local authorities. Political tensions are manifest in frequent budget cuts. While the city often takes the opportunity to blame the national government for shortcomings in urban services, in actual fact, large financial assets, real estate properties and sizeable local taxes yield significant local resources for Budapest. Central subsidies therefore play a less crucial role for the municipal budget than stated by the city officers.

The city employs a neo-liberal economic policy. This comprises attracting foreign investments, encouraging the economic élite to settle down in the city as well as supporting local capital accumulation. It is less sensitive to social solidarity, to issues of urban poverty, disadvantaged minorities or social housing.

Conclusion

Over the past 130 years, a dichotomy of "openness" and "closedness" characterized the main trends in Hungarian politics. National governments either supported "modernization" by opening the country towards foreign, especially Western, influences or tried to rely on internal potentials, emphasizing national traditions and values. The prevailing standpoint of the government in power was influenced by its socio-political background and by its approach to the rural vs. urban dichotomy. Governments marked by "openness" policies have always sustained the economic and urban development of Budapest. Governments following "closedness" policies tend to bestow privileges on rural and small town areas.

It is difficult to formulate a well-balanced national urban policy. In Hungary, centralization of local resources and their redistribution from the central budget has always been a traditional method for adjusting regional differences. Hence, even rich and powerful Budapest had to rely on state subsidies to maintain and develop its sizeable infrastructures. While redistributing the budget, national governments also need to take into consideration that half of the country's population lives in medium-sized and small towns and 30 percent in rural communities, who are also in need of governmental support. Especially in the countryside, infrastructural development was seriously neglected during the socialist era and nowadays there is an enormous demand everywhere for investments in infrastructure.

The size of Budapest is not the only reason for special treatment by national urban policy. During its history, Budapest represented a more advanced stage of urban development than any other urban agglomerations in the country. The great population growth following the industrial take-off took place in Budapest between 1870 and 1910, while in the other cities only 80 years later. Suburban development started around Budapest after 1870, while around secondary centers only after 1950. The tertiary and quaternary economy started to become dominant in Budapest in the 1970s, while in other cities only 20 years later. Furthermore, cosmopolitan and metropolitan lifestyles are unknown outside Budapest: the second largest town has but 200,000 inhabitants. In Budapest, everything happens in a different way than elsewhere in the country. Since its creation in 1873, Budapest is the symbol of modern Hungary. This position may invite admiration, respect, curiosity, jealousy – or rejection, suspicion, hostility: the capital city is often judged in a sentimental fashion. Fear of modernization and its "consequences" is frequently hidden behind anti-Budapest feelings and declarations.

The cornerstone of Hungarian regional policy has always been to level the gap between Budapest and the less developed regions and cities. Regional planners have to admit now that urban competitiveness in Hungary cannot be judged without being compared to other European countries. The success of Budapest in the competition of European metropolises is an important challenge for the whole country, and therefore it needs nationwide support. The capital has a favorable international geopolitical position. Two emerging dynamic economic axes of Europe intersect here: one leading from Northern to Southern Europe (Copenhagen, Berlin, Prague, Budapest) and another, relaying Southern European cities (Barcelona-Lyon-Milan-Munich-Vienna-Budapest). Within Hungary, there is no functional competition between Budapest and the other cities. Medium-sized cities need a non-metropolitan type of infrastructure and institutional development. Since the 1980s, there is a concentration process of modern economy and economic decision making into large urban regions all over the world. It would not be wise if central policies failed to seek to integrate the only large metropolitan region of Hungary into these global processes.

Notes

1. In Hungarian terminology, the modernization of society during the 19th century is referred to as *polgárosodás* (becoming bourgeois).
2. Transition crisis: the sudden switch from a state-controlled economy to the market competition resulted in an economic crisis in every post-socialist country.

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The 1969 Delos Symposion (Delos Seven)

C.A. Doxiadis talking on dynamic growth of settlements at Delos Seve, on board ship, chaired by Jean Gottmann (right).

From left to right: Karl Deutsch, Jean Gottmann and Whitney Young in session.



Jean Gottmann with Thomas A. Lambo.

Towards a megalopolitan world?

"The title of the present essay calls to mind its triple *raison d'être:* a homage paid to the person and to the paramount contribution of the late Professor Jean Gottmann and especially to the study of the North East corridor of the United States of America coined by him as 'Megalopolis' ... Similar concerns of urban concentration emerged in the Delta of the Rhine-Scheldt-Meuse of North West Europe, more congested in space but divided by national borders of five States ... handicapping large-scale actions required by the transfrontier character of most planning issues ... and the setting-up (1955) of an international association called the Conference of Regions of North West Europe in order to cope with planning issues. The above two 'megalopolitan' areas were studied on a comparative approach in my paper 'Vers une Mégalopolis européenne?' Thirty years later it seemed to be appropriate to paraphrase the same issue in a larger context, still keeping the question mark in the title."

I.B.F. Kormoss

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Preface

The title of the present essay calls to mind its triple *raison d'être:*

- A homage paid to the person and to the paramount contribution of the late Professor Jean Gottmann and especially to his study of the North East corridor of the United States of America coined by him as "Megalopolis." We had the privilege to discuss with him in Paris, Oxford, and during his short visit to Bruges in the late 1960s at the College of Europe; his work inspired us to further studies on the matter.
- Similar concerns of urban concentration emerged in the Delta of the Rhine-Scheldt-Meuse of North West Europe, more congested in space but divided by national borders of five States – Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – handicapping large-scale actions required by the transfrontier character of most planning issues (e.g. green areas, transportation networks and services, transborder commuters, etc.). The starting process of European integration was limited to the Coal and Steel Community (1953) and those responsible for the physical planning of the above five countries set up (1955) an international association called the Conference of Regions of North West Europe (CRENO/CRONWE) in order to cope with planning issues (LEY, 1967) as indicated in figure 1.
- The above two "megalopolitan" areas were studied on a comparative approach in my paper "Vers une Mégalopolis européenne?" (1971) (fig. 2). Thirty years later it seemed to be appropriate to paraphrase the same issue in a larger context, still keeping the question mark in the title ...

Caveat

Definitions

The terms Megalopolis, Megalopolitan, derived from the ancient Greek "Megalos" (big) and "Polis" (town) – a municipality and an eparchia called Megalopolis still exist in Greece today in Nomos Arcadias (Peloponnese) but far under the statistical criterion used here – received after Gottmann's work a widespsread scientific echo (e.g. JAPAN CENTER, 1973; von MALCHUS, 1975; MUSCARA, 1978).

In the Ekistic Grid Index, used constantly in all issues of the journal *Ekistics,* "Small megalopolis" is listed under unit 11 (25 million inhabitants) and "Megalopolis" under unit 12 (150 million inhabitants) and recent triple issues (vol. 63, Jan.-June 1996, "Metropolis"; vol. 65, Jan.-June, 1998, "Mega-cities" and "Mega-city regions"; vol. 66, Jan.-June 1999, "Futures") offer an outstanding overview on the matter.

Hence, instead of presenting new definitions, just "l'art pour l'art," it seems advisable to retain that of J. Gottmann, in his slightly completed version of B.J.L. Berry (BERRY, 1973):

> ..., that megalopolis be identified as a tightly-woven concentration of not less than 25 million people living and working at high density in a polynuclear structure, tied together by a large volume of transactional activities.

This definition allows a series of levels within a "Megalopolitan area" as we have already done (KORMOSS, 1971):

"Level 1: North-West Europe delineated by the cardinal points Liverpool-Hamburg-Swiss Plateau-Southampton: 133 million inhabitants, 283 inh./sq.km;

Level 2: North-West continental Europe delineated by Calais-IJmuiden-Hannover-Bregenz-Geneva-Verdun: 71.7 million inhabitants, 270 inh./sq.km;

Level 3: North-East Delta Megalopolis delineated by Calais-Ijmuiden-Hannover-Bonn-Arras: 38.4 million inhabitants,[1] 462 inh./sq.km

Level 4: Metropolitan regions > 5 million inhabitants, e.g. Randstad Holland, Rhein-Ruhr, Paris agglomeration, Greater London;

Level 5: Metropolitan regions between 2.0 and 4.5 million inhabitants, e.g. Randstad, North wing, Randstad, South wing, Antwerp-Mechelen-Brussels, Rhein-Main, Greater Birmingham, Greater Manchester;

Level 6: Agglomerations and urban regions between 0.8 et 2.0 million inhabitants, e.g. the triangle Aachen-Liège-Maastricht, Rhein-Neckar, Lille-Roubaix-Kortrijk."



Fig. 1: Space elements in North West Europe. *(Source:* Ley, in *Wegwijzers,* 1967).



Fig. 2: Megalopolitan regions of North West Europe and North East America. *(Source:* Kormoss, 1971).

Levels 1, 2, 3 are definitely *transborder areas,* those of levels 4 to 6 intermunicipal and partly interprovincial (or *Länder*), partly international transborder areas as is the North-American level 1 we defined in 1971 between Quebec-Boston-Norfolk-Saint Louis-Duluth (108 million inhabitants, 107 inh./sq.km).

The delineation of other areas – outside the North Atlantic Megalopolitan 1 area – should be examined under double facets: the interior population and socio-economic structures and the exterior setting and relationships.

Statistics

The statement *Die Zahlen regieren die Welt* (Figures govern the world) attributed to Goethe (1749-1832) is often quoted in statistical handbooks. Still there is little or no evidence that this universal genius dealt with statistics: he was a minister of finances of Thüringen in charge of budget figures.

Arnold Toynbee's (1894) remark on "our imperfect materials"

> "Coming to the facts of the Industrial Revolution the first thing that strikes us is the far greater rapidity which marks the growth of population. Before 1751 the largest decennial increase, so far as we can calculate from our imperfect materials, was 3 percent."

is still striking for scholars of the 21st century that is beginning, frustrated by delayed or cancelled censuses in highly developed countries,[2] in category "A" of the UN statistics and there are three other ranks at worldwide scale ...

Moreover, the ongoing censuses – if any – (2000, 2001) are not yet available with detailed (local units) breakdown and comparable population and socio-economic data – notwithstanding the electronic devices, not available for Toynbee!

Therefore, regretfully but not surprisingly, our statistical series end – with a few exceptions – by the 1990s with retrospective data back to the 1950s and if feasible the 1900s.

Methods

The methods of the present study flow out logically from the above definition and statistical issues and they are:

- historical (retrospective), and
- comparative (selective).



Fig. 3: Three alternatives for the future urbanization pattern. *(Source: Second report on Physical Planning in the Netherlands,* The Hague, 1966).

Historical: Urbanization is a long-term process where a historical approach is advisable and necessary, e.g. the so-called crater phenomenon demonstrated for North West Europe (KORMOSS, 1961): the "flight" to the suburban (green) area was a hard trend (*tendance lourde)* during a generation after World War II and just moderately ebbed after the 1973 petroleum crisis. Cfr. also for Lombardy/Milan (PRACCHI, 1978) and about skyscrapers (GOTTMANN, 1967).

On the other hand, future apocalyptical scenarios (EHRLICH,

1968) such as depicted in *The Population Bomb* have been contradicted by the real demographic evolution and 10 years after partly rectified by the author. On the contrary, one of the most improbable scenarios for 2000 of Kahn and Wiener (1968), namely the collapse of the communist regime has occurred ... and long before that mythical date.

The year 2000 was also the horizon for planning perspectives in the well known "Second report on physical planning in the Netherlands" (1966), a pioneer step in the form (published in four languages – German, English, French, Dutch – by a national agency), in the geographic delineation (all the maps in the appendix cover areas beyond the Dutch border, especially Map 2, "Spatial structure of the Netherlands in a larger surrounding" depicting North West Europe between Liverpool-Hamburg-Mannheim-Cherbourg) and in the proposed urban pattern, i.e. the "concentrated deconcentration" (more expressive in Dutch: *gebundelde deconcentratie)* (fig. 3).

Despite all expertise and interdisciplinary effort, the 1966 Dutch scenario

> "It is to be expected that between now and 2000 our population will increase by about 7.5 million people"[3]

failed, the population figure in 2000 was 15 million: the events in May 1968 in Paris and their demographic consequences were not predictable – nor were those of September 11 in New York and their influence on urban planning, which are still coming.

Comparative: Historical comparison should be completed by a geographical one, leading to a selection of megalopolitan areas spread out on the Earth outside the negative areas as delineated by Stamp (1952), (fig. 4) – less often quoted than its importance would require – a "global" approach, *avant la lettre* and emphasized by Lewis Mumford (1961/1967):

> "Now it is not a river valley, but the whole planet that must be brought under human control ..."



Fig. 19. The map combines Figures 16, 17, and 18 and shows those parts of the earth's surface which through cold, aridity, or mountainous character prohibit close settlement and agricultural development. It does not take account of irrigation settlements where the 'negative' character of the land has been counteracted, notably in Egypt, Iraq, north-western India and western Pakistan, Russian Central Asia, and parts of western United States.

The blank areas which remain on this map are potentially cultivable or actually cultivated. Although so much of the earth's surface has been eliminated, many areas have been given the benefit of the doubt in deciding whether or not they are 'cultivable': thus, the high plateau of Bolivia, a considerable part of the Canadian Shield, Finland, and the Russian forest lands are included.

The map serves to focus attention on the 'positive' or presumably developable areas of South America and Africa as the major under-developed lands, and calls attention to comparable problems of Canada and U.S.S.R. in northward expansion.

Fig. 4: The World Lands: Total negative areas. *(Source:* Stamp, 1952).



Fig. 5: Excerpts from *Distribution of the World's Population. (Source:* UNESCO, 1997).

Indeed, megalopolitan areas are distributed on the *whole planet* located in clearly defined *positive* regions:

- sometimes isolated in both the geographical (insular location) and demographic sense (surrounded by very low densities) as in Java-Bali vs. Borneo and Sumatra (fig. 5b); or,
- articulated in axial population belts at the edge of deserts such as between Abidjan-Accra-Lagos-Douala-Yaoundé (fig. 5a); or,
- forming huge coastal/peninsular/insular concentrations with deep continental hinterland as Manchuria/South Primorsk with Vladivostok/North and South Korea/Japan/Taiwan/ Continental China of the Great Rivers (fig. 5c) (cf. LEMAN, 1998).

In order to complete our first study (1971) we recently drafted (KORMOSS, 1999) a comparative map for N.E. American/N.E. Central European/Far East megalopolitan areas visualizing urban units with more than 500,000 inhabitants (fig. 6). More detailed studies as in Europe, based on municipalities (nearly 100,000 in EUR 15!) or in N.E. American countries could not be carried out for the Far East, except for Japan, for the above-mentioned reasons: (i) definition, (ii) statistics.

The following will therefore deal more in detail with the megalopolitan areas around the North Atlantic area and with the Japanese archipelago, keeping eyes open on the other megalopolitan areas in formation or *in spe.*

Megalopolitan areas study

The issues discussed are:

- the delineation of the "field of comprehensive study" (as TOYNBEE, 1894 stated), i.e. here geographical, historical and statistical framework;
- population evolution and density of the concerned countries;
- demographic indicators for the selected megalopolitan areas; and,
- megalopolitan areas in global world network perspective.

Delineation of the study area

In our first above-mentioned study (1971) the delineation of the three megalopolitan areas of the developed (OECD) world was proposed as being located between the following foci:

- **North West Europe:** Liverpool-Hamburg-Swiss Plateau-Southampton
- **North East America**: Quebec-Boston-Norfolk-Saint Louis-Duluth
  and adapted to major administrative subdivisions.
- For **Japan,** reference was made to the entire country area or to the central main island (Honshu = Hondo).

As all delineations of divisions of a whole, the above proposals might be questionable from several viewpoints, e.g. such as:



Fig. 6: Megalopolitan areas in NE America, NW and Central Europe and Far East. *(Source:* Kormoss, 1999).

• **The pertinence of the basic criterion** chosen: here the advanced level of Megapolitan urban pattern as defined by Gottmann/Berry.
• the **choice** of the most appropriate **statistical/administrative units**:
- in Europe: province, département, county, Regierungsbezirk, canton;
- in America: the State or province respectively, county;
- in Japan: the division in islands.

• The understandable **chronological limit** for the historical "flashbacks." Here we hoped to be able to bridge over two centuries. If data were available for the U.S. from the first census in 1790, this was not the case for all regions of the N.W. European Megalopolis, mainly due to changing areas of States and their regional units. So our historical series start after the Congress of Vienna (1815). Also, in order to facilitate long-term comparisons, in Germany we followed the retrospective data of the Statistical Bundesamt from 1816 to 1996 for the area of West Germany (1950-1989: 248,938 sq.km, cf. *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1997,* p. 47) completing that series with data since 1939 for united Germany (1989: 357,022 sq.km).

In order to make in historical series the delineation of the territorial units *similar* on both sides of the Atlantic as far as constituting the megalopolitan areas, we adopted:
• in Europe, the level of *Länder,* British and French regions and Swiss cantons outside of Benelux, belonging entirely to the N.W. Megalopolis;
• in America, the U.S. States (18 until 1840, 19 with Wisconsin from 1840 on) and a special delineation in the Canadian provinces Ontario and Quebec, for the southern densely populated parts, dealt with in **Appendix 1**.

As for Japan there is no other choice than those imposed by geography; going below to level of prefectures is helpful and necessary for a better definition of conurbations, but not for the delineation of the megalopolitan area, as we adopted, covering the entire country (370,285 sq.km). No data are available prior to the year 1870.

• Finally, political constraints could not be neglected, e.g. the border barriers known as the "iron curtain," a geographical nonsense, deleted from the map of Europe in 1989 but rendering, in the period of the publication of our first study, Lübeck, Hamburg, Wolfsburg, Kassel, Fulda, etc., frontier towns within an earlier united socio-economic landscape.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the delineation of the N.W. Megalopolis is likely to be moved to the East, possibly up to Rostock, Dresden, Chemnitz, and the name perhaps changed into ... the North-Central European urbanized milky-way?

For the above indicated historical period (1820-1990) a few basic comparative indications were chosen, i.e.
• population
• population density covering both historical and geographic aspects of demographic patterns; and,
• increase or decrease over preceding census (normally 10 years).

This approach needs two steps:

• **The first step:** A general framework of data *on country level:* USA, Canada, Japan as well, for Europe, the seven countries covered (entirely or partly) by the N.W. Megalopolis and, for further comparison, Finland, Sweden and "Hibernia," i.e. *the whole island* of Ireland (divided since 1922 into two parts: Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, belonging to the UK); we use these data for historical and statistical reasons.

Also, this will allow us to realize that Benelux – currently the core area of the N.W. European Megalopolis – and Hibernia were characterized in the first half of the 19th century by very similar indicators (same number of inhabitants, nearly the same population density in similar areas) and that without the potato blight, the worst demographic incident in modern Europe, Hibernia would probably have had the chance of another destiny.

For these reasons and for easier reading, the statistical data are divided into several tables: table 1 registering the number of inhabitants of the above selected countries, table 2 dealing with their population density and table 3 indicating intercensal change (increase or decrease) of population.

• **The second step** (table 4) deals with the same data of the above delineated three megalopolitan areas – Japan being present in both steps for a better comparison.

For the location of the three areas dealt with, one should refer to figure 6.

Population evolution and density of selected countries

Population evolution: As a first approach in all international statistics (UN, EUROSTAT, OECD, Council of Europe), records on the number of inhabitants are most helpful, although these figures are seldom available for the last two centuries. Official census data are used if available; if not or when other reservations – e.g. data for census years – have to be made, figures are printed in italics.

Table 1 deals with straight (population) figures in thousands; serving as basic data for elaborating further indicators such as density and intercensal population change.

Population density of selected countries: Data on population densities could be divided into three groups as far as historical evolution concerns:
• countries or regions with high density, such as Benelux, Great Britain, Germany and Japan;
• countries with low density, such as North European countries, USA (and Canada, cfr. Appendix 1 and selected figures in footnote of **table 2**); and,
• countries with medium density, such as France, Switzerland and Hibernia, the last one having reached the threshold of 100 inhabitants per sq.km earlier (1840) than all other countries of our study, but having dramatically diminished in the second half of the 19th century and slowly recovering since the 1950s.

It should be stressed that the above figures are national averages, useful for a first approach, but covering a wide range of regional differences.

At the above threshold (100 inhabitants per sq.km) arrived successively, still in the 19th century, Benelux (1850), Great Britain (1860), Japan (1880), Western Germany (11 *Länder*) (1890), much later Switzerland (1930) and just in the latest census period France (1990).

Not belonging to the N.W. European Megalopolitan area, the figures for Sweden and Finland are helpful as a comparison with those of USA and Canada.

According to the latest trends, three groups of countries are emerging:
• Benelux and Japan, on the top, with 344 and 334 inh./sq.km respectively with roughly – but surprisingly – similar growth trends since 1870;
• Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) and Britain, close together (257 and 247 respectively) with criss-crossing trends: BRD first (1800) leading but rapidly (1820) overtaken by (industrial) Britain and retaking the lead since the 1960s;
• France forms a category apart due to a century-long demographic stagnation until the very impressive baby boom after World War II.

The above stressed population density trends over nearly two centuries are confirmed by the figures (percent) of population

Table 1
Population evolution for selected countries (1,000 inhabitants)

Year	Benelux	F	GB	BRD	Hibernia	CH	S	FIN	USA	JAP
1790	–				4,753	–	2,188	706	3,929	–
1800	*5,086*	27,349	10,501		...	–	2,347	833	5,308	–
1810	...	*29,107*	11,970	*13,720*	...	–	2,396	863	7,240	–
1820	*6,350*	*30,462*	14,092	14,580	6,802	–	2,585	1,178	9,636	–
1830	*6,860*	32,569	16,261	15,860	7,767	–	2,888	1,372	12,866	–
1840	...	34,230	18,534	17,010	8,175	*2,190*	3,139	1,446	17,069	–
1850	7,580	35,783	20,817	18,230	6,552	*2,393*	3,471	1,637	23,192	–
1860	8,028	37,368	23,128	19,050	5,799	*2,507*	3,860	1,747	31,443	–
1870	8,608	36,103	26,072	20,410	5,412	*2,669*	4,169	1,769	38,558	36,288
1880	9,743	37,406	29,710	22,820	5,175	*2,846*	4,566	2,061	50,189	38,166
1890	10,793	38,133	33,029	25,433	4,705	*2,933*	4,785	2,380	62,980	40,353
1900	12,034	38,461	37,000	29,838	4,459	3,315	5,137	2,656	76,212	43,785
1910	13,542	39,192	40,831	35,590	4,390	3,753	5,522	2,943	92,228	49,066
1920	14,532	38,798	42,769	*39,017*	*4,229*	3,880	5,905	3,148	106,021	55,391
1930	16,333	41,228	44,795	40,334	*4,248*	4,006	6,142	3,453	123,203	63,872
1940	...	...	...	43,008	...	4,266	6,372	3,696	132,164	71,400
1950	*18,428*	*41,315*	*48,854*	49,989	4,332	4,715	7,041	4,030	151,325	83,200
1960	21,061	46,500	51,284	55,433	4,243	5,429	7,495	4,446	179,323	93,419
1970	23,205	51,250	53,821	60,651	4,503	6,270	8,110	4,680	203,302	103,720
1980	24,464	53,966	54,784	61,538	5,007	6,366	8,320	4,812	226,542	117,060
1990	25,460	57,055	56,193	63,254	5,121	6,874	8,576	4,974	248,718	123,557
1995/6				66,444		7,065			*265,284*	

Italics: Changes for non-decennial periods, according to censuses held outside of a year ending with O or 1; other non-comparable data, except USA: Population data of census figures relating to changing territories.

Key figures for Canada (1,000 inhabitants):

1901 : 3,371	1961 : 18,238
1911 : 7,206	1971 : 21,568
1921 : 8,788	1981 : 24,343
1931 : 10,377	1991 : 27,297
1941 : 11,507	1996 : 29,123
1951 : 14,009	

Key figures for United Germany (territory of 1991) (1,000 inhabitants):

1950s : 68,377	Density : 193
1960s : 73,300	205
1970 : 77,709	218
1980 : 78,275	219
1990 : 79,365	222

Table 2
Population density (inhabitants/sq.km)

Year	Benelux	F	GB	BRD	Hibernia	CH	S	FIN	USA	JAP
1790					58	–	5.3	2.3	*1.7*	
1800	...	51	46	...	...	–	5.7	2.7	*2.3*	
1810	...	55	52	*55*	...	–	5.8	2.8	*1.7*	
1820	86	57	61	59	83	–	6.3	3.4	*2.1*	
1830	93	61	71	64	95	–	7.0	4.0	*2.9*	
1840	...	64	81	68	100	*55*	7.6	4.2	*3.8*	
1850	102	67	91	73	80	*60*	8.4	4.8	*3.1*	...
1860	108	69	101	77	71	*63*	9.4	5.1	4.1	...
1870	116	68	113	82	66	*67*	10.1	5.2	4.2	98
1880	131	71	129	92	63	*71*	11.1	6.0	5.5	103
1890	146	72	144	102	57	*73*	11.6	6.9	6.9	109
1900	162	73	161	120	54	89	12.5	7.8	8.3	118
1910	182	74	178	143	53	94	13.4	8.6	10.0	133
1920	196	71	186	*157*	...	97	14.4	9.2	11.5	150
1930	220	76	195	162	*52*	100	14.9	10.1	13.5	173
1940	...	...	...	*173*	*52*	107	15.5	10.8	14.4	193
1950	249	76	213	203	53	118	17.1	13.2	16.4	225
1960	284	85	223	223	52	136	18.2	14.6	19.5	252
1970	313	94	234	244	55	157	19.7	15.3	22.2	280
1980	330	99	238	247	61	159	22.2	15.8	24.7	316
1990	344	105	224	254	62	172	20.7	16.3	27.1	334
1995/6				*267*		*177*			*29.0*	

Due to the huge areas non-inhabited in Canada (1991: 9,203,210 sq.km land areas) the density as indicator for the whole country is less appropriate (cfr. table 4 for the Southern Megalopolitan area).

As for information: the density reaches 1.13 in 1930 (1920: 0.95) with subsequent growth: 1940: 1.25; 1950: 1.52; 1960: 1.98; 1970: 2.34; 1980: 2.65; 1990: 2.97; and 1996: 3.16 inhabitants/sq.km.

Italics: Changes for non-decennial periods, according to censuses held outside of a year ending with 0 or 1; other non-comparable data.

increase or decrease over preceding census (**table 3**) (intercensal evolution). Census data are not yet standardized overall for years ending in 0 or 1 (1980 or 1981, 1990 or 1991), as proposed by UN and EU statistical offices.

Also due to political events occurring on various dates and leading to changes of area, population number figures of some countries are only available for other years (1816, 1925, 1936).

Hence table 3 should be consulted with caution, particularly for the USA with growing territory and huge immigrant flows leading to over 35 percent intercensal growth ... by the way misleading Malthus when elaborating his statement on "doubling time" of the population in 25 years – true for the USA at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries only.

The baby boom after World World II marks higher figures for

Table 3
Population increase/decrease over preceding census for selected countries (in percent)

Year	Benelux	F	GB	BRD	Hibernia	CH	S	FIN	USA	JAP
1790					17.4		3.3	6.3	–	
1800							7.3	16.0	35.1	
1810		*6,4*	14,0				2.1	3.6	36.4	
1820	*24.8*	*4.6*	17.7	*7.9*	*43.1*		7.9	36.5	33.1	
1830	8.0	6.9	15.4	8.8	14.2		11.7	16.5	33.5	
1840	...	5.1	14.0	7.3	5.3	–	8.7	5.4	32.7	
1850	*10.4*	4.5	12.3	7.2	-19.8	9.3	10.6	13.2	35.9*	
1860	5.9	*4.4*	11.1	4.5	-11.5	4.8	11.2	6.7	35.6	
1870	7.2	*-3.4*	12.7	7.1	-6.7	6.5	8.0	1.2	22.6*	
1880	13.2	2.8	13.9	11.8	-4.4	6.6	9.5	16.5	30.2	5.2
1890	10.7	1.9	11.1	11.5	-9.1	3.1	4.8	15.6	25.5	5.7
1900	11.5	0.8	12.0	17.3	-5.2	13.0	7.4	11.6	21.0	8.5
1910	12.5	1.9	10.4	19.2	-1.5	13.2	7.5	10.8	21.0	12.1
1920	7.3	*-1.0*	4.7	*9.6*	*-3.7*	3.4	6.9	10.3	15.0	12.9
1930	12.3	6.2	4.7	*3.4*	–	3.2	4.0	9.7	16.2	15.3
1940	...	...	...	6.3	*0.4*	6.4	3.7	6.5	7.3	11.8
1950	*12.8*	*0.2*	*9.1*	18.1	2.4	10.5	10.5	9.1	14.5	16.5
1960	14.3	12.5	5.0	10.6	-2.1	15.1	6.4	10.3	16.5	12.3
1970	10.2	10.2	4.9	7.9	6.1	16.2	8.2	5.3	13.4	11.0
1980	5.4	5.3	1.8	1.7	11.2	1.8	2.6	2.8	11.4	12.9
1990	4.1	5.7	2.6	*3.5*	2.2	5.7	2.5	3.3	9.8	5.5
1995				*2.8*					*6.7*	

Italics: Changes for non-decennial periods, according to censuses held outside of a year ending with 0 or 1; other non-comparable data, e.g. for reason of territorial changes (France).

For BRD data related to 1989 territory of Western Germany computed by Stat. Bundesamt.

Hibernia: 43.1% for three decades.

Canada: cfr. population developing counts:

1901 : 6.0 %
1911 : 34.2 %
1921 : 21.3 %
1931 : 18.1 %
1941 : 10.9 %
1951 : 18.6 %
1961 : 30.2 %
1971 : 16.8 %
1981 : 12.9 %
1991 : 12.1 %
1996 : (7.4 %)

For earlier data, after estimated population figures of HAMELIN (1969):

1891 : 11.7 %
1871 : 13.1 %
1851 : 37.7 %
1831 : 37.0 %
1881 : 17.3 %
1861 : 31.9 %
1841 : 45.1 %
1821 : 35.3 %

Table 4
Demographic indicators of megalopolitan areas (1,000 inhabitants)

Year	Populaton (1,000)			Density (inhabitants/sq.km)			Intercensal change (%)		
	NWEur	NEA	Japan	NWEur	NEA	Japan	NWEur	NEA	Japan
1820/1	38,202	*(7,342)*	–	79	*(5.13)*	–	–	–	–
1830/1	41,930	*(9,727)*	–	87	*(6.79)*	–	9,8	*(62.4)*	–
1840/1	45,621	*(12,756)*	–	92	*(8.91)*	–	8.8	*(31.1)*	–
1850/1	49,288	*16,976*	–	102	*11.85*	–	8.0	*(33.1)*	–
1860/1	52,906	*22,183*	–	110	*15.5*	–	7.3	*(30.1)*	–
1870/1	57,190	*26,593*	36,288	118	*18.6*	98	8.1	*19.9*	–
1880/1	64,272	*32,085*	38,166	133	*22.4*	103	12.4	*20.7*	5.2
1890/1	70,616	*38,073*	40,353	146	*26.6*	109	9.9	*18.7*	5.7
1900/1	79,418	45,000	43,785	164	31.6	118	12.5	18.2	8.5
1910/1	89,558	53,296	49,066	186	37.5	133	12.8	18.4	12.1
1920/1	94,025	61,749	55,391	195	43.5	150	5.0	15.9	12.9
1930/1	101,425	71,833	63,872	210	50.6	173	7.9	16.3	15.3
1940/1	...	76,142	71,400	...	53.8	193	...	6.0	11.8
1950/1	114,270	86,174	83,200	237	61	225	*12.8*	13.2	16.5
1960/1	125,517	101,278	93,419	260	72	252	*9.8*	17.7	12.3
1970/1	136,242	113,317	103,720	282	80	280	8.5	11.9	11.0
1980/1	139,327	*116,020*	117,060	289	*82*	316	2.3	*2.4*	12.9
1990/1	143,860	122,102	123,557	299	86	334	3.3	*5.2*	5.5
1995/6									
Area 1991 sq.km	482,127	1,492,266	370,285						

- Data not available.
( ) Rough estimations for the Canadian Megalopolitan area.
Italics : Rupture in historical series.
Two decimal fractions are indicated only for NEA, for lower densities until 1860, and one until after World War II.

decades 1940/1950 and 1950/1960, including also neutral countries (Switzerland, Sweden). In Japan the highest registered figure ever (16 percent) is that of 1940/1950; in the same period, Western Germany's population grew over 18.1 percent, due to the arrival of people expelled from earlier German territory or occupied countries.

Data for Canada are not listed in **table 3** itself, but recorded as a footnote, due to already mentioned statistical uncertainties; there are similarities between both North American countries, the "peaks" being higher in Canada than in the USA, e.g. 1960/1961: 30.2 percent vs. 18.5 percent or 1840/1941 : 45.1 percent vs. 32.7 percent, due to different immigration policies.

Demographic indicators of megalopolitan areas: Table 4 deals – probably for the first time in the framework of comparative studies – with the long-term historical retrospect of the three megalopolitan areas of the developed world.

Currently (1990/1991) the three areas have a population in a close range: in Europe (NWEur) 144 million, in North America (NEA) 122 million and Japan (JAP) nearly 124 million inhabitants. The historical evolution is as follows:

Table 5
The historical evolution of three megalopolitan areas

Year	NWEur	NEA	JAP
1820	38	7.3	-
1870	57	27	36
1930	101	72	64
1990	144	122	124

(1 million inhabitants)

A series of maps on the evolution of the USA – here excerpts for the years 1720 and 1790 (*Geographical Review,* vol. 30, no. 3, 1940) (cf. fig. 7) – emphasizes as a major graphic demographic feature the developing North East Corridor. In Europe of the Congress of Vienna (1815) the urban structure is more balanced, with major foci in the Midlands, the Rhine Meuse Delta, the Normandy-Seine-Loire Valley, the Rhone Valley – the densest – and Northern Italy.

In 1820 the ratio between NWEur and NEA was 5.2/1; 50 years later, only 2.1/1; between NWEur and JAP 1.6/1. In that period (1870) the population growth trend of both areas is reinforcing, in clear relationship with the strongly progressing industrial development, while the demographic take-off of Japan occurred a generation later (1900).

Due to World War I, there is a demographic slowing down between 1910 and 1920 in Europe, without any feedback on America, where the economic crisis of the 1930s is clearly marked: strong in the USA, less in Canada.

1940 is a turning point towards a very dynamic population growth both in America and Japan; comparable data for non-neutral European countries are lacking for the period of World War II, but the so-called baby boom is manifest overall for the decade 1950-1960, continued during the "Golden Sixties."

The decade 1970-1980 is another trend inflection for NWEur and for NEA: should we emphasize the first oil crisis of 1973? Japan's population growth however started slowing down only ten years later (1980).

The major trends of the population dynamics are completed by the figures in the third column of **table 4** indicating intercensal changes.

For NWEur three peaks (over 10 percent growth) appear: 1870/1880, 1890/1910 and after World War II, the latter due to the baby boom. Two other periods could be amalgamated, since for the decade 1880/1890 the growth is 9.9 percent: the 40-year period before World War I was indeed marked by a growing prosperity too in Western Europe.

In North America, as already mentioned, intercensal change figures have another significance, at least before 1860 when figures over 30 percent decennial change indicate clearly population growth due to immigration. Figures around the 30 per-



Fig. 7: USA – Demographic evolution of the North East Corridor, 1720 and 1790. *(Source:* Excerpt from *Geographical Review*, vol. 30, no. 3, 1940).

cent mark half a century until 1910, followed by 16 percent growth for 20 years (1910-1930). The crisis decade 1930/1940 was already stressed as well as the post-World War II peak, culminating in 1950/1960, contrary to Japan and also a bit later than in NWEur.

The weakest figures of the 170-year long period are those of the decade 1970/1980 on both sides of the Atlantic (2.3 percent and 2.4 percent respectively); the subsequent recovery is very slow in Europe (3.3 percent in 1980/1990), two points higher (5.2 percent) in America, about on the same level as in Japan (5.5 percent).

sis years and the New Deal of Roosevelt); between 1940 and 1970 the dynamic retakes with subsequent slowing down – a general feature of the ending 20th century.

Further, more detailed comparative figures at the level of "conurbation" are given in **Appendix 2** for the BIG TEN of each of the analyzed megalopolitan areas, including variants for the main German conurbation of "Rhine-Ruhr" of which unity is still being discussed.

Finally, as a useful comparison (1990/1991), the proportion of the "megalopolitan" population in Western Europe (seven



Fig. 8: Megalopolises with more than 8 million inhabitants in 2015. *(Source: Courrier de l'Unesco, June 1999).*

The figures of population density trends (**table 4**) require the following comments:

Japan's population density started (1870) from a lower level: 98 inhabitants/sq.km than that of the NWEur and showed first a slower acceleration, but since 1900 it is a similar one; after World War II the two trends are running parallel until 1970, a changing threshold in European population dynamics. Concerning the NEA, due to the much more extended megalopolitan area (3x that of Europe and 4x that of Japan), the comparison of a density indicator is less easy; the general trend is however growing until a deceleration between 1930 and 1940 (cri-

countries) – (if the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) is included in the total – which was not the case in our first study) is 65 percent. This ratio shrinks to 44 percent in North America (two countries, but still 56 percent for Canada alone). In Japan we considered the entire country as "megalopolitan" (as could be South Korea in case of extension of the area around the Sea of Japan). Leaving aside the northern and less densely populated island (Hokkaido 5.6 million inhabitants, density 62 inh/sq.km), the central and southern islands of Japan would score 95 percent with 398 inh./sq.km vs. 298 in NWEur and 86 in NEA megalopolitan areas (cfr. **table 4**).

Megalopolitan areas in a global world perspective

Since our first study, the so-called term "globalization" became familiar in science, media and industrial and social affairs. But *nihil novi sub sole,* already after World War II, Wendell L. Wilkie, candidate for the US presidency, spoke of "One World" which was indeed materially proved by ... Magellan's circumnavigation of Earth ... four centuries ago. Cosmonaut's fascinating view and meteo-sat TV news became parts of our daily life. Every week new books are published on "global society," of which "Megalopoles" are also a concern for Unesco (*Courrier de l'Unesco,* June 1999) (fig. 8).

The very important contribution made by the Athens Center of Ekistics, an international team led by C.A. Doxiadis and John G. Papaioannou under the title *Ecumenopolis, the Inevitable City of the Future* (1976), is long known and quoted (cfr. especially chapter 24).

Concerning the megalopolitan areas, a possible "global" approach could be threefold:

- Examination whether the delineation made in 1970 is still accurate: some extensions are thinkable, for NWEur towards Central Europe, for NEA towards the South (cf. **Appendix 3**) and Japan could be considered being in closer relationship with the mainland, first with South Korea or, if political changes allow, further to NW, around the Sea of Japan *(ibid.),* similar to NWEur, today around the North Sea.
- Further emerging megalopolitan areas could also be considered such as:
  - In **South America**: the Buenos Aires-Montevideo-Porto Alegre-São Paolo-Rio de Janeiro corridor;
  - In **Africa**: the north coast of the Gulf of Guinea from Abidjan until Yaounde via Accra-Lagos-Port Harcourt-Douala.
  - In the **Middle East**: a renewed edition of the "Croissant Fertile" from Cairo until Kuwait via Alexandria-Tel Aviv-Jerusalem-Amman-Beirut-Damascus-Haleb (= Aleppo) - Adana-Diyarbakir-Mosul-Baghdad-Basra-Abadan (provided the pending tension is peacefully settled), three countries entirely and parts of six others;
  - In **Europe,** when the Western Mediterranean Sea becomes, as in the past, a factor of integration, a sui generis megalopolitan area is thinkable, including one country entirely (Italy) and the Mediterranean regions of France and Spain, and coastal areas with the bulk of the population of three countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) giving a total of 150 million inhabitants (like the NWEur Megalopolis).

What about the more densely populated areas in the Far East, with +/-2,500 million inhabitants, 42 percent of the world's population, particularly in China: the coastal areas and the valleys of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers; in the Indian subcontinent the valleys of Bramaputra, Ganges and Indus as well as the Southern peninsula?

There are indeed in the eight continental countries concerned of South and East Asia, 186 conurbations ("agglomérations urbaines") with more than 500,000 inhabitants (of which 71 over 1 million) and a further 16 (of which 12 over 1 million) in the islands of Indonesia and the Philippines.

It is however questionable whether all these areas could be classified as megalopolitan since that term is – according to the above definition – hardly to be applied to regions where the majority of the population is settled in rural areas (overcrowded indeed) with a relative high number of towns/conurbations, slums included.

Finally a few remarks on axes, corridors, networks of megalopolitan areas, a paramount tool of integration in and between these major urban concentrations.

Let us only focus on the high speed train (HST/TGV) revolution, reshaping the space deserving important agglomerations, e.g. 59 minutes for a Lille-Paris trip (220 km), surprisingly seldom scrutinized in megalopolitan studies, duration corresponding to a normal suburban commuter route. Also a Lyon-Paris (450 km) trip in 2 hours allows a daily return.

As for transborder traffic, major "missing links" were completed or are under construction (Eurotunnel, Great Belt bridge and tunnel to "Norden" and new Alpine tunnels (Mt. Cenis, Gotthard) to Southern Europe.

If the German economist J.H. von Thunen (1783-1850) had had the opportunity to check the pertinence of his theories (*Der isolierte Staat,* 1824) one and a half centuries after and looking for an Isolated State, e.g. such as Taiwan, the Chinese island earlier called Formosa, he would have been surprised to know that this country has chosen that type of corridor development.

- Before then, as an example and archetype of corridor development seems to be Japan, a pioneer in new railway technology: the Tokkaido-Sanyo line and its successive extensions are well known. Current yearly traffic: 140 million passengers, cumulated traffic since open (1964): 2.5 billion. One is however less aware of the very reasons of that innovation which lie in the physical constraints that make the country hostile to man: seismic and volcano hazards, strong climatic conditions (-40°C of winter temperature in Hokkaido, at latitude 44° North, like Nice, Rimini, Yalta), a difficult orography: mountains and hills with over 15 percent slope cover 3/4 of the area of which 16 percent only is flat land; the land use is characterized by an extremely high portion of forest (68 percent!), leaving for the ecumene a limited area with population densities over 1,000 inh./sq.km (in 7 of 47 prefectures). This is a crowded urbanized area of which the central part, Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka/Kobe, less than 400 km long, concentrates in 1970 as many inhabitants as the US NE corridor, i.e. 40 million, grown today (1990) to 50.4 million.

The first ten conurbations of Japan total 60.3 million inhabitants, i.e. nearly half (48.8 percent) of the national population. Their postwar increase (average over 40 years) is 145 percent (1950: 24.6 million and 1990: 60.3 million) with a range of 102 to 176 percent (except Kitakyushi 33 percent) as listed (cfr. **Appendix 2**). The Japanese urban pattern is nearly "ideal" for HST development: a linear (corridor) structure with high density and mobile urban population; it is however sui generis due to the still ongoing increase, much over the national demographic growth for the same period (cfr. **table 1**): 48.6 percent, a percentage which emphasizes continuing population flows into urban areas.

- This is, in general, no more the case in the NEA Megalopolis – with a few remarkable exceptions – as Toronto/Hamilton, Washington/Baltimore and Montreal metro areas as shown in the same listing. The first ten metro areas (8 US, 2 CDN) total (1990, without non-urban hinterlands) 61.1 million inhabitants, nearly the same number as in Japan, and 50.0 percent of the total population of NEA, but show a growth rate of only 53.1 percent (vs. 1950: 39.9 percent), i.e. about three times less than the Japanese "Big Ten" increase.

Concerning fast intercity passenger traffic, in NE America, the "North East Corridor" (Boston-New York-Washington) has been in the highlight since the end of the 1950s: planning of "Metroliner" and studies on the Megalopolitan Seaboard could not be separated. **Appendix 3** indicates the secular population trend in the first seven major US metro areas as well as HS Rail corridors designated by the US Dept. of Transportation (cf. map): none of them have been initiated. Junctions might be possible with – not yet planned – HS lines in Canada (Toronto-Montreal-Quebec) at the Detroit/Windsor and Buffalo/Hamilton border – near cities.

- Contrary to that situation *pro futuro in spe,* in the NW Eur Megalopolis we can already travel on a real network of transnational

TGVs that perform and are time saving, which have grown rapidly from a French pioneer project, the TGV Paris-Lyon.

The European high speed network will cover nearly the entire continent (fig. 9) by the horizon of the year 2020, a paramount achievement after the first trunk line already in service in 2001. We hope to be able to analyze the feedback of this network on the megalopolitan area in a few years.

Notes

1. To be compared to the "Urbanized Seaboard of the United States" between Boston and Washington, DC: 41.1 million inh., 296 sq.km, as delineated by Gottmann, 1961.
2. For example, the 2001 decennial census in Belgium was replaced by a so-called social inquiry, issued by and to be returned to the Statistical Office. More than 200,000 replies (nearly 4 percent of the households) are still missing and should be collected by extra agents.
3. English version, p. 7; the prospective population growth was 50 percent: from 13.5 to 20 million in one generation!

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

Fig. 9: European High-Speed Network 2001-2020. *(Source: Agenda 2002,* Paris, International Union of Railways (UIC)).

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

Fig. 9: (cont'd)

Appendices

The three appendices to which references are made in the text are as follows:

Appendix 1: The case of Canada
Appendix 2: The "Big Ten" of megalopolitan areas
Appendix 3: The case of possible extension of North American megalopolitan areas

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APPENDIX 1

The case of Canada

The N.E. American Megalopolis (NEM) is a transfrontier area between USA and Canada, that boundary, drawn in the Treaty of Versailles in 1783 remaining without change now for more than two centuries, a remarkable stability versus the frequently changing European frontiers.

Also, the U.S. part of the NEM was easy to delineate since detailed census reports are available from 1791 on: that area concerns currently 19 U.S. States and in the historical series before 1850, 18 States, Wisconsin joining the USA in 1848. The respective areas are: 19 States, 1,254,490 sq.km; 18 States, 1,112,433 sq.km.

These rough figures underline the structural differences between the subdivision of the megalopolitan areas: as for the North West European Megalopolis (NWM) and Japan, the overall population density is around 300 inh/sq.km (298 and 334 respectively) to be compared to that of the USA. In that figure the Canadian part of the NEM is *not* included, major difficulties arising through non-comparable statistical areas, to be used within the provinces Ontario and Quebec, too large for detailed demographic approach.

The two provinces with megalopolitan areas were step by step enlarged to the North – as the whole Confederation, with an important advance of frontier to the North but the bulk of population remained in the S.E.; therefore population density figures (1991) such as for Quebec 5.1 or Ontario 11.0 inh/sq.km are very rough averages for areas of 1,357,800 and 916,700 sq.km respectively, together 2.4 million sq.km, the same area as "EUR12" but with a density of 148 inh/sq.km!

This population distribution is taken into account by Canadian geographers through a distinction of so-called **ECUMENE** (French **OECUMENE**) from non-inhabited areas; a continuous ecumene is located in the **Prairie Provinces** (Southern parts) and much more to the East, from **Lake Huron** to the **St. Lawrence estuary.** Between the two ecumenes several W-E and a few N-S population corridors irrigate the otherwise tiny or non-inhabited landscapes. The Eastern ecumene largely corresponds to the historical Lower and Upper Canada and could be delineated by Sault Ste Marie-Sudbury-Quebec.

For our first study we used a comprehensive delineation based on intraprovincial economic regions (1961 Census) distinguishing 10 economic regions in Prov. Quebec of which 4 (Côte-Nord & Nouv. Québec, Gespesie et Rive Sud, Saguenay & Lac St. Jean and Ouest du Québec méridional) were left out in defining the megalopolitan area. In Prov. Ontario, also from 10 regions just one (Ontario West) was neglected. The "megalopolitan" population of these provinces is shown in the following table:

Table 1
Canada – Megalopolitan population of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario (1,000 inh)

	(a)		(b)
Quebec	4,345	Total provinces	5,259
Ontario	6,019		6,236
Total	10,364		11,495

Note: Proportion of megalopolitan population (a/b): 90.2 percent.

The more detailed census divisions (99 for Prov. Quebec and 60 for Prov. Ontario) allowed a finer approach: all units with less than 10 inh/sq.km have been eliminated, i.e. 36 units in Quebec and 11 units in Ontario, leading to the following figures for the Canadian megalopolitan region:

Table 2
Canadian megalopolitan region

	Quebec	Ontario	2 Prov.
Area in sq.km	73,300	104,800	178,100
Population (1,000)	5,839	9,409	15,248
Density (inh./sq.km)	79.2	90.0	85.6

The figures (1991) for the entire area of Canada: 9,203,210 sq.km, population: 27,297,000 inh., thus density: 2.97 inh/sq.km; the proportions of the megalopolitan region to the country: area 1.9 percent, population 55.9 percent.

These figures could complete those related to the U.S. part of the NEM, being aware of the dichotomy of data on both sides of the U.S.-Canadian border. The following table, recapitulating data since the beginning of the 20th century, shows this clearly. If the overall trend of the proportion of the population of the megalopolitan area of N.E. America is decreasing (1900/1: 55.4 percent, 1950/1: 52.1 percent and 1990/1: 44.2 percent) the diminution is only 9.3 points for the Canadian part of NEA (1901: 65.2 percent, 1951: 53.6 percent and 1991: 55.9 percent), thus a concave curve starting and finishing much higher than that of the U.S. megalopolitan parts (1900: 54.4 percent, 1950: 52.0 percent and 1990: 43.0 percent) a nearly straight decreasing curve vs. the growing population of earlier peripheral areas. New York ranked first in 1900 and 1950, but second in 1990, after California and third in 1996, after California, and Texas, and followed, as fourth, by Florida.

Table 3
Northeast American megalopolis: Comparative demographic data for Canadian and U.S. part 1900/01-1990/91

	Year									
	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991
Population (1,000)										
Ont.	2,182.9	2.527.3	2,933.7	3,431.7	3,787.7	4,597.5	6,236.1	7,703.1	7,932.9	10,084.9
Qué.	1,648.9	2,005.8	2,360.5	2,874.7	3,331.9	4,055.7	5,259.2	6,027.8	5,829.2	6,895.9
Total	3,831.8	4,533.0	5,294.2	6,306.4	7,195.6	8,653.2	11,495.3	13,730.9	13,825.2	16,980.8
Megalopolitan Population (1,000)										
Ont.	2,067.6	2,305.9	2,676.7	3,099.0	3,375.8	4,136.0	5,641.2	7,087.1	*7,290.0*	9,408.8
Qué.	1,434.9	1,748.8	2,052.9	2,504.1	2,832.9	3,372.6	4,533.1	5,284.6	*5,165.0*	5,839.8
Total	3,502.5	4,054.7	4,729.6	5,603.1	6,208.7	7,508.6	10,174.3	12,371.7	*12,455,0*	48.6
Megalopolitan Density (inhabitants/sq.km)										
Ont.	19.7	22.0	25.5	29.5	32.2	39.5	53.8	67.6	*69.5*	89.7
Qué.	19.6	23.9	28.0	34.2	38.6	46.0	61.8	72.1	*70.5*	79.7
2 prov.	19.6	22.8	26.6	31.5	34.9	42.2	57.1	69.5	*69.9*	85.6
Megalopolitan Population vs. Total Population (%)										
Ont.	94.7	91.2	91.3	90.3	89.1	90.0	90.5	92.0	*91.9*	93.3
Qué.	87.0	87.2	87.0	87.1	85.5	83.2	86.2	87.6	*87.7*	84.7
2 prov.	91.4	89.4	89.3	88.8	86.3	86.8	88.6	90.1	*90.1*	89.8
Total National Population (1,000)										
CDN	5,371.3	7,206.6	8,787.9	10,376.8	11,506.7	14,009.4	18,238.2	21,568.3	24,343.2	27,296.9
USA	76,212.2	92,228.5	106,021.5	123,202.6	132,164.6	151,325.8	179,323.2	203,302.0	226,542.2	248,718.3
Total	81,158.5	99,435.1	114,809.4	133,579.4	143,671.3	165,335.2	197,561.4	224,870.3	250,885.4	276,015.2
Percentage of Megalopolitan Population (%)										
CDN	65.2	56.3	53.8	54.0	53.9	53.6	55.8	57.3	*51.2*	55.9
USA	54.4	53.4	53.7	53.8	52.9	52.0	50.1	49.6	*47.0*	43.0
2 countries	55.4	53.6	53.8	53.8	53.0	52.1	51.3	50.4	*46.2*	44.2

APPENDIX 2

The "Big Ten" of Megalopolitan areas

1,000 inhabitants, in decreasing order of 1990/1 figures of 10 conurbations ranking first in each area and percent of change. (*Source*: *Geopolis Database*).

N.B. We are using, here, the term *conurbation,* in order to distinguish these figures from those of official (Census) data, delineated on the basis of countries and therefore often different from Geopolis data, based on morphological criteria. Example (US, 1990) CMSA's (= Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas) vs. Geopolis "conurbations" (1,000): New York 19,549 vs. 23,901, Chicago: 8,240 vs. 8,907, Washington/Baltimore 6,726 vs. 5,332, Boston: 5,455 vs. 5,206, Detroit (US only): 5,187 vs. 4,142 (US + CDN) ... St Louis 2,432 vs. 1,947. US Bureau of Census lists 40 metro areas of at least 1 Million population (= 53.4 percent of the US population in 1990 – 54.5 percent in 1994). The cumulated population of *all* metro areas was in 1990 79.4 percent (79.8 percent in 1994 vs. 76.2 percent in 1980).

NE American Megalopolis

	Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %		Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %
1	New York	17,363	23,901	37.6	6	Detroit/Windsor*	2,978	4,142	39.1
2	Chicago/Milwaukee	6,070	8,907	46.7	7	Montreal	1,354	2,871	112.0
3	Washington/Baltimore	2,460	5,332	106.7	8	Cleveland/Akron	2,022	2,674	32.2
4	Boston	3,858	5,208	35.0	9	Cincinnati/Dayton	1,264	2,043	61.2
5	Toronto/Hamilton	1,384	4,201	203.5	10	St Louis	1,400	1,947	39.1

* US + Canada

Japan

	Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %		Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %
1	Tokyo	10,428	28,738	175.6	6	Kitakyushu	1,167	1,558	33.5
2	Osaka	6,790	14,983	120.7	7	Hiroshima	570	1,417	148.6
3	Nagoya	3,150	6,708	120.0	8	Sendai	488	1,129	131.4
4	Fukuoka	676	1,894	180.1	9	Nara	377	1,098	161.2
5	Sapporo	442	1,864	321.7	10	Okayama	506	1,020	101.6

NW European Megalopolis

	Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %		Conurbation	1950	1990	+ %
1	Paris	6,362	9,312	46.4	6	Manchester	2,508	2,204	-12.2
2	London	8,961	7,385	-17.6	7	Cologne/Bonn (Rh-R) c	1,363	2,147	57.5
3	Essen (Rhein-Ruhr) a	4,065	4,598	13.1	8	Hamburg	1,817	2,051	16.6
4	Düsseldorf (Rh-R) b	1,984	2,461	24.0	9	Brussels	1,584	1,845	16.5
5	W-Midlands (Birmingham)	2,352	2,225	-5.4	10	W-Yorkshirre (Leeds)	1,509	1,434	-5.0

variant:

1a	Rhein-Ruhr (a+b+c)	7,412	9,206	24.2	10a	Rotterdam	1,042	1,355	30.0
9a	Frankfurt + Wiesbaden + Mainz	1,315	1,832	39.3					

Note: In West Germany, conurbations (24) were defined by Government decision of January, 1967 including – ranking first **Rhein-Ruhr** Verdichtungsraum (10,412,000) above nos. 3, 4 and 7 listed separately by Geopolis: Rhein-Main Verdichtungsraum covering Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Mainz and intermediate areas, ranking 2 (2,375,000). Using these territorial definitions but with data Geopolis (less than official figures) Rhein-Ruhr would rank after Paris (1a) and Rhein-Main after Brussels (9a). As 10th Rotterdam would appear in the list.

APPENDIX 3

The case of possible extension of North American megalopolitan areas

W.K. REILLY (1973): The Rockefellers Brothers Task Force Report made projections for population and land use in urban regions, year 2000. As for population, the middle fertility assumptions (curve E, figure 1, p. 78, with 2.1 births per woman) proved to be nearest to the current (1996) population figures, i.e. 265 million inhabitants. As for the assumed further extension of urban regions within and around Mid and Southern Appalachia, the following States would be concerned: North and South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia. Other major extensions were assumed on the Southern Coast (Texas, Lousiana and particularly Florida), as well as in California, assumptions today are a reality as shown by the changing rank of the seven "first" States of the USA from 1900 until 1990 (1,000 inhabitants).

1900		1950		1990	
New York	7,269	New York	14,830	California	29,758
Pennsylvania	6,302	California	10,586	Texas	19,966
Illinois	4,822	Pennsylvania	10,498	New York	17,991
Ohio	4,158	Illinois	8,712	Florida	12,936
Missouri	3,107	Ohio	7,947	Pennsylvania	11,883
Texas	3,049	Texas	7,711	Illinois	11,431
Massachusetts	2,805	Michigan	6,372	Ohio	10,847

Accordingly, the delineation of the NEA Megalopolis could be extended in order to include Memphis, Birmingham, Atlanta, Charlotte and Norfolk Metro areas, the last two being on the route of the new North East Corridor, as shown on the following US Department of Transportation map.





Jean Gottmann speaking at the ancient theater of Delphi.

The 1972 Delos Symposion (Delos Ten)

Jean Gottmann and Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson) in session on board ship.

Signing the Delos Declaration: Juliusz Gorynski followed by Jean Gottmann.

Ekistic grid index

The articles in this issue are coded by the scale of settlements and an aspect of an element indicated in the ekistic grid.

The content of each article is classified within an ekistic grid as follows:

- The scale of the settlement(s) with which the article deals is selected from among the 15 ekistic units:

No.	Name	Population
1	Anthropos	1
2	Room	2
3	House	5
4	House group	40
5	Small neighborhood	250
6	Neighborhood	1,500
7	Small polis	10,000
8	Polis	75,000
9	Small metropolis	500,000
10	Metropolis	4 million
11	Small megalopolis	25 million
12	Megalopolis	150 million
13	Small eperopolis	1,000 million
14	Eperopolis	7,500 million
15	Ecumenopolis	50,000 million

- The subjects dealt with in each article are selected from among the subheads of the five ekistic elements. The position of a dot in any square of the grid indicates which of the four subheads is being referred to. If the article arrives at a synthesis of these elements, either in a physical plan or in ekistic theory, the dot is at the top or bottom of the square.

key to placement of subheads



The subheads of the elements are:

NATURE
1. Environmental Analysis
2. Resources Utilization
3. Land Use, Landscape
4. Recreation Areas

ANTHROPOS
1. Physiological Needs
2. Safety and Security
3. Affection, Belonging, Esteem
4. Self-actualization, Knowledge and Aesthetics

SOCIETY
1. Public Administration, Participation and Law
2. Social Relations, Population Trends, Cultural Patterns
3. Urban Systems and Urban Change
4. Economics

SHELLS
1. Housing
2. Service Facilities
3. Shops, Offices, Factories
4. Cultural and Educational Units

NETWORKS
1. Public Utility Systems
2. Transportation Systems
3. Personal and Mass Communication Systems
4. Computer and Information Technology

SYNTHESIS
1. Physical Planning
2. Ekistic Theory

Each article is described by keywords, which are also used in the *Ekistic Index,* and by abbreviations referring to their illustrative content.

Keyword letter code

D = Diagrams
I = Illustrations
M = Maps
R = References
S = Statistics, Tables, Graphs
X = Simulation, Mathematical Models, etc.



From megalopolis to global cities – Introduction ... **p. 138**
Jean Gottmann, Urban Geography, Megalopolis, Ekistics World; Past, Present, Future



An interview with Jean Gottmann on urban geography **p. 140**
Jean Gottmann, Urban Geography, Megalopolis, Urbanization General, N.E. USA; Past, Present, Future



Sustainable development in the frontiers of the ... **p. 147**
J. Gottmann, Megalopolis, Sustainability, Urbanization N.E. USA, Appalachia; Past, Present, Future *D,M,R,S*



Marche region, a "marginal" area in Italy: Participation ... p. 162
J. Gottmann, Urban Geography, Mediterranean Megalopolis
Italy, Marche; Past, Present, Future *D,M,R*



Iconography and circulation on the Atlantic seaboards ... p. 180
J. Gottmann, Urban Geography, Iconography, Circulation
W. Europe, N.E. USA; Past, Present, Future *R*



City image and major international events: A new tool ... p. 196
Urban Planning, City Image, International Events
World, London, Paris, Barcelona; Past, Present, Future *D,I,M*



Love and hatred: Changing relations between the city ... p. 218
Human Settlements System, Politics, Capital City
Budapest, Hungary; Past (1870), Present, Future *I,M,R,S*



In the footsteps of Jean Gottmann: From Le Havre to ... p. 170
Jean Gottmann, Urban Geography, Territorial Identity
Le Havre, France; Past, Present, Future *I,M,R*



Political aspects of planning the Basque coastal ... p. 183
Urban Geography, Politics, Development Planning
Basque region, Spain; Past, Present, Future *D,M,R*



The periphery in the center: Some political features ... p. 211
Urban Geography, Politics, Urbanization, Immigration
Turkey; Past (1970) to Present and Future *M,R,S*



Towards a megalopolitan world? p. 228
N.W. European Megalopolis, Urbanization, J. Gottmann
N.W. Europe, N.E. USA; Past, Present, Future *D,M,R,S*

Ekistics Editorial Advisory Board meeting, 22 September, 1973

The joint meeting of the Editorial Advisory Board and Executive Committee of the journal Ekistics held in Athens on 22 September, 1973. Clockwise from left: C.A. Doxiadis, D. Kennedy, A. Tsitsis, Gerald B. Dix, Jean Gottmann, N. Avronidakis, J. Chapple, M. Connou, C. Natsis, J. Tyrwhitt, D. Anagnostopoulou (behind J. Tyrwhitt), G. Bell; J. Papaioannou, J. Platt, A.B. Leman, M. Perović, and P. Psomopoulos.

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Note

ACE : Athens Center of Ekistics
COF : "City of the Future" Research Project
COG : "Capital of Greece" Research Project
HUCO : "Human Community" Research Project

These publications, though in very limited supply, can be obtained from the Athens Center of Ekistics, 24 Strat. Syndesmou Street, 106 73 Athens, Greece. Price in US$ includes mailing cost (surface mail).

EKISTICS (modern Greek: ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ) is derived from the ancient Greek adjective *οἰκιστικός*, more particularly from the neuter plural *οἰκιστικά* (as "physics" is derived from *φυσικά*, Aristotle). The ancient Greek adjective *οἰκιστικός* meant: "concerning the foundation of a house, a habitation, a city or a colony; contributing to the settling." It was derived from the noun *οἰκιστής*, meaning "the person who installs settlers in a place." This may be regarded as deriving indirectly from another ancient Greek noun, *οἴκισις*, meaning "building," "housing," "habitation," and especially "establishment of a colony, a settlement or a town" (already in Plato), or "filling it with new settlers": "settling," "being settled." All these words grew from the verb *οἰκίζω*, "to settle," and were ultimately derived from the noun *οἶκος*, "house," "home" or "habitat."

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* contains a reference to an *oecist*, *oekist* or *oikist*, defining him as: "the founder of an ancient Greek ... colony." The English equivalent of *οἰκιστική* is *ekistics* (a noun). In addition, the adjectives *ekistic* and *ekistical*, the adverb *ekistically*, and the noun *ekistician* are now also in current use. The French equivalent is *ékistique*, the German *ökistik*, the Italian *echistica* (all feminine).