EKISTICS
ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ

the problems and science of
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

THREE DOUBLE ISSUES:

1: **Reflections on Gottmann's thought**
   (no. 418/419, Jan./Feb.-Mar./Apr. 2003)

2: **From megalopolis to global cities**
   (no. 420/421, May/June–July/Aug. 2003)

3: **The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world**
   (no. 422/423, Sept./Oct.-Nov./Dec. 2003)

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In the steps of
Jean Gottmann

The Athens Technological Organization (ATO)

The Athens Technological Organization (ATO) is a non-profit organization established in 1958 to further technology and scientific research on any subject which can contribute to the improvement of human living conditions, technical and economic development and the training of people capable of pursuing these purposes.

Athens Center of Ekistics (ACE)

Upon its establishment in 1958, ATO started ekistic research and educational programs and later on in 1963 established the Athens Center of Ekistics (ACE) to foster a concerted program of research, education, documentation, and international cooperation related to the art and science concerned with the development of human settlements. In the domain of documentation in addition to its library, ACE publishes the following two journals:

- Ekistics, the Problems and Science of Human Settlements, and
- The Ekistic Index of Periodicals, as well as
- A series of research reports and monographs documenting its following four major research projects:
 – "The City of the Future"
 – "The Capital of Greece"
 – "The Human Community"
 – "The Ancient Greek Cities"

Since 1965 ATO-ACE have hosted on their premises the Headquarters and Secretariat of the World Society for Ekistics (WSE), an independent organization, whose goals and objectives are compatible with those of ACE.

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World Society for Ekistics (WSE)

The Society – an international nongovernmental organization (NGO) in consultative status with the United Nations (ECOSOC) – is a nonpolitical and nonreligious body with limited membership, formed to study man's patterns of living and their physical expression in the past, present, and future. The aims and objectives of the Society are:

- To promote the development of knowledge and ideas concerning human settlements by research and through publications, conferences, etc.;
- To encourage the development and expansion of education in ekistics;
- To educate public opinion concerning ekistics, thus stimulating worldwide interest and cooperation;
- To recognize the benefits and the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach to the needs of human settlements, and to promote and emphasize such an approach.

For further information on WSE, consult www.Ekistics.org

In the steps of Jean Gottmann

Three parts in three double issues

- Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought
  (no. 418/419, Jan./Feb.-Mar./Apr. 2003)

- Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities
  (no. 420/421, May/June-July/Aug. 2003)

- Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of
  the world (no. 422/423, Sept./Oct.-Nov./Dec. 2003)

Guest - editor: Calogero Muscarà

Part 3: The bag of tools
for a new geopolitics of the world

In the steps of Jean Gottmann (three parts)

General introduction

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought (vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003)

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities (vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003)

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world (vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003)

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 3 of 3

General introduction

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source*: Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

To the Reader

As is stated in the tables of contents (pages 258 and 259), the papers solicited and compiled by Calogero Muscarà, guest-editor, for the special volume of Ekistics (vol. 70) entitled "In the steps of Jean Gottmann," are organized in three parts, in three corresponding double issues of the journal with the following sub-topics:

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought
      (vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003);

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities
      (vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003);

Part 3: The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world
      (vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003).

The present issue is Part 3.

The reader interested in the contents of the entire volume should refer to Parts 1 and 2 of which detailed tables of contents are given on the two pages that follow (pp. 387 and 388).

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 1 of 3

General introduction

Part 1: Reflections on Gottmann's thought

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source*: Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

In the steps of Jean Gottmann – Part 2 of 3

General introduction

Part 2: From megalopolis to global cities

Cover: Jean Gottmann, 1983. (*Source:* Photograph by Hazel Rossetti, Fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford).

General introduction

Bernice and Jean Gottmann at a vacation hotel in Eilat, Israel during the summer of 1993.

The editor's page

● The completion of this volume of *Ekistics* makes the guest-editor, Professor Calogero Muscarà, and myself really proud and happy. We are also relieved for having fulfilled, albeit partially and belatedly, a longstanding commitment, and are deeply grateful to all those who have joined us in this tribute to Jean Gottmann who has marked our lives since we first came across some of his thoughts. I remember Calogero Muscarà telling me what a struggle he had to go through for many years obliged to work in universities and other research institutions, without real interest, in physical geography, when his main interests were history and social and political sciences which were "more appealing for the explanation of life." It was only in the mid-1950s when he discovered Gottmann's book *La politique des États et leur géographie,* that he began to understand how effectively geography could be connected to his real interests. The long period of close collaboration, both nationally and internationally, between Gottmann and Muscarà, which started 20 years later in 1977, only ended with Gottmann's death in 1994 but Muscarà's keen interest and personal involvement in promoting Gottmann's thought never ceased. I myself, an architect-planner, already fully engaged in ekistics,[1] and a close collaborator of Constantinos A. Doxiadis,[2] will never forget the day I first met Gottmann in the early 1960s and how avidly I absorbed the relevance of his remarks on the complexities involved when trying to apply the interdisciplinary approach needed in assessing conditions for planning action. And this continued during all the years and on all the occasions I had the good fortune to be with him.

● I think it is appropriate here to remind readers of Gottmann's long involvement with ekistics – with Doxiadis for the first 15 years and thereafter with the rest of us.

His first contact with Doxiadis was in 1960. Three years later, in 1963, an abstract of a paper by him appeared in *Ekistics* for the first time. He first joined the activities of ekistics in 1964, at the Delos Symposion (Delos Two) – the annual week-long conference held on board ship at the invitation of Doxiadis, focusing each year on the discussion of a major theme. Since then, further to his participation in several Delos Symposia (1964, 1968, 1969 and 1972) Gottmann was one of the founders of the World Society for Ekistics[3] of which he became the third President from 1971 to 1973, and never stopped being actively involved in ekistics until the end of his life.

Referring to the mutually gratifying relation between him and Doxiadis, Gottmann[4] writes that his "colleague in the study of settlements and of the modern urban evolution, and a personal friend" – who also "knew and valued the power and lasting quality of ideas expressed in written words and symbols that outlive stone and style" – had in his overall effort two priorities:

• "to search for a widely publicized consensus on the present needs of human settlements, established by free and thorough discussion on an international and pluridisciplinary basis: the universality and complexity of the problems called for a broad spectrum of participants in the debate and in the agreement; this was attempted and largely achieved by the Delos Symposia and their Declarations from 1963 on"; and,

• "to further settlement analysis and planning on the necessary scale," develop ekistics – "a general body of theory, again on an interdisciplinary and worldwide basis ... a permanent, evolving and spreading scientific approach to the study of and action for human settlements."

The association of these two men, both so much ahead of their time, was profound, mutually enriching, and inspiring.

Naturally, the *Ekistics* journal was always an open forum for Gottmann and his thought. We have published many articles by him[5] on a wide variety of themes, and also reports on and abstracts of his contributions to discussions in the international meetings or other programs of the Athens Center of Ekistics, such as the Delos Symposia. Furthermore he acted as guest-editor for three issues of the journal, the last being in 1990.[6]

● But we have never had the opportunity for such a comprehensive – though not exhaustive – presentation of his life and thought as in the present case where we have the privilege to host again and walk in the steps of this unquestionable authority together with so many distinguished scholars, having as a guide in this itinerary Calogero Muscarà,[7] a very dear friend and colleague, and a real admirer and "disciple" of Gottmann. Muscarà, our world expert on Venice, further to being known for his exceptional contribution through research, teaching and writings to the wide field of geography and its relation to human settlements planning, became a member of the World Society for Ekistics many years ago on the strong recommendation of the great Master, and he is a participant in its meetings, and a regular contributor to *Ekistics.* Who could be better qualified to act as guest-editor for such an endeavor?

I will not expand here on the contents or the structure of the present volume of *Ekistics.* This task is so brilliantly fulfilled by the guest-editor in his introductory statement and his notes preceding each of the three parts into which the papers are divided. In this respect, the reader may also refer to the Ekistic Grid for each individual paper, and the Anthropocosmos Model on p. 391.

I would like, though, to stress how rewarding it is to know that whatever this effort represents it is only a step in a long process with a really substantial past and promising future. The agenda proposed for further action and the involvement of the younger generation in this process give us grounds for hope.

● In closing, let me be personal and appeal for the kind understanding of Mrs Bernice Gottmann for my initiative in using, without her permission, the photograph opposite this note. After all, on every occasion since we first met, whether as their guest or their host or simply a participant with them at meetings, not only in Athens, Oxford or Italy but the world over, Jean and Bernice were always together. So why shouldn't we feel that we are all together on this occasion as well?

P. Psomopoulos

1.See back cover of the journal.
2. Architect-Planner, 1914-1975, founder of ekistics and President of the Athens Center of Ekistics.
3.See inside front cover of the journal.
4.For all quotations in this paragraph, see J. Gottmann, "The ekistic philosophy of C.A. Doxiadis: a personal appreciation," *Ekistics,* vol. 41, no. 247, 1976, pp. 383-385.
5.See *Ekistics,* nos. 89, 107, 123, 155, 167,174, 203, 204, 219, 233, 243, 247, 264, 272, 302, 314/315, 316/317 (see also pp. 405-408).
6.See *Ekistics,* nos. 274, 299 and 340/341 (see also pp. 405-408).
7.See biographical note of the guest-editor's introductory statement on the following page.

From the global network of megalopolises to the political partitioning of the world

The guest-editor's introductory statement

Calogero Muscarà

The author, guest-editor for the three double issues of this special volume of Ekistics, *is Professor of Urban Geography at the University of Rome La Sapienza. He has been a member of the Commission Permanente de Géographie Politique chaired by Professor Jean Gottmann. He chaired the Working Group on Geography of Transport of the International Geographical Union from 1980-1988. Professor Muscarà's scientific interests have always focused on the epistemology of geography. He has researched issues on the geography of development and on regionalization, especially regarding its relationships to the dynamics of urbanization. Of his numerous publications, his latest book is on the paradox of federalism in Italy. He is a member of the World Society for Ekistics.*

● From Paris to Ekistics: The validity of a great geographical theory

This special volume of *Ekistics* began in a very simple way. In 1996 an important symposion devoted to the thought of Jean Gottmann was organized at the Sorbonne by Paul Claval, George Prevelakis and André-Louis Sanguin. Jean Gottmann was one of the greatest geographers of the 20th century. The title of this meeting made explicit reference to the Gottmannian concept of "iconography" and to the way in which it could apply to the identity of Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conference attracted many researchers to Paris, not just experts and admirers of Gottmann's thought. There were also numerous young scholars, who discovered the thought of the great geographer evoked by the political events of the time.

In truth, as George Prevelakis writes for this special volume, the outcome of the Paris conference on current European issues was not entirely convincing. Although dedicated to Gottmann and his thought, the Paris conference focused more on research concerning single European cases after the recent political events. There was at least one exception though; the

quest for a unified European iconography – an issue that Gottmann would have attributed to a need for security, as opposed to the possibility of maintaining a variety of European iconographies – in Gottmann's perspective could have been an indicator of Europe's strength.

But there is no doubt that the greatest appeal of the conference for researchers interested in the distribution of humans in space had been the opportunity to verify in the light of recent events in the political geography of Europe the validity of a modern theory of the relationships of human communities with territory. That important studies on the matter would be published for a wider readership than that of the Paris conference seemed thus a good reason to propose to the Editor of this journal to host them in *Ekistics*, although some of the papers in English had already been published.

Therefore it seemed to me that it would be of interest to return to the initial proposition of the Paris conference, emphasizing not so much the single cases of Europe in the light of Gottmann's political thought, but on the contrary the validity of the ideas of Gottmann in the light of European events, without concerns of a geo-political nature having to resolve single cases. The initial interest of the Paris conference regained importance by showing that it was necessary to read again the work of Gottmann to measure its validity in terms of the contribution it could make to the explanation of the European concerns that emerged after the collapse of the Berlin wall.

Many papers, especially those presented in the first part of the Paris conference, would certainly have been of great interest to a Society such as the World Society for Ekistics (WSE) and to a journal such as *Ekistics* devoted to the theories of the human occupation of inhabited space. It would also have been a way to remember that Jean Gottmann had been President of the World Society for Ekistics and had collaborated assiduously with the journal since the 1960s. The publication of the papers of the Paris conference turned then into an occasion to measure the validity in time of this theory and to verify to what degree and in what way it had kept on developing. The request to the authors was to publish the studies presented in Paris or to write new studies on the same matter, but expressly focusing

on illustrating the thought of Gottmann became the new spirit of the special issue. At the same time it also became legitimate to address the same request to all the partners of Ekistics. And the result was that all the contributions are new.

● A second impulse

The second impulse for a publication on the thought of Jean Gottmann came from the consideration of what had happened above all in Anglo-Saxon geography after the disorientation produced by the collapse of the so-called new geography. The whole validity and modernity of the thought of the great master consists in the fact that, in those same years in which American geography denounced the "exceptionalism" of French geography, Gottmann too was aware of the necessity to overcome the "exceptionalism" proposed by French geography, and this was confirmed by the important considerations of Maurice Le Lannou. For the "exceptionalism" the interest of geography is in the specific cases and not in theories. But the differences between the thought of Gottmann and that of the "new geography" were very relevant. Perhaps for excess of abstraction the "new geography" proposed, as other sciences, a widespread use of statistics and, above all, mathematics. But, not long after 1953, the year in which this American experience began, numerous scholars of the "new geography" started to recognize its limits. And sooner or later the "new geography" was abandoned.

Unlike the American experience that, for excess of abstraction, would quickly be shown inadequate, Gottmann completed the paradigmatic turn by reapproaching the geography of the French school. Indeed he succeeded in bringing geography – a discipline whose existence is justified by the need to explain the variety of the inhabited world – close to the epistemological way with which historians have brought history closer to the other human and social sciences. This is testified by the interesting interview that Gottmann granted to the historian Miloš Perović. In this interview it emerges how much for the Oxonian master human geography remains a discipline that is not epistemologically different from all other forms of knowledge in the intent, confirmed in the conclusions, to provide some references of a practical nature. But geography is methodologically different; first of all because it draws the proof of its statements from the historical reality of territories; and secondly for the attention, similar to that of history, that combines the rigor in the documentation of facts and circumstances with the caution towards conclusions that are too simple and easy.

A few essays of this volume help us to understand this contribution of Gottmann. This is an aspect that Pavlos Tzermias, a historian interested in the relationships between history and geography, reflects well in its articulations and references. And it is also noticed in the articles of John Agnew or Luca Muscarà, who underline the connections that intervene between the various parts of the thought of Jean Gottmann. In other words we are in the presence of a real new theory that justifies the judgment that Gottmann deals with a new anthropocosmos and ekistic model parallel to the one proposed by Constantinos Doxiadis.

● The geographical theory of Jean Gottmann

In the context of these considerations, the commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the death of Jean Gottmann – the third motivation for the preparation of the present volume of Ekistics – is a duty and homage to his thought and the continuous flowering of the studies that he initiated. But it is also an opportunity to recognize in an appropriate way the remarkable place of Gottmann in the history of the geographical thought of the second half of the last century, which is the fruit of his work on Megalopolis or of his contribution to the solution of the epistemological problems of geography.

First of all it is important to consider the theory he elaborated to explain the relationships of man with geographical space, a theory he formulated in a famous essay of 1948 (De la méthode d'analyse en Géographie humaine) and in the chapters on geography (1) and on regional geography (8) of his book La politique des États et leur géographie (1952). But it is necessary to clear the field from a possible misunderstanding, i.e. the conviction that this theory is just a political theory. If someone thinks that the geographical theory of Jean Gottmann is political because it is proposed and formulated in a book on political geography, the reading of the book helps to clarify this point. The tendency to the compartimentation (partitioning) of space is as diffused as the tendency to the centralisation and to the creation of "carrefours" (crossroads). It is in the carrefours that we find the temple, the castle and the market, i.e. the points of departure of the city since antiquity (religion, politics and economy). But centralisation, i.e. the tendency to serve parts of the space starting from a center, lives together with a tendency to divide the space for services or to give identity to a territory which a people considers its own. This "service partitioning" lives always together with circulation (movement), the first great strength working on the world surface to deplace raw materials, products, men and ideas. The "political compartimentation" (partitioning) (states, regions but also empires or federations) is the answer to that other big strength working on the Earth, i.e. that coming from the world of ideas, values (iconographies) and myths, rites and liturgies to restrain the tendency to the "service compartimentation" (service partitioning) that is perpetually moving.

That is not just a political theory but a general theory of the human occupation of the Earth's surface. And, since the human activity that Jean Gottmann confides to geography is to live together – in the accessible and humanized space – with other men and nature, this theory appears to me a true ekistic theory or even a new anthropocosmic model after the model of Doxiadis.

From a casual encounter with a great geographer interested in society and geography, this volume became an occasion to revisit this scientific theory measuring its congruence with the problems of the following years, that is with subjects in which both the World Society for Ekistics and this journal have always been interested.

● The three parts

However the subdivision of this volume of Ekistics into three parts does not correspond to the above theories. Although more than one article was eligible to be included in more than one part, I made an effort to bring together:

● in the first part (vol. 70, no. 418/419, January-April 2003), the studies that directly or indirectly contribute to the explanation of the thought of the great master; this part is concluded by Jean Gottmann's complete bibliography first compiled by Lord Patten and subsequently updated by Luca Muscarà;

● in the second part (vol. 70, no. 420/421, May-August 2003), the studies on the particular form of regionalism that Gottmann attributed to contemporary urbanization that speak of "megalopolis"; this part also contains those articles that investigate the political dimension of the city and concludes with a revisitation of contemporary urbanization in an attempt to evaluate the forecasts of both Gottmann and Doxiadis;

● in the third part (vol. 70, no. 422/423, September-December 2003), a collection of papers in which the authors question whether and how the cognitive tools proposed by Gottmann facilitate the understanding of the evolution in contemporary geography in terms of change, partitioning and centrality.

Acknowledgements

Fig. 1: Jean Gottmann with Calogero Muscarà in Rio de Janeiro, August 1982.

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In the steps of Jean Gottmann

Guest-editor: Calogero Muscarà

Part 3

The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world

Fig. 2: Jean Gottmann at home in Oxford, during one of Calogero Muscarà's visits in the early 1990s.

The bag of tools for a new geopolitics of the world

Introduction by the Guest-Editor

Calogero Muscarà

The text on these pages is a brief introductory note by the guest-editor on the contents of Part 3 of the present issue.

● The essay by **Alan Henrikson** deserves its place as an opening statement in this third part of the volume of *Ekistics* on "In the steps of Jean Gottmann" and there are reasons for this. There is no doubt that the USA appears today preoccupied with all the world chessboards. But the bond that links the USA and Europe appears solid despite the recent misunderstandings due to the war in Iraq. In contrast to the negative side, there are political-diplomatic relationships that lean on thousands and thousands of relationships that are woven between the two sides of the Atlantic and build increasing solidarities. As Alan Henrikson says, "Even to see the explanation of transatlantic comity and cooperation as lying primarily in the field of politics and diplomacy may not be the best way to achieve a basic understanding of what is, after all, an Atlantic community of sorts, a *de facto* entity if not a *de jure* one. The responsiveness of Europeans to Americans and, reciprocally (though, as we shall see, not always symmetrically), of Americans to Europeans, is clearly greater than that of any other comparable intercontinental pairing in the world. How can this be explained?"

Investigating the special relationships that link the USA and Europe, Henrikson develops a particularly meaningful role. He recalls, even if in summary, Jean Gottmann's theory of political geography elaborated by the great teacher in 1952. And above all he finds that "rather than attempting to define 'community' itself, in an essentialist way, Gottmann seeks, in analytical fashion, to lay bare the structure of the *icons* of identity and the *circles* of activity that shape, and reshape, communities over time." It is not easy to understand whether Gottmann considered that an Atlantic community existed: "What is clearly evident" continues Alan Henrikson "is that he believed that, at least in the particular realm of urban discourse, 'there exists one vast transatlantic orbit in which all the main planning policies, technological innovations, and methods of management are exchanged, attempted, at least debated.' There is "a *common lore*

of ideas and techniques, Gottmann observed, shared by all those involved in urban design on both sides of the Atlantic who 'moved freely around within the transatlantic orbit.' "Certainly the North Atlantic has been and remains" Gottmann wrote "the large portion of space on this planet most intensely crisscrossed by ships and airplanes, telephone connections and other telecommunications, people, goods, and messages," even if "the results in terms of the evolution of cities are ... strikingly at variance, not only between Anglo-America on the one hand and continental Europe on the other, but even on the two sides of the Channel between England and France, or between Switzerland and Belgium ... This arresting description by Gottmann," Henrikson concludes "of 'one vast transatlantic orbit' of ideological flow and human interaction, combined with recognition of the stubborn differences that continue to exist among at least the cities of the Atlantic, is consonant with the interpretation of American-European relations here offered as a plurality of transatlantic difference in ways of living."

The big invention of Jean Gottmann, as George Prevelakis remembers in the essay that follows, consisted – in a time of crisis of French regional geography and of the German school in some measure caused by German geopolitics – of the theory according to which, on the parts of the earth inhabited and accessible to man, two big strengths coexist and operate. The first big strength is that of "circulation", that is the movement of men and the exchange between men, of ideas, values, myths, inventions, techniques, money, raw material and products. In this sense "circulation" is the bearer of change and therefore innovating. The other strength is that of the values and the symbols (what Gottmann calls iconographies) in which every human group believes, due to the fact that humanity is organized socially – earlier than politically – in groups or communities that need identity. Iconography is potentially a stabilizing strength. But iconography – like circulation – can also be a destabilizing strength, in cases in which the single geographical individualities to which iconography gives origin do not come in coordinate structures of socio-politics able to found solidarity, as happens in the case of federal states, the USA and Switzerland above all.

With the support of this theory, Henrikson investigates if and what solidarity exists on the Atlantic between the USA and Europe. Elsewhere – as we have the opportunity to see from the essays which follow – the destabilizing tendency of the iconographies prevails instead. Of this continuous opposition and at the same time the whole effort to bring cohabitation from a conflicting position to a position of solidarity, the articles selected in this section testify to all the situations described. There results, often beyond the intentions of the authors themselves, a kind of perspective geopolitics of the world examined in the light of Gottmannian theory, a political picture of iconographies in construction or overcoming the opposition of which the iconography is the bearer when it aims to strengthen local identities above all, or to overcome the risk that such opposition brings with it, certainly the greatest of that introduced in the system on the strength of "circulation." Part 3 on Political Geography is therefore a verification of the geographical theory of Gottmann, 50 years after its formulation, in the light of actual events, but often rising again to a history that is at least secular.

● To come back to the articles, while Henrikson aims to provide evidence that all strengths and initiatives between the two sides of the Atlantic are expressions of a most integrated reality that does not denounce the official demonstrations, **George Prevelakis** – who had already devoted one important international conference in Paris to the thought of Gottmann and the utility of his concepts in interpreting the political tendencies in action in Europe – faces the theme of European iconography. And he asks if "there can be a European iconography strong enough to overcome the influence of national iconographies in times of crisis and economic difficulty. Will the French or the Germans accept to sacrifice essential national or other interests for the European idea when no major outside threat is present? Or, for the sake of European unity, should a threat be invented?" If we think that the essay was written before difficulties emerged on the occasion of the war in Iraq we will realize the importance of the question and its timeliness. With the end of the Cold War, in fact, Europe wondered for what reason it had to continue to stay united, when there was really another question to put: How to behave in front of the equivocal situation of a widening of the Union to all the States that have shaken off the Soviet yoke? Because, if it comes to all the countries dominated previously by the Soviet Union applying to enter the Union, the risk is that the already fragile European iconography will become even more fragile. But if we exclude this widening, Europe will appear arrogant and selfish.

● A second burning dimension of the actual political geography is that of the Middle East to which **Giuseppe Campione** devotes his essay. "As Gottmann points out, seeing what is happening today, reality is not all that simple – he writes – 'The old structures have been liberated from age-old threats to the promises of globalization – and this corresponds to a resurgence of nationalism, regionalism, local interests, age-old tribal instincts, parochialism. It is not the geography of matter that shapes the true compartmentalization of space. Nowadays in this field problems can be solved technologically and economically. It is in the hearts and minds that true blockages occur'." And, strong in this belief, Campione questions the ways that it would be possible to contrive that the three monotheistic religions of the Mediterranean can cohabit side by side. "Indeed – he writes – it is the written word which is the strongest enforcer of identity and differences, above all in the Mediterranean, which is characterized by what can be called 'hard-line regionalisms.' Everything in the Mediterranean tends to be imbued with 'exclusively local color.' In order to foster development and peace in this sea of compartmentalization, it is necessary to solve a 'puzzle': the infinitely complex puzzle of ethnic groups and countries, of peoples and religions, with many opposing

factors, both structural and symbolic, acting as dividing lines – North-South, West-East, Europe-Arab World, Christianity-Islam. These are oppositions which also entail further divergences and asymmetries. Nonetheless, various psychological universes do attract each other in an intertwining of spatial dealings, relationships and connections. At the end of the day, these are the real issues involved in the complexity of the Mediterranean so strongly felt by Braudel." And Campione goes on to review all the proposals and the attempts to reach this objective.

● The essay of Campione is followed by that of **Vladimir Kolossov**, who is also convinced of the validity of the thought of Jean Gottmann. "There exists," he writes, "an inseparable connection between geopolitics, iconography and political identity. Jean Gottmann was the first who in the early 1950s considered the importance of iconography in the creation of national and political identity. National iconography is a result of a long historical development of the perception by state leaders, public opinion and the intellectual elite of the place of a country in the world, its geopolitical situation, national interests, external threats to national security." Kolossov's essay introduces the results of a recent investigation on the same theme conducted in Russia by the working group of which he is director: Russia today oscillates between the European world and the Asian even if the picture is not as simple as it would seem. Russia is not only engaged in a series of hard internal conflicts, of which that with Chechnya is the most fluorescent and tragic. It is also searching for a reaffirmation of the world role that it had acquired in the times of "real socialism" and the Cold War. It is not by chance that on the occasion of the war in Iraq Russia built an anti-American bridge with Germany and France.

● The essay in which the opposition between the different ways of looking at the political and military order of the world in the light of new geopolitics is examined, is that of the Australian geographer **Dennis Rumley**, perhaps the only one of our collaborators who does not call Jean Gottmann and his thought in support. Yet, despite this absence, the thought of Gottmann emerges on more than one occasion from the reading of this interesting article. They are the same conclusions of the article according to which the world is divided between the vision of President Bush and the scholar of politics Samuel Huntington on one side and on the other that of the countries of the Third World which aspire to free themselves from the ties with the western World and to reaffirm their own political and geographical individuality that confirm the full validity and utility of Gottmannian thought. It is a greater confirmation because Rumley does not call Gottmann in support. Of course, Rumley's article is also useful as an introduction to the problems of Asia (with some reference to the Middle East and black Africa) because it gives a correct perspective to the articles that follow which are devoted to India, China, Southeast Asia and, finally, Japan.

● **Sanjay Chaturvedi** writes: "Jean Gottmann once remarked that 'the geographer must keep the past in mind if he wants to understand the whys behind the present problems and the present landscapes.' In agreement with such insight, his paper argues that Indian geopolitics is best understood in its historical and discursive context of theorizing and practices ... If geopolitics can be critically conceptualized as a 'way of seeing' whereby groups and individuals, political elites, and the institutions and intellectuals of statecraft, attempt to spatialize politics by implanting maps of meaning, relevance and order onto the highly complex and dynamic political universe they inhabit, observe, try to understand, and sometimes even desire to dominate, then, undoubtedly there is a long lineage of geopolitical thought, theorizing and practices on the subcontinent." He continues, proposing the question of the title: "Indian" geopolitics:

Unity in diversity or diversity of unity?: "Whereas the concluding parts of the essay critically examine the nature and implications of an increasingly influential geopolitics of 'Hindutva' or 'Hindu nationalism' and attempt to deconstruct the geopolitical reasoning deployed by the Hindu nationalists to carve out a homogenous and monolithic 'Hindu' identity from a remarkably different and eclectic cultural tradition on the subcontinent. The question raised above is now recast in accordance with the tone and tenor of Hindu nationalist discourse: what are the key geopolitical idioms, myths and representational practices employed by the Hindu nationalists to inscribe something called India and endow that entity with a Hindu content, a Hindu history, a Hindu meaning, a Hindu trajectory and a Hindu *unity*?"

● **Fabrizio Eva** devotes his article to China. For him too Gottmann's thought remains valid, although he does not see all the implications that we have remembered. His great interest is in understanding the Chinese world. "With the notion of iconography, [Jean Gottmann] demonstrates that spatial identity, nationalism, and the resistance of places can develop a power comparable to that of material forces. Within geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics, self-regard and self-esteem play an important role, since one's self-image is the image one wants to 'export' and display in relations with others. Self-image also determines how people understand others, and it therefore influences strategic decisions. Like Gottmann, I would define these factors as 'iconographic'." For Eva, who supports his thought by recalling a vast international literature, the geopolitical role of China today takes nourishment from the following factors: "the political make-up of the country must reflect the behavior of its citizens within a society with long historical traditions and that groups together one-fifth of the world's population. ... China's leaders have their own particular way of acting both domestically and internationally. This is the product of a millennia-old tradition and undoubtedly represents an iconographic point of resistance." But there are other determining factors and that is "a vision of one's self based on an ongoing relationship with the territory, established over time through historical events and iconographically fixed within a national identity made up of the 'representation' of the country's past and a conviction that the Chinese are superior" and "a way of relating to 'others' based on a particular view of life and the nature of social relationships that are traditionally shared." "China conducts itself – Eva concludes – in an extremely pragmatic fashion; it clearly defines its goals and strategies, and can identify the right moment to act. The title of a recent Chinese film, which also met with success in the West, ideally encapsulates China's current, and possibly future, geopolitical role: *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*. China's aim? To (again) become the epicenter of the world."

● **Elena dell'Agnese** faces the burning theme of the Asian Southeast: "As in many other geographical representations – is the thought of Elena dell'Agnese reading Lewis and Wigen – regional labeling is a spatial construct; a form of geo-power deeply embedded in a historical and cultural context, a conceptual formation generally presuming some form of correspondence in space between physical landmasses and human cultural features. Yet, it is also a very adaptable form of geographical representation, which can modify its spatial coverage over time, perambulate around its original site, or even reverse its symbolic meaning, departing from the system of cultural references in which it was initially coined whilst still remaining tied to its own place." Of course, a lot of circumstances enter into the game and between them the creation of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) has had certain weight, even if "it is still disputable whether its emerging iconographies (which include an official anthem and a logo) are powerful enough to make ASEAN something more than a 'security community' of states." The question stays open as the title of the article suggests: " 'One Southeast Asia': Emerging iconographies in the making of a region," although Southeast Asia, made even more fragile by the powerful pressures of Communism on one side, and Islam on the other, appears in a phase of transition between a striking ethnic diversity – which Fisher (1962) described as "The Balkans of the Orient" – and the emergence of a new icon that tries to overcome the simple military reasons for the birth of the label.

● To close with Asia and its oscillating between the emergence of competitive regionalisms and new geopolitical identities comes the essay of **Juri Yamashita** on Japan that refers expressly in its title to Gottmann: "Influence of Jean Gottmann's thoughts on national development plans in Japan." As the introduction of the article also says: "the purpose of the present paper is to identify the influence of Gottmann's thoughts on national land plans in Japan." Really, the essay goes well beyond a simple examination of the relationship of the urban thought of Jean Gottmann to interpret the present geography of Japan. Above all it examines the different plans in Japan in the time that followed the end of the Second World War, the reconstruction and the Westernization, where the author puts the history and the economic geography of Japan in that international context which has made it the protagonist of post-colonial Asia and the post-Cold War. In this sense also the article confirms the great theoretical contribution that Gottmann's thesis of the two strengths that operate in geographical space anticipated.

● "In his famous work" **Alessia Turco** writes "Jean Gottmann said that: '... national politics is built not only upon what exists or doesn't exist inside the border of a country, but upon what is found or not found in other countries whom the former has relationships with. ...' In the context we are analyzing, we are talking about a continent, Africa, that is trying to rebuild these relationships on a new basis, in order to get out of its geopolitical and economic isolation and identify its role in the international scene." And to make this examination, the researcher examines carefully the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD), the programmatic document introduced by some important leaders of a second generation, sensitive to the necessity that Africa expresses it itself through the choice of the proper destiny and of the tools and conditions to reach it. From the examination of the document – approved and sustained at the G8 meetings in Genoa firstly and "later re-elaborated before being newly discussed during the last G8 meetings in Canada" – Turco draws the belief of being in the presence of a political effort that addresses Africa along the lines of an African "regionalism" that tries to overcome the local splitting up and whatever remains of the colonial period: "a real project of economic development 'of Africa for Africa'." But it is a regionalism that is aware of the necessity to be framed in the global context. Therefore it recognizes that the States involved must become democratic States and must accept to pursue a sustainable objective either in terms of defense of resources or in those of social justice. These new States must defend themselves from the risk of giving support to terrorism and must introduce an "important change in the way of conceiving the relationship between North and South, going from a logic of support, that characterized the development cooperation in the last 40 years, to a logic of partnership that can create advantages for both parties."

● The picture of Latin America is different, but the intent of the two authors is clear. "The main geographic and political question is," **Monica Gangas-Geisse** and **Hernán Santis-Arenas** write, "What is the political nature of territorial entities?" The answer comes from the studies of the great Teacher: "In an article on 'The political partitioning of our world', Jean Gottmann states and affirms that a strong belief based on some religious creed,

certainly a social point of view, or a pattern of political memories, can help to establish some notions on the origin of the political fragmentation on the surface of the planet; but more frequently, he argues, this origin resides in a combination of the three. In this sense, Gottmann thinks that every regionalism has some 'iconography' as its base."

The iconographic expressions of the political societies – the political "territory" – at least in the case of the Latin American countries, clarify the value of the notions of Jean Gottmann. The advances in terms of investigation and reflection find their proper explanation in the theoretical thinking of the geographer that we are evoking. They demonstrate the logic and validity of his thinking, and render his schemes and proposals a theoretical explanation worth considering for the present and the future, in spite of the fact that more than half a century has elapsed since these notions were first presented.

Jean Gottmann, President of the WSE 1971-1973

Jean Gottmann, President of the World Society for Ekistics, chairing a meeting of the WSE Executive Council and other members on the future program of action of the Society in the amphitheater of the Athens Center of Ekistics, September 1973.

Jean Gottmann (second from the right) following C.A. Doxiadis' presentation at the same meeting.

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Fig. 1: An early 1954 NATO map showing the North Atlantic area. (*Source:* Lord Ismay, NATO, *The First Five Years, 1949-1954.* Utrecht, Bosch, 1954).

The iconography and circulation of the Atlantic community

"The transatlantic alliance between the United States and Canada, on the one side, and the majority of the countries of Europe, on the other side, is held together by a formal commitment, a legal bond. ... To look only to the explicit bonds of obligation or the official consultative arrangements between the United States, in particular, and the countries and organizations of Europe as the source of the cohesion that does, at most times, exist between the continents of America and Europe would, surely, be to miss much of the substance of the connection. ... Gottmann seeks, in analytical fashion, to lay bare the structure of the icons of identity and the circles of activity that shape, and reshape, communities over time."

Alan K. Henrikson

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The formal bonds of alliance plus the icons and circles of community

The transatlantic alliance between the United States and Canada, on the one side, and the majority of the countries of Europe, on the other side, is held together by a formal commitment, a legal bond. Commonly called the "pledge," Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, states simply but sonorously: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 2001, p. 528) (fig. 1).

This expression of solidarity – resembling the Three Musketeers' pledge – does not, it should be noted, indicate the existence or require the establishment of a common identity, a single polity of the state-parties involved in defending the Atlantic

area. It is, though binding, merely an international connection. Still less, perhaps, do the more recent formalizations of common interest and shared purpose made by the United States and Canada in their separate accords with the European Union – notably, the US-EU and Canada-EU Transatlantic Declarations of 1990 – create an overarching Atlantic Community or imply that one could be formed. These, too, are merely intergovernmental in character.

Yet to look only to the explicit bonds of obligation or the official consultative arrangements between the United States, in particular, and the countries and organizations of Europe as the source of the cohesion that does, at most times, exist between the continents of America and Europe would, surely, be to miss much of the substance of the connection. Even to see the explanation of transatlantic comity and cooperation as lying primarily in the field of politics and diplomacy (my own area of special interest) may not be the best way to achieve a basic understanding of what *is*, after all, an Atlantic community of sorts, a *de facto* entity if not a *de jure* one. The responsiveness of Europeans to Americans and, reciprocally (though, as we shall see, not always symmetrically), of Americans to Europeans, is clearly greater than that of any other comparable intercontinental pairing in the world. How can this be explained?

Jean Gottmann's work offers a new way of interpreting the Atlantic community, and its constituent facts and forces. Rather than attempting to define "community" itself, in an essentialist way, Gottmann seeks, in analytical fashion, to lay bare the structure of the *icons* of identity and the *circles* of activity that shape, and reshape, communities over time.

Any social system, as Gottmann posits, is a combination of "iconography" and "circulation" (GOTTMANN, 1952, pp. 219-225). His terms are correlative and, taken together, are presumably inclusive. "Iconography," as he conceives it, refers to the symbols, concrete and also abstract, that give a community its identity, that embody and express its history and values. "Circulation," by contrast but in close functional relation to iconography, refers to the flows of people, goods, and also information and ideas that nourish a community, that support and supply its life. Circles of activity, on many scales, generate the material energy of a city or a country and also cause much of its ex-

Fig. 2: Paris – The Arc de Triomphe.

Fig. 3: New York – The Statue of Liberty.

Fig. 4: Paris – View from the Arc de Triomphe, looking down onto the Place Charles de Gaulle (Etoile), showing the traffic movement – "circulation" in Gottmann's terminology.

Fig. 5: Paris – View from the Arc de Triomphe towards the Eiffel Tower.

citement, around more or less fixed icons. Gottmann calls iconography a *"principe de stabilité"* and circulation a *"principe de mouvement."* Both the iconographic, or symbolic, factor and the circulatory, or economically and socially energizing, factor are necessary for a community – a human community on any level – to cohere and to prosper. These "centripetal" and "centrifugal" forces, Gottmann suggests, must be kept in balance over historical time if not, necessarily, at every moment of crisis such as the September 11, 2001, trauma whose impact on transatlantic relations will be assessed at the end of this article.

To illustrate Gottmann's distinction between iconography and circulation, two familiar examples, one from either side of the Atlantic, may be given. The Arc de Triomphe in Paris (fig. 2) and the Statue of Liberty in New York (fig. 3) may be regarded as icons, in Gottmann's sense, of the monumental type. Both are geographical reference points, but they also have considerable historical and ideological meaning. They can orient the citizenry of Paris and New York, and also outsiders, "morally," as well as directionally. Circulation is as easily illustrated as iconography.

The traffic flowing to and from, and around, the Arc de Triomphe (figs. 4 and 5) recalling Napoleon's victories and France's unknown war dead, circles around an icon. So, too, does the movement of ships in and out of New York harbor, and also the air traffic overhead and highway traffic on surrounding shores, circulate, though more widely, around "Lady Liberty" (figs. 6, 7, 8 and 9). Generally, as Gottmann sees it, iconography is static, backward-oriented, and, on balance, conservative. Circulation, in his view, is dynamic, forward-oriented, and, most often, progressive in effect. Sometimes, of course, iconography can embody a "revolutionary" tradition, and circulation can be "congestive" rather than flowing and free. They can support each other, but they also can contradict each other. They interact, over time, with resulting changes in both.

The valuations, positive or negative, that are given to iconography and circulation are affected by history. Technology and

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Fig. 6: New York – The Statue of Liberty monumental icon of the city (detail).

Fig. 7: The Statue of Liberty as a small figure in front of the New Jersey port facilities, representing maritime "circulation." (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

Fig. 8: New York – The tip of Manhattan with a ferry and a sailboat – in "circulation" – in front of it. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory*, New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

Fig. 9: New York – General view of Manhattan's Financial District. The World Trade Center twin towers are shown, intact, in the background. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory*, New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

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Fig. 10: Paris – the Eiffel Tower.

the Zeitgeist can modify the very meanings of icons, just as they can accelerate and alter the directions of circulatory processes. In one of his later essays, "Transatlantic Orbits: The Interplay in the Evolution of Cities" (1986), Gottmann recalled a conversation he had with Henry Churchill, a Philadelphia friend who recently had been traveling in France. Churchill had spoken of "the gradual change" he observed. His impressions merged with Gottmann's own:

He also referred to the symbolism of the monuments in Paris, that the Arc de Triomphe signaled the end of a long period opened by Greco-Roman architects, while the Eiffel Tower (fig. 10) heralded the new era of history opening up in our century with skyscraping, liberation from old molds, and new engineering taking over the design of the environment. Gifted artists just express the trends and traditions in the local people's spirit (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, pp. 264-265).

Within the same local population, as Gottmann was delighted to note, there are generational and other differences in taste and outlook (fig. 11). He tells, for instance, of the conservative French poet, Théophile Gautier, who "took long detours around Paris to avoid the sight of the Eiffel Tower." He then adds, indicating his own preference for innovation and succession. "Similar attitudes could be observed among good Parisians in recent years towards the Centre Pompidou! The latter is, however, a loved attraction for large crowds of youngsters (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 256).

Most of Gottmann's specific arguments about social organization, including his iconography vs. circulation distinction, were applied by him in worked-out and detailed fashion only to particular cities such as Paris, particular regions such as the

Fig. 11: European monuments-symbols – city icons. (*Source:* "21st century views," *Europe: Magazine of the European Union,* no. 392, December/January 1999-2000).

Northeastern coastal "Megalopolis" of the United States, or particular countries such as France. His 1952 study, *La politique des États et leur géographie*, and constant travels abroad attest to his keen interest in the world, however. His interests, intellectual and geographical, were broad. He was a true global thinker. It is his half a century of personal "transhumance over the North Atlantic," as he termed it (GOTTMANN, 1952, p. 257), that truly stands out in his own life experience, geographical writing, and mental speculation.

Whether Professor Gottmann considered that an Atlantic "community" existed is difficult to know. The answer to the question is partly just a matter of definition. What is clearly evident is that he believed that, at least in the particular realm of urban discourse, "there exists one vast transatlantic orbit in which all the main planning policies, technological innovations, and methods of management are exchanged, attempted, at least debated." There was "a *common lore* of ideas and techniques," he observed, shared by all those involved in urban design on both sides of the Atlantic who "moved freely around within the transatlantic orbit." Yet, he could not but note, these transactions had not produced "a straight, generally applicable solution" to the urban problems of America and Europe. "Certainly the North Atlantic has been and remains the large portion of space on this planet most intensely crisscrossed by ships and airplanes, telephone connections and other telecommunications, people, goods, and messages," he wrote. "The results in terms of the evolution of cities are nevertheless strikingly at variance, not only between Anglo-America on the one hand and continental Europe on the other, but even on the two sides of the Channel between England and France, or between Switzerland and Belgium" (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 260).

This arresting description by Gottmann of "one vast transatlantic orbit" of ideological flow and human interaction, combined with recognition of the stubborn differences that continue to exist among at least the cities of the Atlantic, is consonant with the interpretation of American-European relations here offered as a plurality of transatlantic difference in ways of living and interacting. More particularly, the emphasis is here placed on local communities, especially those in and around coastal cities, on both sides of the Atlantic whose mutual perceptions and, increasingly, actual relations are making a new Atlantic community, if not an Atlantic Community with a capital "C."

An Atlanticism based on cities as well as on countries

The standard way of speaking about transatlantic relations, as indicated at the outset, is to refer to formulae of political obligation and also economic cooperation – that is, the NATO pact relationship and also the increasingly systematized relationship between the United States, as well as Canada and a number of other countries in the Western Hemisphere, and the developing European Union. The texture of transatlantic relations is both much wider and much thicker than this conventional approach suggests.

*Non-*central entities too – subnational governments as well as nongovernmental entities including private corporations and institutions – are actively engaged in American-European relations and, arguably, are also helping to reshape the Atlantic community. The particular analytical focus here, following Gottmann, is placed on what may be termed *metropolitan regions*. These are amalgams of local, state, and even federal authority and are also, as Gottmann demonstrated in *Megalopolis*, major manufacturing, commercial, employment, and transportation agglomerations (GOTTMANN, 1961, pp. 447-690). Arguably, these concentrations – "region states," as

Kenichi Ohmae has characterized them more recently – are the most dynamic and important ones in the rapidly globalizing world economy of today (OHMAE, 1993). On both sides of the Atlantic, cities and the regions surrounding them, many with distinct "personalities," are coming to the fore.

The emergent pattern of Franco-American relations, in which Gottmann was of course especially interested, is illustrative. The New York financier Felix Rohatyn, when serving as United States Ambassador to France, told the US Conference of Mayors: "The most important thing that we can do now is to think about Europe in a new way – not just as a collection of nation-states, but as a single economic space filled with a constellation of dynamic cities and economic regions, of future customers and partners." The government of France itself, Ambassador Rohatyn pointed out, had "long recognized the importance of cities outside capitals" and, accordingly, maintained consulates in Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and seven other American cities. By contrast, the United States maintained only two consulates in France, one in Marseille and the other in Strasbourg. Seeking to make up the difference, Ambassador Rohatyn initiated the new approach of creating smaller American Presence Posts (APPs), staffed from the US Embassy in Paris and supported by modern communications technology, in other French cities. He set up the first APP in Lyon, "not only because it is France's second largest city, but because of its regional importance," he said. More than a hundred American firms did business in Lyon, and US trade with the Lyon region amounted to some five billion dollars a year. Recognizing that many in France (presumably Parisians) saw in globalization an American takeover threat, Rohatyn contrasted the outlook of the regions of France. "In the regions, people think differently," he said. He cited as a particular example that of Toulouse, where he also opened an APP. "Toulouse is an aerospace city, a combination of Silicon Valley and Southern California, where business activity is paramount and I think there is much more admiration for the American model and less distancing from it." The US Embassy under Ambassador Rohatyn also carried out a culturally oriented strategy for diversifying America's relations with the country. With corporate support and with the ambassador's wife, Elizabeth, in the lead, the Rohatyn team began a program of linking up regional museums in France with similarly sized and situated museums around the United States (ROHATYN, 1999; WHITNEY, 1999; RIDING, 1999). Such transatlantic partnerships could be significant, in an iconographic sense, as well as substantial, in a circulatory sense.

Cities of all sizes, especially when clustered together as metropolitan regions, are coming to be "fundamental spatial units of the global economy" and, prospectively, even "*political actors* on the world stage" (emphasis added). Far from being "dissolved away by processes of globalization," as Allen J. Scott, John Agnew, Edward W. Soja, and Michael Storper further observe, city-regions are "becoming increasingly central to modern economic and social life" and also are "beginning to consolidate politically." They are doing so in response to the need felt by individual urban centers for "region-wide coalitions" as a means of dealing with the threats and the opportunities of globalization (SCOTT, AGNEW, SOJA, and STORPER, 1999).

My hypothesis is that these vital urban centers and their associated hinterlands may play a role *internationally*, well beyond the limits of state (provincial), national, or continental lines. They can engage in region-wide coalition-building that is transoceanic in extent. Moreover, they can do so *directly*, without the mediation of national governments or of international or supranational bodies. A phenomenon that Gottmann himself noted was the "*expansion of the horizons* of urban activities." In the first instance, this meant their "geographical

horizons." Cities, even those not of the largest size, increasingly are able to communicate on their own with the world beyond their hinterlands. In the past, Gottmann noted: "The range of these relations seldom extended very far, unless the city was a political capital of substance, or a very active seaport" (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 11). Today, most cities and their regions have, or can have, truly far-flung connections. Those across the Atlantic are among the easiest to form.

As already suggested, the international involvement of US subnational units – cities, states, and metropolitan regions – with their European counterparts, despite the incongruency that does exist in American-European organizational forms, is what has actually been called, though from a central-government perspective and with NATO and especially the EU in mind, a "New Atlantic Community." This was the phrase employed by a former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, when he said in Stuttgart in September 1996: "Closer political cooperation in the European Union, and its coming enlargement, will contribute to the security and prosperity of the New Atlantic Community and strengthen the partnership between Europe and the United States" (CHRISTOPHER, 1996). The "new Atlantic community" that I envision differs somewhat from such Washington-Brussels partnership thinking, and also from older, more elaborate conceptualizations such as the "Atlantica" plan put forward in 1963 by retired US Secretary of State Christian Herter (HERTER, 1963a). Atlanticism today is marked by the high degree of pluralism, or multi-centeredness, within it, and also by the non-hierarchical character of its structure. Its organization is more informal and implicit than formal and expressed. The newer concept implies a devolution of responsibility, as well as initiative, to non-central governments (NCGs) as well as to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and also to business enterprises and institutions such as museums, orchestras, and universities. The established structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the channels of regularized communication that increasingly join the United States government to the European Union will, of course, remain in place, for the coordination of overall defense and trade policy especially. But the locus of initiative in transatlantic relations will become, more and more, "localized."

"Communities" and "capitals"

A true "community," on any geographical scale, may be distinguished – partially in opposition to the Gottmann iconography-circulation model which does have an in-built centralist bias to it – by the norms of equality of status and opportunity for participation. Wide and general involvement is required, from the so-called peripheral areas of a society no less than from its center – its predominant metropolis or, on the international level, its most powerful country. Any human community of whatever size, almost by definition, should have more than one "center," lest it be overly *dirigiste*, such as the French political system, strongly centered on Paris, has appeared to be over the centuries. The transatlantic relationship, too, has seemed to be an "imperial" structure, with the United States, especially during the Cold War years, predominating heavily as the leading member of NATO (CALLEO, 1987). Both examples of overlordship, though inspiring in many ways, have been, from a community perspective, somewhat dispiriting.

Even very idealistic schemes, such as those for creating a transatlantic federation of some kind that were put forward at various times during the Cold War years, have an airless, freedom-less quality to them, whatever the stated liberalism of their associated rhetoric. One of these was Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now, A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free* (1949). Streit's and other such plans were efforts to try to replicate the formation of the United States of America on an international level, starting with the USA and the democratic countries of Western Europe. American federal thought was indeed an element in the ideology within which NATO was created, although the actual North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, if more than a traditional alliance, was not itself a federalist text (HENRIKSON, 1982; KAPLAN, 1984). An Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, a gathering of citizens under the chairmanship of former Secretary of State Herter that took place in Paris in January 1962, produced a detailed blueprint (the "Declaration of Paris") for constructing a "true Atlantic Community" (HERTER, 1963b, pp. 79-90). This document provided for an executive body, a permanent High Council, and a High Court of Justice. An Atlantic Economic Community also was projected. Such an Atlantic Economic Community would not be closed, but "open to other nations of the free world."

A grand Atlantic Community of NATO Nations, had such a plan ever been adopted, would have been highly centralized, as the very notion of a High Council makes evident. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself was "a political center" that would be capable of acting in some areas even by a weighted majority vote. In other noteworthy ways, it should be allowed, the vision embodied in the Declaration of Paris was pluralistic. This was especially true of its references to the cultural sphere. The plan's authors traced the origins of the "magnificent civilization" that Atlantic peoples shared to the "early achievements" of the Near East, the "classical beauty" of Greece, the "juridical sagacity" of Rome, the "spiritual power" of religious tradition, the "humanism" of the Renaissance, and also the "discoveries" of modern science. The Declaration of Paris even included what, in the Gottmann sense, could be termed an iconographic proposal: "*Reconstruction of the Acropolis*," to make it "the symbol of our culture" and "the shrine of our Alliance" (HERTER, 1963b, p. 87).

The American relationship with what has evolved into the European Union, by contrast with NATO-based thinking, has developed much more along the lines of a "partnership" of separate equals. This concept of community was most influentially articulated by President John F. Kennedy in what has been described as his transatlantic "Grand Design" (KRAFT, 1962). In an address at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, President Kennedy reflected upon the American political system as one whose "checks and balances are designed to preserve the rights of the individual and the locality against preeminent central authority." As the effort for "independence" in the world was approaching a successful end, a great new effort for "interdependence," an idea also embodied in the US Constitution, was beginning.

This could most clearly be seen "across the Atlantic Ocean" among the nations of Western Europe. Kennedy conditionally offered to enter into practical discussions of "a concrete Atlantic partnership" if and as Europe moved to perfect its union, thereby forming an entity that would be capable of working, equally and interdependently, with the United States, the "old American Union." A "strong and united Europe," as the President foresaw, would be "a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations." Forming "the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible" would not be easy, he acknowledged.

"But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago" (KENNEDY, 1963).

In this "Design," in theory, the United States would be not on-

Fig. 12: Gottmann's Northeastern coastal Megalopolis of the United States, showing population density in 1960. (*Source:* Gottmann, 1961, inside front cover).

ly connected to but also counterbalanced by a consolidating Western Europe, thus ensuring the inner freedom as well as the outer force of Atlantic civilization.

. In the subsequent development of the US relationship with the European Communities, there has been much less actual connection than in the more solidary NATO context. The relationship between Washington and Brussels was not even made formal until the previously noted 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (TAD). The TAD itself was not given much programmatic content until the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and Joint Action Plan (JAP) which did, fairly boldly, envisage a pragmatic, participant-oriented "New Transatlantic Marketplace" (though not a Transatlantic Free Trade Area, or TAFTA). The primary emphasis of the NTA/JAP was on private business relations rather than on governmental ties, at any level.

Relations between NCGs were simply not a leading agenda item. Nonetheless, in the last part of the JAP, "Building Bridges Across the Atlantic," there is the explicit urban recommendation: "encourage 'sister cities' to promote exchanges." Referring to the twinning of cities that had been going on across the Atlantic, as well as within Europe, during the whole period

since the Second World War, this urban reference, though brief and even seemingly perfunctory, was recognized by city associations on both sides of the Atlantic as being important. It provided a larger formal framework for their future programmatic cooperation, as well as the prospect of funding. And it licensed, so to speak, a more general dialogue between city authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. The NTA/JAP initiative also emphasized the role of the urban-based private business sector, which through the recently formed Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) had contributed to the content of the NTA/JAP (COWLES, 2001).

Communities normally have capitals – in the case of nation-states, usually only one. National capitals, which are in most cases the largest cities of countries, traditionally have dominated Atlantic affairs. On the American side of the Atlantic, it has been Washington, DC, the administrative capital (HENRIKSON, 1983), and sometimes New York – taken together, the "London" or "Paris" equivalents in the United States – that have, separately or jointly, dominated the transatlantic dialogue, especially with regard to high political and financial matters. In order for the Atlantic world to develop further together as a community (fig. 12), other important urban centers – regionally prominent

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cities on the seaboard such as Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Atlanta, and Miami, as well as powerful cities in the interior of the country such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago – should be recognized for also having significant relationships with Europe. They can have actual leading functions as well. Chicago was, for example, the location of the second meeting, in November 1996, of the TABD. The initial, organizing conference for this influential group of some three hundred American and European chief executive officers, with government officials present, was held in Seville, Spain, in November 1995 (COWLES, 2001, pp. 243-253).

The "capital," in the sense of the heading-function that may be pertinent at the time, of the discussions of the Atlantic community can shift, in the United States no less than in Europe, from one center to another, though the term does, of course, normally refer to political, governmental headship. State and society must work together.

America's East Coast urban centers, for some of which external networks have often been of even greater importance than their immediate regional connections, have performed what Gottmann has termed a "hinge," or gateway, function as well. New York and Boston, with "their international linkages," stand out for him in this way (GOTTMANN, 1961, pp. 156-165; GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 14): These and other coastal cities have helped to swing European and other continents' assets – investments as well as immigrants – toward America. They also have been pivots – "hubs" – for turning the attention of the United States outward and abroad, "circulating" American funds, products, and people toward port and other gateway cities on other continents. Many of these flows occur within regular transatlantic "orbits," as Gottmann describes these widening spirals of urban-centered activity (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, pp. 257-259).

The participation of cities and their supportive regions in transatlantic community-building can today be, as they have been historically, direct and strong, and largely unmediated by the hierarchies of imperial command, national government, or international organization. The formal structures of NATO and of the developing US-EU relationship do provide guidance and context for transatlantic connecting, including, as recommended in the 1995 US-EU Joint Action Plan, further exchanges between "sister cities." But the cities have to do the exchanging on their own. And they do.

American non-central governments and international relations

The range of activities of American non-central governments – city, county, state, and also metropolitan-regional authorities – is increasing, and now extends even into what has traditionally been the sphere of "international relations," no longer a federal government preserve. To a degree, this has occurred at the behest of the US government. In 1956 President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a people-to-people program at a White House conference intended, in the words of the subsequently created Sister Cities International (SCI), to "involve individuals and organized groups at all levels of society in citizen diplomacy, with the hope that personal relationships, fostered through sister city, county and state affiliations, would lessen the chance of future world conflicts." This began a "national initiative" of American NCGs overseas-affiliating (SISTER CITIES INTERNATIONAL, 1999, p. 2).

Of the total of some 2,020 foreign cities affiliated with US cities under SCI auspices by the end of 1999, the largest number, 723, were in Europe. During the 1990s the extent of SCI's network on the continent of Europe increased very considerably. Initially, most of the European cities chosen by US cities

as partners were in Western Europe. In 1999 there were, for instance, 104 British cities, 105 French cities, and 157 German cities with linkages to US cities, in some cases more than one. With the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet bloc, and the general weakening of central authority within the former Soviet zone, non-central connections eastward and westward were possible. There was, consequently, a remarkable enlargement of US sister-city linkages, including some with cities in states that once were part of the USSR itself. For example, there were, by the end of the 1990s decade, 9 Czech cities, 8 Hungarian cities, 31 Polish cities, 25 Ukrainian cities, and 117 Russian cities having official ties with American cities as counterparts.

In most cases, the American and European cities that have thus paired up under SCI or other auspices are comparable in size and similar in character. Increasingly, economic, particularly business-driven associations produce city-to-city affiliations. Sometimes there are also "background" factors, such as historical links or ethnic ties, that may cause these to be formed. Current international diplomacy, too, occasionally can produce affiliations. A particularly interesting such connection, more fortuitous than others and having a high political content, is the one that was established between Dayton, Ohio, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, once part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This no doubt was intended to help reinforce the peace agreement negotiated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at the sequestered site of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, in November 1995 (HOLBROOKE, 1999). The present Dayton-Sarajevo cooperative relationship indicates that "citizen diplomacy" at the city level can serve an international political function as well as those of cross-cultural understanding and community development.

American states, as well as cities, have engaged in supporting US policy in the context of American-European relations. An example is the continuing involvement of US National Guard units, based in states, in advising, training, and otherwise assisting countries that once were members of the Warsaw Pact. Called the State Partnership Program (SPP), this initiative of the National Guard Bureau began in 1993. It consists of a series of partnerships between the host nation and an American state, which operates under the National Guard Bureau, the US ambassador to the host nation, and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. The following partnerships are illustrative: Illinois is associated with Poland, Ohio is associated with Hungary, Pennsylvania is associated with Lithuania, Vermont is associated with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Georgia, homonymously, is associated with the Republic of Georgia (UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM).

Despite these examples of political and even military local and state government involvement in Europe, the international presence of American NCGs in the past has been confined mainly to the tasks of trade, investment, and tourism promotion, and, to a lesser degree, cultural and educational activity. These traditional representational and exchange functions are well understood and are well documented (FRY, 1998; FRY, RADEBAUGH, and SOLDATOS, 1989; MICHELMANN and SOLDATOS, 1990; HOCKING, 1993). Many US states, and also the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, actually have established overseas offices, though not always continuously, in Europe and also in nearer Canada and Mexico, as well as in Asia (FRY, 1998, pp. 68-70). Although interest in the Western Hemisphere and in East Asia has been rising, interest in Europe has not declined. The European market is not only large but also relatively stable, and therefore likely to remain a major focus. States' overlapping interests in Europe have even led to formation of an association, the Council of American States in Europe (CASE). This functions as a coordinating agency for the approximately

30 US states that have offices in Europe. With CASE's help, "USA Trade Days" periodically are organized (FRY, 1998, pp. 75-76).

The role that non-central governments play in international relations, it should be recognized, remains subordinate. For the most part, NCGs must content themselves with exercising influence as "lobbies," acting upon national authorities either on their own or working through like-minded groups such as the National Governors' Association (NGA), US Conference of Mayors, or the National League of Cities. The NGA, for example, provided strong support for approval by Congress of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations and also renewal of "fast track" authority for the president to negotiate further trade agreements (FRY, 1998, p. 109). Later, both houses of Congress, mindful of the large US trade deficit and resulting unemployment in some states, voted to give President George W. Bush the requested Trade Promotion Authority, as "fast track" is now called.

The US Constitution assigns power over the conduct of international relations, including trade regulation and tariff collection, to the central government. Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution gives to Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." There is a prevailing constitutional doctrine regarding foreign policy of "one voice" – that of the national government in Washington. Though the strength of this doctrine is being relaxed somewhat by lower-level judicial decisions and actual governmental practice today, it still is generally understood to be the case that the federal government "speaks for" the United States in international matters (HENKIN, 1972, pp. 15-28).

Nonetheless, non-central government leaders – principally, governors and mayors – now have distinct and important functions that can have a bearing on the international relations, even political relations, of the United States of America – if not on its "foreign policy" proper. One of these is their function, which should be much better recognized, as co-managers, together with leaders in Washington, of "symbols of American community" (MERRITT, 1966). There are important signs in Gottmann's portmanteau term, "iconography" – of Atlantic, as well as American, community that need, carefullly, to be handled, for they can have powerful effects.

Iconography, urbanity, and diplomacy

Many of America's icons, especially the more concrete ones, are site-specific – in contrast, for example, with such political and legal abstractions as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. We have seen, however, that even these abstractions can be associated, as they were by President Kennedy in his July 4 "Grand Design" speech, with a particular building in the City of Philadelphia.

The Statue of Liberty, mentioned at the outset to illustrate Gottmann's idea of social iconostasis, is both physical and metaphysical. Its formal name is "Liberty Enlightening the World" (fig. 13). The Statue is not only an American but also an Atlantic icon. It faces the Atlantic, and the world. Proposed by the historian Édouard de Laboulaye, designed by the sculptor Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, donated by the people of France, the Statue of Liberty is derived from Mediterranean and Western archetypes, going back to the Colossus of Rhodes. Presented to the United States in Paris in 1884 and shipped to New York where it was assembled and ceremonially dedicated by President Grover Cleveland in 1886, it was intended as an expression of Revolutionary friendship and as a symbolic reminder of the liberty that citizens can enjoy under a free form of government.

To the poet Emma Lazarus, who called it "The New Colos-

Fig. 13: New York – "Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World," 1886, by Edward P. Moran (1829-1901) – an Atlantic icon.

sus," it later became also a welcoming figure to immigrants. "Give me your tired, your poor,/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free" – these words from her poem were inscribed at the foot of the Statue in 1903, making it thereafter an express signal of America as a refuge, a home for the oppressed. In the course of subsequent decades, reason was given – by restrictive US immigration policies and also xenophobic popular attitudes – to question the strength of Americans' commitment to this promise of liberty and safety. But the philosophical belief and the philanthropic wish remained, in part because they were reflected from across the ocean and were reinforced by European expectations of America's openness.

No city in America is as self-consciously emblematic as the nation's capital, Washington, the District of Columbia – intentionally designed by Thomas Jefferson and his planners as an iconographic city (CUMMINGS and PRICE, 1993; CRAIG et al., 1978). As Gilles Paquet has pointed out, with regard not only to Washington, DC, a capital city is "a pattern of symbolic resources" – a "terrain of realities" but also a "theatre of representations" (PAQUET, 1993).

A US President, though occupying a national office and constitutionally representing all of the people of the United States, acts somewhat as a local official when he situates himself authoritatively amidst the built symbols all around him in the capital. As Claude Raffestin asks, "Une capitale est-elle une sémiosphère nationale ou le lieu de mise en scène du pouvoir?" (RAFFESTIN, 1993).

The meaning of architectural and sculptural symbols is defined by their place, as well as by their purpose. It is also defined by their beholders. Political iconography, moreover, is not the preserve only of government officials or politicians. It also can be wielded by others who speak from positions of moral authority and public trust – a Reverend Martin Luther

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King, for example, when he appeared as a private citizen in front of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 (figs. 14, 15 and 16). Standing proudly before Daniel Chester French's marble statue of the Great Emancipator, he said: "I have a dream . . . ," to a quarter of a million immediate listeners, black and white – and to millions more Americans and others around the world. The Lincoln Memorial, the Mall, and the City of Washington together served as his megaphone. His voice was heard in Europe, and in 1964 he was invited to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Other US cities too, notably New York, have functioned as public "sémiosphères" and as sounding-boards for policy. By projecting "identity" as well as power, city governments have hoped to increase the size of their markets, to draw in more investment, to bring in larger numbers of tourists, and also, sometimes, simply to make an impression. A "law and order" urban leader such as a former Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, sometimes conducted his office in a way that seemed purely willful, to assert his own and his city's primacy.

On occasion, as in October 1995, his assertive behavior produced embarrassment, for it interfered with American foreign policy. At that time the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, was visiting the city to attend the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, whose headquarters was situated there by international agreement (HENKIN, 1972, pp. 382-383, 396, 424 and 482). A special New York Philharmonic concert at the Lincoln Center had been arranged, and Arafat was to attend. The occasion – a highly iconographic one – suggested civility and ecumenism. The Mayor directed his aides to have the PLO leader removed from the event. The PLO delegation had been invited by the United Nations Protocol Office, but not by the local United Nations Host Committee! The City furthermore informed the United Nations that seven other "nations" not recognized by the United States would be excluded. "Diplomacy, Giuliani-style: Mayor has 'foreign policy' for local consumption," said the *Boston Globe* disapprovingly, if with a hint of respect for Giuliani's "brutish stylishness." It further observed: "Perhaps something strange inflames a

mortal's senses when he takes command of a city so large, full of so many nationalities. As the site of the United Nations, New York City is, in a sense, the capital of the world, and so, would not that make its mayor something of a global potentate himself?" (KAPLAN, 1995).

The impact abroad of such demonstrations of metropolitan

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
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
Fig. 14: Aerial view showing the March on Washington at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC on 28 August, 1963, with 250,000 people fighting for pending civil rights laws.

Fig. 15: The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. acknowledges the crowd at the Lincoln Memorial for his "I have a dream" speech during the March on Washington, DC, on 28 August, 1963.

Fig. 16: Stonecarver Andy DelGallo of Arlington, VA, readies a portion of Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech to be installed on the floor of the Lincoln Memorial, 23 July, 2003.

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
power and personal sway can be dramatic, comparable in effect to the symbolic assertions of America's national leaders. The "strong mayor" system of many US cities, New York above all, has itself become exemplary, especially within what Gottmann called the "vast transatlantic orbit" of urban discourse. This example has had perhaps its greatest effect in the United Kingdom where the Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair has sought to strengthen local government in order to make it more visible and accountable. The installation there of directly elected mayors in place of the traditional town councils, it was reasoned (partly on the basis of American experience), would facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships and intergovernmental coalitions. Mayor Giuliani himself was asked to comment on the Labour government's policy initiative.

Other American urban leaders, too, were invited to contribute to the reform discussion. To further the dialogue, the Local Government Association (LGA) in the UK held a seminar in March 1999 in London, titled "Models of Local Government: A Transatlantic Exchange," in which the mayors of Baltimore and Philadelphia and also other senior US local government personalities participated. There could hardly be a better example of Gottmann's "transatlantic orbit" of urban discussion, and of the community-building effect, at least in the realm of ideas, that it could have.

The most obvious outcome of the debate in Britain was the introduction of a "mayor plus assembly" form of governance for the greater London region. A new mayor of London – Ken Livingstone, an independent leftwing politician – was chosen on May 4, 2000, as the first directly elected executive in the United Kingdom. By British standards, Mayor Livingstone has a massive constituency. The 4.9 million citizens entitled to vote were a voting population equivalent to the combined constituencies of the 74 London Members of Parliament. The London mayor "will not surprisingly have a very high national and international profile – certainly a profile which will make most politicians in Westminster green with envy," read one British commentary (LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, 1999). To some extent, as it was recognized, this represented an Americanization of British municipal government.

Actual participation in what might be called *municipal diplomacy*, connective and not just comparative, would be a further extension of urban influence abroad. The political scientist Ivo Duchacek uses the word "microdiplomacy," or "paradiplomacy," to refer to the processes and networks by which subnational governments deliberately seek to establish links with central governments and private enterprises at a distance (DUCHACEK, 1986).

Municipal foreign policy would be a suitable term for the even newer phenomenon of subnational authorities, speaking for the populations of cities and states or provinces they represent, taking formal positions on controversial international issues. In years past, most such controversial position-taking by non-central governments has concerned regions of the world or substantive issues remote from the concerns of Europe or America themselves. In the United States, city and state governments and their leaders have taken "foreign policy" stands on such questions as nuclear disarmament, stratospheric ozone preservation, the apartheid regime in South Africa, the status of Taiwan, the war in Vietnam, the Arab oil embargo, and – somewhat closer to home – relations with Cuba, revolution in Central America, and the future of Puerto Rico. Among the relatively few Europe-related topics that have been cited are the Northern Ireland conflict, Swiss banking practices, and recognition of "Macedonia," along with other Balkan issues. From the European side, there generally has been more for governments at every level to criticize: the US government's sanctions against Cuba, Libya, and Iran; its rejection of the

Kyoto protocol on global warming; its opposition to the International Criminal Court; and, a matter internal to the United States itself, the adherence of some state governments to the death penalty.

A particularly controversial legislative measure adopted by one state – the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Burma Law, which discriminated in state government procurement policy against corporations, including many European ones, that did business with Myanmar (Burma) – was protested against by European companies primarily at the "European" level, as a matter of trade policy under the principles of the World Trade Organization. When tested in the US court system, the European Communities and their Member States joined in the American legal proceedings as *amici curiae*. The US Supreme Court finally ruled, if only on the narrow basis of federal supremacy, that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional. The moral and political issues involved in the Burma case and others like it, however, cannot easily be settled, on either side of the Atlantic, because they involve profound differences of opinion within American and European society. There is a larger Atlantic intellectual and political sphere of discussion – a Gottmann "transatlantic orbit" for the circulation of ideas – that can, at times and over time, result in a community of thought and even of policy.

The Atlantic community and the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks

No event since the Second World War or perhaps the Cuban Missile Crisis has so tested, and arguably also so demonstrated, the validity of the notion of an Atlantic community as did the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, using hijacked airliners, on the World Trade Center in New York City (figs. 17 and 18) and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001.

Did those acts and, most relevantly here, the responses to them of Americans (figs. 19 to 22) and Europeans (figs. 23 to 27) as well as others around the world also prove the existence of an *integrated* Atlantic relationship, one in which not only transatlantic "we-feeling" but also mutual responsiveness, and actual cooperation, in decision making were evidenced (DEUTSCH et al., 1957, p. 9)? Most fundamentally, did the behavior of the United States along with its allies and friends in Europe, have an "Atlantic" character to it?

Both iconography and circulation came into play during the crisis. The former is, as Gottmann said, a stabilizing factor. And the latter, as he explained, is a movement factor. At the level of formal relations across the Atlantic, support was given almost at once. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the very next day after the attacks, invoked the all-for-one, one-for-all pledge of the 1949 Washington Treaty, Article 5 (BENNETT, 2001/2002). Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, said afterward in an address to the Atlantic Council in Washington: "The Alliance's historic decision on September 12 to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty underscored the profound link between two continents and among 19 nations. And it underlined our collective determination not to stand idly by, but to act." Who would have guessed, he went on to say, citing doubts of the proverbial "milkman from Omaha," that the Article 5 commitment would be invoked, 52 years after it was made, "after an attack on US soil." He itemized the kinds of help that the NATO allies were giving, much of it involving "circulation" in the larger Atlantic sphere: intelligence support, transit permission for military aircraft, access to ports and airfields, dispatch of elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, and also replacement with European capabilities of

Fig. 17: New York – The Statue of Liberty surrounded by boats with fireworks overhead on the occasion of the celebration of the centennial of Lady Liberty. It shows social and celebratory "circulation." (*Source: Northeast: Images of America,* New York, Gallery Books, 1987).

Fig. 18: New York – Nighttime photograph showing The Statue of Liberty in front of the Twin Towers – representing modern commercial and financial "circulation," with most of the office lights on. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

Fig. 19: New York – The Statue of Liberty and the smoke-filled sky in the background immediately after the terrorist attack of 11 September, 2001 on the World Trade Center. *(Source:* Cover of *NATO Review,* Winter (Dec./Jan./Feb.) 2001/2002.

Fig. 20: New York – A phoenix will rise from the ashes. *(Source:* "Recovery redefined," *The Economist,* 15 September, 2001, p. 66).

We will roll up our sleeves.

We will move forward together.

We will overcome.

We will never forget.

A message from

GE

Fig. 21: New York – A message after the 11 September, 2001, terrorist attack. (*Source: The New York Times,* 21 September, 2001).

Fig. 22: New York – The twin beacons. (*Source: The Economist,* 26 January, 2002, p. 30).

some US assets in the Balkans.

"Most significant – and symbolic –" Robertson then added, "is the move of NATO AWACS airborne early warning aircraft from their base in Europe to replace US aircraft now being transferred to Asia" (fig. 24). As he explained: "This is NATO's first operational deployment in the United States: the old world coming to the aid of the new (fig. 25), to reverse the words of Winston Churchill" (ROBERTSON, 2001).

To illustrate the popular reaction of Europeans, Robertson noted that in Paris "the headlines read, 'We are all Americans now'" (ROBERTSON, 2001). What he did not mention is that in this much-referred-to article in *Le Monde* by Jean Marie Colombani the words, "Nous sommes tous Américains," are

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Fig. 23: "The fanatic cannot bear a city so civilized." (*Source:* Mario Vargas Llosa, "Out of Many, New York," with illustration by Angus McWilton, *The New York Times,* 11 December, 2001).

Fig. 24: Take-off: Five NATO AWACS aircraft have been deployed in the United States to help with counter-terrorism operations. *(Source: The Economist,* 26 January, 2002).

Fig. 25: Cargo ships line up at Port Newark. Some 2,000 containers arrive in the United States every hour. Those involved in shipping fear that added security will cut deeply into gains in efficiency and cost. *(Source:* Steve Lohr, "How to keep cargo safe, and rolling," *The New York Times,* 27 May, 2002.

Fig. 26: "Nous sommes tous Américains. Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais!"

Fig. 27: Paris – 2002 Bastille Day celebration down the Champs d'Elysées in memory of the victims of September 11. The military parade was led by a contingent of more than 160 West Point Cadets, who were also invited guests of France. In the foreground is a New York City fire engine. (*Source: Magazine of the European Union,* no. 419, September 2002, p. 48.

immediately followed by the sentence, "Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais!" (fig. 26). The identification of Frenchmen and others in Europe was specifically made with a *city!* (fig. 27). Moreover, it was a reciprocal city identification. Colombani indicated that the declaration, "We all are New Yorkers," was prompted by recollection of John F. Kennedy's having declared himself, in 1963 in Berlin, "Berlinois" (COLOMBANI,

2001). President Kennedy (or his speechwriter) had been mindful of an even older precedent. Speaking before Berlin's City Hall on June 26 of that year he had said: "Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was 'Civis Romanus sum.' Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is "Ich bin ein Berliner'" (SORENSEN, 1965, p. 677).

These interacting urban symbols provided stability – and also

Fig. 28: London – 7 September, 1940: the beginning of the London Blitz.

Fig. 29: London – 29 December, 1940: St. Paul's Cathedral emerges from the flames during one of the most devastating raids.

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produced transtlantic unity. Even as the "icons" of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers collapsed in fire and smoke and part of the Pentagon was blown away, "another older, American icon," noted the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, "was not submerged." Speaking in London from St. Paul's Cathedral, itself a survivor of terrifying bombardment from the air during the Second World War, Archbishop Carey said: "The September morning sun continued to shine on the Statue of Liberty, her torch raised like a beacon, a symbol of all that is best in America" (BARRY, 2001) (figs. 28, 29 and 30).

President George W. Bush, in his address to Congress on September 20, gratefully acknowledged "the outpouring of support" that was coming from all around the world. "America will never forget the sounds of our national anthem played at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate" (figs. 31, 32 and 33). Nationals of some 80 other countries had been killed, including "hundreds of British citizens," he said in a gesture to Prime Minister Blair who was in the balcony: "America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again we are joined together in a great cause. I'm so honored the British prime minister has crossed the ocean to show his unity with America. Thank you for coming, friend." President Bush welcomed as well the presence of "two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani." He went on to affirm, putting the capacity of the federal government behind the country's pre-eminent municipality: "As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress and these two leaders to show the world that we will rebuild New York City" (BUSH, 2001).

Not only did iconography have to be reconstructed. Circulation, which had been brought almost to a stop by the trauma of September 11, had to be restored. The impact on commercial airlines was devastating. British Airways, Europe's largest

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Figs. 31, 32 and 33: September 11 memorial services near Big Ben, London, Notre Dame, Paris and the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin (with a sign "Wir trauen – our deepest sympathy"). *(Source: Europe: Magazine of the European Union, October 2001).*

Fig. 30: New York – 11 September, 2001.

Fig. 34: European inland waterway network starting at Rotterdam.

carrier, announced almost at once that it would lay off one-eighth of its work force, drop 10 percent of its flights, and mothball 20 planes. Following September 11, the price of its

Fig. 35: Rotterdam, The Netherlands – The huge Regina Maersk" (longer than the Eiffel Tower is high), which will carry container goods between Western Europe and Southeast Asia.

shares declined 42 percent. Other European, and also American, airlines suffered the same or worse setbacks, with most of the smaller ones being left on the brink of actual bankruptcy (COWELL, 2001). Transatlantic and global shipping also suffered a major blow, not only because of the general reduction in business activity resulting from the crisis but also because of the sharply heightened concerns about port security and the sufficiency of inspection procedures.

The containerization of international shipping – now the method by which roughly 90 percent of the world's cargo is transported – implied an enormous new task of surveillance. "The reality is that the system is vulnerable," frankly acknowledged US Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner. "If an international terrorist organization uses a container to wreak havoc by concealing and detonating a weapon of mass destruction, the system of international trade is going to come to a halt" (ALDEN, 2002) (figs. 34 and 35).

Circulation, like iconography, no longer could be taken for granted. Confidence needed to be rebuilt, and quickly. Within the transportation sector itself, urgent measures were taken,

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
Fig. 36: Map of the evolving Atlantic Rim.

Fig. 37: Map showing North America and Europe interconnected by all sorts of lines (shipping, air, communications links). It shows how relatively "dense" this modern web of interconnection is. It is, in a sense, Gottmann's "circulation," updated, on the transatlantic level.

Fig. 38: A "narrow" Atlantic Ocean lying between North America and Europe. *(Source: NATO Review, Spring/Summer 2000).*

using new technological means as well as added personnel, so as to tighten inspection systems. Most innovatively – and most indicative of an underlying "community" relationship – agreements were made to begin to "push the border" back for inspection of goods. Under such agreements US agents could inspect shipments in European and other ports even before they left the dock. This opportunity and privilege would be reciprocated. "Point-of-origin" inspections, with the cooperation of the private companies involved, might even be carried out at the factory level. Furthermore, the tracking of shipments by satellite, using transponders, would be instituted on a wider scale. The result would be a "fast and slow lanes" pattern for cargo shipment, with the speed determined by the security rating given (LOHR, 2002).

The transatlantic shipping and air cargo realm, though no longer the biggest trading orbit in the world today (owing to the rise of Asian production), would become a major beneficiary of these developments. The largest and most efficient of America's and Europe's ports and airports, rather than smaller ones that might lose business as the new security and clearance standards spread, are likely to be commercial winners. By stages that are hard to predict, the Atlantic trading orbit may take a new shape in the future, just as infrastructure and iconography change (figs. 36 and 37).

No amount of iconographic interrelation or circulatory connection can overcome the physical Atlantic itself, its actual geography (figs. 38 and 39). This is a classical subject, partly of Platonic origin (RAMAGE, 1978; CUNLIFFE, 2001, pp. 1-18), which Jean Gottmann knew and loved. The still somewhat mythic Atlantic distance, which is legendary and historical as well as oceanic, can, however, be bridged. As I have emphasized, the organizational structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and, in an ever-closer approximation, the U.S.-EU relationship, too, do provide important frameworks for cooperation at the international level. At the subnational level as well, as has been shown, very significant links have been formed. As the impact of September 11 makes even clearer today, city-to-city rela-

Fig. 39: Germany, with some of its architectural "icons," looking out across a foreshortened Atlantic, designed by *INSIGHT*/Peter Yuill following Saul Steinberg. *(Source: Lufthansa).*

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tionships can become city-to-country relationships, and even city-to-continent relationships.

As a coda, a brief "Atlantic" community story, merging iconography and circulation, may be told. On February 13, 2002, former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, having finally won the hearts of much of Europe and even the world, was made "Sir Rudy" by Queen Elizabeth II in London. "Fighting Terror, Global Honor," as the press saw it *(Boston Globe,* 2002). He was flown over to Buckingham Palace to receive his honorary knighthood on a supersonic British Airways jet, the British- and French-designed Concorde (figs. 40 and 41). "One of the many dreams that I have had, this is one I have always dreamed, of flying on the Concorde," he said. With him were two others who represented, to many, the new human "twin pillars" of New York: the retired police and fire commissioners of New York City, both named Commanders of the British Empire. One of Giuliani's further purposes in London, and subsequently in the Netherlands and Germany, was to raise money for the Twin Towers Fund for the benefit of families of the rescue workers who were killed on September 11. "In human life, having friends means a great deal; it gets you through the tragedies of life," he said. "The same is true of nations" (HERSZENHORN, 2002).

Fig. 40: The Concorde in flight in its prime.

Fig. 41: London – The last Concorde owned by British Airways is raised from a barge to be displayed outside the Houses of Parliament, as it travels to Scotland, 13 April, 2004.

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The relevance of Jean Gottmann in today's world

"The question is if there can be a European iconography strong enough to overcome the influence of national iconographies in times of crisis and economic difficulty. Will the French or the Germans accept to sacrifice essential national or other interests for the European idea when no major outside threat is present? Or, for the sake of European unity, should a threat be invented?"

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Introduction

Jean Gottmann is known for his work on cities and especially for his contribution in understanding the urbanized zone from Boston to Philadelphia to which he gave the name "Megalopolis." His other contributions are less known, although lately more and more social scientists are showing interest in them.

In this article the main ideas of Jean Gottmann about the structure, the organization and the dynamics of geographical space are outlined, as well as their relevance to today's problems and issues such as globalization, terrorism or European integration.

During the late 1940s and the early 1950s Jean Gottmann tried, as a geographer, to address the major problems of geographical theory. That was a critical period for Geography. The classical paradigm of the French "regional" school – of which he was one of the major representatives of his generation – was having more and more difficulty in interpreting the new world: a world which had resulted from two world wars, rapid urbanization and the new threats to natural equilibria created by the advances of science and technology (nuclear power, automobile pollution, etc.).

The only existing alternative to the French school, the German *Geopolitik*, had proven extremely dangerous before and during the Second World War. With the German defeat, it disappeared. Thus, geographical theory was in a vacuum. The need to renew Geography led ultimately to the quantitative revolution of the 1950s and of the 1960s which, instead of solving the problem of theory, resulted in many countries in the loss of a valuable geographical tradition and in general to the decline of Geography.

The effort of Jean Gottmann to renew Geography without cutting it from its traditions can be fully appreciated in retrospect. Had it succeeded, it would have contributed to saving and reinforcing the status of Geography as a social science. However Jean Gottmann's concepts were too advanced and too sophisticated for a world whose ideas were organized around the clash of two economist ideologies: Communism and Liberalism.

Geographical space and its partitioning

The basic element of Jean Gottmann's theoretical framework is the concept of the partitioning of geographical space. Geographical space is the space occupied by Mankind: the Ecumene of the Ancients. It is limited, since it cannot go beyond the technological capacities of Man; however, as those capacities develop, geographical space is constantly extending its limits. The concept of geographical space is close to that of political space: both are extremely complex and synthetic. All aspects of human life are integrated in them: physical and cultural, economic and social, military and diplomatic.

Geographical space is subdivided into territories occupied, organized and dominated by different groups which form simple or more elaborate political societies. The partitioning of geographical space is a fundamental reality of our world. One of the major symbolic representations of Humanity is the political map of the world: an image of fragmentation.

Partitioning is a highly geographical concept. It is also a fundamental political concept, even though Political Science has not yet adopted it to a sufficient degree. The form of partitioning defines the limits of the various polities. Changing it brings about results of enormous political consequences:

Fig. 1: The partitioning of European space – The density of borders created in Europe during modern times is an expression of territorial instability. It increases from West to East. (*Source:* Prevelakis, 1994).

majorities become minorities and vice-versa, the regional balance of power is altered, etc. For this reason so much blood has been shed for territorial disputes (fig. 1).

The recent wars in the Balkans have shown once again the importance of partitioning. The unified Yugoslav space has been subdivided into Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Serbs became a minority in Croatia and in Bosnia. They tried, in their turn, to introduce a new partitioning in order to become a majority in even smaller territories. In Croatia they failed and have been obliged to leave their lands; in Bosnia they more or less succeeded, but caused wars and suffering. Similar processes are taking place in the zone of contact between Serbs and Albanians. The Albanian population, a minority in Serbia but a majority in the Serbian province of Kosovo, decided to separate its destinies from those of Serbia. The *de facto* secession of Kosovo transformed the Serbs living there into a persecuted minority. Similar analysis can be made about Macedonia, where the Albanians form a minority. The autonomy of the Albanian-populated areas of Western Macedonia and the prospect of their inclusion into a larger Albanian-dominated territorial entity – Kosovo or Greater Albania – would automatically transform the Macedonians of those areas into minorities (fig. 2).

The partitioning of geographical space is therefore a fundamental concept and a political issue of great importance. The question Jean Gottmann asked was why Mankind needs to partition geographical space; what leads to the fragmentation of Mankind along territorial lines? This is an often-asked question since our dominant view of world affairs conveys the opposite, the unification of the Ecumene.

The potential for circulation

Geographical space was and is characterized by heterogeneity. Natural resources vary from place to place. Mountainous areas abound in products that are lacking in plains and vice-versa. Complementarity of resources can be observed at all geographical scales, from the local to the global. Human life and action reinforce natural heterogeneity. The distribution of manpower or of capital is as uneven as that of natural resources.

Spatial heterogeneity creates differences of potential that, in their turn, can generate currents. Thus, high population densities in one part of the world and the absence of manpower in another constitute a difference of human potential that ultimately will lead to migrations.

If all the differences of potential existing around the earth were added, the outcome would be an enormous capital of economic opportunity. This opportunity cannot however bring economic results as long as there are obstacles, natural or man-made, to movement. The metaphor of communicating vessels is eloquent: the difference of level of water is not sufficient to bring about the flow of water. It is also necessary to establish a connection. Only then will the levels become equal as a result of the movement of water from one vessel to the other.

Humanity has been creating connections between places with differences of potential since times immemorial. From the first boats serving the commerce between different shores to the Internet, Mankind has been struggling against the "friction of space" in order to enlarge the realm of move-

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
Fig. 2: The importance of territory – The lack of coincidence between political and ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious territories as a cause of conflict in former Yugoslavia. (*Source:* Prevelakis, 1994).

ment. The more there is movement, the more economic and cultural benefits are reaped, even though certain individuals and groups may suffer. The positive global outcome from the expansion of movement and exchange creates an enormous force pushing towards the unification of the world. Jean

Gottmann called this force **Circulation**.

This force is contradictory to the partitioning of geographical space – at least at a first level. Its triumph is associated with the abolition of every form of technical or political obstacle to movement: borders should disappear and the Ecumene

Fig. 3: Circulation in the Balkans – The arrows indicate the annual migrations of semi-nomadic (transhumant) shepherds. (*Source:* Prevelakis, 1994).

should become a unified economic field (fig. 3). The generalization of circulation, if realized some day, will lead to the gradual abolition of the heterogeneity – as in the metaphor of the communicating vessels. Mankind would live in a uniform geographical space – at least in respect to economic and social conditions. Such a uniformization would abolish what Jean Gottmann called "geographical injustice" and, with it, most of the causes of conflict and war. History would thus "come to an end" and Geography (as the study of the diversity of the face of the Earth) almost disappear.

The dream of unification of Humanity is not new. At certain times in history, parts of mankind came quite close to it. The Roman Empire unified most of the known world of the ancients. Much later, the British Empire also unified a large part of the earth, but for a much shorter period. However, partitioning was never absent, manifesting itself at different scales. Even more important, the Roman Empire collapsed before managing to extend its territory to the whole of the Ecumene. Partitioning ultimately claimed its rights and the long period of Roman unification gave its place to the era of extreme feudal fragmentation in Europe.

The invention of iconography

Since the advantages of circulation are obvious, how can we explain its failure to unify the world? Jean Gottmann answered this question by introducing a second factor; by imagining the dialogue of two terms, the combination of which leads to an

infinity of possible outcomes, some of which are represented by the political map of the world at different historical moments. This second element he called **Iconography**. Circulation and Iconography are therefore the two poles around which Geopolitics oscillate. When Circulation triumphs, geographical space becomes unified; on the contrary, the strengthening of Iconography leads to additional or reinforced partitioning.

Iconography is described by Jean Gottmann as the "glue" which binds individuals together in order to form political societies. It also relates them to a portion of space. This triangular relationship leads to the emergence of territory, since space becomes thus inhabited thanks to the iconographic "glue." In its turn, territory reinforces the links between the individual members of the political society and becomes part of their iconography.

Iconographies are not made up only of territorial representations, even if most of their elements have a relationship with territoriality, real, imagined or dreamed. Religion, language, history, taboos, all these elements are integrated and mobilized in the constitution of an iconography. Iconographies are made up of cultural elements – or, in the terms of Samuel Huntington – of *civilizational* elements. However, the use of those quite vague terms (culture, civilization) for lack of better ones should not lead to an image of iconographies made up of things immaterial. The elements of iconographies can be very material indeed: the landscapes of our homelands (with their seasonal perfumes) or our religious rit-

Fig. 4: Soviet iconography in Sebastopol – A combination of communist and neoclassical symbols in a city of great symbolic value for Tsarist Russia. (*Source:* Photograph by the author).

uals (with the tastes of the prescribed foods) are parts of our iconographies. Such iconographic elements are very resistant because they are deeply rooted, far beyond our conscious mind. Through the concept of Iconography, Gottmann introduced the anthropological dimension in the debate about identity.

Iconographies can manifest themselves at different scales. Local iconographies can co-exist or be in contradiction with imperial iconographies creating thus an extraordinary interplay of scales. Conflicts or alliances of iconographies rhythm the history of large areas, as shown by the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire. During the last centuries however, this complicated game has been exceptionally simplified in Europe – and then in the rest of the world – by the domination of iconographies functioning at the national scale. Thus, today's world is characterized by national iconographies subdividing geographical space into national territories. This makes the task of political cartography much easier than at the time of the Holy German Empire.

Iconographies explain thus the failure of circulation to unify the world. Geopolitical systems are founded on iconographies, without which they would crumble under the pressure of forces of circulation. The Soviet Union offered recently a perfect illustration of the dangers related to a weakening iconography. The Soviet Union was much less built on the

communist ideology than on the Soviet iconography, whose father was Joseph Stalin. The communist regime created by Lenin was extremely vulnerable and would not have resisted the German attack without Stalin's iconographic manipulation. He did not hesitate to rehabilitate the symbols of Tsarist Russia and to combine them with elements of the communist ideology that he reinterpreted. Eisenstein, the filmmaker, created through his cinema some of the new icons by combining the symbols of eternal Russia with references from the present. Constructivism, the artistic expression of the communist ideology of the 1920s, gave its place to socialist realism. Finally, the Communist Party took the place of the Church in the same way that Communist Orthodoxy replaced Christian Orthodoxy. The Soviet iconography explains to a large extent the success of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht as well as the transformation of the Soviet Union into the second super power of the post-World War II era.

However, during the decades of the Cold War, the heritage of Stalin weakened, and, together with it, the Soviet iconography. Its erosion can be explained by various reasons, one of which was the activity of Radio Free Europe. The circulation of jazz music across the Iron Curtain probably did as much for the collapse of the Soviet Union as the nuclear threat of the USA (fig. 4).

The end of the Soviet Union is equivalent to the disappear-

Fig. 5: Greek-American iconography in Boston – Resisting destabilization of a diaspora community after the end of the Cold War. (*Source: Photograph by the author*).

ance of the Soviet iconography. The fragmentation of the Soviet space was the result of the recomposition of the existing iconographic material, its redistribution in new forms. Russia reappeared together with the return of Russian iconography while the renewed Ukrainian or Georgian iconographies led to Ukrainian and Georgian independence.

Iconographies are therefore essential for the stability of a State. They explain why people are ready to sacrifice their lives defending its territorial "integrity." However, even if we accept their usefulness – together with their virulence, since they also serve to wage war – their *raison d'être* is still unclear. Why does Mankind need States, Territories and Iconographies? Why can't it form one human family, occupying a unified Ecumene animated by unhindered circulation? Why can't the anarchist's dream become reality?

Iconography, a self-defence mechanism

To answer this question Jean Gottmann argues that iconographies constitute societies' defensive mechanisms. What do societies have to defend themselves against?

Circulation is certainly essential to human life. We can understand its importance when we are deprived of the liberty to circulate. Short of capital punishment, the worst penalty is life imprisonment. However, circulation has to be regulated, otherwise it can bring about very negative results. Circulation is the geographical expression of the wider concept of change. Circulation is change in space. In its turn, it

produces all kinds of transformations. Commerce changes the terms of competition where new and inexpensive products are introduced and can thus ruin traditional economy, as happened in India during the 19th century with the introduction of British textiles. New ideas penetrate societies through circulation and produce radical changes in the behavior of populations. Change is, for conservative minds, equivalent to corruption. Plato's utopia was a society without change. One of the ways devised by the great philosopher to attain this ideal was to minimize circulation. His utopian city was to be built on an island.

Isolation as a means of preserving a society from change has been adopted by many regimes, from Japan of the Tokugawa (mid 17th-19th centuries) to Albania of Enver Hoxha or to Stalin's Iron Curtain. However, the abolition of circulation weakens the defences of society by rigidifying its iconography. It can lead to its collapse when finally circulation manages to make its way through the fissures of its walls (fig. 5).

Circulation is thus a factor of change which, if left unhindered, can destabilize societies in the same way that too rapid change can lead individuals to the loss of their psychological balance. Like persons, societies do not all have the same capacity to adapt to change. Some are more threatened by change than others. However, no society can adapt to an unlimited amount of circulation in the same way that no person is capable of constant reinvention of his or her lifestyle. Even the open societies of Western Europe of today suffer from the stresses of immigration and tend to restrict circulation of people as the rise of extremist ideologies shows.

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Circulation is therefore regulated by Iconography. The spatial result of their interplay is the partitioning of the world. For this reason partitioning is dynamic. Borders do change, in spite of efforts to limit those changes to a minimum, to preserve the *status quo*. Even when their geometry remains immobile, they can become more or less open, expressing thus more subtle, but still very important, transformations in the partitioning of geographical space. In the European Union, state borders remained unchanged during the Cold War; however their function changed enormously during that period. European integration, by promoting the free circulation of goods, people and ideas, has altered the partitioning of the continent without shifting its borderlines. The end of the Cold War also more or less respected the geometry of European borders. However, the disappearance of the Iron Curtain completely changed the function of those that were part of it. Again, the respect of the principle of the intangibility of borders did not limit the dynamic character of the partitioning of geographical space.

These two sets of forces, Circulation and Iconography, do not always function in the direction of either unifying or partitioning space. There are cases when Circulation can be captured by iconography and serve its purposes; and vice-versa. Scale is an important aspect of the dialectics of partitioning.

Thus, European integration has promoted circulation and has thus contributed in de-partitioning a large part of European space. Borders between France, Belgium or Germany became practically invisible. The unification of European space by circulation has been possible because of a certain idea of Europe, because of a European iconography, however weak it may still be. The more circulation develops inside Europe, the stronger the European iconography will become. Various programs of the European Commission (such as Erasmus) promoted the movement of students in order to bring about a feeling of common identity among the future opinion makers.

The growth of a European Iconography however brings about another type of partitioning, the one between the European Union and the rest of the world. The case of Great Britain shows the dilemmas of repartitioning. Will British students prefer to go to other European universities for postgraduate studies rather than to American universities? This would be one of the tests concerning the iconographic limits of Europe. We see thus that Iconography does not always limit circulation, but rather redistributes and regulates it.

One could multiply the examples in arguing that the Gottmannian dialectics of Circulation and Iconography are able to interpret efficiently the geopolitical evolution at different places and times. Through their prism, history is animated; the political map of the world constantly changes form, scale and function with the rise and fall of Iconographies and with the ebb and flow of Circulation.

Jean Gottmann's ideas in the post-Cold War period

This extraordinary intellectual instrument devised by Jean Gottmann in the late 1940s and in the early 1950s remained unexploited during the Cold War. It is true that this was an exceptional period of stability, at least in the Western world. Changes of borders outside Europe and America continued to take place, however the traditional eurocentrism of the social sciences limited the perception of these events (with the exception of Israeli geography, for obvious reasons). Thus, the ideas of Jean Gottmann attracted little interest. Their author, discouraged, did not fully develop them in a theoretical book – the closest to a theoretical presentation is his

Significance of Territory – as he doubted if he would find a public or even a publisher. Jean Gottmann's ideas are dispersed in articles and in regional analyses. Our task today is to assemble them into a coherent *corpus*.

With the end of the Cold War, the predominant paradigms collapsed. Economism, either left wing (Marxism) or right wing (Liberalism), was proven unable to explain the passions leading to conflicts and wars, from the Balkans to Afghanistan and even further. The social sciences have failed in predicting the new threats to stability and in preparing States and Governments to cope with them, as the events of 11 September 2001 have shown. The replacement of old paradigms by new ones became an urgent necessity. Certain prominent intellectuals have tried to respond to this need. Samuel Huntington is the most well-known among them.

Samuel Huntington's ideas about the "clash of civilizations" seem to correspond most to the new intellectual and geopolitical environment. They have the great advantage of bringing the cultural factor back to our attention. However, the fundamental hypothesis of Huntington is an over-simplification of a much more complex reality. It has the advantage that it has permitted Huntington's ideas to reach a very wide audience and to contribute to the relativization of Economism. However, over-simplification can constitute a danger. The most obvious risk of Huntington's hypothesis is that it may lead to the consideration that populations' geopolitical behaviors are predetermined by cultural factors that can neither change nor be interpreted in various manners. Thus, after having abandoned the Marxist deterministic historic view, a new kind of historical determinism threatens to appear through the vulgarizations of Huntington's hypothesis.

Jean Gottmann's ideas can offer a much more balanced solution to the need of a new paradigm. His concept of Iconography reintroduces the role of culture in politics. However, there is nothing static about Iconographies. They constitute elements of conservatism and inertia. However they change constantly through the redefinition of their elements in their effort to adapt to the changing challenges of circulation.

The role of circulation is as essential as iconography. The material world of the economy, of technology and of migrations cannot be ignored. Focusing only on culture or civilization can lead to a vision as mistaken as that of the Cold War Economisms.

A short presentation of the applicability of Jean Gottmann's ideas to the major issues of today's world will show the efficiency and the relevance of his theoretical framework.

Globalization as Circulation generalized

Globalization has occupied a large part of the debate during the last decade. Some have argued that it corresponds to a new phenomenon, others that there have been precedents. Together with the theories of Globalization, the argument that Humanity has been unified in a Global Village has been advanced. The End of History and the End of Geography have been announced in the same outlook.

In Gottmann's terms, Globalization corresponds to a dramatic advance of Circulation, due to a series of technological, economic and political evolutions. It is not original in essence. However the extent to which circulation has become a generalized phenomenon is new.

Will the opening of the world bring about progress and happiness to Mankind, as some argue, or is it a threat as the anti-globalization movement tries to persuade international public opinion? If we follow Gottmann's ideas, we will arrive at an in-

termediary position. Globalization has positive effects of various kinds; it is certainly a factor limiting "geographical injustice" even if, at the same time, it reinforces social inequalities at various scales. However, whatever the merits and the disadvantages of globalization, one thing is clear. As a generalization of circulation, globalization is a factor of destabilization. Our world has certainly become more interesting during recent decades, but at the same time it is a more dangerous and unpredictable world.

The new instability is multi-faced. The creation of one world market has thus introduced new financial threats. A global economic crisis with unprecedented destructive results is looming like a sword of Damocles over the national and the global economies.

However, the most spectacular form of destabilization related to globalization has been the events of 11 September, 2001. The USA, by dominating the world, has also unified it militarily and politically. Unification leads also to polarization. The relationship of Center and Periphery that has been created leads naturally to the interiorization of peripheral conflicts in the Center. No wonder therefore that violence has shifted, that the symbols of the Core have been attacked. The events of September 2001 have been the price of globalization, a price paid by the major power promoting globalization in its very flesh.

The major force of terrorism resides in the resentment created in peripheral populations as a reaction to a dominant and unifying cultural model. Again we encounter the destabilizing role of circulation. The global cultural model, diffused all around the world, is threatening the values of traditional societies. In order to preserve their social order, they have to promote strong and aggressive iconographies that will struggle against the free circulation of ideas and its promoters. Thus, the cultural and political foundations for terrorism (and for other forms of conflict) are laid.

At the same time, globalization offers enormous new possibilities to terrorism and limits the means of States to defend their territories. Free circulation of people all around the world helps terrorists in their movements and offers them the possibility to extend their networks everywhere. Freedom of the movement of capital solves problems of terrorist logistics that would be much more complicated in economies under the control of States. Finally, the volume of information circulating around the world facilitates the organization and the functioning of global terrorist networks that can hide their communications behind a cloud of "noise" of unthinkable dimensions.

After a period of rapid globalization, the destabilizing effects of circulation start to become obvious. Resistance to circulation is growing first of all in those who lose because of it. As the global destabilizing effects are becoming felt and threaten even the "winners" of the game, more and more voices argue in favor of limiting circulation and demand to moderate globalization.

Thus, we should not be surprised if Mankind, after its great advances in developing circulation during the past decades, has now started to build obstacles to movement, to develop iconographic defences against destabilization. Contrary to the idea that globalization will go on indefinitely, Gottmann's ideas lead to the prediction that we will soon enter into a new period characterized by protectionism, xenophobia and the constitution of regional blocs, probably antagonistic economically and politically. A new political map of the world is in the making. Its form may surprise us.

Europe is one of the major issues of the redesign of the world map. The challenges of European integration are also clarified by the use of Gottmann's concepts.

The European question, an iconographic dilemma

During the Cold War, European integration was the result of a rather vague European iconography and of the fear of Communism. Europe has been constructed as part of a larger anti-Communist geopolitical structure, dominated by the USA. The Cold War European iconography included large parts of a liberal Western ideology that Europe shared with North America. The end of the Cold War challenged this outlook since the Communist threat disappeared. Europe inherited its unity from the Cold War, but, at the same time, lost part of *its raison d'être*. Why should Europe remain united?

Unable to answer this question in a convincing way, the leaders of Europe engaged their countries in pursuit of deepening and widening the European realm as if those policies were self-evident. The metaphor of the bicycle has been used as an explanation: a European integration that stopped moving would fall. However, the major geopolitical problems of European integration could not be addressed in this way. The question is if there can be a European iconography strong enough to overcome the influence of national iconographies in times of crisis and economic difficulty. Will the French or the Germans accept to sacrifice essential national or other interests for the European idea when no major outside threat is present? Or, for the sake of European unity, should a threat be invented? Until now, the peoples of Europe have not been confronted with those dilemmas. Before 1989, the communist threat functioned as efficient glue; after the end of the Cold War the euphoria of the victory created an atmosphere of optimism. However, sooner or later, the moment of truth will come and at that moment Europe will need a strong iconography in order to resist forces of disintegration. The arrival of an era of global regression in respect of globalization will soon create important tensions inside and outside Europe and will render the question of European iconography more and more urgent.

This question is related to a series of issues, economic, cultural, historical and political. The process of enlargement is of critical importance. Including new countries will introduce more cultural heterogeneity to Europe. Some analysts consider this as a major danger, as a threat to dilute and therefore weaken whatever exists of a European iconography. On the other hand, without enlargement, what would be the core of the European iconography? The personality of Europe would appear as that of a prosperous private club of dominant nations, ignoring the difficulties of the others. If the basis of European iconography is to be arrogance and egoism, then why not return to nationalism? National iconographies are much more efficient in expressing isolation and xenophobia. To be successful, the European iconography has to be open to the others and with a positive outlook towards circulation.

The issue of iconography is therefore the most critical European question of the coming years. For this reason, the debate around the European identity is starting to develop in many institutions, although still not enough. There are no easy answers to this question since European history is characterized by a very strong heritage of national iconographies, which are the least malleable of all. In order to advance in this debate, a solid theoretical framework is necessary. Jean Gottmann's ideas on the dynamics of iconographies and on the dialectics of geographical space offer a convincing basis. The European question is, finally, a question of partitioning of geographical space. The Europeans are participating in the redefinition of the World Political Map of the 21st century. They need it for that geographical theory. Jean Gottmann's project of renewing it is relevant again.

Fig. 6: Population density in Europe – Mean for square kilometer. (*Source: Atlante Geografico Zanichelli*).

Fig. 7: Peoples and languages in Europe. (*Source: Atlante Geografico Zanichelli*).

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Fig. 8: Jean and Bernice Gottmann, and (left) Panayis Psomopoulos, in the Zappeion Megaron Lecture Hall, Athens, Greece, attending the meeting on "The big metropolises around the Mediterranean Sea" in November 1986 convened by the "Great World Metropolises Research Committee" of the International Geographical Union, chaired at the time by Jacqueline Beaujeu-Garnier. The meeting was organized by George Prevelakis and sponsored by the Athens Municipality.

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Gottmann and Mediterranean Iconographies

"As Gottmann points out, seeing what is happening today, reality is not all that simple. 'The old structures have been liberated from age-old threats to the promises of globalization – and this corresponds to a resurgence of nationalism, regionalism, local interests, age-old tribal instincts, parochialism. It is not the geography of matter which shapes the true compartmentalization of space. Nowadays in this field problems can be solved technologically and economically. It is in the hearts and minds that true blockages occur'."

Giuseppe Campione

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Introduction

"How can we best study the influence of religion in geography?" Pierre Deffontaines asked in 1966, adding that it is "worthy of further study for each religion, in order to establish a geographical hinterland of the influence of each religious system; this would doubtless be a useful exercise in the study of each religion. However, for a geographer, it is clear that this kind of study should begin by following the major flows of human geography and by observing the input of each different type of religion."

To be more precise, Jean Gottmann (1996) began his deliberations by observing that "the effect which each group may have does not in any way depend exclusively upon material conditions, nor does it depend upon movement or distribution mechanisms," but rather that they also depend upon prevailing emotional states, and that they are "difficult to define and to classify." He went on to say that "they are at times even difficult to follow, in that they are exceedingly volatile; nonetheless, one may grasp the most durable aspects by studying abstract principles, the deep-seated symbolism in which people have faith. This 'group iconography' includes a number of elements, ranging from flags, to the shape of bell-towers, to received social structures, and from religious beliefs to education principles. These include official vested interests such as popular ideas concerning what the group may and must do with its local habitat."

Michel Serres (1994) as well refers to transcendental universal truths and states that "less than a millennium ago, and more or less in the same venue – in the fertile crescent – arose the only two schools of thought which truly count for something; the previous one, God, and this one, geometry. Monotheism and rigorous science, these are the two universal transcendental truths."

And, continuing in his inspired vein, he wrote that "currently, at the end of the second millennium, a new universal truth is approaching, a universal truth which sums up the local sophisticated distinctions drawn by science, by laws, by politics and morality, so as to construct an entity marching towards a religious leader who has yet to be conceived of, whose reach and range unites and shall unite all others, whether together or dispersed, whether they exist collectively, objectively, subjectively, thus linking the faith of the individual ego to the infinity of the objects in the universe and the collective or universal love of mankind, i.e. the relevant reasoning of pathos, of aesthetic values, of the physical world, of technical and charitable activities ..."

It would appear that the reality of the Mediterranean condition sets aside as unimportant, indeed can even completely expunge, the hypothesis of collective and universal love; even the underlying tensions of connection which Serres seemed to

Fig. 1: The Middle East (*Source: National Geographic*, Washington, DC, 2002).

descry are wiped out and we are, instead, forced into a more dramatic reading of other issues, those of a dramatic deterioration and of a possible interaction between religion and conflict or, rather, between monotheism and conflict.

Judaism, Christianity and Islam: these are revealed religions to mankind through the word of God, which has come down to us through history and which is directed to each and every person on his or her path; each human being is treated as an intelligent individual capable of laughing and suffering, and forces each human being to face his or her choices and bear his or her responsibilities (fig. 1).

Thus, is it utterly utopian to imagine that one can still perceive the presence of a force which – notwithstanding even dramatic resistance – can move the peoples of the Mediterranean? This is a converging force which can shape and impress the historic movements of these peoples (LA PIRA, 1961).

It is as if an old prophecy of Giorgio La Pira had taken shape: once more we move from the slavery and suffering of Babylon towards the freedom and joy of Jerusalem.

The point is that, notwithstanding present events, everything might actually be possible once more, given peace, which can be obtained, notwithstanding a thousand difficulties, notwithstanding schizophrenic highs and lows.

The Mediterranean complexity

One starts from Abraham's family, in a triple line of descent: these are the people of the book which one Islamic mystic (SCHWARTLANDER and BIELEFELDT, 1993) defines as follows: Israel is the "religion of hope," Christianity is the "religion of love" and Islam is the "religion of faith." The people of the book are thus called not only because of the spoken word but also because of the written word – the Torah, the Bible and the Koran. There are indeed fundamental differences between the oral and written cultures, particularly as far as religious creeds and practices are concerned, and they depend upon the cultural systems and upon the modes of communication, as can be deduced from Goody's (1988) very abstruse and dense analyses.

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
Fig. 2: The Mediterranean region (*Source: Istituto Geografico DeAgostini*, Novara, 2000).

Goody states that where there is the written word, both the liturgy and prayer practices may change. There may well be a difference between the orthodox and reformist creeds, but "the word, as such, remains unchanged ... and where there is change, it takes, in the main, the form of a schism." However, in the case of oral religions, there may well be a process of assimilation in that the frontiers, the outer limits, allow for a "crossing of boundaries," exactly where in religions with a written creed, there may be only and exclusively conversions, even radical ones, and where overcoming the boundaries – where possible – turns out to be, in the final analysis, irreversible.

Indeed, it is the written word which is the strongest enforcer of identity and differences, above all in the Mediterranean, which is characterized by what can be called "hard-line regionalisms." Everything in the Mediterranean tends to be imbued with "exclusively local color" (fig. 2). In order to foster development and peace in this sea of compartmentalization, it is necessary to solve a "puzzle": the infinitely complex puzzle of ethnic groups and countries, of peoples and religions, with many opposing factors, both structural and symbolic, acting as dividing lines – North-South, West-East, Europe-Arab World, Christianity-Islam. These are oppositions which also entail further divergences and asymmetries. Nonetheless, various psychological universes do attract each other in an intertwining of spatial dealings, relationships and connections. At the end of the day, these are the real issues involved in the complexity of the Mediterranean so strongly felt by Braudel.

It is impossible not to dwell – in this sea of "infinite varieties," whose history is inseparable from the history of the surrounding land – on the impact that the three great monotheistic reli-

gions have had on the history, the culture and the very identity of these places.

It is also impossible not to dwell on the fact that the various subjects in the area are far from melding into one another in an integrated fashion which would appreciate the differences while promoting the affinities, overcoming mental blocks and biases, and establishing new relationships. It is indeed most difficult to try to move beyond the stereotype whereby the Mediterranean world is forever condemned to remain – and visibly so – on the periphery of life, far from the centers of world dynamism (C. MUSCARÀ, 1993), in that the Mediterranean essence, notwithstanding decades of European declarations, tends to be self-involved, locked in a process which accumulates the negative effects of life on the fringes, in the embrace of a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, afflictions and conflicts.

The geopolitical approach

Reconciling this Mediterranean backdrop teeming with ancient and modern unresolved problems would require a re-thinking of historical and political facts and their relationship with the geopolitical situation; in other words, it is imperative to deal with geopolitics in a way which does not necessarily involve tactical and strategic issues mainly linked, as has been the case in the past, to "imperialist adventures or the even more terrible events of totalitarian regimes" or, at any rate, to a new type of geography of power (CAMPIONE, 1995 and 1996a).

If it is a given that political geography, or rather geopolitics *tout court*, is a dynamic way of embracing a series of issues pertaining to political organization and the way in which it is concretely implemented, the way in which it expresses itself

regionally, its cultures in the broadest sense of the term and the divisions substantiated by said cultures, then iconography must of necessity be the object of study and analysis within the confines of a type of geopolitics which transcends mere diplomatic and military events but which, in an attempt to identify and understand phenomena, focuses attention on other factors, such as religions, in order to grasp specificities which might be contained in the almost genetic bond existing between religious features and national and nationalistic phenomena (THUAL, 1996).

Indeed, Gottmann's keywords on geographical theory are an initial approach to defining iconography – that is, a set of symbols people can believe in even – well, why not? – in an acritical way which, however, has accreted over time, in the guise of something (some force?) which might well shape how spaces are organized. Iconography is thus a discriminating, a *cloisonant* – partitioning – element precisely because it does, indeed, express quite thoroughly "the nature of social groups to find religious identities, national identities and cultural identities by constructing a defined set of creeds, of ideas and of icons on a local scale" (L. MUSCARÀ, 1995).

As Gottmann points out, seeing what is happening today, reality is not all that simple. "The old structures have been liberated from age-old threats to the promises of globalization – and this corresponds to a resurgence of nationalism, regionalism, local interests, age-old tribal instincts, parochialism. It is not the geography of matter which shapes the true compartmentalization of space. Nowadays in this field problems can be solved technologically and economically. It is in the hearts and minds that true blockages occur" (GOTTMANN, 1992). At any rate, if it is true that it is indeed these factors which are *à la fois matériels et spirituels* – both material and spiritual in nature – but particularly spiritual, indeed one could say cultural in nature and which are the prime cause of the political *cloisonnement* or partitioning of the world – then it is also true that iconography "is a way of selecting amongst a number of cultural factors those which influence the creation of *cloisonnement*, of regionalism," whilst also creating "the key to a dialogue between cultural and political geography" (SANGUIN and PREVELAKIS, 1996). It is precisely this dialogue which will ultimately shed light on kinships, deeply-rooted identities, hand-me-down ideas, myths, languages, symbols and even icons; this entails ritual behavioral patterns apparently deriving from a kind of a *opinio iuris ac necessitatis*; this is far from the realm of ideology in that these are things that speak more to the heart than to the mind (PREVELAKIS, 1995).

And so, generally speaking, iconography is essentially a barrier to change, to innovation and to movement. Indeed, it is as if in trying to read the icons made in the Byzantine figurative tradition, one were able to grasp that they are in essence inward-directed and one-dimensional; they are static in their representation and they have what could be called an objective self-identity and their structure is ahistorical – all traces of history have been removed (FARINELLI, 1994). They exist in an eternal present – the shape of which has definitively congealed (AVENICEV, 1994) – and where the past might well become a memory but where there appears to be no future of any kind.

Thus, the whole point is understanding whether, given the static nature of these entities, they may in some way shape or create change in nature, and if so, how.

There is a juxtaposition which always underlies the shaping of public authority and the political life of peoples, whilst bearing within itself the seeds of conflict. It might very well be that iconography tends to use circulation in order to establish and extend its authority and that, vice versa, circulation – of ideas, capital, traffic, technologies, goods – might show strong signs of allowing different forms of iconography to flourish where they cross the areas in question (GOTTMANN, 1966).

Indeed, "the two main factors of movement and iconography would appear to work at cross purposes: movement promotes change, given the greater spatial fluidity, while iconography promotes the conservation of the established order and the strengthening of existing division. Nonetheless, the two factors combined generate what might be called an equilibrium which promotes the working of a local-global continuum inside the total geopolitical area which is open to human activities. This equilibrium is undoubtedly an unstable equilibrium. It is fluid, local details change, but this fluidity does not halt the entire global system in its tracks" (GOTTMANN, 1996).

The Mediterranean

Thus, to come back to the Mediterranean area, which is to all intents and purposes the symbol of the considerations made above, it appears clear that this area, particularly, though not exclusively, the Arab world, bears the weight of all the tensions of the West, making it almost the "world's powder keg," precisely because it bestrides the world's fault lines. Its central position is defined in historical and geographical terms in relation to the west and is referred to an Islam which perceives a new-found cultural identity in that "wide-spread need for the meta-rational, bringing to the fore both cults and faiths." Indeed, part of this perception is of Islam "as a religion which redeems the oppressed and the wretched of the earth, bringing new tensions to bear between the northern and southern hemispheres" (CARDINI, 1994).

The arousal of a state of fear in the West is to a great degree due to the neglect, deferment and shifting of priorities. Nor has it been possible to convey the idea that such a broad range of crisis points would in the end have a negative impact on internal relations inside the European Union. To tell the truth, for the longest time it appeared that the prevailing reasoning was to promote a strategy aimed at integration. However, the philosophy of dominion of a bipolar division of the world held sway and ensured a situation whereby the entire Mediterranean area remained an external backdrop to the skirmishes and disputes for spheres of influence and use of resources. In other words, an important iconography that must be kept under control so as not to jeopardize in any way the bipolar leadership of the world by, for example, using the "oil issue," pitting producing countries against the west but also pitting Arab country against Arab country and the "confrontation" countries against the "rejection" countries (FARINELLI, 1992).

These events took place against a backdrop of boldness and caution, vigilance and denial, in a sinusoidal process. The southernmost parts of Europe shifted the center of gravity of Community policies even further south, Delors' "White Paper" (1994) was ignored and welfare policies were thrown into a state of crisis. Part of this was due to the changes under way caused by globalization and at the end of the day attention was drawn away from the area.

It appeared that Barcelona sparked a return of European interest in the area, with declarations, complete with literary references and rhetorical flourishes, that the region shares a common history, a common identity and common values. The truth is that this resurgence in interest felt by Europe was mostly spurred by a renewed awareness of (and – let's be frank – fear of) mass migratory flows from south to north.

The ultimate goal seemed to be to take steps to ensure that these flows be gradually stopped or at least contained by establishing and regulating partnerships aimed at providing new economic prospects. These objectives, however, were slightly dimmed in the final declarations by the long list of proposals. The determining factor was the demographic forecasts put forward by the United Nations at the Cairo conference and which, however approximate, are probably fairly

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close to the truth or at least as close to a vision of the truth of such complex situations as is possible. The forecasts are for enormous differences between the northern and southern rims of the Mediterranean. The southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean have a population of 321 million inhabitants as compared to 143 million along the northern rim. Forecasts for the year 2015 are for the population along the northern rim to remain stable at 143 million inhabitants but the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean will have a projected population of 489 million; by the year 2050, the population living along the northern rim will have dropped to 123 million, while the south and the east will have a population of 738 million people (UNITED NATIONS, 1994a). Clearly, the type of demographic policies debated at the Cairo conference alone will not suffice to deal with problems of this magnitude, nor will defensive or, worse yet, substantially repressive policies work (CAMPIONE, 1994 and 1995; UNITED NATIONS, 1994b).

One thing, however, remains clear, and that is that notwithstanding renewed attention to the area, no feasible and viable projects are forthcoming.

The situation is still spiraling downward, with intractable problems still persisting, iconographies increasingly frozen, ending up in large swathes of violence and conflicts. It might be useful, in an attempt to come to grips with the reasons behind this downward spiral, to re-exhume the definitions of the circular nature of the cumulative cause of underdevelopment, as analyzed by Gunnar Myrdal (1957) in the second half of the 1950s. A vicious circle, whereby "poverty becomes the cause of poverty"; the free play of market forces contains within itself the seeds of imbalance; the poorer the country, the greater the imbalance. Of course, the whole concept of cumulative circular process implies an entire series of interacting and reacting forces, so as to keep a poor country ever poorer, until the downward slide is complete.

Utilitarianism, vested interests and fear underpin geopolitics. Any and all assessments included in the strategies of the powers that be have essentially been literary in nature, assessments concerning the tribal and pre-modern nature of these countries, with an emphasis on the folkloristic nature of their mores, the entire thing wrapped up in ethnographic and anthropological terms. All of this serves to consolidate the ghettoization of iconography. Indeed, in these closed systems where there is increasing deterioration, there is an irreversible speeding up of entropy and order is continuously destroyed (VALLEGA, 1982; VON BERTALANFFY, 1968).

There are, however, others – particularly in the south, and not out of nostalgia – whose narrative regarding the Mediterranean describes a place where "the universal principles of democracy, of human rights and the rights of communities originated." For example, Paul Balta (1994) came up with the idea of a Mediterranean Charter. He said that these values, restored and updated, could form the basis and would spread to other shores (as if there could ever be a recurrence of a situation such as: *Graecia capta ferum victorem coepit*). One can perceive the glimmerings of a desire to overcome this dead end and move towards a rediscovery of relationships.

One must understand, as Claval (1996) stated, that notwithstanding "the similarities and parallels deriving from nature and history," the Mediterranean, even the northern and western parts of the Mediterranean, "is to be considered a fragmented area, though there is now greater access to Europe and to the world: the current conditions reiterate the image of a badly integrated part of the world." The question is whether there can be hope that the situation will improve soon. "It certainly can, particularly if efforts are made to restructure connections." These are what will, in the final analysis, "ensure that a deeper form of solidarity and more substantial affinities might be created." This is very much in line with the draft Charter of the

Communities of the Peoples of the Mediterranean (BALTA, 1994). The draft states that these communities intend to anchor their future to the international community and, in particular, to a system of meaningful relations with Europe. Trade (but above all history, culture and thus politics) has always occurred within the confines of the Mediterranean basin and for that reason the citizens of the Mediterranean wish to "take their destiny into their own hands" and work hard to ensure that the Mediterranean basin be recognized in national, regional and international fora as "a geographical entity and a geopolitical assemblage," even though the rim countries at the moment belong to an array of international institutions.

It is for that very reason that the document, amongst other proposals, "calls upon regional political organizations to establish a Mediterranean project. This project should promote the establishment of a Baltic-Mediterranean axis embracing Africa and the Near East, whose waterways would be the Rhône, the Danube, the Black Sea, the Euphrates, the Nile and the Suez Canal; endeavour to consolidate the Latin arc of countries, establishing a pole of development extending to the Maghreb countries and establishing another pole to the east, covering an arc ranging from Egypt to Turkey and from Greece to the countries of the former Yugoslavia; provide support for all bodies involved in co-operating and networking, including Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and particularly those working in the field of culture, environmental issues and the economy, in order to ensure that the Mediterranean become, once more, an area where there may be the free circulation of peoples, of cultures and of goods forevermore; contribute towards the co-development of the northern and southern rims of the Mediterranean in a spirit of partnership in order to achieve, at a later stage, co-prosperity."

In essence, this would constitute an attempt to turn around the current situation, whereby the Mediterranean reflects the conflicts (Kliot) of the countries along its rim. Up until now, the networks reflect above all the immense diaspora which has "brutally transformed the daily life of millions of citizens of the basin ... and which, used correctly, could play a very important socio-economic role, providing ethnic bridges proving to be both solid and flexible" (BALTA, 1992).

Should we entrust this new beginning predicated upon values to the peoples of the book? It has been said that they are the people to whom the book was revealed and who might well become once more a source of salvation and liberation even though many facilely assume that it is the religious element which is the source of the tensions and malaise that have accumulated in the region over the years. They forget, however, that even the west has malaise and tensions on its conscience and that, after decolonization, the tensions have increased over time, the epiphenomena of globalization, of monetarist theology and of the harsh processes of capitalist restructuring, as Hobsbawm or Dahrendorf would say. These processes of the west have sparked Darwinian selection and marginalization and are responsible for the shocking increase in poverty and the huge gap between rich countries and poor countries. Indeed, even in countries with an advanced economy where the marketplace is the sole regulator, the marketplace has caused or at least highlighted social traumas and enormous imbalances.

Why then not simply state that marginalization, poverty, degradation and underdevelopment are the causes of the hardening of age-old enclaves and the proliferation of new ones?

Taking a moralistic stance is neither helpful nor useful in sorting out such an unwieldy situation and coming to grips with revolutionary events such as the rise of terrorism. Nor will prejudice and over-simplification help. Indeed, it would be most useful to understand the underlying concepts and the yard-

sticks used in passing judgment on the basis of a moralistic assessment.

One must also stress that in the west, public opinion is basically uninterested in fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is something bloody and separate from us, we deny it by demonizing it and consider it something almost exotic, medieval and, in general, something that belongs to the Islamic countries. Fundamentalism is a demon from another world. And yet it isn't. Fundamentalism as a phenomenon, with its ferociousness and use of modern technology (consider, for example, the horrifying attacks on New York), with its harsh relegation of women to suffocatingly traditional pre-modern roles, is something which arises from the crises of the modern-day world, something which arises from our time.

The overarching ideologies and the ambitious agendas of social transformation have collapsed, bringing widespread economic security and a deep-seated crisis of stable moral values in their wake; fundamentalism provides a refuge, provides a sense of identity, strength and certainties which are irresistible lures for millions of people.

This happens in the Christian world as well as the world of Islam, in the Jewish world as well as among the Hindus. Not all phenomena are equally widespread, but they all have the same root cause: hatred arising from deep-seated fear (DONI, 1995; POLITI, 1996). As often happens, pitting one type of fanaticism against the other creates monstrosities much greater and more dangerous than the original monsters which aroused such great fears. It would be worthwhile to meditate on the fact that it is precisely the unresolved problems of the Muslim world (FULLER and LESSER, 1996) or rather, more generally, the unresolved problems of the Third World, which feed tensions and ignite a continuous escalation of violence. Harshness or, worse yet, repression in no way resolves the issue; indeed, it simply plunges that world into a tempestuous vortex of endless tensions.

Against this backdrop of what might be termed an international division of labor, rather than compartmentalization, there are enormous benefits deriving from circulation, which causes and indeed strengthens and uses the unleashed energy released by the downward spiral of dead-end situations and whose *raisons d'être*, to quote Gottmann, can be found in the complex motivations of iconography. What can one say about these Mediterranean tragedies, with the attendant halfhearted attempts at mediation, the wait-and-see, non-interventionist attitudes, the resigned impotence of the international community in the face of massacres, genocide, ethnic cleansing in the daily headlines? One merely becomes used to it, it becomes part of daily life and in the end one loses even the comfort of indignation, ever more thinly veiled by the useless cant of declarations.

Our understanding is shallow (is this an alibi?), and the west harbors fear and dread. This leads to a sterile casting of blame elsewhere, as if in an attempt to exorcise a very faintly perceived sense of guilt.

It is legitimate to wonder to what extent religion – specifically monotheism – is the source of these very complex situations. Is it not possible that religion might well act as a detonator of an already explosive situation, brimming with ideals and above all imbued with fiercely-held motives against a complex iconographic background?

The answer might lie in a key point which could well spark off a virtuous cycle which might dampen passions underlying the explosions, as Bonanate (1994) observes – despotism or rather illiberalism, closed-mindedness and rejection of liberating relationships, ancient blood-feuds over land – and thus restrict the opportunities for conflict.

Or is it at the end of the day easier to embark upon the path of kangaroo courts and shop-worn clichés?

Since we are on the subject of the fears the west harbors, particularly with regard to Islam, how then can we defend this hostility towards a religion espoused by over a billion people, which is present throughout the entire area of Christianity, which is 14 centuries old and whose contributions to civilization are beyond dispute; how can we accept that we dismiss this religion out of hand as inferior while knowing so little about it?

Conversely, a more mature attitude would allow us to grasp the fact that we are, de facto, living through "the most cruel war of religion"; even though it is an undeclared war, as Roger Garaudy (1995) says, it "colors social relations and international relations. We practice a form of market monotheism with, however, a cult of adoration of many idols: money, power, nationalism and various forms of fundamentalism. The most pressing task now in order to come to grips with this monotheism is to call upon the good offices of those for whom life has a special meaning and who are capable of finding it and putting it into practice ..."

Pierre Claverie, the bishop of Oran (1995), who witnessed the bloody protests coalescing around the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), said that he was convinced that the fear of Islam arises from disinformation, as is always the case with religions other than one's own, and added that fundamentalism is like "a fever spreading when the political structures are weak or are crumbling and governments no longer represent the people ... but Algerian society is healthy, strong, civil and wise. It has shown itself capable of co-existing with death, while emerging alive from the fire. What we need now is to re-establish democratic rules to shut the fundamentalists down – nobody wants it."

How to recover from these fevers? The three Mediterranean religions must carry on a dialogue, "starting from real problems – what respect for human life means, what respect for the dignity of man means, what justice means ... These are the issues which unite us," and so by sharing joys and pains, problems and worries, Christians and others work together in the hopes of growing together, learning more about each other's religious heritage, in a spirit of reciprocal respect for each other's values, religious traditions and spiritual richness.

And yet, the Bishop of Oran died while bearing witness to the fact that "Thou shalt not kill in the name of God," (CAMPIONE, 1996b).

Jews invoke a culture of dialogue as well: for example, Borowitz (1990) refers to the enslavement and the exodus, to the centuries of persecution and degradation, to the emancipation from the ghetto and, lastly, to the Holocaust. He uses this often tragic history to teach a lesson in ethics which "must be part of our Jewishness." Jewishness is the deep-seated and absolute respect for the value of universal human rights which must be "extended to every living creature."

Nonetheless, as the Dutch theologian Walf (1990) insists, if the values of experience are to apply with any degree of probity, then in that same spirit of probity, one must also acknowledge those "lacks which the Judeo-Christian tradition acknowledges and maintains with regard to human rights" (fig. 3). He goes on to say that this heritage can and must be overcome within the very heart of institutionalized religions. Often, in a more or less open fashion, institutionalized religions have tried to envelop power in a holy shroud, as Garaudy feels from the Islamic point of view. Whereas in truth it is power which has, at the end of the day, used religion; the upshot is an exploitation of divine law (the shari'a) for its own needs, thus creating a tradition (Sunna) which at times is in radical opposition to revealed truth – indeed, the worse violations of human rights are in line with this philosophy.

Well then, continues Garaudy, and here he still is referring to Islam, the very heart of this reasoning could well refer to other religions. The point is that it is high time to end a literal inter-

Fig. 3: Israel and the representation of peace. (*Source:* F. Encel, *Géopolitique de Jérusalem,* Paris, Flammarion, 1998).

lence[2] as well was useful in order to come to a full understanding of the fact that monotheism does not necessarily mean the rise of pride, arrogance and religious fundamentalism or wilfulness and power and the desire to prevail at all costs.

Let us look to the Koran: Faith requires no force, the straight and narrow path of righteousness is easy to see, those who turn away from Tàgut (i.e. idols) and believe in God have an unbreakable grip on righteousness; God listens to them and knows who they are (Koran II, 256). Thus "Muslims and Christians stand face to face, as human beings in a society becoming ever more varied and in a world which is becoming ever smaller, until they actually touch" (KHOURY, 1985).

Nonetheless, the difficulties of reconciling the two opposite forces remain, as do the difficulties in conducting a dialogue.

Though it is true that tolerance and dialogue are the very basis of human society, it is also true that the "word," i.e. considering one's own truth as the only truth, must of necessity lead to dogmatism, as Vitiello, the philosopher, observes. It is clear that religion requires verities – verities which each religion assumes it has and which are different from those of other religions and, being different, the opposite.

It is perhaps on the basis of this assumption that, were we to "assess this based on our criteria," as Karl Rahner (1985) writes, we would understand that the history of Christianity has also, to an appalling degree, been "the history of intolerance, the persecution of heretics, wars of religion and the crushing of individual consciences by ecclesiastic and state authorities."

And so it should be understood, as *Civiltà Cattolica* has written, that when people state that "Christianity is the one true religion," then that means that "the absolute truth and holiness inherent in the Christian religion does not apply to Christianity as it has existed in history, but to Jesus Christ. Over the course of time, Christians have mingled verities and errors, holiness and sin; they have committed the sin of domination and oppression of other religions. Thus the true way is to go along this path: from the word to dialogue, i.e. from identity to the Other, face to face, the believing Christian and the other.

This means an open-hearted acceptance of the other – accepting him and his otherness; this is the beginning of communication and the true path towards reconciliation as Pittau says. Today we are living in an extraordinary world of racial, religious and cultural pluralism; we must of necessity ensure that the culture of otherness be accepted as the first step towards true communication.

As Bruno Forte, the theologian says, that is why in our relationship with other religions, all religions which are different from Christianity should be treated by Christians with dignity and forbearance, which "should never be sullied by the presumption that Christianity is the only religion," even though it is clear that this attitude of profound respect for other religions does not exempt a Christian from "living his faith fully and completely." Thus, tolerance and respect should become a living embodiment of faith and at the same time a form of dialogue. Bruno Forte wrote in a text on ecumenism that "The Gospel of the Church is against ideological standardization, it invokes the infinite dignity of human beings before God and before other men, irrespective of who they are and irrespective of their station in life ... what the Church's Gospel offers the world is neither standardization nor nihilism. What it offers is the coming together and union of differences, of God and man, of the individual and his neighbor, of races and cultures in all their inimitable originality."

The religions shall confront one another – but not as espousing the one, the true religion, but rather as the upshot of that give and take which history provides, without however fearing that religious truth be downgraded to a mere historical fact or mere affirmation of ethics. Attention must be paid to the otherness of the world, which is expressed in other religions and

pretation, i.e. to stop reading the Koran with the "eyes of a dead person," as if being a Muslim meant being frozen in a remote era of time, completely immobile. It is also time to stop this idolatrous cult of tradition which, as has already been said, ends up contradicting itself. It is also high time to put an end to the infinite number of sayings of the prophet, which have been "brooded over for centuries"; this is undoubtedly "the source of garbled messages." And lastly, it is high time to stop legal hairsplitting which "robs Islam of its charitableness and love."

These doctrinaire statements, born of experience, were a warning to millions of men who, in fighting injustice, might at the same time, harm the image of God.

As the French philosopher says, "Islam, as well as Christianity, needs a theology of liberation."

One of the main topics addressed by the Italian Church in Palermo, in its meeting held once every ten years, was the construction of a new society upon the foundation of the commandment to show charity "at the moment in which charity is lacking or cold-hearted ... because of long-standing divisions."[1] At the meeting there were moments of great ecumenicity, and dialogue and prayers were put forward in an attempt to establish a sort of communion as a sign of the possibility of reconciling diversity.

Indeed, the meeting in Naples on Monotheism and Vio-

which is a reaffirmation of true exchanges, of dialogue and sol-
idarity, "both freely given," in the mystery of the meetings aris-
ing from human exodus and divine advent. One must over-
come, though not deny, the weight of so much scandal which
true believers have caused throughout history. "How many
horrors have been committed in the name of the absolute truth
of Christianity, how many pyres have burned in the name of
the truth of Christ!"

That is why true believers must ask themselves every day
whether "the Light can help overcome the darkness of scan-
dal." Interreligious dialogue aims not only at mutual under-
standing and at friendly relations, but also must turn into a
mutual act of bearing witness to one's own creed, precisely
because on the one hand there is an acceptance of differ-
ences while on the other there is a respect for "freely-taken
decisions of conscience," in order to establish reciprocal forms
of appreciation. The Second Vatican Council, in fact, acknowl-
edges that all men, of whatever religious persuasion, are all
basically just waiting for an answer to the most hidden secrets
of the human condition which deeply trouble the hearts of men,
today, as ever always.

It is therefore inevitable that any of the monotheistic reli-
gions, as they have always stated, must of necessity operate
in a unified sort of pluralism, and must work towards bettering
the values of loving one's neighbor, of justice and of peace. In
other words, working for liberation.

Quinzio would say that, with the help of faith, religion is far
from being something conservative, something which keeps
public order, something socially static. In the truest sense of
the term, history has proven religion to be a subversive critical
force, a force for change, an initial spark of eschatological
protest against the powers that be and against the prevailing
order.

It is important not to confuse faith with religion, given the
institutional nature religions acquire over time, to the detriment
of the original drive of faith [...].

On the contrary, faith is "totally other" as far as the world is
concerned; it welcomes the pronouncement and proposition
from God that faith "should be" something different from
"being" in the world we experience on a daily basis.

Faith is "the realization of what is hoped for" (Hebrews 11, 1),
and we hope from it the prophecy, "Behold, I make all things
new" (Revelations 21, 5), and that "we await new heavens and
a new earth in which righteousness dwells" (2 Peter 3, 13)
(QUINZIO, 1989).

Throughout history, religions have structured in social terms
these paths to faith. Bygone religious ages were capable of
"establishing societies which survived for long periods of time
in which tolerance was much more than merely abstention
from open warfare." The rights of outsiders are well established
in the Bible, as in the Koran, which bans enforced conversions
(QUINZIO, 1995), so much so that, in a splendid display of the
concept of mercy, the very concept of the enemy is super-
seded (QUINZIO, 1995). There are other religious periods of
history, even recent history, and in other parts of the world, in
which the opposite was true: was this because of nationalism
or the raw appeal of power?

But now this issue has once more become topical, because
we still need hope in our lives. That might be why, on the eve-
ning of Holy Thursday in Jerusalem, in the cenaculum where
Christian tradition has it that the Last Supper was held, time is
taken away from war to celebrate.

This is where, in a "universal plea," it is said: We, the chosen
children of Abraham, who have descended from him in three
family lines: Jews, Christians and Muslims, but who are united
in venerating one god, ... are here united to honor a com-
mandment issued two thousand years ago – to "love one
another as I have loved you" (MONAR, 1996).

Conclusion

It now becomes quite clear how it is that with regard to the
issues which we have quite amply discussed there appears to
be a clear awareness of how much guilt and how many errors
there are in history. They have immensely aggravated ten-
sions and conflicts which have become internalized and which
have caused the continuous spasms of fierce violence in the
Mediterranean.

Indeed, one could well say that it is precisely these elements
which imbued wars of religion and conflicts with meaning and
which – though the wars might have had other root causes –
made them even more ferocious and inhumane.

It would appear that at this juncture, the most important point
would be to wonder about the underlying causes and effects of
an unstoppable downward spiral of malaise and degradation.

An inward look, without pretence, painful even; it is a ques-
tion of passing in review the history of groups and of individu-
als – something which might well, one hopes, become the pre-
lude to painfully reconstructed and carefully judged elements
of sharing and disengagement. These elements must be inter-
twined and assessed without bias and without the intrusion of
egos, because not everything can be resolved within the con-
fines of the endless mediation of diplomatic ritual. Everything
must be carefully assessed, of course. But it is also important
to break the silence.

Tahar Ben Jalloun (1996) is deeply convinced of the fact that,
though it might well be true that "without a religious conviction"
so many things are destined to fail, it is also true that very often
things such as lynchings, unspeakable violence, etc., would
have happened anyway, for other reasons, without any need
for justification.

What can we do to salvage Islam and the Koran from this
"casting of stones"? ...

"Is Islam fundamentally the people who practice it or does it
exist outside the human framework?" ...

Isn't Islam what men make of it? It is high time for cultivated
Muslims, who deeply believe in the message of Allah and his
prophet Mohammed, for enlightened Muslims, who are mod-
ern and democratic, to rise up against the massacres perpe-
trated by the warriors who think they speak on behalf of Islamic
culture and civilization.

These men do exist. They are discreet. The only question
is – for how long will they give free rein to these barbaric acts
whose repercussions are felt by the entire Muslim and Arab
population of the world?

These are questions which are not meant to be excuses.
They are also questions which might well be asked in other
spheres as well, unless one wishes to establish that everything
in the area is pre-destined, as Gottmann wrote on the recon-
dite meanings of iconography. The crux of the issues perhaps
lies in these heartfelt writings. In other words, once more it is
possible to put a different spin on the history of these territo-
ries, a spin which is in the hands of man, but only if everyone
involved were to consider themselves part and parcel of the
same adventure, having the same – or almost the same –
resources and worries. As Olivier Carré (1997) says, the strug-
gle should not founder, in the light of a possible secularization,
in the name of God's vengeance. It is of the utmost impor-
tance to fight for a lay interpretation of the Koran and to ensure
that three separate issues remain separate: religion, state,
world.

This, however, is a truth which applies to all. To take arms
in favor of cultural modernity and thus remain open to other
civilizations and cultures requires a modus operandi which is
not in contradiction with warning against the effects funda-
mentalism has on all religions in its neo-absolutist mode (TIBI,
1997).

Notes

1. The Third Ecclesiastic Meeting, 20-25 November, 1995, used the conclusions drawn by the Italian Episcopalian Conference, "The Gospel of Charity for a new society in Italy," *Magistero* 235, Edizioni Paoline, Milan, as the basis for its deliberations; G. Campione, comments on 'Il Sole 24 Ore,' November 17, Milan; *Il Popolo*, 16-21-22-23-24-25 November, Rome; *La Gazzetta del Sud*, 14-20-21-22-23-24-24 November, Messina.

2. International Study Days on "Monotheism and Conflict. How to prevent and resolve conflicts between monotheistic religions in the Mediterranean," held in Naples at the Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa on 13-15 December, 1995; participants included Italian, French, German, Israeli and Arab, representing institutions, academies and embassies. There was an intense debate of profound interest. See: P. Claverie, "Les derniers et 'le royaume de l'homme' " (The last and the kingdom of man); B. Forte and V. Vitiello, "Il dialogo e le ragioni dell'altro" ("Dialogue and the arguments of the other"); R. Garaudy, "Islam, margination et émancipation humaine" ("Islam, marginalization and human emancipation"); G.S.I. Pittau, "Gesù Cristo: alterità e interiorità" ("Jesus Christ: otherness and the spiritual life"); S. Quinzio, "Se vedi l'asino di chi ti odio" ("If you see your enemy's donkey...") "Justice and Solidarity." These are the texts in E. Ferrie (1997), *Monotheism and Conflict* (Naples, Cuen).

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A "quantitative" analysis of the geopolitical situation in Russia

"There exists an inseparable connection between geopolitics, iconography and political identity. Jean Gottmann was the first who in the early 1950s considered the importance of iconography in the creation of national and political identity. National iconography is a result of a long historical development of the perception by state leaders, public opinion and the intellectual elite of the place of a country in the world, its geopolitical situation, national interests, and external threats to national security."

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Geopolitics in Russia: Old and new

Everybody in Russia knows about the famous discussion about "Slavophiles" and "Westernizers." This discussion, which in Soviet times was familiar to Russian citizens from school textbooks on history, in the early 1990s became extremely relevant because it concerns the very basis of contemporary Russian life. Is Russia part of Europe or does it not even make sense trying to return to the European house after almost 75 years of separate existence? Or is Russia "Eurasia" and does it make up a particular integral world and civilization which organically combines features of European (Slavic) and Asian (Turkic) cultures? Or is she "Asiope" – their odd and chaotic combination? Or she is simply Asia? What should be the ground of the Russian state that emerged on the wreckage of a superpower? Does she have allies or is she condemned to geopolitical "loneliness"?

All these questions are really existential, and many spears have been broken around them during the last years of the 20th century. Journalists and politicians, philosophers and sociologists have published a lot on this theme. Of course, they remembered "classical" authors – thinkers of the past, whose writings, often forbidden in Soviet times, have been published again with abundant comments. They attempted to find in their heritage solutions to today's problems. During the first decade after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, geopolitics in Russia was almost monopolized by the so-called national patriots and left-wing activists, who had been the most active in introducing its concepts and ideas. Leaders of a num-

ber of left and national patriotic political parties wrote a series of geopolitical books-manifestos, justifying their views on their perspectives of Russia.

The "neo-Eurasian" school claiming to be heirs of a long tradition in Russian philosophical and political thought (HAUNER, 1990) has created most concern in the Western media (CLOVER, 1999). As almost always happens with epigraphs, neo-Eurasianists simplified and primitivized the ideas and concepts of the founding fathers. In particular, the originators of the concept emphasized in their books the importance of the Mongol yoke period for Russia, that delimited the Russian cultural area by separating it from the Christian West and orienting the country towards the Finno-Ugrian, Siberian and "Turanian" worlds.

Neo-Eurasianists strongly criticize the process of economic and cultural globalization and view the general adoption of liberal democratic procedures and principles in Russia as imposed forcefully by the West. Neo-Eurasianists combine the ideas of G. Vernadsky and other members of his circle with some points from early European geopolitical writings.

They uncritically and unilaterally adopted Halford Mackinder's theory of the world Heartland, as they believed that it endowed Russia with a particular geopolitical role. Even since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia occupies the main part of the heartland, termed by Mackinder as constituting the geographical pivot of history, the control of which would enable ultimate control of the "world island." Not surprisingly, the thesis promoting Russia's specific and "eternal" geopolitical role has been taken up by a large section of the Russian public, not least because it has served as a sort of psychological compensation for the dismantling of the empire and the rapid decline of the Cold War geopolitical status of the country.

Using the heartland theory has enabled Russians to predict a return to great power status simply because of their geographical location, without a need for any major effort on their part.

Contextually, some authors have suggested updating the Mackinder formula in the following way: "who controls the heartland possesses an efficient means to command world politics, by maintaining the geopolitical balance and the balance of power in the world." The neo-Eurasianists remain a small group of intellectuals and have little chance to promote themselves into an influential social movement, because, first

of all, it is impossible to mobilize the Russian population on the basis of huge utopian projects, as was the case in the late 1920s and early 1930s and, to a lesser extent, during the three decades after World War II (KOLOSSOV and TUROVSKY, 2001). In May 1998, about two-thirds of the All-Russian Centre of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) respondents to a national survey declared that their family affairs were closer to them than the health of the country. Individual, pragmatic, "petit bourgeois" values now dominate among Russians (ECKERT and KOLOSSOV, 1999).

However, the influence of the neo-Eurasianist circle is much larger than their "direct" political strength. Their arguments are widely used by Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which possessed the largest fraction in the State Duma between 1995 and 1999.

In Europe itself and in Western countries as a whole the economic gradient between east and west, which is to a large extent explained by natural factors, has for a long time been used for grounding and interpreting political theories and ambitions, looking for allies and enemies, distinguishing "us" and "them," as a powerful leverage for transforming and strengthening ethnic, national and supra-national identities. As Russian political scientist A. Miller noted, exercises with maps and borders aimed at defining the limits between the "civilized" and the "Barbarian" worlds are not new. Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur appointed ambassador of France to Saint Petersburg wrote in 1784 that he completely quit Europe when he crossed the border between Prussia and Poland.

Nowadays, of course, nobody doubts that Poland is a European country (MILLER, 1997). But there is a tendency to perpetuate the border between more "civilized" Central Europe kidnapped for a while from simply Europe by the communist USSR and still "Barbarian" Eastern Europe or between Eastern Europe and "Eurasia," i.e. Russia. Intellectuals of Central and Eastern European countries compete trying to prove that their country is truly European.

"Europeanness" is evidence of stability and reliability for political partners and an argument for knocking loudly on NATO doors, according to an expression of Eduard Shevardnadze, and taking soothing medicine against existential fears of aggression from the East, and a trump for attracting potential investors.

In other words, though borders between geopolitical and/or "civilizational" regions are inertial, they are not something given for ever by their very nature, but depend on historical circumstances and the collective will of peoples. There are social constructs interpreting contemporary borders between regions with different relationships between modernization, social innovations and traditionalism.

We believe that any analysis of the geopolitical situation should be based not on speculation but on a study of a system of concrete indicators reflecting, in particular, the numerous and rapidly changing relations between a country or a region and the external world. Such a system should certainly include international trade and financial flows related to payments for services and investments, transportation flows, which constitute a reliable and precise measure of the intensity of international contacts, flows of energy and pollutants, whose diffusion in the natural environment does not recognize political boundaries, phone traffic and, of course, flows of people – bearers of information and culture, permanent and temporary migrants, skilled specialists, public benefactors, statesmen, etc. It is difficult even to list all possible kinds of international interactions and quantitative parameters which can help to evaluate them.

This idea, first developed by Jean Gottmann, who designed different kinds of interactions between political-territorial units' "communication," was used as the basis of a study carried out in the Centre of Geopolitical Studies of the Institute of Geography

of the Russian Academy of Sciences thanks to the support of the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation (La Collocazione Geopolitica della Russia, 2001).

The main objective of the study was to compare representations about the geopolitical situation of Russia and contemporary Russian geopolitical concepts with the results of an analysis of concrete variables characterizing the relations between the country and the outside world. It is impossible to embrace all of them, and the authors selected a series of relevant statistical and other data which can help one to understand the changes in the situation of the country in the world that occurred after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The place of Russia is evaluated via the territorial distribution, the dynamics and the composition of her international trade, foreign investments, transportation flows and telecommunications.

Political contacts of the countries were described through an analysis of the geography of visits of Soviet/Russian leaders abroad and foreign statesmen to the USSR and Russia from the early 1980s until 2000. The growing interdependence between geopolitics and socio-cultural factors results in contacts among numerous ethnic and cultural communities dispersed in the world, and their historical motherland, between national Churches and their parishes and missions abroad. The authors investigated the contemporary number, self-identification and self-organizations of Russian communities abroad, the social and political role of the most important confessions of Russia in the field of international relations.

It is more difficult to "measure" the cultural "radiation" of a country, its image emerging among politicians and in the mass consciousness around the world, on the one hand, and the image of the world and the perception of neighbors in the country itself. However, in post-industrial times the quality of population and culture often become the most important and the "material" factors determining the geopolitical situation of a country. For example, Paul Claval (1994) believes that today they play the decisive role for France. There are a number of approaches in cultural geography allowing one to evaluate social representations. Naturally, studies of identity and of the role of geopolitical representations in it are impossible without sociological surveys.

The authors tried to study, first, the dynamic of representations about the place of Russia in the world, their regions and the outside world in the works of Russian poets of the 18th-20th centuries and in the titles of "abstract" musical works (i.e. not operas and ballets) by Russian and European composers of the same period. Second, they analyzed a series of surveys concerning Russian identity conducted by the All-Russian Centre of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in recent years.

Let us briefly describe some results of the study. International trade and the movement of capital, first of all investments, are the main kind of foreign economic relations of any country. Andrei Treivish showed that Russia remained a kind of island in the globalizing economy, because even for a medium country her international trade turnover is not big. The per capita export (US$ 470-600) is about ten times less than in Western Europe, though it is considerably more than in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Since the disintegration of the USSR, Russia reoriented first her international trade relations to the "far abroad," though its role for the Russian Federation has been always more important than in other former Soviet republics. She depends more strongly on the CIS for imports. The ratio of Russia in the exchange with the "far abroad" in all of them is larger than their role in Russian trade. The share of former COMECON countries decreased sharply, while the ratio of developed countries exceeded two thirds.

The attraction of international trade not only of Russia and

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other CIS countries as a whole but also of their regions to some main foreign partners is increasing, which resulted from the disintegration of interregional economic relations. Gravitation models, as well as an analysis of critical dependency of Russia on export and import of certain commodities from separate countries were used to evaluate this phenomenon.

It is known that foreign investments in Russia are not significant yet. Nadezhda Borodulina considered their distribution by types, branches and regions, and their relation with state private domestic investments, which were sharply decreasing in the 1990s. Direct foreign investments in the Russian economy, the most important for its revival, are distributed by territory extremely unevenly. In 1997, before the 1998 financial crisis, Moscow was by far the first (US$ 354 per capita). Magadan and Sakhalin oblats in the Far East followed with a large gap (US$ 237 and 72 respectively). Since 1998, the picture has changed, though Moscow keeps its leadership. Western European countries are the main investors, and Germany was the first in their list (34.3 percent); the shares of the following three countries – the US, France and UK – were respectively 15.5, 15.0 and 12.7 percent.

An analysis of international tourism and transportation by Yelena Seredina and the author of the present paper demonstrated first, the growing openness of the country: more and more trains and regular flights and rapidly developing telecommunications reunite Russia with the outside world (fig. 1). Many airports acquired international status, though the lion's share of passenger traffic (73 percent of regular flights) still passes through the Moscow hub. Characteristically, Moscow airports and Pulkovo airport of Saint Petersburg now serve much more international communication than domestic connections, which is hardly normal for such a large country as Russia. Second, the transportation system of Russia, formerly isolated and highly centralized, is to a growing extent oriented outside. The negative side of this process is that external connections are not balanced with internal ones. It can be partly compensated for by the development of telecommunications, which radically transform the notion of periphery.

As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, about 25 million Russians suddenly found themselves to be outside Russian borders. Their former identity was being painfully transformed, because most of them are supposed never to have left their motherland (the USSR) before. An analysis of shifts in foreign migrations of Russians by Olga Vendina helps to answer the question whether they could organize themselves and create a diaspora of full value or remain an amorphous national minority.

Ethnic Russians make up 18 percent of the population of the "near abroad." Though the tendency for them to return to Russia could be observed already since the mid-1970s, these migrations grew sharply in 1992-1994. Under new conditions, repatriation became most often forced and resulted from ethnic discrimination. The types of national and ethnic self-identification among Russians vary depending on the localization, the "age" and the origin of their groups. In most of Ukraine and Transdniestria (a part of Moldova with a predominantly Russian-speaking population which proclaimed its independence in 1990), Russians' identity is complicated, ambiguous and "eroded"; in the Baltic countries, West Ukraine and most of Moldova their identity is marked by a certain inferiority complex; in Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia it is based on a high self-estimation.

The identity of Russians who resettled from Russia to the countries of "the far abroad" is not shaped yet. They feel by intuition the need for the restoration by Russia of the role of a great power, which could raise their status, the respect of local dwellers and diminish the necessity in the creation of a true


The number of flights per week:

☐ less than 5   ◼ 51-100
◼ 5-10   ◼ more than 100
◼ 11-50   ☐ no regular flights

Fig. 1: The number of air flights per week to Russia and from Russia.

diaspora. An analysis of six waves of Russian emigration allows us to come to the conclusion that a high educational and intellectual level was the main feature of Russian communities abroad. It was typical of emigration during the first years after the 1917 revolution. The quality of "human capital" from Russia was as a rule supported by the contemporary brain drain.

The religious factor, according to Alexei Krindatch, becomes more relevant for the geopolitical situation of Russia. A particular place in the formation of the Russian political space belongs to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which plays a very important role in the Orthodox world. The ROC remains a spiritual and institutional force still uniting Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Besides, in many states of the "near abroad" (especially in the Baltic countries and in Central Asia), parishes of the ROC assume the functions of a kind of ethno-cultural center consolidating a considerable part of the Russian population. The ROC is an international social institution and acquires a more and more active role on the political scene in Russia and in other CIS countries as well as outside her borders.

Among former Soviet republics, only Russia is comparable with the Russian Empire and the USSR in confessional diversity. Almost all world religions (Christian denominations, Islam, Buddhism) either have vast historical areas of influence here, or are represented by numerous ethnoconfessional minorities, which are dispersed over all national territory (Judaism, the Roman Catholic Church, different Protestant Churches). The development of religious communities has a considerable influence on the relations of Russia with the outside world.

Islam is the second religion of Russia by number of believers. Today, the "Muslim factor" is always present both in domestic and foreign policy. It is difficult to estimate it exactly, because it is often supposed that all members of traditionally Muslim ethnic groups living in Russia are Muslim believers. Anyway, the ratio of "Muslim" groups in the total population of Russia is constantly growing. It is necessary to take into account huge ethnocultural and regional differences inside the Muslim community, which consists of 40 ethnic groups speaking various languages and having different cultures.

In the late 1980s, Russia took the way of religious revival. Despite the importance of its real consequences, a clear system of relations between the state and Churches has not yet been created. The position of the ROC in Russian politics is not strictly defined, as well as a possible role for religion in the formation of the new Russian national-political ideology.

There exists an inseparable connection between geopolitics, iconography and political identity. Jean Gottmann was the first who in the early 1950s considered the importance of iconography in the creation of national and political identity. National iconography is a result of a long historical development of the perception by state leaders, public opinion and the intellectual elite of the place of a country in the world, its geopolitical situation, national interests, and external threats to national security.

Literature, music, fine arts play a considerable role in the formation of social representations about territory as an element of iconography. Poetry and symphonic music are one of the most abstract and symbolic kinds of literature and arts. Using an analysis of works of major Russian (Soviet) poets and composers, it is possible to define the place of Russia on the geopolitical axis "East-West," to follow the evolution of self-identification of the country and of the relationship between the development of geopolitical concepts and iconography, to analyze the image of (Western) Europe in Russia and, vice versa, the perception of Russia in (Western) Europe. Such an attempt has been made by Vladimir Kolossov, Tamara Galkina

and Olga Lavrenova.

They analyzed maps, tables and diagrams reflecting the kind, the frequency and the character of toponyms mentioned in poetic and abstract musical works of different authors and epochs and, respectively, shifts in the evolution of social representations about the world and Russia herself. The authors linked the evolution of self-identification of the country in the mirror of poetry and academic music with its geopolitical development.

The Russian "toponymic" iconography is very rich and was widely used by the political and intellectual elites in state-building and in purposes of national integration. During the Soviet period, the creation of geographical (territorial) images followed general tendencies of autocentrism ("the USSR as the main center of the progressive world"), ideologization and submission of the arts to political and geopolitical interests of power, even in symphonic music.

There is no doubt that iconography, in its turn, influences the popularity of geopolitical concepts and representations ("the movement of ideas" in Jean Gottmann's term) and the strategic choice of the country.

The geopolitical vision of the world being shaped in the consciousness of Russian citizens under the influence of mass media is considered in the example of Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG), a liberal daily newspaper of high repute (KOLOSSOV, TIKUNOV and ZAYATS, 2000). The importance of an area was evaluated by the frequency of its mention in the newspaper's pages. A separate article appeared in this newspaper during almost three years (1997 to early 2000) having a more or less obvious geographical address or addresses which was taken as a unit for mapping and calculations. The study was limited to articles having a more or less clear political sub-text. The authors came to the conclusion that Russian public opinion perceives the world space and the territory of its own country in a discrete way. Mass media play an outstanding role in the shaping of geographical images, in presenting some countries and regions in a favorable light and often imposing negative images of other territories, often without "objective" justifications.

However, information about regions of Russia in NG correlated considerably with their share in population, the economic potential and the real influence on the political situation in the country. As for the outer world pictured by NG, the "near abroad" clearly dominated in information. Quite naturally, areas of ethnopolitical conflicts close to Russian borders are highlighted. Russia was represented first of all as a European power maintaining the closest relations with the club of leading world powers (figs. 2 and 3).

The character of Russian national (political) identity was analyzed by a sociologist, Lev Gudkov. It still is one of the most "ideologized" and mythical themes discussed by the intellectual elite in Russia. The first system of ideological constructions, which should be used as a basis of national identity, was created in the early 19th century, but for a long time there have not been serious attempts at its academic description and analysis, with the exception of works of outstanding historians before the 1917 revolution (Kluchevsky, Milukov and some others).

Before the collapse of the communist regime, there were practically no special theoretical or methodological works on this problem. The present-day structure of national identity was formed in the period of Brezhnev, though its major components had existed in the early 20th century, and some of them were reanimated by the Stalin regime.

The study is based on the data of a survey conducted by the All-Russian Centre of Public Opinion in 1988-1999 and includes an analysis of mythical elements and the structure of Russian national identity, of its territorial and temporal dimen-

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Fig. 2: The number of publications in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* by country.

The number of publications by countries:

|		
10	608	1206
209	808	1406
409	1007	1605

Fig. 3: The absolute number of publications in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* by country in 1997-2000.

sions, the role of the image of the "enemy" and of the attitude to other countries in its formation.

Nowadays, self-identification of Russians is controversial: on the one hand, it is to a large extent based on representations and values of the Soviet era (greatpowerness, heroic, mobilizing nationalism), and on the other hand, on amorphous and irrational views on a "normal," quiet and socially and legally secure life as a vague prototype of civil society.

The disintegration of the Soviet system provoked significant changes in identity. Direct relations of individuals with the state weakened, and the traditionalist complex of representations about historical events, outstanding leaders and other persons, and the symbolic role of territory strengthened. Such interrelated shifts show the shortage of values today, the lack of collective positive representations about reality, of social mechanisms of self-respect. In the late 1990s, the only positive point of national consciousness of post-Soviet society was the victory in the Great Patriotic War (War World II).

The attitude to the West remains ambiguous. It is still considered as a source of threat, and at the same time as a temptation, and an unreachable ideal of welfare.

Exploitation of symbolic resources of the past, and opposition of Russia and Russians to developed countries and non-Russians inside the country have led in recent years to outbursts of xenophobia. The image of the "enemy," of the ethnic "other" became more important. However, in today's Russia attempts at the reanimation of great-Russian nationalism do not have a mobilizing force, but are only a form of psychological compensation and defense.

Main conclusions

The combination of the results obtained by the author of this paper demonstrates that despite loud declarations of Eurasianists and adherents of the "third way" concepts, in the matter of fact the main interests of Russia are related to Europe. The real geopolitical situation of the country in the mirror of its external relations differs considerably from representations of most contemporary theoreticians, depicting it in different ways depending on their ideological views.

As a Norwegian expert wrote not without irony, in the 19th century the Russian state started to copy European models of "ancient regimes" just when Europe rejected them, and in the 20th century to reproduce the socialist model created in Europe, which Europe preferred not to realize (NEUMANN, 1995, pp. 1-2).

Russia is a part of the Christian world. Despite her relative ethnic heterogeneity, the European cultural code has always been basic for Russia, and her history, counting more than one thousand years, is inseparable from the European process. And today, as well as earlier, achievements of European science, culture and the arts dominate the mind of Russians (UTKIN, 1999).

The analysis of almost all variables selected by the authors shows that the importance of former Soviet republics and former socialist countries of Europe in the external relations of Russia was constantly decreasing. But, naturally, the relations of Russia with the neighboring countries, which for centuries were part of the same state with her, are determined not only by economy. There is an obvious contradiction between remaining human and cultural ties and weakening (or weakened) economic and political contacts.

Calculations by Vladimir Kolossov and Rostislav Turovsky (2001), including an analysis of the geographical distribution of foreign official visits to and from Russia/the USSR, showed that the European orientation, together with prioritarian relations with the CIS countries, had long ago objectively become the dominant direction in foreign contacts of Russia.

For Russia's nearest neighbors on the west, the same European orientation does not at all necessarily contradict enjoying equal rights, mutually profitable and even friendly relations with Russia. Russia's neighbors and Russia can "move to Europe" not only in parallel but also in coordinated ways.

However, a number of popular scenarios of the development of the geopolitical situation in Europe are based on the assumption that by no means will Russia struggle for restoration of her direct political and military control over former Soviet republics and Central European countries. This assumption, in its turn, is based on representations of traditional pre-World War II geopolitics and, in particular, on the view that national interests are dictated by the geopolitical situation of the country, and are natural and unchangeable.

In other words, the bipolar world of the time of the Cold War has been replaced by a hierarchical military-political structure with the center in Brussels and concentric "strategic" circlesenvelopes around it. Such a development would put the new independent states of Central and Eastern Europe in face of a wrong alternative: either civilized Europe, or the backward Asian East.

The main objective of Russian foreign policy is the ensuring of favorable external conditions for solving internal economic and social problems and successful participation in the creation of the new fair geopolitical world order. The realization of this goal is related not only with the transition to a market economy, but also with objective processes of globalization, and with changes in the Russian national and ethnic identity, with the building of the Russian political nation. External relations and foreign policy are their result and at the same time their instrument. The population of Russia is not yet well adapted to new state boundaries not matching ethnic, linguistic and cultural limits. Hence, external relations in Russia are a more important element of self-identification of people than in old democracies. Representations about principles of relations with the closest neighbors and with other neighboring countries are being shaped in Russia as a result of the struggle between different opinions. What is most important for Russia is to avoid the risk of turning to be again in international isolation and to ensure the conditions for the social and economic revival of the country.

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C.A. Doxiadis giving Jean Gottmann a guided tour

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Fig. 1: C.A. Doxiadis and Jean Gottmann on their way to the Symposion Hall of the Apollonion in the Porto Rafti community on 22 September, 1973.

Fig. 2: In the Exhibition Hall – From left to right: John Platt, Declan Kennedy, Bernice Gottmann, Panayis Psomopoulos, Jean Gottmann and C.A. Doxiadis.

Figs. 3 and 4: Relaxing in the courtyard of the Apollonion, Porto Rafti.

Fig. 3: From left to right – Jean Gottmann, John Platt, C.A. Doxiadis and Emma Doxiadis.

Fig. 4: From left to right – Gerald B. Dix, Jean Gottmann and C.A. Doxiadis over a drink.

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The Asia-Pacific region and the new world order

"On the one hand, Asia-Pacific states are in the process of reacting to Western visions of a new world order which is resulting in new regional tensions. On the other hand, Cold War security structures are still essentially intact and post-Cold War Asia-Pacific regional arrangements are internally conflictual and are relatively weak. However, with the current global security configuration consequent upon the new internationalist agenda and the spread of nuclear weapons, Western states need to sufficiently recognize Asia-Pacific regional interests and to more effectively accommodate these in new regional and global economic and security structures."

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Introduction

The Asia-Pacific region is still in a process of transition to a new post-Cold War order. The main aim of this paper is to raise a number of questions about the implications of the disjuncture or dislocation between what constitutes Western visions of a "new world order" with those of the rest of the world and especially of states in the Asia-Pacific region.

On the one hand, Asia-Pacific states are in the process of reacting to Western visions of a new world order which is resulting in new regional tensions. On the other hand, Cold War security structures are still essentially intact and post-Cold War Asia-Pacific regional arrangements are internally conflictual and are relatively weak. However, with the current global security configuration consequent upon the new internationalist agenda and the spread of nuclear weapons, Western states

need to sufficiently recognize Asia-Pacific regional interests and to more effectively accommodate these in new regional and global economic and security structures.

Visions of a new world order

From a Western perspective, there exist at least three interlocking visions of what constitutes the meaning and intent of a "new world order."

● First, for its originator, former US President George Bush, it embodied a vision of a world which enshrined the sanctity of sovereignty and the rule of law. From this perspective, Western interests were seen to be threatened by peripheral separatist groups, by states with scant regard for human rights and by "lawless" or "rogue states" – Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. As has been pointed out, these "rogue states," although not constituting a cohesive category, were classified as such because of their alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, their alleged support for terrorism, and the perceived threat that they pose to regional neighbours and to other states around the world (HOYT, 2000).

In addition, "failed states," such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, while being incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own territories, are also "troubling to world order" since they are or may become sources of instability, mass migration and terrorism (ROTBERG, 2002). In the 21st century, both "rogue states" and "failed states" have been portrayed by the West as being located outside of the "civilized" world in a way which echoes the Cold War good-versus-evil rhetoric of the conflict with the Soviet Union. This is also true of the US characterization of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as comprising an "axis of evil" based on a belief that these states are developing weapons of mass destruction. Such portrayals, which have become more focused as a result of the terrible events of "9-11" (CHOMSKY, 2001), help bolster the current US military doctrine of "pre-emption," which is essentially an offensive posture based on perceived threat.

● Second, it has also been argued that, for the first time in human history, the end of the Cold War signalled a new era in global politics which was both multicivilizational and multipolar and that conflicts in this new era would be essentially cul-

tural rather than ideological. The major cleavage in this new world order was seen to be between "the West and the rest" (HUNTINGTON, 1996), and some of the implications of this vision for the Asia-Pacific region are discussed later in this paper.

● Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave rise to a range of expectations about a "new world order" which also embodied the triumph of neoliberal capitalism in a new era of globalization. The only seeming arena of contestation in this vision centered on the ability of the various developed capitalist models – market-led (USA), state-led (Japan) or negotiated/consensual (Germany/Sweden) – to maximize state welfare (COATES, 1999). In any event, consequent upon the globalized economy, capitalist diversity was doomed (WEISS, 2000). Inevitably, it was felt that the demise of communism, homogenization and market interpenetration would assure stability and security.

The meaning and intent of the "new world order" were seen quite differently from a Third World perspective, however. From this viewpoint, it embodied four collectively distinctive characteristics:

– the United States as the only superpower,
– an increase in democratization,
– the growth of nationalism and,
– the onset of economic supranationalism.

In the Third World, these shifts have become associated with an increase in ethno-religious conflict, intra-state regionalism and multilateral intervention, all of which serve to threaten the viability of the nation-state, and, in some cases, resulting in "failed states" (MAINUDDIN, 1995).

These and other outcomes have caused an expected reaction embodied in the multifaceted "anti-globalization movement" designed to function as a counterbalance in the international system (GREEN and GRIFFITH, 2002). For some sections of civil society, resistance is seen to be necessary to the hegemony of the nation-state, to US unilateralism and to Western financial interests as well as to other negative outcomes of globalization, since they are regarded to be sources of instability rather than of order (RUMLEY, 1998). In such circumstances, for many states, both developed and developing, the term "new turbulence" might be viewed as being more relevant than that of a "new world order" (KOTHARI, 1997).

As has been argued, government dependence on global financial markets coupled with increasing economic interdependence have collectively produced the conditions for financial crisis (CASTELLS, 1997, p. 252). In the Asia-Pacific region, the extent of democratization, the nature of adjustment to globalization and economic liberalization and the changing nature of near-neighbor relations have collectively contributed to differential state visions of a "new world order" (BAYARKHUU, 1999). It has been suggested by some regional commentators, for example, that the 1997 currency crisis was as a result of the actions of Western financial speculators as part of a new kind of Western colonialism (RUMLEY, 1998). Elsewhere in the region, it is abundantly clear that globalization is not geographically all-encompassing, since some regional spaces – North Korea, parts of China, and most of Burma, for example – are excluded, and many groups of people – women and children, many indigenous groups, and the poor – are marginalized (OLDS et al., 1999). A range of other state-specific geopolitical outcomes has followed the end of the Cold War. For *India*, for example, the end of the Cold War is closely associated with its look east towards Southeast Asia. In turn, this new process has resulted in new geopolitical challenges which impinge on relations with other regional states (KANJILAL, 1998). All Asia-Pacific states are in the process of reconstructing their own vision of order and, in the process, are still involved in a reassessment of Cold War arrangements, regional relationships and grand strategies.

Geopolitical structure and change

One Western geopolitical portrayal of the structure of the Asia-Pacific region at the end of the Cold War was that it comprised three first order powers (China, Japan and Russia), a number of actual and emergent second order powers (including Australia, India and Indonesia) and several "gateway states" (including Western Australia), all of which were located within five geostrategic regions (COHEN, 1991):

● East Asia
● Heartland
● Offshore Asia and Oceania
● South Asia
● Southeast Asia.

Of course, such structures are never static, yet, in basic realist terms, while Russia is currently a declining great power and China and Japan are rising great powers, apart from the few second order states, the remainder of the Asia-Pacific comprises many "lesser states" (that is, Third World states) which are unlikely to be of strategic importance for the foreseeable future (CATLEY, 2001, p.151). New states, when they emerge (such as East Timor), are likely to be small and remain economically and politically weak. What may be important, however, from the viewpoint of regional and global stability is the extent to which those rising and existing/declining powers are able to reach some consensus on the nature of "international order" to maximize the prospects for a peaceful transition (FOONG KHONG, 2001).

In the decade both before and after the end of the Cold War period, a plethora of literature served to portray the Asia-Pacific as the coming global economic heartland based around its economic growth and potential economic power (for example, ABEGGLEN, 1994; THOMPSON, 1998). To some, the 21st century as the "Pacific Century" was taken for granted (for example, COTTON, 1988; BORTHWICK, 1992). However, even before the Japanese economic downturn and the onset of the Asian economic crisis, some commentators were raising questions about the efficacy of this particular regional characterization. One writer concluded that a Pacific Century cannot simply be Asian; that it needs to be based on more than just economic growth; that it will not occur without the close involvement of the United States, and that there continue to exist a number of difficult intra-regional problems which have yet to be resolved. In short, the original concept of a Pacific Century is as much a myth as it is a reality (ABRAMOWITZ, 1993; FOOT and WALTER, 1999). Others thus prefer to talk of a "global century" rather than a "Pacific Century" (LINGLE, 1996).

From a cultural perspective and following Huntington, the Asia-Pacific region is replete with Asian "civilizational core states," including China and Japan, as well as a number of representatives from Western civilization, including Australia and New Zealand (HUNTINGTON, 1996, p. 135). In short, the Asia-Pacific is a vast multicivilizational region, and thus, according to the Huntington hypothesis, the potential for ongoing conflict and a lack of community of interest is quite considerable (fig. 1).

The Asia-Pacific is also said to contain at least one "cleft country" (Malaysia) – that is, a state in which "large groups belong to different civilizations"; and, at least one "torn country" (Australia) – that is, a state which "has a predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization" (HUNTINGTON, 1996, pp. 137-139). Following Huntington, all attempts at cultural-geographical relocation have failed, and, from this cultural deterministic ahistorical perspective, inter-civilizational bilateral relations and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific as a whole are destined to fail. In short, according to this representation, it seems that Asian and Western values cannot be reconciled and thus intra-Asia-Pacific relations will inevitably be conflictual. Furthermore, Asia-Pacific

Fig. 1: The Asia-Pacific Region and Dobbs-Higginson's "inverse triangle." (*Source:* Rumley et al., 1996).

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civilizations will be in conflict with others around the world, and especially with the West.

If the Huntington hypothesis is to be taken seriously, therefore, it raises a host of fundamental issues associated with global and regional stability and security and mechanisms for the management of conflict. In this regard, identifying the precise source of global and regional instability and conflict becomes a critical test of the hypothesis. However, one commentator, among the many who have criticized the Huntington hypothesis, has suggested that the main source of global conflict is more likely to be a "clash of fundamentalisms," especially between Islamic fundamentalism and "the mother of all fundamentalisms: American imperialism" (ALI, 2002, p. 281).

Asia-Pacific security threats and conflict management

Following from what has been discussed above, traditional security threats from Asia-Pacific states to Western interests have been seen to include one "rogue state," North Korea, plus the non-Western civilizational states of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia and the Buddhist Asia-Pacific states. In short, the vast majority of the population of Asia-Pacific states is seen by Huntington as a security threat to Western interests. Although from a practical policy perspective this notion is absurd, it nonetheless lends weight to a continued US regional military presence. It is argued that this continued regional presence, especially in Japan and South Korea, is necessary both to safeguard US interests and to save the region from itself, given its inherently conflictual structure and its apparent unwillingness or inability to resolve intra-regional conflicts.

There are at least three sides to this issue.

• The first is that the US military presence is necessary for the good of the region in order to function as a kind of regional stabilizer.

• Second, a US presence is essential for the development of what has been referred to as a "New Pacific Order," designed primarily as an organizing tool for the enhancement of US economic interests in the region by facilitating access to Asia-Pacific economies within a stable security context (DE CASTRO, 1994).

• A third is that the US military presence is unnecessary, since, not only has there been a fundamental change in the security environment, but that, in addition, its existence constitutes a regional security threat.

From this viewpoint, since the combination of power contestation and economic dynamism is particularly evident in Northeast Asia (INOGUCHI and STILLMAN, 1997), and since that region consumes more than 75 percent of the Asia-Pacific regional defence budget (RUMLEY, 2001, p. 35), then the existence of a significant US military presence fuels a "quasi-shatterbelt" context. Those who support this view would more likely advocate a "voice of Asia" security model in which Japan can begin to disengage from the West and where Asia-Pacific security is guaranteed by increased intra-regional cooperation and through regionally-based security mechanisms (MAHATIR and ISHIHARA, 1995).

Intra-regional Asia-Pacific tensions and conflicts cannot be denied, and perceived traditional security threats to Western interests are well-known and have often been rehearsed (for example, CAMILLERI, 2000). China figures prominently in many Western analyses of such threats (for example, DIBB, 1996), and, to some commentators, the Sino-US relationship is seen to be the most problematical of all of the great power relations in the Asia-Pacific region (KLINTWORTH, 2001). During its construction of the new world order, US policy towards China has shifted from Cold War "containment" to post-Cold War "engagement"

but has wavered towards "constrainment" (that is, to engage China in such a way that any "unwanted behavior" is constrained – SEGAL, 1999, p. 35) and, in the "war against terrorism" has even resumed some of the characteristics of a "de facto containment" (KELLY, 2002). From a Chinese perspective, considerable importance is attached to maintaining constructive relations with major powers (YANG, 2001). Furthermore, as has also been argued, stability in the Asia-Pacific region is as much in China's interests as it is in neighboring states and thus China is unlikely to pose a regional threat in the short-to-medium term (KLINTWORTH, 1998). Partnership, rather than rivalry with Japan, for example, is thus a more likely future scenario for China, despite the existence of deep-seated mutual suspicions (LI, 1999).

Apart from the end of the Cold War, one of the most important global geostrategic shifts of the latter part of the 20th century was the beginning of the "second nuclear age," which arguably began in 1974 (BRACKEN, 2000, p. 109). The Asia-Pacific region not only has two of the "official nuclear powers" – China and Russia – but it now also has two of the "declared" nuclear powers – India and Pakistan. This shift has fundamental implications for the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and raises important questions about the precise role and location of US armed forces in the region. It also raises some difficult questions about the potential implication of other regional states, such as Australia, in the operationalization of any US National Missile Defence (NMD) system.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the management of these and other actual and potential regional conflicts effectively remains in the hands of a series of Western military alliances, especially the US-Japan security alliance, ANZUS and the Five Powers Defence Agreement (FPDA), all of which are guaranteed by extra-regional powers. Indeed, as one commentator has put it, the basic structure of the Cold War still remains in the Asia-Pacific region since the general relaxation of tensions evident from the late 1980s more closely resembles that of the 1970s European détente – that is, a recognition of a Cold War status quo – rather than the actual end of the Cold War (HARA, 1999).

The only region-wide security forum, the fledgling ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), although not confined solely to Asia-Pacific states, has led to an increasing commitment to confidence-building measures (CATLEY, 2001, p. 150). While conceived as a mechanism for maintaining continued US regional security involvement, it is also seen by China as an instrument to facilitate Asia-Pacific multipolarity and thus as a counter to US hegemony (EMMERS, 2001). However, as has been pointed out, there is a need for the ARF to move from being just a consultative forum to begin to address difficult regional issues if it is to remain relevant (GAROFANO, 1999; NAIDU, 2000).

Globalization and regionalism

Economic regionalism is a very conspicuous component of the new world order, and opportunities afforded by the end of the Cold War have resulted in a significant increase in intra-regional institutionalization in the Asia-Pacific (WANANDI, 2000). Regionalism can perform a range of potential functions for states, not the least of which is that it can be used as a form of resistance to globalization. Regionalism, of course, is contested both in theory and in practice, and, since it is constructed and not "natural," then competing views are likely to exist in terms of its membership and functions (RUMLEY, 2000).

The current Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization of 21 states was inaugurated in Australia in 1989 and comprised an initial group of 12 members. This initiative occurred more than 20 years after Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki launched the "Asia-Pacific policy" (TERADA, 1998). The original conception of APEC was that it was to be a West Pacific grouping, but pressure from the United States ensured

North American membership and subsequent great power additions and, by 1997, it had been transformed into a Pacific Rim grouping and thus had become effectively "deregionalized." As a result, among other things, APEC thereafter provided a forum at which competing visions of the new world order in the wider *Pacific* region could be disseminated (BERGER, 1998).

To some extent, APEC's deregionalization has facilitated a general level of contestation regarding its goals, with member states being essentially split into at least two groups – those with a "neo-liberal" orientation to APEC goals and those possessing an "Asian" orientation (GALLANT and STUBBS, 1997). This situation has caused some commentators to refer to this regional arrangement as "APEC adrift" (RAVENHILL, 2001, pp. 186-222). Others who are more critical imply that one of the causes of the drift is due to the use of regional institutions such as APEC by the United States to pursue its neoliberal Pacific Rim economic agenda in the form of an "exploitative hegemony" (JOHNSON, 2000). This, in turn, has become associated with the revival of an Asian regionalism concept.

Given the character of globalization, it is unsurprising that first order states would generally prefer bilateralism over regionalism. In the past, the United States, in particular, has tended to stress economic and security bilateralism at the expense of economic and security regionalism. This is also due in part to the geopolitics of land-based USA regionalism compared with Europe or the "near neighbor" regionalism in the case of Japan. However, the geopolitics of 20th century global bilateralism may well be in the process of giving way to 21st century US unilateralism. For "APEC-pessimists" (for example, DOBBS-HIGGINSON, 1993, p. 389; BERGER, 1999; JOHNSON 2000, p. 209), the combination of all of the above factors could engender the emergence of a tripartite global geopolitical/geoeconomic order in the 21st century (TAYLOR, 1993, p. 55; BERGSTEN, 2000).

For the Asia-Pacific, such a regional grouping is most likely to be made up of ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea). It is arguable as to whether some states, such as Australia, for example, could be seen to be "natural" members of any of the three global pan-regions (O'LOUGHLIN and VAN DER WUSTEN, 1990; RAVENHILL, 1998, p. 147). In short, it is possible that the new Asia-Pacific economic regionalism of the 21st century could exclude all Western states which would then have to rely on bilateral economic arrangements with the three groups.

Conclusion: Towards a new Asia-Pacific order

The Asia-Pacific region is still in the process of transition to a new post-Cold War order. For the future, there are likely to be at least four critical issues which have the potential to enable the region to become more stable and much more internally cohesive.

● First, it has been suggested that the growth of new technologically armed states and their peaceful assimilation into the global community is a central challenge of the 21st century. While the "old order" is still run by a "Western club," its rules will have to change to better reflect the interests of a large part of the world located primarily in the Asia-Pacific region (BRACKEN, 2000, pp. 168-170). As a result, Asia-Pacific regional great powers will have to be entrusted with guaranteeing their own regional security. Clearly, the transition from Western domination to Asia-Pacific security regionalism will require very careful planning and analysis on behalf of all regional and extra-regional participants.

● Second, for the past 30 years, partly as a result of globalization, and more especially as a consequence of the end of the Cold War period, there has been an increasing concern with "non-traditional" sources of security associated with the debate over the relevance of the realist model of security. As a result, there has emerged a new internationalization agenda central to which are many non-military issues. These would include, for example, economic security, human development, aids, drug trafficking, water security, energy security, food security, environmental security, human rights, illegal immigration, transnational crime and refugees, in addition to concems over terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the second nuclear age (DUPONT, 2001). The determination by regional states to effectively deal with these "non-traditional" sources of security is likely to enhance the nature and strength of inter-state relations and thus help overcome traditional regional sources of insecurity.

● Third, the nature and structure of Asia-Pacific economic regionalism needs to be dominated by regional states incorporating regional values and recognizing the equality of states. This means confining its membership to the Western Pacific, not only to ensure that each of these states obtains a regional voice, but that the region then also becomes an effective counterweight to the economic power of the EU and NAFTA. This would take APEC back towards its original regional conception.

● Fourth, it has also been argued that civil society will likely be a primary location for political struggle and political change during the 21st century (for example, SCHECTER, 2000). Such struggles will be an outcome of the refusal by social movements to accept the taken-for-granted communication boundaries of established systems of domination such as states and because such groups will also offer resistance in opposition to neoliberal globalization (ROUTLEDGE, 2000). On the other hand, while another common assumption of the emergence of a global civil society is that new political organizations structurally converge around a common global agenda, in reality it seems that the convergence of world views is highly fragmentary (HEINS, 2000). However, as has been recently argued, *regional* opportunities currently exist within the Asia-Pacific for "second track" actors to make an important contribution to regional security (BALL, 2001). Other areas of concern, such as environmental security and many other non-traditional security threats such as those noted above, might well form the basis of an increasingly strong civil relationship among Asia-Pacific people in the future.

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"Indian" geopolitics: Unity in diversity or diversity of unity?

"Jean Gottmann once remarked that 'the geographer must keep the past in mind if he wants to understand the whys behind the present problems and the present landscapes.' In agreement with such insight, this paper argues that Indian geopolitics is best understood in its historical and discursive context of theorizing and practices."

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Introduction

If geopolitics can be critically conceptualized as a "way of seeing" whereby groups and individuals, political elites, and the institutions and intellectuals of statecraft, attempt to spatialize politics by implanting maps of meaning, relevance and order onto the highly complex and dynamic political universe they inhabit, observe, try to understand, and sometimes even desire to dominate, then, undoubtedly there is a long lineage of geopolitical thought, theorizing and practices on the subcontinent. Contingent as well as context-bound, geopolitics can also be considered "intimately bound up with the nation-state and its capacity to produce, regulate and survey political space."[1]

Jean Gottmann once remarked that "the geographer must keep the past in mind if he wants to understand the 'whys' behind the present problems and the present landscapes."[2] In agreement with such insight, this paper argues that Indian geopolitics is best understood in its historical and discursive context of theorizing and practices. The paper begins with a brief overview of geopolitical impulses and characteristics of

ancient and medieval India from a geo-historical perspective. This is followed by a critical examination of various facets of the geopolitics of the Raj, with special reference to the manner in which "India" was imagined, constructed and represented by the British. The analysis then shifts to a discussion of some of the major institutional and ideological legacies of British rule, especially those inherited by the dominant geopolitical discourse and practices of the post-colonial state in India. The key enquiry relates to the dominant geopolitical idioms, myths and representational practices used by the post-colonial, "not-yet-nation" state to inscribe something called India and endow that entity with a content, history, meaning, trajectory and unity. Whereas the concluding parts of the essay critically examine the nature and implications of an increasingly influential geopolitics of "Hindutva" or "Hindu nationalism" and attempt to deconstruct the geopolitical reasoning deployed by the Hindu nationalists to carve out a homogenous and monolithic "Hindu" identity from a remarkably diverse and eclectic cultural tradition on the subcontinent. The question raised above is now recast in accordance with the tone and tenor of Hindu nationalist discourse: what are the key geopolitical idioms, myths and representational practices employed by the Hindu nationalists to inscribe something called India and endow that entity with a Hindu content, a Hindu history, a Hindu meaning, a Hindu trajectory and a Hindu unity?

The analytical approach adopted in this paper is inspired, on the one hand, by the fast expanding and impacting literature on what has come to be known as "Critical Geopolitics,"[3] which is centered on the Foucauldian premise that power, knowledge and geopolitics are bound together in an intricate and intimate manner.[4] In this perspective, Geography is understood to be a matter of social construction, and the manner in which the lands and the seas, the mountains and the rivers, assume relevance for politics depends essentially on how geography is perceived and constructed from time to time. But on the other hand, this paper draws upon an astute observation made by Jean Gottmann in one of his books on the geography of Europe. Gottmann wanted to explore the extent to which the distinctive features of Europe belong to the pattern of culture rather than to natural environment. While he agreed with the view that social environment puts its imprint on people's ways of living and acting, particularly on their under-

standing of the physical milieu, he also believed that "the stable, permanent features of the physical environment are the raw material out of which men model the finished product, the work of art that appears to the stranger as a 'local landscape'."[5]

Critical geopolitical writers also aim at exploring the manner in which geopolitical reasoning is integrated into a political discourse to sustain, augment and justify social and political practices of dominance in national as well as international politics.[6] A discourse, in a general sense, is a meaning-producing work. It demarcates the limits within which a set of ideas and practices is held to be "natural"; that is, it determines what questions are considered relevant or even intelligible.[7] Discourses, therefore, are practices of significance, providing a set of rules or perspectives for the acquisition and organization of knowledge, with its own dominant metaphors that facilitate further knowledge and insights, but simultaneously limit it. The dominant discourse not only provides the interpretative context within which "facts" are assigned significance but also determines which facts are to be interpreted; and thereby help to sustain and legitimate certain perspectives and interpretations. As far as the colonial discourse is concerned, as pointed out by Sara Mills, "it does not simply refer to a body of texts with similar subject matter, but rather refers to a set of practices and rules which produced those texts and the methodological organization of the thinking underlying these texts."[8] Such colonial, or for that matter, post-colonial discourse(s), often framed and flagged in negative terms of the "Other" could be usefully deconstructed to acquire some insight into how the struggle over representation has far-reaching effects. How are places and peoples (natural-human-cultural geographies) forced, for example, to be categorized, and to categorize themselves, within the Geographies of imperial/national knowledge systems? Yet it is seldom that the former are totally subsumed or mastered or dominated by the latter. Nor for that matter is the interplay, or rather tension, between representation(s) of unity and resistance of diversity ever resolved.

The geopolitical impulses and flows of ancient and medieval India: An overview

The historicity of the state in India is much older than the actual state itself. Though the Republic of India was "born" only in 1950, the *Arthashastra,* written at least three centuries before the birth of Christ, suggests a much older state tradition.[9] Even the idea of building up one empire on the Indian subcontinent is more than 2,500 years old and according to some scholars appears to some to be "the product of India's physical and political geography."[10] Owing to geographical and racial diversities, ancient India is said to have found itself divided into a large number of warring states and races. Hence the need for a political unification of the subcontinent under one empire within its geographical limits being felt and pursued from time to time. This is seen in the birth of certain geopolitical concepts like the concept of *Chakravartin;* a ruler the wheels of whose chariot roll everywhere without obstruction. As Inden puts it:

> The agent that remade all of India, the "entire earth," as an imperial formation was the king of kings who, together with his court, succeeded in the eyes of those who constituted the polities of an imperial formation, in exercising his supremacy over other would-be claimants. He was the king called a Chakravartin, a "universal monarch" or "lord of the entire earth" ... The idea of the Chakravartin, of a universal monarch, and with it the idea that "sovereignty" or, rather, overlordship over the earth, was a whole to be embodied in one polity (and not a particular to be instantiated in indepen-

dent sovereign nation-states) appeared before the time of the Mauryas ... it becomes evident that the notion of universal kingship was embedded in the day-to-day practices of the Indian polities.[11]

After the 6th century BC, with the rise of the kingdom of *Magadha* (which included approximately 80,000 villages), the Indian geopolitical situation entered a new phase of development. *Magadha* under king Bimbisara started the process of empire building, reaching its peak under the king emperor Chandra Gupta Maurya. It was during this period that the most comprehensive treatise of statecraft of classical times in India appeared. Kautilya, also known as Chanakya and Vishnugupta, wrote the *Arthashastra.* During the period when the *Arthashastra* would possibly have been written, i.e. between the 4th century BC and AD 150, there were only two empires, the Nanda and the Mauryan. In fact Chandragupta Maurya was the first conqueror to join together the Indus Valley and the Gangetic plain in one vast empire. The political map of the subcontinent showed not more than six large kingdoms in the Gangetic plain, various republics in the predominantly hilly areas in the west and the north and a number of smaller kingdoms whose relative independence might have varied with the power of the large neighbor.

Most of what Kautilya is concerned with in the *Arthashastra* is not the reality that prevailed during his times, but a *future* reality, which *ought* to be realized or, alternatively, prevented (fig. 1).

As pointed out by L.N. Rangarajan, "He [Kautilya] does not deal with a particular state in a historical time, but with the state as a concept."[12] A hypothetical Kautliyan country was a compact unit ruled by a king, or, in some cases, an oligarchy of chiefs. It is interesting to note the importance that Kautilya gives to his imaginary state. He envisages a number of natural features – mountains, valleys, plains, deserts, jungles, lakes and rivers – though all these may not be found in reality in every country. The *frontier* regions were either mountainous or jungles inhabited by tribes which were not completely under the control of the king. The frontier was protected by forts, especially on trade routes to other countries. References to ships and trade by sea show that some countries had a sea coast. The well laid-out and fortified main city, situated in the central part of the country, was also located near a perennial water source. The *janapadas* or countryside consisted of villages with clearly marked boundaries and roads of different widths, depending on the nature of traffic, connecting not only the towns and villages but also the country with its neighbors.

Since, in the Kautilyan view, the king encapsulates all the constituents of a state, he expounded the theory in terms of the king – any king. In other words, what Kautilya calls the "interest of the king" would nowadays be termed "national interest." In the geopolitical imagination of Kautilya and his construction of a Kautilyan State, the king is designated as *vijigishu* – the king who wants to win or the "would-be conqueror." A neighboring king is then designated as "the enemy," and other kings nearby as allies, a Middle King or a Neutral King. Two things need to be emphasized here:

• First, the terminology employed by Kautilya defines only a set of relationships and therefore the conqueror need not necessarily be a "good king" and, correspondingly, the enemy a "bad king." The advice given to the conqueror can equally be applied by the enemy.

• Second, the *Arthashastra* is concerned with the security and foreign policy needs of a small state, in an environment with numerous other small states. Consequently, the scope for enlargement of this small state was limited to the Indian subcontinent. To Kautilya, "the area extending from the Himalayas to the north to the sea in the south and a thousand yojanas wide

Fig. 1: India as revealed by the Kautilya Arthashastra. *(Source:* Joseph E. Schwartzberg, *A Historical Atlas of South Asia,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 16).

from east to west is the area of operation of the King Emperor."[13]

In other words, whatever notion of *Lebensraum* is to be found in the *Arthashastra,* territories beyond the subcontinent are not included, probably for the reason that the conqueror is expected to establish in the conquered territories a social order based on the Arya's *dharma* (duty, right and justice), *varna* (four principal classes described in Manu's code; the more modern word being caste) and *ashram* (four stages in the life of a Brahman:

• student of the Veda;
• householder;
• anchorite; and,
• abandoner of all worldly concerns)

systems.

And Kautilya perhaps thought that the establishment of such a social order outside the limits of India was neither practical nor desirable. Moreover, plenty of land was available for settlement, indicating a fairly low density of population and many uninhabited tracts.

According to yet another argument the reason why there were no compulsions for territorial expansion was that "her (India's) large size of subcontinental proportion, her diversified natural resource base, her favourable location with reference to oceans and landmasses made the country in a great measure self sufficient."[14] Whereas, according to K.M. Panikkar,

In terms of pressure on space India's geographical problem is different from that of European countries. *She has no*

necessity to expand, from the point of view of security or defense. Her size, her location in reference to oceans and landmasses make a policy of territorial expansion outside her boundaries unnatural. Kautilya defined Chakravarti Patha or the empire state as extending 2,000 yojanas from the Himalayas across the peninsula of India, and the idea of extending the territories beyond the natural frontiers of India was never a factor with the most powerful rulers of India. It may be assumed therefore that the question of space never worried Indian political thinkers. *Himachala Sétu Paryantam* – from the Himalayas to Rameswaram – was their conception of India. Every ruler with imperial pretensions tried to extend his authority over the whole area ...

But outside the natural frontiers of the Indian sub-continent, they never tried to build up effective rule. Chandragupta Maurya no doubt extended his empire to the Hindukush as a result of this treaty with Seleucus ... but we do not know whether it involved only a sphere of influence with autonomy for local rulers or was directly administered from Pataliputra. In any case, it seems to have been given up after Asoka. No other Indian king seems to have held territory outside the Indian sub-continent, though many monarchs of Central Asian origin from Kanishka to Shah Jehan held the Hindukush valley with their capitals in India. *That this was an unnatural geographical agglomeration was again and again demonstrated when after a generation or two the extra Indian territories had to be given up in favour of India. So, one of the main preoccupations of European geopolitics, that is the*

desire for space, has not the same significance in India.[15] (emphasis supplied).

This is why perhaps the main preoccupations of European geopolitics, including matters such as *lebensraum,* have had little significance for India. Also, there is no equivalent of Mackinder's "Heartland" thesis, with its power-political understandings of location, size and resources, in Indian geopolitical thinking.

The analysis so far might convey the impression that the traditional geopolitical impulses on the subcontinent were exclusively land-centric. According to K.M. Panikkar, who in the opinion of this author can be called the Indian "philosopher of sea power" (a term often used for the American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan), the control of the Indian seas belonged predominantly to India till the 13th century AD, a period he describes as the "Hindu period in Indian Ocean." According to him the earliest Indian literature, the Vedas (1,500 BC) speak of sea voyages, and "next to the Himalayas, what has affected Indian history more than any other geographical factors is the Indian Ocean."[16]

The long span of 1,500 years of Hindu colonialism, mostly in Burma and Southeast Asia, was largely economic, cultural and religious in nature. In the 9th century, Hindu kingdoms were established throughout Southeast Asia. In the coastal regions of Sumatra and Java, the smaller islands, and the Malay Peninsula, the populace earned its living by trade and was strongly influenced by contacts with Hindu culture. The Shailendra dynasty (c. 760-860) blended indigenous Indonesian culture with Sanskrit literature and Brahmin and Saivite versions of Hinduism. Great imperial palaces and Hindu and Buddhist monumental tombs were constructed by these very early rulers. The physical remnants can be seen at Angkor Wat and elsewhere in Cambodia and Indonesia, while the cultural remnants permeate these societies. According to one viewpoint, these overseas Hindu kingdoms should not be seen as extensions or projections of an all India-based power; "it may well be that Indian society was so well adapted to overseas colonialism that little or no force was needed."[17]

According to a keen observer of Indian geopolitics what we do find on the subcontinent is a historic core region, which,

> ... lies at the centre of the gigantic Indo-Gangetic plain, which extends across the north of the subcontinent. The watershed region between them includes the Punjab (meaning "five rivers") and the upper course of Ganga and Jamuna. Together these make up the *Madhya-desa,* the middle land around which the first Indian state (Bharat) was formed. The Ganga-Jamuna region has remained the major centre of power since the earliest times. It was here that the principal core regions of the Indian states have been located and where the salient characteristics of Indian (Hindu) culture became evident. The mountains which ring the subcontinent to the north together with the Deccan plateau to the south have been a part of the dominant state during the period of its maximum territorial extent, although the far north and the far south, the latter including the island of Srilanka, have only rarely been incorporated into it. The major axis of communication, the "Grand Trunk Road," extends from northwest to southeast following the line of the river system, and the major centres of political power have almost always been located on or near to it.[18]

While it is difficult to challenge the dominant position of the Gangetic Valley, which makes it the core of India from every point of view, it has been argued equally forcefully that "the unity of the Deccan tableland (geographically a plateau commencing with the Ajanta Range, where the ancient undisturbed rock begins to extend over the Centre of the Peninsula right up to the Nilghiris) is as much an obvious geographic fact,

as the unity of the Gangetic Valley ... The Deccan has always formed the great middle rampart of India and the Gangetic valley was not able at any time to establish over it a secure footing."[19]

Not until the Mughal period (1526-1858), did the "Indian state radically intensify its direct impingement on the life of the common people. Even then, it was like a matted lattice work, or a canopy, open on all sides, suspended over the affairs of rural or inner-city quotidian life."[20] In the Indian subcontinent Islam had been introduced – in the early 8th century via the Arabian Sea and later to the Malabar coast in the south – into an already developed civilization defined by agriculture, urbanization, higher religions, and complex political regimes. "The Muslim conquests brought a new elite and a new level of political integration, and began the process of generating a new culture blending universal Muslim concepts and symbols of statecraft, cosmopolitan artistic pursuits such as architecture and painting, and regional motifs."[21] Whereas the Mauryans had replaced traditional military-tribal patterns of governance with a system based upon rules and regulations – which eventually collapsed due to excessive decentralization – the Mughals, under Akbar, reintroduced bureaucracies to accommodate ambitious and powerful local leaders who might have either revolted against the central authority or conspired together to depose that authority. It needs to be noted that for most of the subcontinent's history the typical pattern had been that even when there were no pan-Indian empires, there were long spells of orderly, organized governance at the regional level lasting for hundreds of years.

The reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707) not only witnessed the reversal of Akbar's policy of conciliation of Hindus in favor of Muslim supremacy, but also profound changes were introduced in the structure of Mughal nobility. He was the first ruler since Akbar to expand the frontiers of his empire. He absorbed East Bengal, pacified the Northwest Frontier, took direct control of Rajasthan, and expanded the Mughal empire in the Deccan. In the wake of invasions, especially of the Deccan, there was not only a sudden rise in the number of Hindu lords into the imperial elite, but also an increase in competition for scarce *jagirs,* factionalism, and the exploitation of peasants. After the death of Aurangzeb, the efficacy of Mughal rule was seriously undermined by struggles of succession, internal rebellions and foreign invasions. In the early 18th century, several regions of the Mughal empire became independent under the rule of local *mansabdars,* who had now become *nawabs.* For example, Hyderabad under Nizam became independent in 1723. In other parts of India, regimes based on Hindu lordships and popular uprising came to power. Hindu-governed principalities regained control of Rajasthan. In Punjab, religious and ethnic groups such as the Sikhs and the Jats established local regimes. By the middle of the 18th century, the Marathas controlled most of South India, and had replaced the Mughals as the dominant power in Gujarat. The Marathas after having consolidated their grip on central and Western India, formed five independent and expanding states, but were defeated at the battle of Panipat (1761) by the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Durrani. The way was also opened for the emergence of the British as the paramount power in India.

Once the colonial power began introducing a series of changes into the kaleidoscopic pattern of "autonomous spaces" of Indian society, or into what Sudipta Kaviraj describes as "a circle of circles, but each circle relatively unenumerated and incapable of acting as a collective group,"[22] the hitherto unbounded geopolitical impulses of Indian civilization would be subjected to spatialization by the intellectuals and institutions of colonial statecraft.

330

Fig. 2: Territorial and administrative changes, 1857-1904. *(Source:* Joseph E. Schwartzberg, *A Historical Atlas of South Asia,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 65).

Constructing "India" in the geopolitical imagination of the Raj

From 1757 to 1857, the English East India Company serially annexed, or else extended its indirect rule over, each of the Indian states (fig. 2).

Capitalizing fully its political, commercial and military prowess, the English company annexed into its direct rule some 2.5 million sq.km or one million sq.miles – over 60 percent of the territory of the subcontinent containing over three-quarters of its people.[23] In the wake of the brutal suppression of a widespread military and civil revolt which had spread through much of northern India in 1857 and 1858, the British, who had started their rule as "outsiders," became "insiders" by

vesting in their monarch the sovereignty through the Government of India Act of 2 August 1858.

However, the British knew that their efforts at social engineering were woefully inadequate in legitimizing British rule in India. Territorial annexation of India had to be supplemented by the annexation of "Indian" in imperial knowledge systems.[24] The mega-diversity of the subcontinent had to be reduced to the status of "familiar" and "intelligible," and established at the same time as "inferior," in the British vision of India. As Cohen puts it, "the period of 1860-1870 saw a rapid expansion of what might be thought of as the definition and expropriation of Indian civilization."[25] This process eventually led to the creation of an array of polarities that shaped much of the geopolitical ideology of the *Raj.*

Once the British started constructing "their India" during the later 19th century, they always had to negotiate the geopolitical disjuncture: between an acknowledgement of similarity, and an insistence upon difference. The task was inherently cumbersome. In order to demonstrate a set of fundamental differences between India and England, the British, together with the construction of a distinctive history that sustained them, also employed ideas of gender and race. In the imperial geopolitical imaginations of the British, points out Metcalf,

> There existed a "changeless" India inhabiting a past that endured in the present; an India of racial "decline" marked by the triumph of Dravidianism and the anarchy of the eighteenth century; and an India of a gendered "effeminacy" which made its women and men alike dependent on a benevolent British "masculinity." Each of these descriptions of India's difference had its own theoretical, even "scientific" rationale; each too was rent with deep contradictions both within itself, and in relation to the others. Above all, race and gender provided explanations of very different sorts for India's plight. The theory of racial decline announced a process of irreversible physical deterioration brought about by the mixing of blood, while the degeneracy defined by effeminacy was one of characters and morals.[26]

As an integral part of the larger Enlightenment project, which through observation, study, counting and classification attempted to understand the world outside Europe, the British set out to "order" the people who inhabited their new Indian dominion. It was crucial that India came to be known in such a manner that would sustain a system of colonial authority, and through categories that made it "look" fundamentally different. In other words, the categories the British would avoid were those which might announce India's similarity to Britain and threaten the colonial order. Accordingly, categories such as caste, community and tribe were placed at the heart of the Indian social system. Whereas class, which Victorian Englishmen considered as the most divisive factor in their own society, was conspicuous by its absence in the British accounts of Indian peoples.

Despite its inconsistencies and subordination to the needs of colonial rule, the British ethnographic enterprise had far-reaching consequences. For, these very categories – of caste and community, of race and sect – informed the ways in which the British, and in time the Indians themselves, conceived of the basic structure of their society.[27] It was only with the coming of British rule, from the late 18th century on, that the idea of two opposed and self-contained communities of the "Hindus" and the "Muslims" in India took a definite shape.[28] The two religious communities were defined, demarcated and demonized in terms of certain basic differences. In short, the British, by highlighting the centrality of religious community, along with that of caste, marked out India's distinctive status as fundamentally different land and peoples. What the British "construction of communalism" had willfully glossed over was the fact that the term "Hindu" was traditionally used not in any sense of a homogenous-monolothic religious belief but mainly as a signifier of location and country. The term has Persian-Arabic origin and derives from the river Indus or "Sindhu" (the cradle of the Indus Valley Civilization that flourished from around 3000 BC), and the name of that river is also the source of the word India itself. "The Persians and the Greeks saw India as the land around and beyond the Indus, and the Hindus were the native people of that land. Muslims from India were at one stage called 'Hindvi Muslims,' in Persian as well as Arabic, and there are plenty of references in early British documents to 'Hindoo Muslims' and 'Hindu Christians' to distinguish them respectively from Muslims and Christians from outside India."[29] Even when the term "Hindu" was used as a mar-

ker to distinguish those adhering to a non-Islamic faith, the perception each group had of the other was not in terms of a monolithic religion, but more in terms of distinct and disparate castes and sects along a social continuum.[30]

However, categories necessitate definition and definitions are in turn needed to impose order. This is where the geopolitics of census, which was introduced by the British in 1872, became integral to the British imperial mapping of India, with special reference to construction of mutually exclusive religious communities in terms of their particular demographic and geographical features. This is how the communal consciousness was forcefully injected into otherwise "fuzzy" communities. As Bhagat has ably shown it is hard to find evidence in support of a sustained communal hatred operating at the popular level prior to colonial rule. The partition of Bengal based on religion in 1905 was the most glaring example of how the British deployed a geopolitical discourse relating to the size of religious communities and their distribution to widen the rift between religious communities, especially between Hindus and Muslims. A new province of East Bengal and Assam was created with a predominance of Muslims in East Bengal in 1905. Speaking in Dacca in February 1904, Curzon offered the East Bengal Muslims "the prospect of unity which they have not enjoyed since the days of the old Musalman viceroys and kings."[31] The new communal consciousness was further perpetuated through the political instrument of separate electorates wherein religious minorities were given separate seats in the legislative bodies according to their proportion of population in the provinces. Even the seats in the government medical college Lahore were distributed in the ratio of 40:40:20 amongst Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in Punjab. Such a policy resulted in further sharpening of communal antagonism in the country, fixed Hindus and Muslims in hostile camps, exacerbated Hindu-Muslim divisions and fostered the spirit of political exclusiveness. Consequently, Muslims were made to "see" the advantage of pressing for special safeguards and concessions in accordance with numerical strength, social status, local influence and social requirement of their community. The following quotation explains why communal riots were so rare down to the 1880s. To quote Bhagat,

> In India social and cultural practices of Hindus and Muslims are inseparable. There are many so called Hindus whose religion has a strong Muhammadan flavour. Notable amongst these are the followers of strange "panchpiriya" cult, who worship five Mohammadan saints of uncertain name and identity and sacrifice poultry in their honour and employ for the purpose as their priest a Muhammadan "dafali fakir." In Gujarat there are several similar communities such as "matia kunbis" who call in brahmans for their chief ceremonies, but are followers of the Pirana saint Imam Shah and his successors, and bury their dead as do the Muhammadans, the "Sheikhadas," who at their wedding employ both a Hindu and a Muhammadan priest, and the "Momnas" who practice circumcision, bury their dead and read Gujarati Koran, but in other respects follow Hindu customs and ceremonial. The boundary line between Hindus on the one hand and Sikhs and Jains on the other is even more indeterminate. Even the census commissioner had reiterated "religions of India as we have already seen are by no means mutually exclusive." However, the practical difficulty in classifying the Indian population in terms of religious categories was solved by the census officials in their own way. The reconstruction of homogeneous and mutually exclusive communities was the main clutch through which divide and rule was possible. This was necessary for the sustenance of colonialism in India.[32]

Yet another dimension of the geopolitical "ordering" of India

under the Raj was the manner in which the "British Authority" came to be constructed, represented and exercised after 1858. Cohn[33] has examined at length the Imperial Assemblage of 1877 and the Imperial Darbars of 1903 and 1911, all organized at Delhi – which is the "political ritual centre" of India – in order to deconstruct the British authority and its representations in India. The so-called *Durbars* – meetings with large number of Indian princes, notables and Indians and British officials – at which honors and rewards were presented to Indians who had demonstrated *loyalty* to their foreign rulers during what the British had condemned as the "Mutiny" (1857-1858), conveyed that subordination to the colonial authority alone established privileges and ensured wealth and status.

One major geopolitical myth created by the "Imperial Assemblage" was that India was diversity, "ancient country of many nations," lacking in coherent communality except that given by British rule under the integrating system of the imperial crown. The enduring ideology that had sustained the Raj for so long was elaborated by Churchill, when he told the House of Commons in the debates on the 1935 Act, that there was "no real practical unity in India apart from British rule." Hence "liberty for India only means liberty for one set of Indians to exploit another." The British may have been only "the latest of many conquerors." but they alone had "made the well-being of the Indian masses their supreme satisfaction." As they had taken upon themselves this "mission in the East," the British could not simply "abdicate" it, and so "withdraw our guardianship from this teeming myriad population of Indian toilers."[34]

The British, however, were rather naïve in believing that through their archive for South Asia's geography (which comprised various images, maps, sketches, censuses, and textual descriptions), they could record and replicate the complexity of the Indian landscape. Moreover, Indians were not the passive and docile objects of the potent British vision which the British ontologically assumed them to be. They could and did resist in various ways the British conquest of the subcontinent and the reconstruction of the imperial space. There was, for example, resistance put up by villagers in various parts of the subcontinent against the surveys conducted from the hilltops; on account of the belief that the sacred geography of their native land was being violated. A detailed account of various instances of resistance to Imperial mapping, many of which are held in the East India Company's records, is yet to be written. Moreover, there were some areas of knowledge (such as the naming of rivers) that could not be reconciled with the ordered and structured space of the imperial geographical archive.

Apparently, a point that the British had missed altogether perhaps was that mapping the land of India has not been simply the domain of the cartographers of empires. One finds that in a range of Hindu traditions, map-making has been the domain of both cosmologists and mythmakers, and the imagined landscape they have created – a landscape shaped by the duplication and repetition of its features – is far more culturally powerful than that displayed on Bartholomew's map of India. One good example of duplication and replication is Ganga, considered as the most sacred river by the Hindus. Ganga as a whole is duplicated throughout India with seven major "Gangas" and numberless other rivers called Ganga. Furthermore, in this landscape networks of pilgrimage places have generated a powerful sense of land and location, not as a nation-state in the modern usage of the term, but as a shared, living landscape, with all its cultural and regional complexity. To quote Eck,

> The past 1,000 years of India's history have also included the flowering of an extensive Indo-Muslim culture with its own mental composition of the land, and with its own imagined landscape – a land enlivened with the heritage of kings and kingdoms, palaces and gardens, heroes and saints ...

there are many places where what we have come to call "Muslim," Hindu, Sikh or Christian traditions through the retrojective labeling of history have a lived-history and lived-reality of their own in which devotion has not subscribed to the boundaries of what we call the "religions" ... local examples of the confluence and layering of religious traditions around sacred sites abound.[35]

The imperial geopolitical imaginations/representations of the place(s) and people(s) on the subcontinent, despite their power-political potency and highly appealing reductionism could not entirely subsume the kaleidoscopic mega-diversity.

The post-colonial "nation-state" in India and the myth of geopolitical unity

The British were paid a handsome tribute in the early 1930s by Mahatma Gandhi when he conceded that the "Indian nation was a creation of the empire-builders. Independent India inherited the colonial nation."[36] As pointed out earlier in the paper, the colonial state was based on bureaucratic institutions and political values, which were not reflected in the historical experience of India. The amorphous structure of Indian civilization had shown the capacity to accommodate a multiplicity of social and linguistic identities, sometimes in a cluster of regional polities, and on other occasions in a somewhat fragile pan-Indian polity. Whereas, one of the major legacies of British rule in post-colonial India happens to be a uniquely colonial construct of the centralized state with an administrative bureaucracy and a standing army in particular, and the attendant ideological trappings of "ordered unity," "indivisible sovereignty" and the like. The westernized political elite of independent India, deeply influenced by the emergence of the liberal state in Europe in the late 18th century, did not seek to dismantle the colonial state. Instead this elite "attempted to conjure into existence a discourse which would democratize the colonial state. Indeed according to them, the democratic empowerment of a transformed colonial system was the most appropriate means of building a nation-state based on 'social and moral concern' for the citizens of a creative and independent polity."[37]

Extreme political instability in the wake of a bloody partition[38] was yet another fact that compelled the Indian state to place immediate emphasis on the state's coercive apparatuses, and to ensure, against the rhetoric of the national movement, that crucial parts of the apparatus of the colonial state did not crumble. The skirmish with Pakistan over Kashmir, the use of military force to integrate several recalcitrant princely states like Hyderabad into the Indian Union, the threat of communist insurgency in Telangana, all required a major recourse to the structures of army and bureaucracy that the colonial administration had left behind. As Kaviraj points out,

> ... the new state immediately entered a life of contradictions. The national state was an inheritor of two distinct, and in some ways, incompatible legacies. *It inherited the colonial state's systems of internal command and control, its administrative ethos, its laws and rules, and its three predominant characteristics to the popular mind: its marginality, its exteriority, and its persistent repressiveness against the lower strata of the people, who, at least in constitutional formality, were made the repository of sovereignty.* At the same time, it was successor to a triumphant national movement whose principal objective was to contest the culture of that state. Some of the ambiguities which had provided strength to the national movement, because it made it possible to draw on support from opposing social groups, now came to be the

issues of contention. *The historical circumstances of partition, dissidence, insurgency and war, made it inevitable that the apparatuses left behind by the colonial state would not be dismantled, but actually reinforced.*[39] (emphasis given)

Much in the British ideology of "difference" also survived and flourished in an independent India. Within the country, it left its mark above all in the conception of India as a society informed by a passionate commitment to community, and of the public arena as a site where communities contested for power. No doubt, after independence separate electorates were abolished and caste outlawed; and the 1950 constitution enshrined the values of secular democracy. Yet, behind the liberal rhetoric of the Nehru era, the structures crafted by the Raj, and affirmed during the course of the nationalist struggle, remained compelling. By far the most powerful were those of religious identity – as Hindu, Muslim and Sikh. As time went on, and the central government itself, together with the leaders of religiously based organizations, began openly to manipulate these communal loyalties for partisan advantage, such ties became ever more deeply embedded in Indian society.[40] We shall return to this theme later in the essay.

Once the political elite of post-colonial India began constructing its India as a "nation-state," it too was also compelled to negotiate the geopolitical disjuncture between an acknowledgement of difference (diversity) and an insistence upon similarity (unity). As pointed out earlier in the paper, the colonial state had faced more or less a similar dilemma while negotiating the disjuncture between an acknowledgement of similarity and an insistence upon difference between the "British" and the "Indians." The Indian state, however, chose to tackle the problem by constructing the "consciousness" of India as a single geopolitical entity, characterized by an organic unity.[41]

As already observed, the concept of the Indian subcontinent as an integrated unit has been implicitly invoked in many contexts over the millennia. "The idea has not only influenced the conception of the natural boundaries over which an emperor (such as Chandragupta Maurya, or Ashoka, or Akbar) would seek to establish command, but has also shaped the nature and domain of various economic, cultural and social movements."[42] Even if, as pointed out by Debabrata Sen,[43] the lineage of geopolitical thought has been inextricably bound up with the development of the sense of one Hindu civilization, it appears to be the modern Indian nationalism which produced unity of country in a way which had not always by any means been a part of India's historical experience. There has also been a deliberate and systematic attempt in the so-called "nationalist interpretations" of Indian history to focus on unity, rather than differences and discord within India.[44] To a large extent this was a reaction to the colonial thesis that India was diversity and it had no coherent communality except that given by British rule under the integrating system of the imperial crown. The nationalist counter-argument was that despite the diversity, there was an essential unity – and that this unity was not accidental, but some reflection of the unifying tendency in Indian culture and civilization as the ultimate foundation of nationalism. And then, as Sumit Sarkar puts it, "it becomes difficult – even for a Nehru, writing his *Discovery of India* – to resist the further slide toward assuming that that unity, after all, has been primarily Hindu (and upper-caste, often north Indian Hindu at that). The slide was made easier by the undeniable fact that the bulk of the leading cadres of the nationalists and leftist movements have come from Hindu upper-caste backgrounds."[45]

According to Austin[46] India's founding fathers were also forced by various pragmatic considerations to adopt the view that of all the characteristics of a "nation," unity is the most essential: no unity, no nation. Traumatized by the partition of India into two sovereign states, on the one hand, they faced

the daunting task of integrating over 500 princely states, which had been outside the circle of British administration. No less compelling in their view was the need to secure their new nation's frontiers as the successors to those of the British empire in the subcontinent. And they were faced with the task of designing a constitutional-administrative system to make an effective nation from India's diverse identities. Compulsions such as these drove them to establish a strong central government, a tight "federal" system capable of becoming "unitary" in national "emergencies." Much of this they had inherited in the 1935 Government of India Act. "The flavour was Mughal as well: Delhi had become habituated to viewing the rest of the country through imperial North Indian eyes – despite the notable figures who had come (and continue to come) to Delhi from elsewhere in India."[47]

Along with the myth of a civilizational unity one also finds in the Indian geopolitical thinking what Barun De calls the "myth of permanence" in the South Asian empires. According to De,

the Ashoka Empire was obviously the Indian government's beau ideal for the Indian state form. Adopting the symbols of the *Asoka Chakra* or the Asokan Lion capital, the Nehruvian Indian State harked back to the Asokan ideas of *satyameva jayate* and *dhammavijaya* as examples of syncretism and non-aligned diplomacy. Yet, historical data tells us that the Mauryan empire hardly lasted more than a hundred years and the Mughal Empire, as a politically stable entity, is supposed even by its greatest contemporary scholars to have lasted not more than a hundred and fifty years – from Akbar to Aurangzeb. Obscured by the Leviathian imperial tradition which, in the Asokan, Gupta, Mughal and British cases, rose from or collapsed into smaller principalities or state structures, there are at least two thousand years of political history of small principalities.[48]

"Cartographic anxieties" of post-colonial and post-partition India

In today's India one finds two principal geopolitical imaginations competing over the "core essence" of India's national unity and national identity: the "secular nationalist" – combining territory and culture; and the "Hindu nationalist" – combining religion and territory.[49] It is significant that for both the geopolitical imaginations, the defining principle of national identity is *territory*. The geo-body of India, according to the secular imagination, emphasized for 2,500 years since the times of the *Mahabharata,* stretches from the Himalayas in the north to *Kanya Kumari* (Cape Comrin) in the south, and from the Arabian Sea in the west to the Bay of Bengal in the east. The Indian subcontinent is not only the birthplace of several religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism), but has also received, accommodated and absorbed "outsiders" (Parsis, Jews, and "Syrian" Christians) over a long period of time. What make Indian civilization unique, therefore, are the virtues of syncretism, pluralism and tolerance reflected in the cultural expression: *Sarva Dharma Sambhava* (equal respect for all religions).

The most noteworthy example of India's national identity is Jawaharlal Nehru's book entitled *The Discovery of India* (1946). In Nehru's construction of India, syncretism, pluralism and tolerance are the signature themes. For Nehru, "some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization." He "discovers" India's unity as lying in culture and not religion – hence no notion of a "holyland" in his mental map of the country. For him the heroes of India's history – Ashoka, Kabir, Guru Nanak, Amir Khusro, Akbar and Gandhi – subscribe to a variety of Indian faiths and it is Aurangzeb, the intolerant Moghul, who "puts the clock back."

India's geography was sacred to Nehru not literally but meta-phorically.[50]

Nehru's secular nationalist construction of India stands in sharp contrast to the religious notion of India as originally the land of Hindus, and it is the only land which the Hindus can call their own.[51] According to V.D. Savarkar, the ideological father of Hindu nationalism, "A Hindu is he who feels attached to the land that extends from Sindhu to Sindhu [from river Indus to the seas] as the land of his forefathers – as his Fatherland; who inherits the blood of the great race whose first and dis-cernible source could be traced from the Himalayan altitudes of the Vedic *Saptasindhus* and which enabling all that was assimilated has grown into and come to be known as the Hindu people."[52] What is said to unite India's physical land-scape is the "sacred geography" of Hindu holy places (Benaras, Triputi, Rameswaram, Puri, Haridwar, Badrinath, Kedarnath, and now Ayodhya) and the holy rivers (Cauveri, Ganga, Yamuna, and the confluence of the last two in Prayag).

It is important to note that the boundaries of India as sug-gested by the secular-nationalist are coterminous with the "sacred geography" of the Hindu nationalist whose hallowed pilgrimage sites mark off essentially the same boundaries of the country, although the Hindu nationalist would go much fur-ther into mythic history than two and a half millennia to assert "historic rights" on these sites. As Varshney (1993, p. 238) remarks:

> Since the territorial principle is drawn from a belief in ancient heritage, encapsulated in the notion of "sacred geography," and it also figures in both imaginations [secularist and nationalist] it has acquired political hegemony over time. It is the only thing common between the two competing national-ist imaginations. Therefore, just as America's most passion-ate political moment concerns freedom and equality, India's most explosive moments concern its "sacred geography," the 1947 partition being the most obvious example. Whenever the threat of another break-up, another "partition" looms large, the moment unleashes remarkable passions in politics. Politics based on this imagination is quite different from what was seen when Malaysia and Singapore split from each other, or when the Czech or Slovak republics sep-arated. Territory not being such an inalienable part of their national identity, these territorial divorces were not desecra-tions. In India, they become desecrations of the sacred geography.[53]

The anxiety surrounding questions of national unity, often expressed in terms of "territorial integrity" is shared by both the secular-nationalists and the Hindu-nationalists. According to Sankaran Krishna[54] such "cartographic anxiety" permeates a society that perceives itself as suspended forever in the space between the "former colony" and "not-yet-nation." Such a state of perpetual suspension can be observed not only in the dis-cursive production of India as a bounded sovereign entity but also in everyday politics. According to Krishna, the degree of anxiety revealed by the state over matters of cartographic rep-resentation, the obsession with notions of security and purity, the disciplinary practices that define *Indian* and *non-Indian*, *patriot* and *traitor, insider* and *outsider, mainstream* and *marginal,* and the *physical* and *epistemic* violence that pro-duces the border illustrate that the real continues to succumb to the imaginary.[55]

The ongoing tension between the mega diversity of the sub-continent and the disciplinary, homogenizing practices of statecraft is also illustrated by the fact that Nehru, despite his firm belief in the timeless existence of a spiritual and civiliza-tional entity called India, is forced to begin his modern recon-struction of India's past in *Discovery of India* (1946) with a graphic description of the country's "natural" frontiers. And in

Nehru's *Autobiography*[56] also, one finds occasional refer-ences to the need for safeguarding the physical boundaries of the nation; tracing the country's downfall to porous frontiers and, more importantly, to unfortunate timing by which a dis-united and fragmented India succumbed to the cresting and united civilization of the British. According to Nehru what was broken up at the time of partition was something very vital and that was the body of India.[57] As Dijkink points out, what Nehru was actually seeking to overcome in his historical perspective spanning 2,500 years or more, was 200 years of British rule. "His idea of unity was nonetheless conditioned by the era he wanted to wipe out."[58]

Early on, the actual foreign policy of an independent India was shaped by Nehru himself and his chief foreign policy adviser, Krishna Menon.[59] Their distinctive world-view had emerged out of the long struggle with the British and out of the wider process of decolonization then taking place. A fairly illustrative account of Nehru's geopolitical vision can be found in his book *The Discovery of India* (1946) especially in the chapter entitled "Realism and Geopolitics, World Conquest or World Association: The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R." What ap-pears as most striking in Nehru's geopolitical thinking is the curious mix of "idealism" and "realism," "internal" and "exter-nal" on which he relies to construct his vision of the post-war world and India's role in it. Nehru is critically dismissive of the geopolitical theories of Mackinder and Spykman, which, accord-ing to him, are the pseudo-scientific justifications for the "power quest," "power politics" and "world domination." To quote Nehru,

> Geopolitics has now become the anchor of the realist and its jargon of "heartland" and "rimland" is supposed to throw light on the mystery of national growth and decay. Originating in England (or was it Scotland?), it became the guiding light of the nazis, fed their dreams and ambitions of world domina-tion, and led them to disaster ... And now even the United States of America are told by Professor Spykman, in his last testament, that they are in danger of encirclement, that they should ally themselves with a "rimland" nation, that in any event they should not prevent the "heartland" (which means now the USSR) from uniting with the rimland.[60]

Behind Nehru's world-view and underlying his reflections on the desirability and feasibility of a just and peaceful post-war world order, one finds a much larger and deeper geopolitical concern with India's internal-domestic situation, and with the need for a foreign policy that would safeguard a "dream of unity" that according to Nehru had occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. He is thoroughly convinced about the unity of India – within its British Imperial borders. To quote Nehru, "thus, we arrive at the inevitable and ineluctable conclusion that, whether Pakistan comes or not, a number of important and basic functions of the state must be exercised on an all-India basis if India has to survive as a free state and progress. The alternative is stagnation, decay and disintegra-tion, leading to the loss of political and economic freedom, both for India as a whole and its various separated parts."[61] Views about a future division of India are subjected to the same criti-cism that Nehru levels at traditional realist power politics: the small-nation state is a phenomenon of the past, and territorial division of India would soon reveal how dependent both new units are on each other and would immediately raise the need for a federal association. Besides, any acceptable territorial division would leave the Muslims with a territory that was both smaller and economically less viable. The prospect for the Indian subcontinent was, according to Nehru, either "union plus independence or disunion plus dependence."[62] The tragic events of the separation of India and Pakistan, as Dijkink points out, "suggest that Nehru was actually engaged in 'con-structing' rather than 'discovering' India."[63]

In the geopolitical calculations of Krishna Menon, "external affairs" were "only a projection of internal or national policy in the field of International Relations."[64] And to a large extent, this was reflected in India's policy of non-alignment. The Indian foreign policy elite, according to Jean Houbert,[65] opted for non-aligned India also because it enhanced the ability of the Indian state in "containing" communism in its domestic politics. Given that the Communist movement in India was neither homogenous nor united in one well-organized party, any challenge on its left could be tackled by the Congress without the Soviet Union intervening. Moreover, non-alignment provided India with the means to save on military spending and put the priority on social and economic development, "thus winning the allegiances of the electorate and cutting the grass from under the feet of the communists."[66] External as well as internal security considerations too were likely to be better served by non-alignment than by joining the Western military alliances. But there was more than security and ideology to India's support for non-alignment; it "would also enhance the power of India ... by harnessing the moral dimension of international politics non-alignment provides India with more power in its weakness than alignment would do ... thus the ideology of peace was bound together with India's security interests and power considerations in the non-aligned policy."[67]

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, independent India's first Home Minister, hailed by many as the Bismarck of India, is yet another example of how "national unity" and "national identity" of post-colonial India dominated the perceptions and priorities of its political elite. In the words of K.P.S. Menon, the former Foreign Secretary of India, "when the British left India the unity of even divided India was in danger. Some 560 Princely States had been left in the air. It was open to them to adhere to India, to accede to Pakistan, or to remain independent ... It almost looked as if India was going to be balkanized. But this danger was averted by the firm handling of the Princes by a man of iron, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel."[68] To Sardar Patel, as Krishna points out, "Hyderabad seemed to have mattered much more than Kashmir. Situated as it was in India's belly, he naturally asked: 'How can the belly breathe if it is cut off from the main body?' That would have sounded the death-knell of Patel's dream of One India; and the cancer of disunity and divisiveness would have spread to totally balkanize the country."[69]

Even a casual observer of the Indian geopolitical scene cannot fail to notice an increasing obsession with the threats – real and/or imaginary – emanating from across the border to the "unity and integrity" of India; the "alien" infiltration with a shadowy "foreign hand" is out to destabilize and destroy the body as well as the soul of the nation. The Indian state has inherited its discourse as well as practices on borders or borderlands from the imperial powers, becoming totally oblivious in the process that the geo-histories of the borders of so-called "South Asia" were actually written by those who were "creating" or "constructing" them in the first place for their own power-political gains. Consequently, the maps that were drawn by the imperial power are both too static and too simple to capture the diversity and the dynamism of the South Asian borderlands. As Paula Banerjee points out,

The last two decades in the twentieth century have witnessed the formulation of policies to make South Asian borders more rigid. Yet a glance at the history of the region will show that the concept of demarcated borders, both inter and intrastate, was not considered viable. It still remains to be seen whether it is wrong to contend that South Asian frontiers cannot be dissected into rigid boundaries, but can at best be organized as borderlands. The concept of strategic frontiers is mainly an imperial and western one. When the British carved up South Asia, they did it largely on paper; the ruling classes in the States thus created then ossified those

borders due to power considerations. This goes against the social, cultural and economic traditions of the region.[70]

The remarkable influence of Curzon's legacy on the Indian state can be well gauged from the fact that it is still unable to get out of the mind set that it has inherited, so much so that even today it continues to deny its own citizens access to maps of the border region, even outdated ones.

The persistent concern of the Indian state, often bordering on obsession, with the "territorial integrity" of its geopolitical realm, is well reflected through the manner in which the Indian state relates itself to its immediate neighbors on the subcontinent, especially Pakistan. Be it the secular-nationalist imagination or the Hindu-nationalist imagination, the geographical size of India and the ideal of its unity are often cited as key differences between India and Pakistan, with the latter being described as a fabrication of geo-political necessity split into two parts separated by a thousand miles. Integral to the geopolitics of place-making on the subcontinent, having acquired hegemonic categorical forms in the imperial mapping of "India" as two opposed and self-contained communities of Hindus and Muslims, authenticated by the "un-clean partition," the otherness in the case of India and Pakistan persists in its various avatars.[71] Pakistan is portrayed by the hawks in India as an inherently hostile, monolithic, identity-crisis ridden society populated and run by fanatics, who would like to "crush" India's unity, and who would not mind risking yet another war (even nuclear war) over Jammu and Kashmir to complete the "unfinished task of partition." Today, just about every other act of subversion in India is blamed on the elusive but omnipresent Pakistani ISI.[72]

This major bone of contention between India and Pakistan, the northernmost state of the Indian Union, namely Jammu and Kashmir, is a good example of how peoples and places with distinctive histories, cultures and ethno-linguistic identities can be reduced to the status of mere "issues" in the geopolitical imaginations of the intellectuals and institutions of statecraft. At the heart of the dominant Indian discourse on Kashmir lies the polemical two-nation theory. While India is said to have somehow reconciled itself to the theory as an "inevitability,"[73] Pakistan is accused of having adopted a rigid position that "the partition of the subcontinent will remain incomplete till all Muslim-majority areas of India either become part of it or are independent Muslim political entities."[74] India's commitment to principles of plurality, synthesis and co-existence – transcending the factors of ethnicity, language, religion and sub-regional identities – is contrasted sharply to Pakistan's devotion to the religious homogeneity of Islam as the sole basis for national and territorial identity. Attempts continue to be made by certain ruling regimes in both Pakistan and India from time to time to re-claim and re-write their respective "national" pasts to suit their present political ideologies.[75] Pakistani contention that Kashmir was a part of Muslim kingdoms over the last 1,200 years and more, is strongly challenged by Indian historians on the ground that history neither commences nor ends abruptly. If Kashmir was a part of Muslim kingdoms and empires, then it was also a Hindu and Buddhist polity at some stage. India remains adamant in its stand that if the political and territorial affiliations were to be based on religious and historical arguments, the political map not only of the Indian subcontinent but of the whole world would have to undergo a radical transformation.

However, once the sanctity of national borders is held to be synonymous with the very existence/survival of the state of the Indian "union" by various political groups right across the ideological spectrum, the perceived indispensability of "secure" or "inviolable" borders for national unity, national development, and a coherent-cogent national identity itself, diverts attention from the violence that continues to define and defend the bor-

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der.[76] A classic example of how a "production of border" can lead to a senseless costly "war" over frozen wastes is that of conflict between India and Pakistan over the Siachen Glacier. According to a recent study,

> The ongoing conflict in Siachen has become embedded in the Indian public consciousness as a symbol of national will and determination to succeed against all odds. Siachen has acquired a sanctity of its own, which is part folklore, part military legend, part mythology, and a substantial measure of national pride ... the beginning of the conflict had much to do with geography, geopolitics and strategic perceptions. Not all strategic assumptions that were brought to bear in the 1980s were entirely right. They were perceived to be correct then, but time and events have shown them to be flawed.[77]

The Siachen conflict is a good example of how a state-centric geopolitical reasoning, while fully drawing upon the emotive symbolism of heroism, sacrifice, and honor, diverts critical gaze away from the social-ecological impact of this unending warfare on the places and peoples of Jammu and Kashmir. Whereas the fact that even though the glacier is miles from the nearest Pakistani military positions in the Karakorams, the local headquarters is often reported by official and popular media as being in the Siachen area, reveals the (geo)politics of cleverly crafted as well as grafted locations.

The rise of "Hindutva" geopolitics: Re-mapping India

Today, in many parts of India, especially the northern and central states, a new Hindu identity is under construction.[78] This process is undoubtedly assisted to a considerable extent by the fact that this identity is also the basis of political mobilization by the party in power in New Delhi, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP is the only cadre-based party in India in the real sense of the term. Unlike the Communist parties and the Congress, having their front organizations with distinctive identities, the BJP is a political arm of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS, National Voluntary Corps), meant to implement its program. The RSS, also known as Sangh Parivar (family), has emerged since its inception in 1925 as *the* organization articulating Hindu revivalism, especially among the youth, devoted to the establishment of a "vibrant Hindu nation" with the ethos of the alleged Golden Vedic Age at its core.[79] According to Tanika Sarkar, "reification and mystification of the country have been fundamentally necessary for the [geo]political project of Hindutva nationalism. The premise of this project is an authoritarian, militaristic and overcentralized polity. The image of threatening neighbors outside and treacherous Muslims within – both of whom are united by a common Muslim identity – is intended to keep the nation an aggressive and unsatisfied whole."[80]

A geopolitical discourse, according to Ó Tuathail and Agnew, signifies much more than the identification of specific geographical influences upon a particular foreign policy situation; "to identify and name a place is to trigger a series of narratives, subjects and understandings."[81] For example, to designate an area as "Hindu"or "Islamic" amounts not only to a naming ritual, but also to enframing it in terms of its "sacred geography," "authentic politics" and the type of foreign policy that its "nature" demands. Geopolitical discourses are rendered meaningful and "legitimate" largely through practical geopolitical reasoning, which relies more on common-sense narratives and distinctions than on formal geopolitical models. One good example of what has been said above is the section entitled "Hindutva: The Great National Ideology" on the official website of the BJP. The opening stanzas read in part as follows:

> In the long history of the world, the Hindu awakening will go down as one of the most monumental events ... Never before has Bharat, the ancient word for the motherland of the Hindus, India, been confronted with such an impulse for change. This movement, Hindutva is changing the very foundations of Bharat and Hindu society the world over ... During the era of Islamic invasions, what Will Durant called the bloodiest period in the history of mankind, many Hindus gallantly resisted, knowing full well that defeat would mean a choice of economic discrimination, via the *jaziya* tax on non-Muslims, forced conversion, or death ... In modern times, Hindu *Jagriti* [awakening] gained momentum when Muslims played the greatest abuse of Hindu tolerance; the demand for a separate state and the partition of India, a nation that had a common history and culture for countless millennia. Thus the Muslims voted for a separate state and the Hindus were forced to sub-divide their own land.[82]

According to Savarkar, as mentioned earlier in the paper, "A Hindu means a person who regards his land ... from the Indus to the Seas as his Fatherland as well as his Holyland."[83] In order to qualify as a "Hindu" a person or a group must meet three criteria: *territorial* (land between the Indus and the Seas), *genealogical* ("fatherland") and *religious* ("holyland"). Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists can be part of this definition, for they were born in India and meet all three criteria. Whereas Christians, Jews, Parsis (already assimilated) and Muslims meet only two. India is not their "holyland."

It has been ably argued by Satish Deshpande that globalization and Hindutva are impacting on each other in contradictory as well as complimentary ways, "making it difficult to hold on to any unidimensional conception of their reciprocal involvement. One important aspect of this mutual impact is the globalization of Hindutva itself, the globalization of its congregations and constituencies. The emergence of what might be called 'non-resident Hindutva' (especially in the USA and the UK) provides an obvious instance where the 'portability' as well as the 'changelessness' of its essence are simultaneously highlighted. Today, when the world is witness to more and more such ongoing negotiations (involving both collusion and collisions) between the local and the globalised faces of ethnicity, the net impact is too complex to predict."[84]

Conclusions

This essay has shown that in numerous ways the complex, multi-layered nature of Indian geopolitics can be attributed to the ceaseless interplay between the natural and imagined geographies on the subcontinent. Once encountered with the mega diversity on the subcontinent, the "Geopolitics of Raj" addressed itself largely to the task of *constructing* differences between the "British" and the "Indians" on the one hand, among the "Indians" on the other, and the *disciplining* of those differences through the transformation of "fuzzy" communities into homogenous-monolithic categories. Whereas the major geopolitical concerns of the post-Colonial State ("Nation-State"!) in India seem to revolve around

- the uncontested *inheritance* of certain colonial legacies, especially the British ideology of "communal" difference in India;
- the subtle but at times harsh denial and disciplining of religious, socio-economic and linguistic diversity by invoking the myth of "geopolitical unity"; and,
- the growing tendency on the part of the Indian state to deal "authoritatively," both at home and abroad, with mounting cartographic anxieties over preserving the "territorial integrity" of the country, a concern shared by both the so-called secular nationalists and the Hindu nationalists.

Against the backdrop of perennial tension between the disci- plinary practices of the geopolitical discourse(s) of "unity in diversity" and the resisting impulses of the geo-cultural "diver- sity of unity" on the subcontinent, the secular-nationalist and the Hindu-nationalist, neither represent nor exhaust the entire range and variety of geopolitical imaginations to be found across the length and breadth of India. The contest among various such imaginations and representations of "India" and "Indians" for spatial hegemony will continue to rearrange the geo-social map of the subcontinent.

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Doxiadis and Gottmann debating on Community

Above: C.A. Doxiadis standing on the left with Jean Gottmann sitting on the extreme right.

Below: Jean Gottmann standing on the right with C.A. Doxiadis sitting on the extreme left.

On 22 September, 1973, members of the World Society for Ekistics had an occasion at the Symposion Hall of Apollonion, Porto Rafti, Attica, to enjoy a rare debate with C.A. Doxiadis presenting his ideas on the development of the Porto Rafti community and Jean Gottmann emphasizing the role of local community in present and future urbanization.

The geopolitical role of China: Crouching tiger, hidden dragon

" 'With the notion of iconography, Jean Gottmann demonstrates that spatial identity, nationalism, and the resistance of places can develop a power comparable to that of material forces.' Within geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics, self-regard and self-esteem play an important role, since one's self-image is the image one wants to 'export' and display in relations with others. Self-image also determines how people understand others, and it therefore influences strategic decisions. Like Gottmann, I would define these factors as 'iconographic'."

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Introduction

In May 2002 the world "giants" jointly announced their desire to organize a peace conference to put an end to the long-standing geopolitical conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The photographs show the representatives of the giants, with US President Bush; Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivanov; the secretary-general of the UN, Kofi Annan; and President Prodi of the EU Commission among the most influential representatives of what is often termed the "international community" – that is, those who control and direct the centers of world politico-economic power (the USA, Russia, the UN [The Security Council, International Monetary Fund, World Bank], G8, EU, NATO, and WTO). Only China was missing.

Yet China is a permanent member of the Security Council with veto rights. It has a nuclear armament. With more than 1.2 billion inhabitants, it is the most populated country on earth. Through Hong Kong it has the largest currency reserves in the world. And it is on its way to becoming a major economic and industrial powerhouse.

So to what should we attribute China's absence from a group regarded as influential in a geopolitical situation that has created problems in international relations since 1947? Was it an error? An oversight? An underestimation of China's influence? Something else?

This incident suggests that a substantial difference exists between the dismissive/depreciating way that the so-called (Western-dominated) international community sees China as a geopolitical force and the way China sees itself and the role it intends to play on the checkerboard of international affairs. China and the rest of the world do not fully understand each other. However, China may win a more favorable position in international dynamics thanks to the unique features of its culture and an extraordinary capacity for pragmatism when negotiating on the home turf of its "adversaries."

"With the notion of iconography, [Jean Gottmann] demonstrates that spatial identity, nationalism, and the resistance of places can develop a power comparable to that of material forces" (LEVY, 1999). Within geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics, self-regard and self-esteem play an important role, since one's self-image is the image one wants to "export" and display in relations with others. Self-image also determines how people understand others, and it therefore influences strategic decisions. Like Gottmann, I would define these factors as "iconographic."

In the case of China (fig. 1), it is possible to state that its current and future geopolitical roles are closely linked to the following factors:

• **The nature of the decisions made by the nation's leaders in geopolitical dynamics** – China displays some significant peculiarities in that the political make-up of the country must reflect the behavior of its citizens within a society with long historical traditions and that groups together one-fifth of the world's population. Only India is in a situation similar to China's in terms of population, and the differences between the two in terms of authoritativeness, role, and the methods of dealing with international crises (China holding the stronger hand in each) demonstrate that cultural characteristics do have a certain influence.

China's leaders have their own particular way of acting both domestically and internationally. This is the product of a millennia-old tradition and undoubtedly represents an iconographic point of resistance.

Other determining factors are:

• **A vision of one's self (self-esteem)** based on an ongoing relationship with the territory, established over time through historical events and iconographically fixed within a national identity made up of the "representation" (narrative) of the country's past and a conviction that the Chinese are superior;

Fig. 1: Map of China with administrative subdivisions – Provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and special economic zones. *(Source: Paris, La Découverte & Syros, 2002).*

• **a way of relating to "others"** based on a particular view of life and the nature of social relationships that are traditionally shared (lifestyle).

China's history, development, and the characteristics of its culture, language, and society are unique in world history. Although all cultures can be regarded as unique, the uniqueness of China's culture stems from a combination of the extent of its landmass, the size of its population, and its long history.

In light of the above comments, it is important to highlight the historical-cultural characteristics of the iconographic factors mentioned, these retaining their determining influence even today.

"… immaterial strategic resources such as geographical factors, the role of history, cultural traditions, the sense of ethnic identity, the domination and use of influence in international organizations, and so on" (QIAO and WANG, 2001, p. 187). ."In this regard Nature has been particularly generous to China. A long cultural tradition, a pacifist ideology, no cases of aggression, the strong economic power of the Chinese, a seat on the United Nations Security Council, and so on – all these elements are important 'strategic resources' " (QIAO and WANG, 2001, p. 189).

The Chinese vision of the Chinese

Relationship with territory

China can be regarded as a "continent" unto itself (fig. 1). China regarding itself as the Middle Kingdom indicates that it gives its territory a significance that goes beyond its simple location along and between the Huang He (Yellow) and Chiang Jiang (Blue) Rivers. The Chinese view of themselves is based upon their centrality and the progressive degrees of barbarism found the farther one moves from the heart of the country. Since the world is divided into Chinese and non-Chinese, China is obviously seen as the pinnacle of desirability and civilization, with the nature of other countries' relationship with the country determining their level of civilization (REYNAUD, 1992, p. 127).

It was the nature of this territory, with the division between land and sea and the location of other countries so clearly marked out, that led to a view that it was both natural and desirable to expand this territory and demand tributes from adjoining populations (fig. 2).

Thus, it was not only the fact that China is a land bordered by water that led to a strong relationship with the territory, but also the belief that the lands lying to the west, southwest, and north

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第一节　中国的疆域 A

从世界
看中国 B

1.1　中国在地球上的位置示意图　C

我们伟大的祖国是中华人民共和国。D

A = The Chinese Space

B = China seen from the world

C = China's location in the world

D = Our great country is the People's Republic of China

Fig. 2: The Chinese vision of the Chinese. (*Source:* liMes, "La Cina è un giallo," *Rivista italiana di geopolitica,* no. 1, 1995, p. 6).

were to be conquered or colonized, this producing the Chinese people's sense of centrality. China's geopolitical strategies and relations, both internal and external, have been modeled on the view of its territory as a continent, this always presupposing a relationship (be it friendly or defensive) with the "others," even if they are regarded as barbarians. There has also been a perception that those to the east and towards the sea – that is, the Korean Peninsular and the Japanese Archipelago – are "others." However, while the Korean Peninsular was easily made to pay tributes to China, the twice failed invasion of Japan by sea confirmed the attitude of the continental centrality of China.

Life philosophy and religious beliefs

Confucius and his theories on social organization heavily influenced all Asia. But there is no ignoring the fact that, unlike other Asian countries, China was also influenced by the teachings of Lao Tzu and Taoism. In China, Confucius's conceptual framework was widespread, but Taoism also had its effects. While the principle of *wu wei* – normally translated as *non-action* – is interpreted in many different ways, it is present throughout Chinese society. "Taoism is a practice" (BOREL, 1999) and as such it has penetrated into the behavior of the Chinese. Along with Buddhism, it has reinforced the tendency to accept authority (non-action) and the price that needs to be paid for stability/harmony – the ideal of Confucianism.

It is reasonable to regard the proverbial Chinese "patience" as the result of this millennia-old philosophical history, which geopolitically translates into pragmatism applied to reaching objectives mixed with the acceptance of change over long periods. For example, the 50-year China-UK agreement on Hong Kong – One country, two systems – gives an idea of the timeframes that the Chinese usually work to.

Is there a relationship between being Confucian and the linguistic structure of the Chinese ideograms?

Learning the language of the Chinese ideograms is independent to pronunciation: the "painted" characters maintain their meaning, irrespective of dialectical variations or different pronunciations. Learning the ideograms is a slow process that involves dedicating a great deal of time to memorization and writing – in other words, it is an ongoing exercise in patience. In combination with the Confucian tradition for "order," this can translate into a greater disposition to relentless work and study. This may provide some explanation of the country's rapid economic growth and its success in the fields of research and study (notably Chinese students at Western universities).

Given that few people in China today would regard themselves as Confucian – a term nevertheless used widely in the West – it is possible that the "linguistic" angle, rather than the "ideological/philosophical" one, provides the most satisfactory explanation of certain typically Chinese behaviors. But what most strikes Westerners about the Chinese is the "spontaneous" adhesion of the individual to community and the hierarchical order. Such acceptance – so different from the Western concept of the "absolute" freedom of the individual – must be the result of one or more specific factors. The presence over thousands of years of an emperor at the head of the political structure, which by necessity was hierarchical and founded upon officials/mandarins, offers us some explanation at the community level. On the other hand, the linguistic factor, as a gymnasium for the mind, offers some explanation of individual behavior.

The concept of hierarchy and the role of the family

The role of, and regard for, the family, seen in the extended and hierarchical sense, is the third main factor that explains

that oriental peculiarity generically labeled as Confucianism.

In the first place, in China blood ties are extremely important, outweighing respect for the authorities and business interests. The Chinese regard family ties as being of the utmost importance. But it is precisely for this reason that they also see belonging to other groups as natural – for example, groups based on common origins in a particular region or shared economic interests – although, with family ties being the strongest, the level of commitment and fidelity to other groups is relative to interest in, and/or the nature of, the relationships involved.

Respect for one's elders remains very important in China, despite the profound social changes currently taking place. But the Chinese have also always recognized individual excellence, which can place even young people in positions of respect – provided due form is observed.

This attitude to family ties, interpreted in the broadest sense to include people with the same surname, not only highlights the differences between East and West (a similar association between all the Smiths or Joneses of the world is unthinkable) but also gives an idea of the links that can even exist over distances with other members of the Diaspora. Chinese people will always turn to a family member if there is trouble and can activate a "Chinese" network of ties and acquaintances, independent of other forms of assistance.

This triggers a process of integration that is always based on "us" and "them" – the "them" being foreigners (at the best of times), adversaries (often), and enemies (sometimes).

In Chinese society, women have had a very restricted role, submissive to, and dependent on, the close male figures in their lives – elders, the father, the husband, and brothers. It was, however, possible that within the family unit a woman could play a strong role if she was elderly or circumstances had left her without a male figure or with a "weak" masculine presence. The declaration of equality of the sexes following the victory of the communists was without doubt a revolutionary event with far-reaching social implications. But it should also be pointed out that 50 years after the formation of the People's Republic of China, there are still very few women at the top.

At the geopolitical level, the absence of a female vision is important, but in this regard there is little difference between China and the leading nations of the world; the few women who have had important roles have often had a "masculine" approach and decidedly conservative political leanings.

Heavenly mandate and mandarins, power, and officials

China has had more than a few imperial dynasties and the country has seen many conflicts for the conquest of power. This is the result of another Chinese concept: the so-called heavenly mandate, according to which the emperor is responsible for fulfilling a mandate from heaven and on this basis can be judged and removed if he fails.

The victory of a faction and the substitution of the emperor were seen as proof of a new heavenly mandate. Natural disasters were also interpreted as a sign of the gods' disapproval and were often used as the justification for revolts against the ruling emperor. The Confucian philosopher Meng Tzu (371–289 BC) clearly expounded the theory that emperors can lose their claim to power if they are unable to guarantee prosperity or if they leave the country at the mercy of invaders.

Power therefore derived from the heavenly mandate and not directly or simply from the physical person of the emperor. This was the background against which the mandarins and, later, the "officials" came into being. Initially one became a mandarin on the basis of one's knowledge and not by birth. The mandarins were under the command of the emperors (or

their representatives) but still acted with some discretion of their own. They therefore had their own real power and were not simply a mouthpiece of the emperor.

In modern times, the authority and respect (if not fear) commanded by the mandarins passed onto state officials and, later, Communist Party officials. Historical accounts and biographies (CHANG, 1994) clearly show how highly considered officials, and their families, were (and are), including those who disgraced themselves.

Chinese geopolitical strategy is decided in closed circles, peopled by professional politicians/officials. Rarely are there significant differences of opinion (in the sense of the presence within these circles of "others" with radically opposing views). While this strengthens the unity and effect of the decisions made, it also makes them liable to negative repercussions arising from errors in judging the potential actions of "others," particularly foreign others.

Modern history

Over the last 150 years, China has seen the collapse of its self-esteem and, since the time of the Opium Wars (19th century) to the constitution of the People's Republic, has had its sense of a collective identity sorely tested. Thirty years of Maoism and more than 20 of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms can be seen as a gradual reconstruction of self-esteem, based on a sense of community and nationalism, as well as a reaffirmation of a Chinese *uniqueness* linked, as in its imperial past, to a strong state.

China remains the most populated country on earth, making up around one fifth of the world's population. It is still a single-party communist country and since 1971 has been a permanent member of the Security Council with veto rights (following the expulsion of Taiwan). That China is able to very discreetly and pragmatically (that is, only to its direct advantage) exercise these rights in no way detracts from the fact that it is among the five most powerful countries on earth as regards that variety of world political power that is accepted, or at least tolerated (EVA, 1999), by the so-called international community. It is also a nuclear power and has the technology to put missiles and satellites in orbit. This makes it a power to be respected on the military level, while its large population places it beyond attack, apart from by means that only the USA, and possibly Russia, have access to. At any rate, any invasion of Chinese territory would result in massive losses of lives and equipment.

From the moment China decided to open its economy to capitalist-style production systems, its ideological danger to the West diminished. However, its economic power is constantly increasing – some people are already talking of China's GDP surpassing the USA's in coming decades (BURSTEIN and DE KEIJZER, 1998).

Nevertheless the West still adopts a "dismissive" approach to China. This approach may be dangerous since the Chinese government is not only adept at diplomacy; it is active at every level and uses the economy, in particular, as a tool for earning, discreetly, important positions and respect internationally.

The reclaiming of national dignity and imperviousness to any international pressure allow China to simultaneously play a regional and global geopolitical role. The reforms introduced by Deng increased the economic possibilities of a territorially united nation with a central authority that exerts a strong presence. Quite apart from declarations of principle regarding key ideologies, there has been a return to, or strengthening of, two traditional Confucian values: the Middle Kingdom and the authority of those in power.

China acts with patience and its objectives are simultaneously clearly defined, pragmatic, and important. It has strong self-esteem, which manifests itself in a strong sense of nation among the people and in a recognition of the role and/or authority of the leaders.

The hierarchical power structure can make (effective) decisions within set times. The structure of power and society are controlled, this making it possible to repress destabilizing dissent and take agreement within society for granted without the "time wasting" of democratic processes.

Relationship with the "outside" world

There is a characteristic of the Asian people, and of the Chinese in particular, that can be summed up by the phrase, "Do not lose face" – the Chinese are pragmatic but very conscious of the "due formalities." This can have negative repercussions in international relations, and China has occasionally been inflexible when defending its rights or points of view. This approach can be successful when dealing with weaker states but can be dangerous when dealing with powers on an equal footing or the US superpower, since they also do not wish to lose face.

The United States

The relationship between the USA and China is much more convoluted and has a longer history than is commonly thought. As long ago as the second half of the 19th century, the Americans were hanging onto the shirttails of the enormous colonial powers of Europe in the slicing up of the failing Chinese empire. The Americans nevertheless endeavored, more than the Europeans or Japanese, to establish relations with China, economic and commercial in particular. These became a support, including political, for the young republicans and Chiang Kai-shek until his defeat in 1949. The fact that China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto rights derives squarely from Anglo-American strategy, which, immediately after the war aimed to give nationalist governments political support and powerful roles.

Paradoxically, Mao's victory ran the risk of turning this support into a "favor" to the communists. Until 1971 the seat at the UN was occupied by Taiwan, but Nixon's and Kissinger's opening up to Maoist China – a part of their anti-Soviet stance – opened the doors to a different type of relationship. For the Chinese, the USA went from being an imperialist paper tiger to a useful ally against what the Chinese referred to as "USSR hegemonism."

The USA has had a heavy presence in the Pacific and Asia since its victory in World War II, and this presence has been strengthened through time, despite Viet Nam. The end of the military conflict with the disbanded USSR saw the end of the nuclear control of the Asia-Pacific airspace but not its electronic control via spy planes. Even with a reduction in its military bases (the Philippines), the USA maintains troops throughout a large area and periodically renews defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. This is a cause of concern for the Chinese in that these treaties are based on the USA's sophisticated weaponry and extraordinary technological supremacy in the electronics field.

The Chinese closely monitor the scope of these "defense" agreements for the main reason that they do not want there to be "coverage" of the Taiwan area, this representing the most vexing aspect of the issue.

China does not feel threatened today by the US presence in South Korea and Japan. Rather it regards this presence as a limit on its capacity for diplomatic maneuvering. Although it is willing to act as go-between/guarantor in the difficult case of North Korea, it does not want to put itself in a situation where it feels surrounded. Fortunately, other than the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, there are no territories in dispute between China and

the two Koreas or Japan, and China's protests regarding military accords – which imply the use of long-range missiles – are more declarations of principle than acts of aggression.

The Chinese leadership is pragmatic and at the same time knows how to assess (and appreciate) power. As regards the USA, there is an obvious (temporary) acceptance of its superiority. But at the same time there is also the implication that China wishes to be treated as an equal to the one remaining superpower; it is the only country that can do so.

The most difficult issue both to resolve and interpret (particularly in the West) is Taiwan. It could very possibly provoke unforeseeable geopolitical dynamics and put China and the USA in the position of not being able to lose face and thus push them into actions that could jeopardize global stability.

The existence of two Chinas remains a difficult issue, partly because – despite what those in mainland China may say – Taiwan has been politically separate from China since the Japanese occupation in 1895. Even before that date, it never played a significant part in China's history. Paradoxically Taiwan's main link to mainland China stems from the fact that Taiwan's leadership is "imported," and only in very recent times has there been a political reawakening of the native inhabitants, who generally declare themselves to be in favor of independence. The students who protested in favor of independence in March 1996 went so far as to declare that they were not Chinese but Taiwanese. They also used the slogan "Two countries, two systems" (PISU, 1996), "heretically" altering the slogan used to define the situation in Hong Kong ("One country, two systems").

The so-called threat of invasion in the form of missile launches by China during Taiwan's presidential election of March 1996 would appear to have been aimed at encouraging the election of a president from the Guomindang, the enemy party in Taiwan in favor of the One China principle, rather than a democratic (separatist) party. The launches were therefore not a threat, but a form of indirect pressure to maintain the *status quo*.

Seen from this perspective, and bearing the economic changes in mind, the differences between the two Chinas appear to be more symbolic/ideological than substantial; Chinese pragmatism and the Asian-style long-term view may produce outcomes that are unforeseeable today.

In light of the above, it is easier to understand the Chinese leadership's strong reaction to the Taiwanese president's declaration in July 1999 of wanting to consider relations between the two "entities" as relations between states. Such a statement was on a collision course with the decades-old declaration of the existence of only one China and, in particular, forced the People's Republic to immediately reassert its position and back it up with credible signs – military threats, rhetorical declarations during the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the republic, and so on.

In view of the aspects discussed, a desirable long-term future scenario for China would be a generalized recognition of China's cultural uniqueness and centrality, and therefore an acceptance of the guiding role of the People's Republic, seen primarily in the traditional and geographic sense of the Middle Kingdom (LIU, 1995). This uniqueness would be based upon strong economic connections in the area as well as a marked politico-administrative autonomy of the outlying regions – first and foremost Taiwan.

The Hong Kong experiment of two different administrations should be useful for China in pragmatically finding a balance in a formal unification of all the Chinese "pieces" into a so-called Greater China that would include overseas Chinese communities and Singapore. Changes in the Beijing and Taipei leadership, through natural means and/or (multiparty?) elections, should play a central role in changing through time the charac-

teristics of the equilibriums reached. If this is achieved, Chinese pragmatism and seeing issues in the long-term will have paid off.

The new Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, a member of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, has made no official mention of Taiwan's independence since he took office. His use of words has been very "Chinese," that is, self-censored (GOMEZ, 2000), and it has not been necessary for Beijing to step up the tones of confrontation beyond the traditional diplomatic protests against any action or statement (even those that may appear irrelevant to us Westerners) that might undermine the One China principle.

Bush is certainly no Clinton, and Sino-American relations have begun to lead in new directions. As regards Taiwan, the Bush administration is more in favor of US military protection, but this only happened after the EP-3 spy plane incident of 2001, an event which the Chinese regard as their victory. In 2002, when meeting the press with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Bush said, "The position of my government has not changed over the years. We believe in the peaceful settlement of this issue. We will urge there be no provocation. The United States will continue to support the Taiwan Relations Act." Bush became the first US president to refer to the act on Chinese soil, without mentioning the three communiqués. The next day, though, Bush did try to reassure Beijing, saying, "I've reiterated support for the 'One China' policy." (KEEFE, 2002).

Although adopting a different diplomatic strategy from the Democrat Clinton, Bush also hastened to reaffirm support for the One China policy. "The September 11 terrorist attacks in the US pushed the EP-3 incident into the background. Beijing quickly gave rhetorical and diplomatic support to the war on terrorism. This led to Bush traveling twice to China in four months. He now embraces a 'candid, constructive and cooperative' relationship with Beijing – though officials in Washington warn quietly that the administration has postponed, not cancelled, its internal debate about whether to view China as a partner or as a foe" (KEEFE, 2002).

China-US relations are dynamic and have contrasting alternating phases. This is possible because, at least in some areas, they are relations between equals.

The question of Tibet was, and is, dealt with extensively by the Western media, and the Dalai Lama traveled the world, being received almost as if he were a head of state, encouraging open intolerance of the Chinese leadership. Many in the West thought it possible that Tibet's autonomist (or separatist) stance would meet with some success. However, Chinese pragmatism and long-term outlook have often quashed the expectations of the West (Hong Kong, for example).

While in the West we make romantic films about Tibet, in China there is a massive emigration of Han populations to Tibetan cities. In the end, the Tibetans will be a minority in their own country.

USSR and Russia

Sino-Russian relations have always been quite "cold" with alternating phases. The fact that the Soviets claimed the world leadership of the communist movement could not easily be accepted by the Chinese, particularly after Kruschev's criticism of Stalinist excesses seemed to set the USSR on the road to revisionism.

The unexpected rupture in good relations with the Soviets brought two geostrategic issues, which had concerned the Chinese for centuries, to the fore: the control of Mongolia and the control of the upper Silk Road, which leads from Xinjiang to central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Only a few short years passed between the political rupture with the USSR and the exchange of artillery fire along the Siberian frontier – particular-

ly in the area of the Ussuri River, a tributary of the Amur. The confrontation/clash with the Soviet Union and its hegemonism, which the Chinese – even more than the West – feared would result in the conquest of territory, was one of the reasons behind China unexpectedly opening itself to the US in the early 1970s.

The disintegration of the USSR and its subsequent loss of power, including military, eased tensions and led to the signing of accords regarding disputed borders. China still has claims on some areas but prefers to regard the northwest Siberian zones as unpopulated but rich in mineral resources, against the excessive population levels in the bordering areas of China. Although only a small market, these areas are more conveniently supplied with goods from China rather than the distant industrial zones of Russia – ignoring the fact that Chinese goods are consistently growing in quality. Even Mongolia has begun to regard the trade and transport routes across China to the sea as more expedient.

Over the last ten years, Russia and China have passed through alternating phases of closeness and relative mutual indifference, depending on the more or less discordant relations of each with the USA on economic matters (Russia) and geopolitical issues (China).

China's current relations with India and Pakistan are an inheritance of its relationship with the USSR. There was a series of wars between China and India during the 1950s/1960s for the control of territory that, although Indian, China had invaded, claiming that the land belonged to China for obvious geographic reasons (the area in question lies north of the Himalayas). It is also for this reason that the Soviet Union traditionally had good relations with India, while China gave more importance to its relations with Pakistan.

Today, with the crisis generated by the attack on the twin towers in New York, the question of Afghanistan has again taken a central place in the game of world geostrategy, and China has been able to declare its support of the US response, partly because it is not at odds with its established positions and relations.

Geopolitical dynamics in the ex-Soviet countries of central Asia would appear to be more delicate, with a massive presence of US troops, organized as a logistical support to operations in Afghanistan, and, precisely for this reason, destined to remain there for the long term to ensure the effective control of this territory. This presence certainly cannot be pleasing to China, which has seen an important geographical corridor closed off, and it may begin to again feel encircled by military forces. China's offers to collaborate with Russia, including on the military front, can be interpreted from this perspective.

Nevertheless, China knows that for the moment it does not have much freedom of movement on the international checkerboard and prefers to concentrate its moves in its priority areas: the managed development of the economy and the question of Taiwan. This would explain China's apparent indifference to the UN Security Council's proposed reforms and its relative silence on geopolitical issues affecting large geographical areas, such as Latin America, Africa, and Israel and Palestine. When the Chinese believe that the "others" regard them as sufficiently strong and recognize its international role, it will begin to openly act as a world power. For the moment, it acts shrewdly to achieve its aims using "Chinese" methods.

Objectives and tools of Chinese geostrategy

China, Greater China, "Chineseness," and the Chinese Diaspora

Chinese communities have established themselves more or less all over the world, while maintaining their own customs and socio-cultural ties through blood relationships rather than nostalgia for the land of their ancestors. The Chinese have always displayed a great capacity for adapting to the socio-environmental conditions of the places they emigrate to and great determination in achieving the goals of bettering the financial well-being of the family, the individual, and the community as a whole (WEIDENBAUM and HUGHES, 1996).

Chinese communities abroad organize themselves as self-centered, self-sufficient groups, culturally based on their *Chineseness* and maintaining family ties locally and with China through contacts within the extended family. Ties to the home country are symbolic and represented by respect for family ties (and some traditions). Just as China expands across the continent, the Chinese expand across the world – to the Han, expansion means assimilation. The characteristic of continentality, of conquest and territorial expansion, remains – after all, the Han are the result of an ongoing process of absorbing other cultures.

Throughout Asia, Chinese communities are centers of economic power. For this reason, in some countries (Malaysia) they are denied "ethnic" political representation, while in others (Indonesia, Viet Nam), during times of economic crisis or social unrest, they become the target of attacks by other ethnic groups or are made the scapegoat for economic problems. Their unquestionable business skills have brought economic power to the overseas Chinese, who today are courted by the communist leaders on the basis of common cultural origins.

From this perspective, economics can become a much more efficient geostrategic tool than military power, given that it would appear impossible to compete with the US in the latter area (at least for the moment). The Chinese have shown themselves to be extremely pragmatic in learning and applying the mechanisms of capitalist economics, and have used, and continue to use, these mechanisms in an expedient way (EVA 2000).

What China is not willing to accept is interference in its domestic affairs by other countries and any challenge to the central authority of the Communist Party. This stance can, however, be traced to cultural traditions that the communists did not invent but merely brought up-to-date.

It is no coincidence that after the anti-Confucian fury of the Cultural Revolution there is now a conceptual return to the country's past, and the most attentive observers can detect in China's actions on the world stage its traditional diplomatic skill in reaching objectives, a shrewd use of words (particularly words with symbolic overtones), and an attitude intended to achieve a formal recognition of the country's superiority (once this took the form of tributes to the emperor, even without military occupation or colonization) or its role (negotiations "between equals" with the United States for entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), but also direct relations with the European Union and other powers, such as France and Great Britain). President Jiang Zemin refused for a week to talk by telephone with President Clinton after the "accidental" bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 during the Kosovo crisis. After a month of confidential negotiations, the Chinese earned themselves 50 million dollars in damages.

President George W. Bush had no more success in the confrontation/clash with China over the US spy plane incident in April 2001, when, because of damage (caused, what is more, by a Chinese military aircraft) it was forced to land on Hainan Island. Although having previously made statements with a very different tone from those of Clinton (China was no longer considered a partner but a competitor), Bush had to modify both his tone and approach to China. He realized (or was made to realize) that one does not order China about and that the words used in statements are weighed very carefully since it is possible to achieve important real outcomes provided due

The territories of modernization after 1978

▨	Special Economic Zones (1980)
●	Open Coastal Cities (1984)
△	Open Deltas (1985)
▭	Open Peninsulas (1988)
☆	Open Cities of Bo Hai Gulf (1988)
▢	Special Economic Zone of Hainan (1988)
◉	Open Provincial Capitals (1992)
✦	Open Frontier Cities (1992)

① The provinces of Guangdong and Fujian
② The municipality of Shanghai, and the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang
③ The municipalities of Beijing (Peking) and Tientsin, and the province of Hebei

The three main regions of growth

— Roads
--- Railroads
⌐ Special Administrative Regions

0 ———— 500 km

Fig. 3: China – The territories of modernization after 1978. (*Source:* Michel Foucher, *Asies nouvelles,* Paris, Belin, 2002, p. 279).

Fig. 4: China – Current administrative structure. (*Source:* A. Roux, *La Chine au XXe siècle,* Paris, SEDES, 1998).

respect is given to form and no one (especially China) loses face. The tale of the two US "very sorries" in the official joint document that concluded the affair is very significant (KEEFE, 2002) (figs. 3 and 4).

Economic instead of military might

From the point of view of the country's image, the non-devaluation of the yuan during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 was a powerful symbol of stability and international authority. Nevertheless, business people and economic experts continued for months to predict, suggest, and declare that devaluation was inevitable and economically correct, without taking into account that it was precisely China's authoritarian and hierarchical structure and its relative economic separateness that allowed it to make contrary and autonomous decisions. The negative social effects and economic costs of certain decisions can be more easily made acceptable to the people if those in charge have a firm grasp on the reins of power.

China's entry to the WTO began a new phase. The West plans to conquer China's market through the progressive elimination of customs barriers and to encourage the spread of "democracy," given the obsessive repetition of the belief that a consumer who is "free" to choose will want equal freedom of choice at the political level. Given the situations in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, I have many doubts on this score.

For the moment, China continues to benefit from the greater number of investments from all over the world, to increase its manufacturing capacity by harnessing Western technologies, and to see its export capacity to the USA and rich Western

markets grow. Its significant commercial weight directly influences diplomatic and political relations. Even the US now has internal economic pressure groups that have called for moderation during US-China geopolitical crises. Moreover it should not be forgotten that the overseas Chinese control significant flows of capital and have already shown themselves to be susceptible to the call of cultural and blood ties (SEAGRAVE, 1996).

Behind this lies the Chinese pragmatic and devil-may-care use of the mechanisms of capitalist economies, including the most speculative. Making money is not merely a skill; it is culturally accepted by any Chinese in whose home there is a fat, smiling Buddha holding a case of money. The economy is, however, steered with prudence and a firm hand so as not to run the risk of it running off course, as in Russia, or causing damage to society, as in the case of Indonesia. Control of the internal political situation allows the Chinese leadership to proceed step by step as it gradually becomes more open economically.

The leadership's control appears to remain strong, even though the challenges of the technological society and capitalist individualism are also very strong. The repression of people in Tian an Men Square was essentially easy for the government, such was the imbalance in power between the students and the army. Also, in spite of the wishes of the West, it was a simple matter for China to repress dissident Wei Jinsheng's call for the "fifth modernization: freedom," a slogan that is difficult to spread (and make understood) in China, where for the most part it is easy to restrict the spread of news and falsify information. Control from above has become troublesome in the case of the Internet (although it exists, its spread is greatly re-

stricted in China), but the almost exclusively China-centric messages posted on the Net by the Chinese after the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade should suggest to the West that it should be careful not to overestimate the weight of opposing voices in China, such as the students in Tian an Men Square. The repression of the Falun Gong sect and the imprisoning of thousands of its adherents in 1999, as well as the little (although stubborn) resistance on the part of these people, estimated to number 100 million in the West, should confirm once and for all that China's social conditions are exceptional and that the government does not intend to concede an inch as regards the sharing of power (particularly with organized movements), unless it is on its own terms and is implemented as a gradual process – a very gradual process.

Conclusion

China's current situation, both domestically and internationally, appears to be more than stable. Economic growth continues strongly, regardless of fluctuations in international markets, and direct foreign investments continue at high levels. Its manufacturing capacity is increasing, primarily because of technologies from outside the country. Exports are sizeable, but should a problem occur, China is able to sell its products to a huge domestic market (particularly in the large cities and coastal areas). Raising one's voice with China is not economically advantageous for anyone.

At the international level, the ready support given to the US in its "war on terrorism" represents a kind of promissory note that the US will honor when China later uses less than orthodox methods to protect itself from "terrorism" in Xinjiang or Tibet. It would not appear to be a coincidence that, after years of tension, there were no particular problems in April 2002 regarding the question of Taiwan: April/May was the period in which the US Congress approved the annual supply of arms to Taiwan – the quality and quantity of these shipments have always been carefully scrutinized by China.

At the level of international relations in general and as regards the world's most explosive geopolitical situations (Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Afghanistan, and India-Pakistan), China maintains an extremely circumspect position, consisting of a small number of cautious statements but also "discreet" indiscriminate sales of arms (to Iran and North Korea, for example).

China does not intervene unless it believes that it is directly affected. But it also does not hesitate to make itself heard when it needs to reaffirm its positions of principle. An example of this is the case of Macedonia, which initially recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan) when it was looking for technology at a good price. After the People's Republic of China vetoed the continuing UN control of the Macedonian territory, and after the ethno-political crisis involving the ethnic Albanians, Macedonia suspended diplomatic relations with Taiwan to go on side with the People's Republic of China.

China conducts itself in an extremely pragmatic fashion; it clearly defines its goals and strategies, and can identify the right moment to act. The title of a recent Chinese film, which also met with success in the West, ideally encapsulates China's current, and possibly future, geopolitical role: *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon*. China's aim? To (again) become the epicenter of the world (FRANK, 1998).

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World Society for Ekistics meetings, 1975

R. Buckminster Fuller, President elect of the World Society for Ekistics, addresses members at the closing meeting of the General Assembly in the Evanthia Theater at Apollonion, Porto Rafti, Attica on 18 July, 1975, three weeks after the death of C.A. Doxiadis.

The 1975 annual meeting of the WSE Executive Council prior to the General Assembly of the World Society for Ekistics in the amphitheater of the Athens Center of Ekistics. Left to right, round the table, Carl Asplund, Alexander B. Leman, Amos Rapoport, Jean Gottmann, Eiichi Isomura (Chair), Panayis Psomopoulos, Reginald Lourie, Charles Haar: in the front row (backs to camera) J. Tyrwhitt, R. Buckminster Fuller, Laila El Hamamsy.

"One Southeast Asia": Emerging iconographies in the making of a region

"As in many other geographical representations, regional labeling is a spatial construct; a form of geo-power deeply embedded in a historical and cultural context, a conceptual formation generally presuming some form of correspondence in space between physical landmasses and human cultural features. Yet, it is also a very adaptable form of geographical representation, which can modify its spatial coverage over time, perambulate around its original site, or even reverse its symbolic meaning, departing from the system of cultural references in which it was initially coined whilst still remaining tied to its own place."

Elena dell'Agnese

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Introduction

Periphery of many centers, colony of many colonizers, Southeast Asia has traditionally been an area more prominent as a cultural and political medley, than as a coherent geographical region. A "collection of peninsulas and archipelagos" (DWYER, 1990, p. 1) lying between the landmasses of Asia and Australia, owing its enormous cultural variety to the contrasting action of circulation and insularity, Southeast Asia, before World War II, "was scarcely even a geographical expression" (FRYER, 1970, p. 1).

In the Cold War period, this area, which remained extraordinarily fractioned by hundreds of linguistic and religious divides, but was now politically organized in the form of a conglomeration of nation-states, assumed new strategic consequence, because of the rift splitting its member countries into two ideologically opposed camps. Given its geostrategical importance, the area began to gain recognition as a single region by the West, and to be organized as such, at least insofar as the non-Communist countries were concerned. In 1967, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded to strengthen regional cohesion among the non-Communist countries of the area (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines). In 1971, the ASEAN nations set as their goal the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. Joined by Brunei in 1984, and, in the 1990s, by Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia and eventually Burma, ASEAN now comprises all the ten countries in the area, under the motto "One Southeast Asia" (figs. 1 and 2).

In addition to enlarging its regional boundaries, ASEAN has widened its field of action over the same period, launching a scheme to establish an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and generally promoting greater economic integration among its member countries. Moreover, it has also cobbled together a unifying narrative of shared norms and values. Even so, it is still disputable whether its emerging iconographies (which include an official anthem and a logo) are powerful enough to make ASEAN something more than a "security community" of states.

"In search of Southeast Asia"

As in many other geographical representations, regional labeling is a spatial construct; a form of geo-power deeply embedded in a historical and cultural context, a conceptual formation generally presuming some form of correspondence in space between physical landmasses and human cultural features (LEWIS and WIGEN, 1997). Yet, it is also a very adaptable form of geographical representation, which can modify its spatial coverage over time, perambulate around its original site, or even reverse its symbolic meaning, departing from the system of cultural references in which it was initially coined whilst still remaining tied to its own place.

In this perspective, "Southeast Asia" is no exception. "Asia" is a metageographical category originally applied only to a small area in Turkey, later extended right up to the Bering Strait covering the whole eastern and southeastern quadrant of the Eurasian continent. Nowadays the term is confined in general use only to this latter part of the "official" continent – which is ostensibly more "Asiatic" than Israel or Syria (LEWIS and WIGEN, 1997). If Asia was born as a "western concept," unknown to the very people living there till their encounter with Europeans, the reference to cardinal points, such as South and East, is an even more blatant restatement of a dominant Eurocentric position. For this very reason, some

Fig. 1: The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the world. (*Source:* Infobase Pvt. Ltd, 2003-04).

Fig. 2: "One Southeast Asia" – The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries. (*Source:* Infobase Pvt. Ltd, 2003-04).

authors, such as David Drakakis-Smith (1992), have proposed re-labelling the area as "Pacific Asia," in order to avoid any reference to its colonial past. But "Southeast Asia," colonial or post-colonial as it may sound, is the label adopted nowadays by its local leaders in order to officially designate their own regional context. Thus, it has been transformed from an incongruous legacy of the European-dominated period, into a contemporary icon of regional unity. As such, it must be considered today.

As a regional designation, "Southeast Asia" does not have a very long history. As Benedict Anderson remarked (1998, p. 5), it is no surprise that "the region was late in its unitary naming." From the outside it was very difficult to distinguish an underlying regional coherence in an area so diverse from the religious point of view, so politically fragmented by centuries of "mottled imperialism," so deeply riven by the internal rivalries existing among its many colonial masters. Only in 1943, with the creation of the South-East Asia Command by the Western powers, did the regional label emerge as a significant political term. In the same period, the term started being used by academics, to become common usage and "normalized" coverage only ten years later.

With the inception of the Cold War, commenced "the long process of making Southeast Asia the kind of imagined reality it is today" (ANDERSON, 1998, pp. 6-7). By then, the area could still be described as "The Balkans of the Orient" (FISHER, 1962): that is, as an area of cultural transition and political instability, whose striking ethnic diversity was apparently in contrast with the very concept of the nation-state. An easily broken geopolitical scenario, made even more fragile by the powerful pressures of Communism on one side, and Islam on the other. Against the specter of a possible "Balkanization" of the area, or the even more worrying menace of its homogenization under an overarching Communist umbrella, in that period the United States began to focus increasing attention on a section of the world they generally started to refer to as "Southeast Asia" (ANDERSON, 1998).

ASEAN and "the ASEAN way"

In the 1950s, the polarization of world politics following the end of the war had forced the various geopolitical entities in the area to take sides, or to officially adopt a neutral position (STEINBERG, 1987). In 1954, the United States, determined not to lose "Southeast Asia" as had happened with China, launched SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), with the intention of keeping the whole postcolonial region free from any Communist interference. However, of the local states, only Siam and the Philippines joined this institution – with the other members being the United States themselves, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Australia and the UK. In contrast, as a response to this American move, other Asian leaders, such as Sukarno, Sianouk and Nu, tried to establish their credentials as "nonaligned" powers in the course of the 1955 Bandung Conference. At the same time, the consolidation of China under Communist rule (1949) confirmed the reassertion of its traditional geopolitical interests in the region, particularly in Laos and Cambodia, but also in regard to the large groups of ethnic "Chinese" that for centuries had been living, as "immigrants," in every state of the area.

In the 1960s, the opening of a military front in Vietnam involved an even deeper engagement of the United States in the region. The manifest failure of SEATO's pacifying capacities led the government in Washington to promote a more permanent institution among the states of the area. Thus in 1967, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was born. It included Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines

and Indonesia (where the "ambiguous" Sukarno had been recently substituted by a definitely anti-Communist military leadership headed by General Soeharto). Burma, despite being invited, chose instead not to join the association.

The five countries brought together by ASEAN ranged from regional giants, like Indonesia, to extremely small port-cities, such as Singapore. Their ethnic composition was also enormously variegated. They contained varying proportions of Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Confucian creeds; and did not even share a common colonial past – since Malaysia and Singapore had been created after the dissolution of the British Empire, Indonesia following the collapse of the Dutch East Indies while Thailand had never been formally colonized. Further, they were differentiated by their various political systems, with Singapore and Malaysia having at the time some degree of democracy, the Philippines and Indonesia subjected to a dictatorship and Thailand governed by a group of corrupt generals. They entertained very little economic interchange, comprising less than 15 percent of the total trade of the area. They were not friends or post-colonial allies, because an acrimonious boundary dispute regarding Sabah still opposed Malaysia and the Philippines, while a very dangerous *Konfrontasi* between Indonesia and Malaysia had only just been ended.

Given these premises, "the establishment of ASEAN did not inspire much hope" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 5). To many, the association appeared to be just another empty box, bound to a rapid demise, like other similar efforts in the area, namely: ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), and MAPHILINDO (Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia). Notwithstanding this pessimistic view, the countries it put together did have something in common: apart from Thailand, they were all postcolonial creations whose boundaries followed the boundaries of former colonial partitions. Thailand included, their confines encompassed many different ethnic groups. Altogether, they were the expression of the victory, in the decolonization process, of the big nationalist movements developed over the first half of the century (which were by no means the only ideological forces competing on the scene – the others being Communism, Islam and ethnic regionalism). They were all under the threat of Communist armed insurrections or Islamic, loyalist and ethnic minority rebellion. ASEAN, whose main purpose, as stated in the founding Bangkok Declaration (August, 1967),[1] was the promotion of "regional peace and stability" (that is, the conservation of the political status quo of its members as unitary nation-states) (CHRISTIE, 1996) had its own good reasons for survival.

In its early years, the Association was mainly involved in managing bilateral tensions among its members (with the cooling-off of the Sabah dispute being its first success). In contrast, the pace of its progress towards regional cooperation appeared to be very slow. The first ASEAN institutional act was the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia (1971), which restated the principles of the Bangkok Declaration for ensuring the region's "stability and security." However, the addition of the phrase: "from external interference in any form of manifestation" infused a new geopolitical meaning into such aspirations. As such, ZOPFAN was a joint attempt to disengage Southeast Asia from superpower rivalry (GANESAN, 1995), albeit obviously a very difficult one to accomplish. Not only because the neutralization framework, envisaged by Malaysia, contrasted with the pro-American attitude of the Philippines and Thailand (members of SEATO), but also because such an objective, to be implemented, would have required the enactment of specific legal provisos about existing alliances and foreign bases (which it refrained from doing). Anyway, ZOPFAN can be considered as the first move towards

regional autonomy (ACHARYA, 2001).

The First ASEAN Summit was held in Bali (24 February 1976) in the aftermath of Vietnam's unification to reaffirm the rationale behind the Association. On this occasion, two treaties were signed:
- The first was the ASEAN Concord, which emphasized the need for "the strengthening of political solidarity" and developing "a strong ASEAN community."
- With the second, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN lay down the fundamental principles of intra-regional relations,[2] whose "cardinal rule" was the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.

The importance of this doctrine can be easily explained by the need for internal stability and regime security of the nation-states that had expressed it. From this perspective, non-interference can be considered "the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 57), a guarantee to prevent any possible attempt to criticize the actions of member governments towards their own people and to provide support to member states in their campaigns against destabilizing activities (a veiled reference to Communist insurgency). Non-intervention can also be credited as being the reason why no war-like tension has erupted among member states since 1967.

Another fundamental norm regulating intra-regional relations, even if not as overtly stated as the non-interference doctrine, consists in the so-called "ASEAN Way." This expression used to identify a "unique" ASEAN style in decision-making processes, does not have an official definition; it generally refers to the importance given to informality, consultation and consensus, instead of confrontation and majority voting. In the beginning, the phrase was applied in a derogatory manner, to criticize ASEAN's lack of institutions and its excessively personal approach, but later "the ASEAN Way" started to become recognized as one of the Association's "major strengths" (ACHARYA, 2001). The contrast could not be greater with Western-style multilateral organizations, where common decisions are taken by voting. Informality and "consensus building" in ASEAN are usually considered a good way to mediate national differences. ASEAN itself was founded as an "association," and not an "organization" in order to convey a sense of flexible informality, and its founding "act" was a "declaration," not a "treaty," so as to stress amity instead of "lack of trust." Moreover, "consensus building" became a way to reduce any form of coercion in collective conduct, "a safety device to assure member states that their national interests will not be compromised and nothing can be done against their will" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 69).

Both "non-interference" and the so-called "ASEAN Way" to consensus are principles more suited to guaranteeing respect for the different "national identities" of member states, than promoting regional integration. They were adopted as such at the time by the Association, whose main purpose continued to be to crystallize the existing system of nation-states in the region (in spite of the ASEAN Concord recommendation to "vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity"). In particular, the non-interference doctrine prevented de jure regional integration, which would have necessarily interfered with the domestic jurisdiction of member states. In their search for a common heritage the "founding fathers" of ASEAN had stated in the Bangkok Declaration that they were joining a group of countries "already bound together by ties of history and culture." However, these ties later turned out to be quite hard to find, and the process of region building slowed considerably. Thus, in the early years of its life, ASEAN encouraged only a very bland form of cooperation among states.

"One Southeast Asia"

In the 1970s, ASEAN activities had been galvanized by the threats deriving from the Vietnam War; in the 1980s, a noteworthy shift into international policy relevance (and internal coherence) came via the significant role it assumed in facing the Cambodia conflict. Cambodia had been occupied by Vietnam in December 1978. Hanoi had presented the conflict as an internal struggle between the forces of the genocidal Pol Pot and the Cambodian "salvation" front, led by Heng Samrin supported by Vietnam. Instead, ASEAN considered the Vietnam troop presence in Cambodia as a patent violation of its norms of regional conduct and doctrine of non-interference. To deal with the situation, ASEAN resolved to punish Vietnam, with the double objective of preventing the establishment of a dangerous precedent in the area, and to pose as a champion of Cambodia's independence. At the same time, it wanted to reaffirm its policy of "regional settlement of regional conflict," that is to solve the situation without too much interference by external powers such as the U.S. or China (ACHARYA, 2001). For more than ten years, ASEAN maintained this position, and persisted in seeking a solution through formal diplomacy and informal contacts among the various conflicting factions – the so-called "Cocktail Diplomacy." With its regionalist formula, which eventually led to a peace agreement at the Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1991, ASEAN succeeded in acquiring unprecedented international stature. The new standing led it to launch the ASEAN FORUM (ARF) in 1992, to promote external dialogue and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region (ARF membership includes Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the United States, Canada, Russia, the European Union, as well as East Asian countries such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea).

With the settlement of the Cambodia conflict, a new era had started for Southeast Asia regional unification. Vietnam, which in 1986 had already adopted doi moi and reformed its economy in a market direction, from being an enemy had now become a prospective ally. As early as 1992, the ASEAN Summit affirmed its desire to forge a "closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with the Indo-Chinese countries." In this perspective, making "One Southeast Asia" became the new ASEAN vision for the decade.

Vietnam was formally admitted on 28 July, 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July, 1997 – on the 30th anniversary of ASEAN's foundation – with Cambodia joining on 30 April, 1999. The ASEAN-ten now has a population of about 500 million and a total area of 4.5 million sq.km. It encompasses the whole region known, since the Second World War, as "Southeast Asia."

With the fulfillment of the "One Southeast Asia" vision, ASEAN geopolitical meaning has changed. With the disappearance of the political polarization of Southeast Asia, ASEAN, from being a simple association of local non-Communist states, has been turned into a regional association including all Southeast Asia and representing its interests on a global scale. For this reason, its political message now emphasizes a stronger sense of regional "unity" – to strengthen the still very feeble ties between the old and new members – and "plurality" – to guarantee full respect for the different political stances taken by member states. In this perspective, its official iconography has been enriched with new symbols, stressing both "unity" and "diversity" at the same time. The "ASEAN Song of Unity," for instance, is a hymn singing the praises of a plurality of voices rising "as one"[3]; the new ASEAN logo,[4] on the same theme, introduces the idea of "concentric" identity, whereby a single regional unity (symbolized by a circle) circumscribes a padi with ten stalks rising out from the same roots, representing each of the ten member states.

In its pledge for "unity," however, the enlarged ASEAN has to face new intra-mural divisions, the main one being the different levels of economic development between the older members and the new entries. As Acharya (2001, p. 123) has stated, "the addition of the three Indochina states and Myanmar creates a real danger of the emergence of a two-tier ASEAN of haves and have-nots." Such differences, however, can also provide the opportunity to increase intra-regional economic cooperation, formally praised for a long time but disregarded in practice by the former ASEAN members which, possessing more or less the same kind of resources and human skills, developed independent industrial capacities and competed with each other on international markets (STEINBERG, 1987).

Asian values

The "One Southeast Asia" slogan, addressing the issue of territorial enlargement, was not the only ASEAN catchphrase of the 1990s, with "Asian values" being the other iconographic motto of the decade. With its appeal to Southeast Asian cultural "uniqueness" and its reference to the excellent economic performance of (part of) the region in the first half of the decade, the "Asian values" campaign represented perhaps an even more powerful tool in the creation of a Southeast Asian "common identity."

Two local leaders, Lee Kwan Yew and Mahathir Muhamad, raised the "Asian values" issue in Singapore and in Malaysia at the beginning of the 1990s. The general argument was that Asia had a common set of values, different from those of the West. Broadly speaking, "Asian values" are assumed to include attachment to family, deference to societal interests, respect for authority, plus the habit of searching for consensus instead of confrontation, not to mention the importance given to education. Stressing consensus over confrontation, and authority rather than individualism, the "Asian values" debate rebuilt the Eastern/Western dichotomy from the other side, as it were. In this process of othering, Westerners were accused of being prone to mistaking their own ideas about individual freedom and liberal democracy for universal truths. In contrast, as pointed out by Mahathir, "hard work, discipline, a strong commitment to community, thrift and moderation are Asian values which have in fact contributed to the emergence of the Asian Tigers and Dragon" (quoted by MILNER, 2000).

On the same grounds, "Asian values" were praised by some Western observers in an attempt to explain Asia's amazing economic success, only to dismiss them in the aftermath of the 1997/98 crisis, or to consider them, reversing their original approach, as the real cause of the disaster – in this case, "attachment to the family becomes nepotism. The importance of personal relationships rather than formal legality becomes cronyism. Consensus becomes wheel-greasing and corrupt politics. Conservatism and respect for authority become rigidity and an inability to innovate." And so on ... (The Economist, vol. 348, 7/25/1998). In any case, "Asian values" are unlikely to be accepted as the keys to understanding the reasons behind the so-called economic miracles of the various dragons, tigers and geese of Asia. Conditions-of-possibility for the "miracle" are more readily found in the big efforts made by Washington to assist a region that, having been the hottest area of the Cold War, received more "aid" in various forms than any other world region; in Japan's geographical propinquity (and in war reparation agreements, funding Southeast Asian countries for purchasing Japanese manufactures), not to mention Communist China's lengthy absence from the global capitalist order (ANDERSON, 1998, pp. 301-302). "Asian values," if any, are also difficult to accept as causing the disaster. Despite this they have been instrumental in the creation of a new sense of Asian-ness that, putting together

economic pride and cultural complacency, has spread from ASEAN to the rest of the Far East.

Interpreted by many as a reversal of "orientalism" (TARLING, 1998), construed as a tendency to essentialize culture and identity (KAHN, 1998) with the basic intention of overturning former colonial prejudices, "Asian values" have represented an attempt to increase regional cohesion. They have been promoted in order to establish a cultural common basis inside a "regional club" such as ASEAN, which, unlike the EU, is not only without a shared religion, but now also includes Communist states, together with military dictatorships, an "Islamic monarchy" and parliamentary democracies of varying types (The Economist, vol. 348, 7/25/1998). They have also been a useful device in reframing the big issue of human rights and personal liberties which arose between ASEAN and the West during the decade on terms more favorable to the former. As an attempt to justify authoritarian rule, the espousal of such "principles" triggered a big debate, not only on the international level, but also among ASEAN's most influential Asian political opponents. However, "Asian values" are not only "new languages of state power" (KAHN, 1998); they must be understood "in the context of the long campaign against Western colonialism ... as a desire to reconnect with [an] historical past after this connection had been ruptured both by colonial rule and the subsequent domination by a Western Weltanschauung" (quoted by MILNER, 2000). As such, they can be transformed into a powerful, albeit debatable, post-colonial icon.

The making of a region

At the beginning of the new century, the region has faced new security menaces posed by terrorism and fundamentalism. As stated by the Bali Concord II, endorsed at the 9th Summit in Bali (October 2003), building an Asean Security Community (ASC) has become one of the Association's "three pillars." The concept of "security community describes groups of states which have developed the long habit of peaceful interactions and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 1). Since its foundation, ASEAN has witnessed no wars among its members, even if in the 1960s, "the outlook for regional security and stability in Southeast Asia was particularly grim" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 4), with the whole region being defined as "the Balkans of the Orient" (with an interesting play of double stereotyping, along the way). Born with the intention of assuring political stability in the region, ASEAN has developed a set of norms that for more than 30 years have been a guarantee of the integrity of national sovereignty, at the same time helping its members to regulate inter-state behavior. In the 1990s, as a consequence of its enlargement, ASEAN changed its character, turning from a group of governments holding a convergent political outlook into a more differentiated entity, which needed to stress more emphatically both the "unity" and the "diversity" of its nature. Together with the other two pillars (concerning the building of an ASEAN Economic Community – AEC, and of an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community – ASCC), the ASEAN Security Community ASC is to be achieved by the year 2020. As pledged by the ASEAN leaders, it should enforce ASEAN's diplomatic role inside the ASEAN Regional Forum for multilateral dialogues, and in its relations with China, Japan and South Korea, which ASEAN had started meeting regularly since 1997, in what have been termed "ASEAN + 3" summits. ASEAN + 3 can be considered as a useful round-table, enhancing dialogue about some of the problematic issues in the area (such as the Spratly Islands dispute).

Inside Southeast Asia, economic integration for a long time has been just a mirage; regional economic integration was

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not a professed goal for ASEAN founders, and it became an issue of interest only at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1992 AFTA was founded (ASEAN Free Trade Area), in order to increase the competitive advantage of the whole region, but the application of its scheme for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers among member countries has been very slow and intra-regional trade is still limited. However, greater economic integration inside ASEAN has been envisaged since 1997, with the so-called "ASEAN Vision 2020".[5] Accompanying the same "Vision," was an official proposal to reduce poverty and socio-economic disparities in the area. Already, however, socio-economic disparities between the original ASEAN members and its new entries are engendering new forms of economic "center-periphery" relations; with old ASEAN members profiting from "a cheaper source of raw materials and production location" (ACHARYA, 2001, p. 122). Other symptoms of growing economic integration are the so-called "growth triangles" which represent a form of trans-border cooperation, promoted between different states in geographically contiguous areas presenting useful economic complementarities. To date in Southeast Asia, the Singapore-Johor-Riau triangle, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand triangle, as well as the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area have all been developed. Another form of sub-regional economic cooperation is occurring as part of the Greater Mekong Growth Area.

However, if economic integration in ASEAN is "on the move" and its international role appears to be central in the Far Eastern area, it is more difficult to establish whether, beyond a "security community" of states, the Association can also represent an "imagined community" of people.

In the 20th century, Southeast Asia generated some of the most influential nationalist movements in the world. But nowadays, the "nationalist project" seems to be under challenge in many corners of the region. On the one hand, the classic "blood and territory" discourse has been partly supplanted, both at the regional and state level, by a narrative based on the strengthening of ties between culture, identity and the economic sphere. In this perspective, economic success provides new sources of political iconography. On the other, increased circulation of ideas has produced new processes of cultural identification, which can be referred to supra-national even if territorially scattered communities, ranging from the Islamic *unmat*, to diasporic communities, like the "overseas Chinese," or to regional communities crossing current boundaries, such as the so-called "Malay civilization" (KAHN, 1998, p. 23).

In ASEAN's official discourse, the promotion of a "Cohesive Community of One Southeast Asia" represents one of the Association's future objectives. That means fostering an ASEAN identity and consciousness, in other words, deliberately creating an "acquired" iconography which, coherently with the institutional character of the Association, can "concentrically" include, but not supersede, its nation state members' iconography (just as the circle representing unity in the ASEAN logo embraces the *padi*, that is the sign for the ten – separated but united – countries of Southeast Asia). Nowadays, the accomplishment of such a task appears far away. It is very difficult to say how many of the 500 million people living in the area ever think of themselves as Southeast Asian, and in what sense, if any (ANDERSON, 1998; TARLING, 1998). In the ASEAN project, just as territorial integration is going to be promoted by the development of trans-ASEAN transportation and energy networks, regional "consciousness" has to be attained through the involvement of the media, educational institutions and via the intensification of regional cooperation among various sectors of the public.

Still, it remains debatable if, in the face of the contemporary proliferation of post-national cultural identities (KAHN, 1998), a significant role can be played by the "ASEAN identity" and its emerging iconographies in providing a new regional "resilience" to Southeast Asia. Alternatively, one may ask whether the region-building effort promoted at institutional levels is bound to remain just an elite agreement, confined to simply coordinating inter-state relations.

Notes

1. "The Association represents the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity."
2. "Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner. Renunciation of the threat or use of force. Effective cooperation among themselves."
3. The "ASEAN Song of Unity" can be downloaded at the website www.aseansec.org/song.htm. The whole text recites: "ASEAN, oh ASEAN. Our voices rise as one. From land to land from sea to sea. Reach out to every one. ASEAN, oh ASEAN. Let's link our arms and stand. Behold the sun has risen to the level of our eyes".
4. "The new ASEAN logo represents a stable, peaceful, united and dynamic ASEAN. The colours of the logo – blue, red, white and yellow – represent the main colours of the crests of all the ASEAN countries. The blue signifies peace and stability. Red depicts courage and dynamisms. White embodies purity and yellow symbolizes prosperity. The ten *padi* stalks represent the dream of ASEAN's Founding Fathers for an ASEAN comprising all ten countries in Southeast Asia bound together in friendship and solidarity. The circle represents the unity of ASEAN" (www.aseansec.org).
5. The vision statement proposed the creation of "a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region, in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investments, capital and equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities".

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Influence of Jean Gottmann's thought on national development plans in Japan

The influence of Gottmann's thoughts on national land plans includes megalopolis in Japan, the importance of the natural environment in a metropolis, decentralization of business functions to sub-centers in metropolitan areas, and so on.

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Foreword

The Japanese government produced the first Comprehensive National Development Plan (CNDP) in 1962. At the same time, namely, in the 1960s, Japan entered into high economic growth after having drastically recovered from its physical and economic devastation since the Second World War. After following this plan, the national government has also drawn up four more CNDPs until now. The purpose of these CNDPs was gradually altered from socio-economic development, emphasizing not only high living standards but also high quality of life, to sustainable development, stressing environmental conservation in harmony with socio-economic development. More specifically, the first and second CNDPs in the high economic growth period chiefly addressed economic development. Consequently, the third CNDP, made in an economically stable period after the dollar crisis, introduced the viewpoint of the development of society into its plan after due consideration of the environmental pollution and deterioration that had occurred all over Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. In the fourth and fifth CNDPs, presented in the era of globalization of the economy and environmental problems since the 1980s, finally, we could observe thoughts of sustainable development considering environmental conservation in harmony with socio-economic development.

Introduction

Given the world situation before the Second World War, the Japanese Empire developed some CNDPs stressing national defence and intended to establish a self-sufficient nation with relation to the Great Powers of the world (ISHIKAWA, 1942; EZAWA, 1942). In sum, these plans were closely related to the policies of the bloc economy adopted by the Great Powers. After the Great Depression in 1929, the free trade system shrank, and then the Great Powers and other Western countries established customs bulwarks and bloc economic policies. In such global circumstances, the then Planning Agency of Japan drew up the National Plan Establishment Guidance (Kokudo Keikaku Settei Youkou) in 1940 to create a national defence system covering Japan, (south and north) Korea and Manchuria. In addition, the agency drew up the Central Plan Draft (Chuo Keikaku Soan) in 1941 to strengthen national defence along the lines of the aforementioned guidance (SUGAI, 1976).

After the end of the Second World War, Japan's CNDPs prioritized mostly economic restoration. More specifically, the government established the National Restoration Plan in 1949, and in 1953 it also released comprehensive regional development plans (CRDPs) modelled after the U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority under the New Deal policy. The CRDP including the Kitakami valley comprehensive development plan was chiefly based on the development of power sources, while constructing multipurpose dams. Japan was able to implement these development plans and restored its physical and economic conditions very rapidly due to the advantage provided by the international situation that followed. The Allied Powers signed the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 because they reflected on the bloc economy that had resulted indirectly in the Second World War. In the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were established in 1945, and then foreign exchange moved to the fixed exchange rate system. After the Japanese government had accepted the Bretton Woods system, it joined the World Bank in 1952, and then took a loan from the Bank, the biggest at that time, which helped the country to execute its National Restoration Plan. The United States established the

Marshall Plan for economic restoration in Western Europe in 1949, while the Soviet Union formed the Communist Economic Conference (COMECON) in the same year to compete with the Marshall Plan. After the establishment of the economic blocs by the liberal and communist camps, each camp established a security treaty, namely the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in 1949 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) also in 1949. Thereafter, the cold war started. In such a Cold War structure, the Korean War broke out in 1950. Japan, incorporated in the liberal camp, got special procurements as a result of the Korean War. With the help of the cheap Yen (360 yen for a dollar) under the fixed exchange rate system, the procurements for the heavy chemical and textile industries brought an increasing amount of exports from Japan to the United States. In such a situation, Japan drastically recovered from postwar devastation.

In the years that followed and in response to the national and international situations, the Japanese government altered the contents of the CNDPs just like the aforementioned National Restoration Plan.

The present paper classifies the five CNDPs into three categories in accordance with three main streams of development theories (YAMASHITA, 2001), and then overviews their contents in due consideration of national and international situations, as follows (fig. 1):
• the first and second CNDPs, which were presented in the economic high growth period, chiefly addressed economic development;
• the third CNDP, which was implemented in a stable growth period, mainly aimed at social development;
• the fourth and fifth CNDPs emphasized the global economy, and globalization of environmental problems, respectively.

High economic growth period and national development plans: The first and second CNDPs

On the basis of the National Comprehensive Development Law enacted in 1950, the Japanese Cabinet adopted the first CNDP stressing regional economic development in 1964. Before this CNDP, the mining and manufacturing industrial output of Japan had exceeded the pre-war level in 1951, and Japan drastically restored its economy so that the Japanese economy entered a high economic growth period in the 1960s with an annual economic growth rate of approximately 10 percent as a result of the international and national situations.

• Concerning **international situations**, Japan was incorporated in the western liberal camp in respect of national security after the conclusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951. The Vietnam War in 1954 brought Japan not only a large amount of special procurements but also a boom in its national economy. The fixed currency rate under the Bretton Woods system and the low price of crude oil were also in Japan's favor. In the 1960s, Japan changed its industrial structure to trade in "improvement," i.e. one which imports cheap raw materials and exports finished goods. Such international situations encouraged more economic growth for Japan.
• Regarding **national situations**, Japan experienced drastic changes in its industrial and energy structure in the 1960s. While the secondary industry grew, the primary industry, which employed about 45 percent of the population in 1955, declined rapidly after that year. Thereafter the country became one of the most industrialized nations. The Income Doubling Plan and Pacific Belt Area Plan presented in 1960 had a strong influence on such a change in the industrial structure.
– The main purposes of the Income Doubling Plan were the in-

crease of social capital and the improvement of industrial structure. Infrastructure, especially industry-oriented social capital, was emphatically upgraded as a result of this plan.
– The Pacific Belt Area Plan aimed at strengthening the existing four industrial districts, namely Tokyo-Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka-Kyoto, and Kita-Kyushu districts, and constructing new industrial areas between the four industrial districts. Just like the industrial structure, industrial location also changed from inland regions, where natural resources like coal or iron ore were produced, to coastal regions, where finished goods are processed and exported using cheap imported raw materials.

At the same time, industry also changed from light industry, which had been the mainstream in Japan until then, to a heavy-chemical one. From the viewpoint of the national economy, Japan experienced remarkably high economic growth, chiefly in the urban areas because the heavy-chemical industry was located there. Conversely, non-urban regions had difficulty in receiving the benefits of rapid economic development because these areas mainly relied on primary industry. This resulted in expansion of income differential between urban and non-urban areas.

Energy structure has, on the other hand, depended heavily on oil since the high economic growth period. In 1960, the country relied on coal rather than oil. Thereafter, Japan changed its energy structure from utilization of high-priced domestic coal to import of cheap crude oil from the Middle East. The number of privately owned cars also rapidly increased in the 1960s because of growing average income, expansion of purchase of other durable goods, and mass production of low-priced cars by Japanese car makers. This indicates that Japan switched its socio-economic system to a mass production, consumption and disposal one of durable goods and fossil fuel in the high economic growth period.

The government decided on the first CNDP in response to such a change in 1962. The first CNDP had the following main objectives and goals (ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, 1962). The main objectives include appropriate utilization of natural resources and suitable regional distribution of resources such as capital, labor and technology, while taking due consideration of prevention of excessive urbanization and reduction of regional differentials. On the basis of these objectives, a goal of the first CNDP was "balanced regional development." More specifically, a concrete purpose of the first CNDP was to solve comprehensively various problems regarding excessive urbanization and differences in regional productivity.

To achieve this goal, a development point method was adopted as a development method in the first CNDP. Considering prevailing conditions of regional development, the Economic Planning Agency classified Japan into the following three categories of area by the development point method:
– overpopulated areas,
– stimulated areas, and
– developing areas.

The government planned to establish new industries in both stimulated and developing areas as development points so as to decentralize industries concentrated in the three metropolitan areas to depopulated regions. Through construction of the development points, the first CNDP aimed at fostering industry and job creation in depopulated regions as well as income increase in these areas, which brings justification of income differentials (ITOH, 1972). The overpopulated areas are characterized as the region or adjoining regions where social problems such as various kinds of pollution, traffic congestion, and shortage of water occurred or were anticipated to occur because of over-accumulated industry and population.
• The **overpopulated areas** included the three metropolitan areas – Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya – their adjoining areas,

The fifth CNDP
⊟ Japan Sea National Axis
▦ Pacific Ocean National Axis
▨ Northeast National Axis
⊠ Western National Axis

The fourth CNDP
More than 30 percent of population moved a day
▦ Year 1985
⊟ Expected region in future

The third CNDP
▦ Model Residential Areas
· Regional Core Cities

The second CNDP
━━ Sinkansen (Bullet train)
── Highway
◆ Large industrial areas

The first CNDP
■ Overpopulated areas
☐ Stimulated areas
▦ Develping areas
⊟ New industrial cities
━·━ Regional boundaries

0   200km

Fig. 1: Japan – Sketch maps of the five Comprehensive National Development Plans (CNDPs).

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and the Kita-kyushu urban area.
- The **stimulated areas**, which enjoyed profits derived from industrial accumulation in the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas, should be developed and stimulate industry decentralization. The stimulated areas corresponded to Kanto, Toukai, Kinki, and Hokuriku districts.
- In the **developing areas** the government intensively promoted regional development because these areas were less likely to receive the benefits of the accumulation in the three metropolitan areas. The developing areas included Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu districts.

As development points in the first CNDP, 15 new industrial cities were designated on the basis of the New Industrial City Construction Promotion Law in 1962, while six industry establishment special areas were assigned on the basis of the Industry Establishment Special Area Stimulation Promotion Law in 1964 (fig. 1).

As a result of the first CNDP, non-metropolitan areas, namely the stimulated and developing areas, grew economically. However, it is hard to identify whether the goal of "balanced regional development" among regions was implemented as planned in the first CNDP. Regarding regional population, except for some regions, population decreased drastically in non-metropolitan areas between1960 and 1965, while, in the same period, the three metropolitan areas received a large number of people. The Tokyo metropolitan area, especially, received more than five million people, which caused population concentration in the area. Furthermore, environmental pollution frequently occurred everywhere in Japan in the 1960s as a negative economic externality resulting from regional economic development based on the heavy-chemical industry in the development points.

Examples of the negative impact of environmental pollution were:

– asthma caused by air pollution in Yokkaichi;
– Minamata diseases by organic mercury in Kumamoto and Niigata; and,
– chronic cadmium poisoning in Toyama.

Lawsuits were filed for pollution in these four regions from 1967 to 1969. Finally, defendants won these lawsuits in the planning period of the second CNDP, namely from 1971 to 1973. Parallel to these lawsuits under trial, national and local governments made much progress in policy for pollution control. In 1967, for example, the national government enacted the Pollution Prevention Basic Law, while local governments established local anti-pollution regulations.

The Japanese wanted the first CNDP to result in economic development, which could bring high level living standards. This became its basic objective. They also wanted social development and improvement of the quality of life. This should be incorporated in the new CNDP.

On the basis of reflection of the first CNDP, the Cabinet decided on the second CNDP in 1969 (ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY, 1969). Although the second CNDP should have included an aspect of social development, in reality economic development was the central issue, just as in the first CNDP, because at the end of the 1960s, progress in information technology and technological innovation were still accelerating high economic growth, though concentration of population and industry in the metropolitan areas had caused a variety of social problems such as environmental pollution.

The four basic objectives of the second CNDP were very much economic in orientation:

- The **first** objective even addressed permanent environmental conservation in harmony of the human being with nature in reflection of the pollution that frequently occurred in the first CNDP, while

- the **fourth** objective referred to the necessity of improvement of the living environment because overpopulation had brought with it a lack of urban amenity;
- from the viewpoint of balanced development of national land, the **second** objective, which very much followed the thoughts of economic development in the first CNDP, was directed towards the expansion of possible development areas in the country as a whole, while the central and local governments developed requirements for regional economic development;
- the **third** objective focused on reorganization of, and effectiveness in, national land use, while keeping an eye on regional development based on regional characteristics.

While adjusting these four basic objectives, the goal of the second CNDP was set not only to create an advanced welfare society, but also "to establish wealthy environment" esteeming humanity, though it came to progress around the second objective.

To implement chiefly the second basic objectives in the second CNDP, the Cabinet adopted a "Big Project Plan" as a development method. Though promotion of big projects, like the construction of the bullet train (Shinkansen) and highway networks over the whole country, the Big Project Plan aimed to reduce uneven utilization of the national land, and solve problems of depopulation, overpopulation and regional income differential (SHIMOKOBE, 1994). On the basis of this plan, the government decided to extend the Tokaido Shinkansen, which had already been in operation since 1964, west- and eastward. As the Shinkansen was opened to traffic between Osaka and Okayama in 1972, and Okayama and Hakata in 1975, Japan partly implemented the Pacific Belt Plan to which we referred earlier.

Regarding highway networks, the Meisin highway connecting Osaka with Nagoya, which had been in operation since 1969, was extended eastward in 1965 and linked to the Meishin highway connecting Nagoya with Tokyo. Thereafter, the Tohoku highway (from Tokyo to Aomori), and the Kanetu highway (from Tokyo to Niigata) were also constructed and opened to traffic. These highways formulated a national highway network. Furthermore, it was decided to construct Kansai international airport in 1974, while the new Tokyo international airport was opened in 1978. Parallel to the construction of international airports, district airports were also newly established or renovated. Along with the increase in the number of international and domestic flight lines, these airports formed the national aviation network. While the government developed these traffic networks, the east-Tomakomai, Mutsu-Ogawara and Shibushi Bay regions were designated as large industrial districts so as to promote the industrial structure conversion from light to heavy chemical industry (fig. 1). The development methods changed drastically from point to network between the first and second CNDP: development points like new industry cities or industry-stimulated special areas were constructed in the first CNDP, while transport networks were formulated in the second CNDP.

At the beginning of the second CNDP, the high economic growth period was still continuing so that the process of social capital development like transport networks went smoothly, while land prices rose suddenly after 1971 because development areas expanded over the whole country. Land prices continued to rise steeply along with skyrocketing prices after the oil crisis brought about by the fourth Middle East War in 1973. Coping effectively with such soaring land prices, the government established the National Land Agency in 1974 so as to reinforce land policy. In the same year, Japan enacted the Land Use Planning Law to proclaim basic ideas for comprehensive national land use. Regarding the environment, further to the enactment of the Pollution Control Basic Law in the period of the first CNDP, Japan established the Environment

Agency in 1971 to strengthen pollution control measures and environmental conservation policies. Not only the establishment of environmental institutions, and the adoption of laws and regulations in central and local government, but also the appearance of energy-saving industry after the oil crisis, gradually decreased industry-originated pollution. Conversely, pollution derived from cities and people's everyday lives increased due to the rapid saturation of privately owned cars since the 1970s.

A national development plan in the stable economic growth period: The third CNDP

After the oil crisis, the government decided on the third CNDP, while the Japanese were experiencing stable economic growth, structural conversion of industry and energy, and a change in public opinion from standard of living to quality of life. The ordinary Japanese, who had already obtained durable goods such as cars and color television in the high economic growth period, had achieved a high standard of living. They were, therefore, very willing to enhance their mental wealth, namely progress in quality of life, rather than physical richness, when the country entered the stable growth period. Regarding the structural conversion of energy and industry, both the Bretton Woods and the fixed rate systems collapsed after the Dollar Shock in 1971. In turn, foreign exchange markets adopted a new floating rate system, which brought a strong yen. Against losses from the soaring yen, Japanese industry was required to make products with even higher added value. While industry was required to convert from a material to a high added value one because profits plunged due to the rise of production costs resulting from the oil crisis, the crisis also urged energy conversion of ordinary industry to an energy-saving one. This indicates that the Japanese realized that the promotion of high added value industry, such as the high technology industry, would be necessary in the stable growth period.

On the basis of such a socio-economic situation, the Cabinet approved the third CNDP in 1977 with the following basic objectives and goals (NATIONAL LAND AGENCY, 1977):

• to enhance the quality of life, **the first objective** was formulated for comprehensive reformation of the residential environment;
• from the viewpoint of resource conservation and energy saving, **the second objective** was also set for conservation and effective utilization of national land;
• finally, **the third objective** showed the necessity of a new correspondence of the Japanese economic society to the drastic changes in the world economy after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.

Under these three basic objectives, the third CNDP also emphasized regional development based on regional characteristics, and social rights, especially the right to life. Accordingly, the basic goal of the third CNDP was "creation of whole environments related to human residence," namely, a comprehensive plan for healthy and cultural residential environments, with consideration of historic and traditional culture using regional resources. The third CNDP was evaluated as a national development plan stressing social development because of its emphasis on social rights.

To implement these three basic objectives, the Permanent Settlement Area Program was adopted as a development method in the third CNDP. The permanent settlement area was a regional planning area where residents actively commit themselves to its regional plan; they also comprehensively manage, conserve and utilize both natural and living environments; establish and arrange public and private facilities and institutes around them. In this sense, the permanent settlement area was regarded as drainage area, integrated administrative region, or commuting area (HONMA, 1999). The purpose of the permanent settlement area program was to create a wealthy environment for human settlements; to control concentration of industry and population in the metropolitan areas through creation of such areas; also to encourage balanced development of national land by stimulating local economy. Finally, 40 model permanent settlement areas were designated over the whole country in 1979 (fig. 1).

As a result of the third CNDP addressing social development, new laws and regulations regarding social rights were established especially in urban areas where many environmental problems had arisen. For instance, the revised Architecture Standards Law came to include the sunshine-shade regulation. In the 1960s, a lawsuit concerning the right to sunlight was filed in the Tokyo district court. In 1972, this court ordered the construction of flats to be partly suspended. Thanks to this juridical precedent, the right to sunlight became part of the rights to life. This was why the sunshine-shade regulation was established. Thereafter, the right to sunshine was regarded as part of basic human rights in the urban area where high multi-storey buildings had often hindered daylight and TV and radio waves for small low-rise houses.

Furthermore, the revised Urban Planning Law included district plans by which a way for public participation was opened for conservation of the residential environment. The district plan was established to fill the gap between urban plans for designated regions, which are assigned appropriate land use under the urban planning law, and for pieces of cadastral land, which are regulated under the Architecture Standards Law. In other words, the district plan addressed intermediate districts that were ignored by the two old urban laws. Using this district plan, residents have their own planning initiative for conservation of their townscape and maintenance of their comfort within their residential environment.

In spite of the fact that social development was a main pillar of the third CNDP, the government was forced to change the direction of its national land policies from social to economic development because of the stagnation of the Japanese economy due to the sharp rise of oil prices after the second oil crisis that resulted from the Iranian revolution in 1979. Thereafter, the notion of technopolis was introduced so as to create high technology industry and take economic measures to boost demand. Construction of the technopolises originated from the Technopolis Program in 1980, and was based on the Development Promotion Law for Advanced Technology Industry Accumulation Areas (the technopolis law, for short) in 1983. The United States had experienced an accumulation of high technology industries, such as computer and aerospace industries, on which universities and other research institutes collaborated. While observing such situations in the US, the Japanese government decided on the construction of technology-based cities, namely technopolises, to vitalize regional economy, and to encourage collaboration between high technology industry and research institutes, while creating comfortable residential spaces. To vitalize regional economy through promotion of high technology industry, 26 regions were finally designated for technopolis areas in 1980.

National development plans in the globalization era: The fourth and fifth CNDPs

Globalization had a strong influence on the fourth and fifth

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CNDPs which were decided on by the Cabinet in 1987 and 1998 (NATIONAL LAND AGENCY, 1987 and 1998). Globalization has two meanings. The first one. indicating globalization of the economy, was strongly present in the fourth CNDP, while the second one, meaning globalization from the viewpoint of humanity, was emphasized in the fifth CNDP.

Globalization of the economy is characterized by the liberalization of financing based on the liberalization of capital. An origin of globalization of the economy may be traced back to the beginning of the floating rate system, which started after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system as a result of the Dollar Shock in 1971. Contrarily, the term "globalization" in the humanitarian sense was first utilized in the Cold War period to express world peace. Thereafter, the term "globalization" has been used to indicate environmental problems, such as global warming and ozone layer destruction which have expanded at the world scale, and led to the1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.

• In the **fourth CNDP** period, between the Dollar Shock in 1971 and the 1990s, while the globalization of the economy was in progress, Japan experienced the following economic situations. As a result of the large amount of steel, cars, semiconductors and television sets exported from Japan, the United States rapidly increased its trade deficit with Japan and its current balance deteriorated substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. The United States became a debtor nation in 1985. Although the United States moved to a high interest rate policy to defend its own economy, the Plaza Accord was concluded among the G5 countries in 1985 to take concerted intervention to correct the strong dollar (fig. 1).

Thereafter, the dollar went down, while the yen went up steeply. While pointing out the closed nature of Japanese agricultural and financial markets for foreign countries in 1979, the OECD recommended that Japan promote further its deregulation policies including more openness of its markets. Regarding deregulation, Japan entered a deregulation era after it had concluded an agricultural agreement in the Uruguay Round in 1993. In this round, Japan reached a consensus on lowering tariffs on agricultural products and imposing a tariff on rice, which was protected before the round. To respond to the demand for opening the Japanese market to foreign countries, on the other hand, the Maekawa report was issued in 1985. This report showed some concrete guidelines for reducing the Japanese trade surplus, especially with the United States. For example, Japan should convert its economic structure from trade-oriented to a domestic demand-oriented one, while internationally long working hours should be substantially shortened so as to enhance the quality of life of the Japanese. Concerning working hours, Japan aimed at creating more leisure hours, and changing itself from an economic to a living power. As a result, the government drew up the Five Year Plan for a Living Power in 1992. The objectives of this plan included reduction of relatively long working hours, establishment and improvement of leisure facilities, and a price cut in the internationally high domestic aviation fares. In such progress in terms of economic globalization, population and other functions were concentrated in Tokyo, which in the 1980s had the locational advantage of international organizations like the foreign stock exchange and many multinational enterprises. On the other hand, local areas other than Tokyo had a serious employment problem because their industrial structure was not converted from heavy-chemical to high technology industries.

Under such situations, the following two objectives were emphasized in the fourth CNDP:

• the first objective in the process of globalization of the economy, especially globalization of finance, was set for redeveloping Tokyo in order to establish there a world city, which could

be equivalent to New York and London where various global functions were accumulated;

• the second objective, which was much related to various problems in local areas, aimed at vitalizing these areas through improvement of everyday life, and lessening regional income differential, based on concentration in Tokyo, through permanent settlement in these areas and interchange with urban areas.

One of the goals of the fourth CNDP was to construct the Dispersed Multi-poles Country Program (YADA, 1998). This program referred not only to strengthening existing international functions in Tokyo, but also to reinforcing other regional functions in local areas. The program indicated a country where regions mutually contact and cooperate with each other through national and international interchanges in order to create many core areas with characteristic functions, and to redistribute evenly population, and economic and administrative functions over the whole country.

The interchange network method was adopted as a development method to build the dispersed multi-poles country in the fourth CNDP (fig. 1). First, the central government attempted to establish some poles that could become nodes of the interchange network on the basis of their regional characteristics. Thereafter, the government attempted to connect these poles with each other using transportation and information networks over Japan. Consequently, the government intended not only to avoid concentration of population and other functions in Tokyo, but also to deepen regional cooperation outside the Tokyo Metropolitan Area through various interchanges on these networks (YAMASAKI, 1999). Transportation and information networks, therefore, were developed in the fourth CNDP.

Regarding the transportation network, Kansai international airport was constructed to strengthen international interchanges, while national transportation networks such as highways, the bullet train (Shinkansen) and district airports were also developed as main national transportation networks under the One Day Trip Area Program.

Concerning the information network, for example, the nationwide integrated services digital network (ISDN) and local Community Antenna Television (CATV) networks were established in the fourth CNDP period.

Regarding the conversion of Tokyo into a world city, Chiba, Urawa and Oomiya, Yokohama and other cities were redeveloped as Business Core Cities under the Fourth Metropolitan Area Basis Plan in 1986. In this plan, Tokyo decentralized some of its concentrated business functions to these business core cities, while these cities shared these functions with each other in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.

Concerning response to deregulation, for which foreign countries were longing, the Japanese government corrected its closed construction market, and permitted foreign enterprises to develop its land, especially in urban areas. After the Temporary Law of Promoting Construction of Special Public Facilities Using Private Sector (the Private Sector Stimulation Law, for short) enacted in 1986, the private sector was actively utilized for urban renewal, especially redevelopment of central parts of Tokyo. Such deregulation was also accelerated in both the Urban Planning Law and the Architecture Standards Law, that were revised in 1992. Along with these revised laws, central parts of metropolitan areas like Tokyo were heavily redeveloped using chiefly the private sector in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Regarding regional development in non-metropolitan areas, on the other hand, the Comprehensive Resort Area Construction Law (the Resort Law, for short) was enacted in 1987 because the government was very willing to encourage the Japanese people to take more leisure hours as mentioned in the

Maekawa report (ISHII, 1988). The purposes of this law were to create more jobs and to convert their industrial structure to the tertiary industry in the non-metropolitan areas by developing resort areas in these areas. Just like redevelopment in the urban areas, non-metropolitan areas were developed everywhere to construct resort areas using the private sector under the Resort Law. Not a few resort areas had some environmental problems like natural destruction and regional conflicts between residents and developers because the Resort Law does not provide environmental conservation regulations for resort developments. However, the only exception might be the Nagasaki Exotic Resort, which was constructed from the aspect of long-term environmental conservation and differed from many other resort areas causing environmental problems. From the viewpoint of long-term environmental conservation, the Huis Ten Bosch centered in the Nagasaki Exotic Resort tackled creatively the establishment of a healthy resort in harmony with the environment (YAMASHITA, 1999). To formulate an environmental system, the Huis Ten Bosch utilized original environmental cohabitation technology such as a garbage composting system, a sewage recycling system, and a district cooling and heating system based on cogeneration using liquid natural gas, which is less likely to emit global warming gas.

Urban renewal in metropolitan areas and in resort development and non-metropolitan areas both based on utilization of the private sector brought a sharp rise in land prices over the whole country in the fourth CNDP period. At the same time, land speculation in both areas also gave birth to a bubble economy. In 1989, the government established the Land Basic Law to deal with the steep rise in land prices since the second CNDP. This law clearly states principles for land use, such as importance of public welfare, necessity of land planning, and evenly shared social costs for development. However, this law does not include any clause or article to regulate individual laws regarding regional development because of its characteristics as a basic law. On the other hand, the Environment Assessment Law was established in 1997 to prevent environmental degradation because environmental problems occurred everywhere in resort areas in relation to resort development. Since then, environmental impact assessments have come to be requested from developers.

● The **fifth CNDP** was decided as a national land plan in an era of globalization of environmental problems such as ozone layer depletion, global warming, and desertification (MIYAKAWA, 1997). After ozone holes were observed on the global scale, the Vienna treaty for ozone layer depletion was concluded in 1985 to regulate substances causing depletion of the ozone layer, and the concrete reduction plan was shown in the Montreal protocol in 1987. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted to prevent global warming, and began to be signed after the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. Thereafter a concrete reduction plan for global warming gases was discussed for inclusion in a protocol, which was adopted at the Kyoto Conference on Global Warming (the third conference of parties, COP3 for short) in 1997. By this protocol, Japan, the United States and the EU agreed to implement a cut of global warming gases by 6, 7 and 8 percent each from 2008 to 2012, while 5.2 percent will be cut as a whole in all developed countries. The International Convention to Combat Desertification, that includes such measures as financial and technical support for forestation and irrigation projects, was adopted in 1994, and went into effect in 1996 because of the expansion of the Sahara desert and, in turn, the occurrence of drought and death by starvation on a large scale. While international institutes tackled such global environmental problems, the Japanese

Government adopted its own Agenda 21 that presented national mission statements for turning Japan towards sustainable development in 1993 because the government intended to respond to Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. In the same year, Japan also enacted the Environment Basic Law that states basic guidelines for environments, while it established the Environment Basic Plan that addresses concrete policies of environmental conservation based on the Environment Basic Act. Japan has both internationally and nationally come to pay much attention to these global environmental problems in the 1990s. This seems to be closely related to a metamorphosis in the global socio-economic system, which chiefly stands on mass production, consumption and disposal, and flows of goods, people, and information on a global scale.

To solve such global environmental problems, one of the basic objectives in the fifth CNDP was set for enjoyment of natural wealth and its continuation. To respond to globalization of the economy since the fourth CNDP, another basic objective aimed at construction on national land to be open to the world. It is worth noting that the fifth CNDP emphasized regional development by local governments and inhabitants instead of by the national government, which had taken the main part since the first CNDP. On the basis of such objectives, a fundamental goal of the fifth CNDP was the creation of national land formulation on multi-axes (fig. 1) to reorganize the mono-pole national land structure that was concentrated in the existing Pacific Belt Area (the western Japan axis in the fifth CNDP). More specifically, the multi-axes national land structure consists of the following three new axes along with the western Japan axis:

● The first one, called the northeast Japan axis, ranges from the central highlands through the northern part of the Kanto region to the Pacific side of the Tohoku and Hokkaido regions (fig. 1).
● The second one, termed the Japan Sea axis, runs from the northern part of the Kyushu region through the Japan seaside of Honshu island to the Japan seaside of the Hokkaido region.
● The third one, named the Pacific new axis, reaches from Okinawa island by way of the central and southern parts of the Kyushu region and Shikoku island to the Kii Peninsula on Honshu island.

To formulate the multi-axes national land structure, the government adopted "participation and coordination" as the development method in the fifth CNDP. More specifically, the Large International Interchange Area was directed towards globalization of the economy, while the Multi-Natural Residential Area addressed the globalization of environmental problems. To improve the rural areas, the government intended to turn these areas into Multi-Natural Residential Areas. The Japanese changed their sense of values, and came to have a better impression of these small cities, towns and villages than before. This is because urban areas have experienced so-called combined serious urban problems such as high land prices, long-distance commuting, air pollution, and shortage of water and garbage disposal sites. To respond to such change in terms of values, and to maximize the benefits deriving from the natural wealth in rural areas, the fifth CNDP encouraged the countermovement of urban residents to these rural areas by means of industrial development, job creation and construction of living-oriented social capitals in the rural areas. Regarding the Large International Interchange Areas, on the other hand, Japan developed airports and harbors as gateways for Asia and other parts of the world because parallel with globalization of the economy international interchange must become more active than ever. To improve access to these airports and harbors, the government promoted construction policies for transporta-

tion networks like highways and high-speed railway networks. Especially, the One Day Traffic Area Program presented in the fourth CNDP was expanded to the One Day Traffic Area in East Asia in the fifth CNDP because interchanges of goods and people are expected to drastically increase in the East.

The fifth CNDP seems to be concerned with both globalization of environmental problems and the economy. Because it is still under way, and should be implemented by 2010-2015, we can expect it to reorganize national land structure in Japan in the near future in response to globalization.

Concluding remarks

Although the Japanese socio-economic system originally revolved around local industry that utilized local resources and circulated its products in a region, the system moved to a mass production, consumption and disposal one with the conversion of industrial and regional structures in the 1960s. After the 1980s, the system more deeply depended upon mass production, consumption and disposal due to the globalization of the economy, and in turn such a socio-economic system brought globalization of environmental problems (KITAMURA, 1999).

In the course of implementation of the five national development plans, the Japanese government intended to absorb three elements of sustainable development, namely economic growth, social development, and environment conservation. In the fifth CNDP, Japan showed an orientation towards sustainable development by means of the valley coordination axis, which is the minimum unit of a regional coordination axis, and an independent region with its own production, consumption and disposal system under a limit of environmental capacity (YAMASHITA, 1999). This suggests that it is necessary for Japan to alter its land planning to an ecological one from the point of view of sustainable development which harmonizes socio-economic development with environmental conservation. In the context of urban planning, this also indicates the creation of sustainable cities within the broader urban area, which seems to be a microcosmos of land planning (YAMASHITA, 2000). We expect, therefore, the construction of a sustainable landform from the viewpoint of both ecology and socio-economic development.

The influence of Jean Gottmann's thought on the Comprehensive National Development Plans is obvious. In the first and second CNDPs, the Tokaido megalopolis was established by implementation of the Pacific Belt Area Program (GOTTMANN, 1981). Tokyo, which was and still is a core of the Tokaido megalopolis, planned to be a world city (GOTTMANN, 1979a) like New York or London, in the fourth CNDP. In the fifth Development Plan for Tokyo Metropolitan Area, Business Core Cities (GOTTMANN, 1979b), like Yokohama, Saitama or Chiba city, were built within the Tokyo metropolitan area to decentralize some functions from Tokyo. The importance of the natural environment in urban space, which Gottmann (1961) emphasized, was observed in various aspects of the National Land Plan in Japan after the formulation of the Tokaido megalopolis. This indicates that Gottmann's thought presented approximately 40 years ago will be realized in the fifth CNDP from now on.

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Africa and globalization: What perspectives for the future of the continent?

"In his famous work, Jean Gottmann said that: '... National politics is built not only upon what exists or doesn't exist inside the border of a country, but upon what is found or not found in other countries whom the former has relationships with ...' In the context we are analyzing, we are talking about a continent, Africa, that is trying to rebuild these relationships on a new basis, in order to get out of its geopolitical and economic isolation and identify its role in the international scene."

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Introduction

Africa is, once more, going through an extremely difficult period of its recent history. The new scenarios that, on a world basis, are emerging in the framework of the new and dangerous international juncture are leading, in fact, to an even stronger reduction of the attention level of the challenges that the Continent has to face daily. We are talking about wars, sanitary emergencies, poverty and, of course, underdevelopment. But we are also considering the efforts that, in the last three years, African leaders have made to give the world a picture of Africa more and more determined to see things with a prospective of globalization and, most notably, no longer eager to pay only the costs of it.

In this perspective, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)[1] is the pivot around which the project of the re-launch of the Continent is revolving.[2] The NEPAD, that initially was presented with the name of New African Initiative (NAI), is the result of the merging of two projects presented in the previous year:

- the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program (MAP), elaborated by Presidents T. Mbeki, A. Bouteflika and O. Obasanjo; and,
- the Omega Plan (Dakar – June 2001), sponsored by the Prime Minister of Senegal A. Wade.[3]

The Plan was first presented at the G8 meeting in Genoa (and

positively welcomed even though maybe not with the attention it deserved) and later re-elaborated before being newly discussed during the last G8 meeting in Canada.

In his famous work, Jean Gottmann said that: "... National politics is built not only upon what exists or doesn't exist inside the border of a country, but upon what is found or not found in other countries whom the former has relationships with ..."[4] In the context we are analyzing, we are talking about a continent, Africa, that is trying to rebuild these relationships on a new basis, in order to get out of its geopolitical and economic isolation and identify its role in the international scene.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development

The New Partnership for Africa's Development has to be seen in this perspective. We try here to present the most significant elements of this document and to understand its importance for the future of the Continent.

Contents

The NEPAD is characterized by two significant aspects:

● First of all, quoting the words reported in the document, it is meant to be a real project of economic development "of Africa for Africa" that declares a direct and conscious commitment by the African leaders who are determined to lift Africa from the plague of poverty and underdevelopment: "This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Program is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world." (Art. 1)[5]

● In the second place, it aims at marking an important change in the way of conceiving the relationship between North and

South, going from a logic of support, that has characterized the development cooperation in the last 40 years, to a logic of partnership that can create advantages for both parties. Articles 185, 186 and 187 of the Plan, while underlining the necessity of a commitment intended to develop and strengthen the partnerships,[6] say that: "The manner in which development assistance is delivered in itself creates serious problems for developing countries. The need to negotiate and account separately to donors supporting the same sector or program is both cumbersome and inefficient. Also, the tying of development assistance generates further inefficiencies. The appeal is for a new relationship that takes the country programs as a point of departure. The new relationship should set out mutually agreed performance targets and standards for both donor and recipient. There are many cases that clearly show that the failure of projects is not caused only by the poor performance of recipients, but also by bad advice given by donors." (Art. 186)

More specifically, article 188 of the Plan points out a list of responsibilities and obligations that the developed countries and institutions have to take charge of. We name some of the 12: "To support materially mechanisms for and processes of conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, as well as peacekeeping initiatives; to accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries, in conjunction with more effective poverty reduction programs ...; To reverse the decline in ODA [Overseas Development Administration] flows to Africa and to meet the target level of ODA flows equivalent to 0.7 per cent of each developed country's gross national product (GNP) within an agreed period. Increased aid flows will be used to complement funds released by debt reduction for accelerating the fight against poverty; To translate into concrete commitments the international strategies adopted in the fields of education and health; To facilitate the development of a partnership between countries, international pharmaceutical corporations and civil society organizations to urgently secure access to existing drugs for Africans suffering from infectious diseases; To set up coordinated mechanisms to combat corruption effectively, as well as commit themselves to the return of monies (proceeds) of such practices to Africa ..." (Art. 188)

We can therefore state that the whole document is based upon two main aspects.

● First of all, the urgency of outlining strategies capable of consolidating the process of democratization that, although already started in some countries (Senegal, Mali, and the sub-Saharan giants Nigeria or South Africa and others) have problems to "take off" in a disruptive way on a continental level.[7] If these conditions are not present, there is a risk that the project will die in the beginning phase, victim of an ideological totalitarism and so to say "patrimonial" that has characterized public life in Africa for 40 years and that prevents the economic development of the Continent.[8] In other terms, the risk of failure of the entire operation is great, due to the lack of a culture of freedom, transparency and participation in the society of many African countries.

● In the second place there is the economic growth that, in this new scenario, has to be interpreted in its wider sense of sustainability of development, meaning the economic growth associated with a sustainable use of the resources in a context of social equity.[9]

The stake

Considering its contents, here very shortly presented, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* shows, without any doubt, its importance. Its approach and strategy makes it an absolutely innovative project compared to those imagined and accomplished in the past: the NEPAD is by any means an analytical plan for development "made by Africans for Africans,"

with figures, data, proposals, arguments, goals and priorities. The involvement of the international community is certainly necessary but its intervention is not expected to be just an entity, an organization that transfers funds to the south of the world, but in the form of a multilateral collaboration that allows the creation of a worldwide partnership capable of creating advantages for all parties.[10]

This extensive document contains not only statements of principles but also and mainly concrete proposals that confer an important value on the work carried out by African leaders. In fact, the success of this ambitious plan is connected not only to the future of Africa but also to its credibility. Besides its economic significance, in fact, the NEPAD is promoting a real political project of "rebirth" of the continent, the so-called *African Renaissance,*[11] greatly supported by the South African president Thabo Mbeki.[12] In an article published in the newspaper *La Repubblica* during the tumultuous days of the G8 meeting in Genoa, he clearly outlines the essential points of his political vision: "... as site where the whole humankind had its origin, Africa has an unpaired role as privileged location for the affirmation of the common humanity of all the people, no matter the race, the color, the gender or the nationality. The ancient African history, including the hearth creation itself, the birth and the evolution of life and mankind, the human society, arts, mathematics, architecture and medicine, must teach us Africans that who affirmed that we are less human, lied ..."[13] With these touching words, Mbeki recognizes the importance of the challenge that the African populations are facing today, but above all he recognizes that democracy, capitalism, globalization are some of the most important aspects that make the Western World the most significant example of these very same political and economic systems.[14]

But also the memory of the geopolitical events of African history and also the derangement and inequalities that they have produced cannot be avoided.[15] Mbeki himself emphasizes how colonialism has contributed to the creation: "... of an image of Africa as a continent keen on war, dictatorship, negation of human rights, corruption and always dependent on aid ..." The NEPAD has the explicit purpose to put an end to this situation of marginalization.

It is useful to make some considerations about this last issue. The modalities of the organization and structuring of the African territory imposed by the colonial powers during their domination originate in a heterocentric logic; the Europeans make their moves according to their political project aiming at reinforcing their international position. This happens through the construction of social and political schemes and economic systems that gradually replace the systems that, for centuries, have governed the basic organization of African communities (autocentric territorial logic).[16] The structures of legitimacy, the institutions and the pre-existent values are emptied of their content, dismantled, or even made slave to the political and economic needs of the imperial powers.[17]

The NEPAD is very explicit about this point (articles 21 and ff), and in particular when the failure of the post-colonial experience is recognized: "... Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies that were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries ...," is reported in article 22. In fact, the "clash" happens at the time of Independence and later: the very same territorial structures used, just before, to satisfy the needs of a precise political pattern, are inherited by the new States which start their project of emancipation around them.[18] The authoritarianism, the centrality of the State, the corruption, the negation of human rights and the lack of democracy are the most evident consequences of the new political asset, but also the marginality of the continent and its total dependence on international aid.[19]

The NEPAD tries to take care of all these problems by proposing a project of economic development supported by a political vision that puts in the foreground a fundamental issue: democracy. About this, in article 47 of the plan it states that: "... The agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving the people. We believe that while African leaders derive their mandates from their people ..."

In this perspective, the concept of democracy as a project, the activation of efficient mechanisms able to achieve its institutionalization on a continental level, the respect of these very same institutions become a real strategic goal.[20]

Certainly, the emergence of important personalities in the African political world and the campaign for promoting the image of the continent in different international happenings, are the sign of the deep changes that are coming into being in this direction.[21] It is not by chance that the NEPAD is the work of a different "generation" of African leaders. These leaders, thanks to the democratic respectability acquired through regular elections, act on the African and international scene obscuring the dictators, golpists, and generals who held power without having a legitimate political representation.[22] The intentions are absolutely positive and propulsive; nevertheless, by considering those criteria of democracy and participation so intensively proclaimed, one might wonder how many people of this "African mass" that Mbeki talks about in different parts of his article are really aware of this grandiose project of political, economic and social emancipation. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development centers around African ownership and management ..." and more, "... NEPAD is based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny," is written with emphasis in articles 47 and 48; but which Africans are we talking about? The intellectuals, the strategists and the statesmen or rather the citizens, the tradesmen, the artisans, the peasants, the common people, the "African masses"?

The NEPAD addresses them and creates great expectations; but we wonder, to what extent Africans are aware of its existence, or even more, as J.L. Touadi says: "... how much, those people who mostly suffer the consequences of the macro-economic policies of the governments and inspired by the international financial institutions, have participated in the elaboration of the plan?"[23]

This very last aspect brings to the foreground more issues to reflect upon, directly involving the "territorial aspects" of the plan. We refer, by saying that, to the way through which the NEPAD proposes to meet the territorial needs of the populations, the needs of social reproduction within their old and deeply rooted cultural frames. According to a merely territorial perspective, it is essential to focus on the fact that any intervention or action of sustainable development, as the NEPAD wants to endorse, must necessarily include an anchorage to the geographical context on which to act because, for different reasons, it is in the territorial dimension that the information indispensable to define the modality of intervention can be identified. This is, for sure, one of the most critical elements of a development project that does not take into account the issue, if not in a very marginal way in articles 143 and 144: "... The New Partnership for Africa's Development leaders will take urgent steps to ensure that indigenous knowledge in Africa is protected through appropriate legislation." The NEPAD does not contain any reference to the question of the involvement of the local communities, the modality of their participation, the valorization of the social, juridical, political and territorial context in which they have developed. The international debate itself that, for some years, involves the issues of cooperation in development does not seem to be taken into great consideration.[24] On the other hand, the choice to give the NEPAD a neoliberal denotation raises the risk of not satisfying the primary needs of the populations by the elaboration of an economic model able to transform them from passive element to main actor of the *renaissance* and able to give value to their resources.

Finally it is important to bring to light a last issue. Apart from being a document, the NEPAD is a real and articulated structure made of different organisms (art. 201-204): an Achievement Committee, composed of the presidents initiating the Plan, and by 10 other Heads of State, a Steering Committee, a High Authority for the NEPAD, a General Panafrican Commission, a Continental Director, a Council of Governors.[25] Regarding this aspect, we cannot avoid facing a prickly matter: the problems that could arise as a consequence of the decisions of a supernational organization, the NEPAD, within the different States (fig. 1). Even if it is true that, as Jean Gottmann said "... no political unit spread on wide areas has lasted long without realizing [inside its borders] some sort of decentralization," it is also a fact that "every State seems to be diffident regarding the perspective of leaving a part of its sovereignty in the hands of a supranational authority."[26] The African States, actually, seem to be very tied to their national prerogatives and it is still to be verified how keen they are on seeing their national sovereignty reduced in topics like the free circulation of goods and people, the homogenization of fiscal policy, juridical control and so on.[27]

The international debate: Contrasting reactions

Looking back to the international dimension, the NEPAD, as we said, was presented for the first time at the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001. This is, for sure, a positive fact as it is the sign of a "take in charge" by the International Community. Regarding this, in some documents that appeared on the official sites of the meeting, the intention of the G8 to support the basic issues of the plan such as democracy, prevention and reduction of conflicts, increase of the commercial exchanges within Africa and between Africa and the world and so on, is clearly underlined.[28] During the last year the meetings and summits have followed each other in order to finalize strategies of actions and to trace the guidelines for the role and position of the African and international private sector within the NEPAD.[29] It is worth lingering on what happened during the last G8 meeting in Kananaskis, in Canada, where in June 2002, Africa, represented by the Presidents of South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Senegal, was summoned by the world's Great powers to definitively seal this development project.[30]

According to the plan, the Africans did not go to Canada to ask for help; they wanted the commitment to a collaboration where everyone must play their role in creating favorable conditions for international investments. A goal of the NEPAD is, in fact (as specified in articles 146-147), to reach a level of annual growth of 7 percent expected by the objectives of international development and, most of all, halve the share of poverty in Africa by 2015. To achieve this aim the continent has to fill up an annual deficit of 12 percent of its GNP, corresponding to 64 billion dollars. The richest countries of the world are requested to collaborate on two most important plans, according to the suggestions by A. Wade: the financial plan, concerning investment in the Great infrastructures of "pre-industralization" (streets, harbors, railways); and the normative plan that regards specifically the integration of the African countries in the international commercial system and in the world economy. On the other hand the Africans commit themselves to the creation of a new juridical and institutional framework able to guarantee good *governance*: promote peace and stability,

Fig. 1: New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – Examples of projects for sub-regional areas.

democracy, respect for human rights, management of the economy that is transparent and effective.

These are ambitious goals; the same secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan, a convinced supporter of the plan, has declared on several occasions that we should not have unrealistic expectations.[31] And, in fact, the demands of the Africans were handled with care by the G8 which, during the meeting, created an Action Plan for Africa full of declarations of principles but was lacking in concrete and significant measures.[32]

Here, in brief, are the contents of this Action Plan. As far as financial support is concerned, the Big of the world will continue to manage aid by themselves; they commit themselves to giving Africa, by 2006, at least half of the supplementary public help to the development (APS) promised at the Monterrey Conference (Mexico) in March 2002: 6 billion dollars per year.[33] In figures, Europe gives, on average, 0.33 percent of

its GNP to the APS, while, within the G8 the percentage is much lower, 0.19 percent; the United States follow with a modest 0.10 percent.

Apart from this, the Plan refers back to already existing actions and programs. First of all, the G8 is committed to supporting Africa in the intervention to manage the armed conflicts, referring in particular to the acts of peace and security in Congo, Sudan, Angola and the region of the Great Lakes. When it comes to debt, the document talks about a contribution of 1 billion dollars for its cancellation to be given to 40 of the poorest countries of the world with a very high debt, 22 of which are African. This measure is part of the program "Very Indebted Poor Country" approved at the G7 in Cologne in 1999. The issue of access to the markets of the rich countries and aid to agriculture is faced only marginally and postponed to the never-ending negotiations of the WTO. The program

"Education for All" elaborated by the World Bank (Dakar, April 2000) with the purpose of giving access to primary school to 125 million children does not receive the necessary attention, if not in terms of a vague commitment of the G8 to support the African countries in the efforts made to increase the quality of education. The sanitary emergency remains unchanged; the Big of the world are committed to "help Africa to defeat the effects of HIV/Aids" and to " ... sustain her in the struggle for the set-up of efficient sanitary structures"; also in this case money is not an issue. Finally, in its last paragraph, the document spends some words on the water problem and on the possible implications if managed in a strategic way, exhorting once more the continent to improve the efficiency of the hydraulic policy.

This is, synthetically, what Africa obtained in Canada: "a Great Action Plan that, unfortunately, lacks of action" is the comment of some. The rich countries are reluctant to make concessions and this because of a simple and openly declared reason: they do not have enough guarantees that Africans are able to fulfil their obligations to secure peace, democracy and correct administration. Indeed, the good governance issue is the pivotal point for the entire Action Plan; the document dedicates the whole introduction to this specific matter, identifying, in the governance and in the fine-tuning of the legislative and institutional instruments essential for the reinforcement of the democratic structures, a real parameter of evaluation. This becomes a crucial aspect in the prospective of the elaboration of a worldwide partnership based on new rules that find their foundation on the transparency and efficient management of resources. The G8, therefore, supports and shares the objectives of the NEPAD, gives expression to its commitment to create forms of partnership with the African countries, but the choice of these partners is based on the results achieved in the matter of governance. As can be read in the document: "... the struggles will be concentrated on those countries that will show political and financial attachment towards good governance, that invest in their own human resources and that will try to pursue that kind of politics finalized at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty."

As said before, the partnership presented in the document is going to be neither indulging nor rhetorical but, instead, precise and demanding. And it is exactly this point that raises a question. On the African side, the mechanism of control over the processes of democratization and over the activation of procedure able to realize its institutionalization on a continental scale is optional and, until now, no system of sanctions exists. What does the NEPAD have more than the beautiful promises of democracy so often pronounced by African governments? But a similar consideration can be made for the rich countries. As we know, the best way to "help the Africans to help themselves" is buy its products; now, President George Bush recently increased the subsidies to American agriculture by 80 percent, and also the EU has recently taken some measures in the matter of agriculture within the Community. Given this scenario, it becomes kind of rhetorical to think that the Great of the World will support the initiatives of the NEPAD.

Conclusion

The New Partnership for Africa's Development is proposed, in the intentions of the leaders who elaborated it, as a tool that could really change the destiny of Africa. As we have said several times, it puts as the center of its objectives the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the respect for human rights as essential conditions for cutting the vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment and giving a start to the process of economic growth that the continent needs to get out of the long lasting outsider condition.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the NEPAD can be looked at with critical eyes, both from the methodological point of view and from that of the general ideas; the same International Community expresses its skepticism about the requests brought up by the African representatives and asks for stronger guarantees. Furthermore there is the fact that this development plan today finds an international conjunction that is not very keen on preparing the way for its success. The dramatic events of September 11 and the winds of war that are blowing today in the Middle East are increasing the political and economic isolation of the continent. The new geopolitical assets that are emerging on a world-wide level follow the strict rule according to which the different countries are more or less important with respect to the position that they take in the war that America has declared on terrorism and, what is more important, to their direct involvement.[34] Of course, going back to Africa, right after the Manhattan attacks, A. Wade promoted an "African Pact against Terrorism" signed by 27 State leaders, and almost all the African leaders did not fail to emphasize, in a series of declarations, their support and their collaboration to the United States in this new emergency. Nevertheless, there is a concrete risk that Africa will be transformed into a real battlefield. Countries like Somalia, Sudan and others can become the target of an America that wants, at any cost, to destroy, according to its own vision of the problem, all the terrorist organizations spread all over the world. And, on the other hand, the present conflict in Iraq fully reflects this convulsive situation that creates specific dynamics for which the United States has renewed attention for the continent. This attention is motivated, first of all, by great interest for oil.[35] In September 2002, 11 African State leaders were in Washington to discuss new aid, investments, the fight against HIV/Aids, all of this in exchange for energy resources. Unavoidably, the new "tempting" orientation of American policy could have serious drawbacks with regard to the efforts that, although with great difficulty, were becoming more concrete to defeat corruption, repression, attempts to destroy democracy that for a long time have prevented Africa from having relief from poverty and underdevelopment.

Adding to all of this is the fact that the NEPAD must be financed by the International Community in order to give positive and satisfactory results; now we are in an epoch in which the world economic systems of the rich countries are based on financial investments that aim at paying high rents in a short term: what is the interest in investing in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Zambia or Botswana where, in any case, the profitability of investments is low and the risks of failure of the operations is high? On the other hand, it is important to remember that many African countries are still torn apart by bloody conflicts that anyway could undermine the efforts made by the promoters of the NEPAD.

The NEPAD is, of course, an ambitious project. The difficulties that can be seen on the horizon are several and they are even more serious because Africa is today, as said before, in a galloping context of globalization that does not leave space for forms of idealism and even less space for long-term program plans. Nevertheless, to quote Jean Gottmann once again, "the international morals [political] consist in allowing change, in preventing a population using acquired positions from having too many advantages with regard to others; but it demands as well that the chance is granted to every Nation, to keep what it acquired in the past ...."[36] The bet is high; the NEPAD, in fact, facing crucial questions such as democracy, respect for human rights, the sustainability of economic development (articles 42-49), could really represent an opportunity of reprisal for the continent.

Notes

1. The NEPAD document is available on the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) web site: http://www.uneca.org/.
2. The NEPAD has an important place in the set of events that in Johannesburg in July 1992 brought to birth the new African Union. Constituent act, finalities, structure and participant members are found on the web site: http://www.oau-oua.org/.
3. The MAP is available on the UNECA web site; the OMEGA Plan has its own web site: http://www.omegaplan.com/.
4. J. Gottmann, *La politique des États et leur* géographie (Paris, Armand Colin, 1952), p. 7.
5. For an analysis of the contents of the Plan see Al. Turco, "NEPAD, una via africana allo sviluppo," *Terra d'Africa 2002* (Milan, Unicopli, 2002), pp. 271-298.
6. "The various partnerships between Africa and the industrialised countries on the one hand, and multilateral institutions on the other, will be maintained. The partnerships in question include, among others: the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s; the Africa-Europe Summit's Cairo Plan of Action; the World Bank-led Strategic Partnership with Africa; the International Monetary Fund-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; the Japan-led Tokyo Agenda for Action; the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States; and the Economic Commission on Africa-led Global Compact with Africa. The objective will be to rationalise these partnerships and to ensure that real benefits to Africa flow from them" (Art. 187).
7. On this subject, see: *Démocraties certes et encore fragiles, mais les libertés fondamentales sont en expansion à travers le Continent,* Coalition Mondiale pour l'Afrique, Rapport Annuel 2000/2001.
8. J.F. Bayart, *L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre* (Paris, Fayard, 1989).
9. I. Ikeme, *Sustainable Development, Globalization and Africa: Plugging the Holes,* in: http://www.afbis.com/analysis.
10. On this subject, the Article 5 says that: " The New Partnership for Africa's Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions."
11. Article 47: "Through this program, African leaders are setting an agenda for the renewal of the continent."
12. For a critical analysis of the South African President's thinking, see R. Ajulu, "Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalizing world economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent," *Review of African Political Economy,* 87, 2001.
13. Mbeki, "Il mal d'Africa e i suoi tutori," *La Repubblica,* 18/07/2001.
14. Many articles and literature have been written in recent years about globalization. Besides the most successful books, for example: N. Klein, *No Logo* (Toronto, Knopf Canada 2000), Z. Bauman, *Globalization: the Human Consequences* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998) we consider relevant to name: A. Bonomi, *Il trionfo della moltitudine. Forme e conflitti della società che viene* (Milan, Bollati-Boringhieri, 1998); Id., *La comunità maledetta* (Turin, Edizioni Comunità, 2002). Referring specifically to the African question, we can mention "Globalization and African responses," *Review of African Political Economy,* 85, 2000 (special issue).
15. On this subject, see Articles 18-27, 52 of the Plan.
16. On this topic, refer to A. Turco, *Africa subsahariana ... op. cit.,* in particular Chap. 11.
17. Id., "Strutture di legittimità nella territorializzazione malinké dell'Alto Niger (Rep. di Guinea)," in E. Casti and An. Turco (eds.), *Culture dell'alterità. Il territorio africano e le sue rappresentazioni* (Milan, Unicopli, 1998), pp. 13-60; V. Berdoulay and O. Soubeyran, "Milieu et colonisation dans le contexte de la modernité," in V. Berdoulay and O. Soubeyran (eds.), *Milieu, colonisation et développement durable* (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000), pp. 15-17.
18. An. Turco, *Africa subsahariana... op. cit.*
19. R. Klitgaard, *Combattre la corruption* (Paris, Nouveaux Horizons, 1988).
20. Starting from the fact that the concepts of "space" and "place" are strongly present in the dissertations concerning the modern theory of democracy, E. Entrinkin explores the possibility of the existence of a real "geography of democracy," but he observes that: "... place and space work as metaphors, as a way of understanding someone's place in a social, political and cultural prospective. As metaphors, they lose their specificity of concrete spaces and places, but acquire semantic flexibility and rhetorical efficiency for the theoretical dissertation" (p. 190). Refer to: N. Entrikin, "Le language géographique dans la théorie démocratique," in J. Lévy and M. Lussault (eds.), *Logiques de l'espace, esprit des lieux* (Paris, Belin, 2000, p. 190); refer also for a wider view: V. Berdoulay, "Le lieu et l'espace public," *Cahiers de Géographie du Québec,* 114, 1997; V. Berdoulay and N. Entrikin, "Lieu et sujet. Perspectives théoriques," *L'espace géographique,* 2, 1998.
21. Consider, for example, the presentation of the Plan at the G8 meeting in Genoa (July 2001), the WTO summit in Doha (November 2001), the latest G8 meetings in Kananaskis, Canada, Evian, France and Sea Island, United States.
22. We refer to T. Mbeki, of course, but also to A. Wade (Senegal), A. Bouteflika (Algeria), O. Obasanjo (Nigeria), A.O. Konaré (Mali). See, on this matter, the dossier: AA. VV., "Globe Trotters," *L'autre Afrique,* 2001, no. 7, pp. 8-15.
23. J.L. Touadi, "Nuova iniziativa per l'Africa. È il modello giusto?" *Nigrizia,* 2002, no. 2, pp. 24-25.
24. We refer in particular to the "decentralized cooperation," innovative tool for "support to development" carried out according to the principles of sustainable development.
25. On this matter, it is important to name the document published during the summit of Abuja, in October 2001, and available on the website of UNECA.
26. J. Gottmann, *op. cit.,* p. 193.
27. The debate on the common currency finds place in this frame. This issue is a part of the more general political picture carried on by the African Union. Actually, the monetary integration, as we have seen in Europe, is an essential component of economic integration: it is difficult to imagine an increase of the exchange and economic growth within the Continent considering the actual circulation of so different and floating currencies, mostly not exchangeable one into the other.
28. The official site of the summit in Genoa: http://www.genoa-g8.it/.
29. We refer to the WTO summit in Doha, November 2001, to the summit in Dakar, January 2002 and the one in Addis Ababa, April 2002.
30. Refer to the official site of the meeting: http://www.g8.gc.ca/kananaskis/afraction-fr.asp.
31. *Le Monde,* 30.6.2002.
32. The Action Plan for Africa is entirely available on the official site of the event.
33. See the web site: www.un.org/esa/ffd.
34. An. Turco, "L'Africa e l'11 Settembre," *Terra d'Africa* (Milan, Unicopli, 2002), p. 14.
35. About this matter read the arguments exposed by: An. Turco, "Gli amici di Bush," *Nigrizia,* December 2002, pp. 26-28.
36. J. Gottmann, *op. cit.,* p. 189.

Jean Gottmann as Guest-Editor of *Ekistics*

EKISTICS
ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ VOLUME 46, NUMBER 274, JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1979

the problems and science of
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

OFFICES AND URBAN GROWTH

EKISTICS
ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ VOLUME 50, NUMBER 299, MARCH/APRIL 1983

the problems and science of
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CAPITAL CITIES

EKISTICS/ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ: the problems and science of HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
Volume 46, number 274, January/February 1979

Offices and urban growth

This issue was compiled by Jean Gottmann, guest editor.

Cover: Suburban office locations in Edinburgh (from the article "Office activity in Edinburgh," by John Fernie, p 25 of this issue).

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Volume 50, Number 299, March/April 1983

Capital cities

This issue was compiled by Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, Consultant Editor, and Jean Gottmann, Guest Editor.

Cover: Our global world (from N.L. Engelhardt, Jr. *Toward New Frontiers of our Global World*, New York, Noble and Noble, Publishers, Inc, 1943, p. 28) slightly modified by EKISTICS.

Covers and tables of contents of *Ekistics* (vol. 46, no. 274, January/February 1979) on Offices and Urban Growth, and *Ekistics* (vol. 50, no. 299. March/April 1983) on Capital Cities with Jean Gottmann as Guest-Editor.

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—— and M. GANGAS GEISSE (2000), "Los conflictos del año 2000. Análisis geográfico-político," *Revista Geográfica de Valparaíso,* vol. 31, pp. 237-257.

SIMANCAS, Francisco (1993), *Geopolítica Brasilera. Amazonia y Garimpeiros* (Caracas, Ediciones del Congreso de la República).

Last *Ekistics* with J. Gottmann as Guest-Editor

Cover and table of contents of *Ekistics* (vol. 57, no. 340/341, January-April 1990) on Urban Growth and Politics with Jean Gottmann as Guest-Editor.

Ekistic grid index

The articles in this issue are coded by the scale of settlements and an aspect of an element indicated in the ekistic grid.

The content of each article is classified within an ekistic grid as follows:

● The scale of the settlement(s) with which the article deals is selected from among the 15 ekistic units:

No.	Name	Population
1	Anthropos	1
2	Room	2
3	House	5
4	House group	40
5	Small neighborhood	250
6	Neighborhood	1,500
7	Small polis	10,000
8	Polis	75,000
9	Small metropolis	500,000
10	Metropolis	4 million
11	Small megalopolis	25 million
12	Megalopolis	150 million
13	Small eperopolis	1,000 million
14	Eperopolis	7,500 million
15	Ecumenopolis	50,000 million

● The subjects dealt with in each article are selected from among the subheads of the five ekistic elements. The position of a dot in any square of the grid indicates which of the four subheads is being referred to. If the article arrives at a synthesis of these elements, either in a physical plan or in ekistic theory, the dot is at the top or bottom of the square.

key to placement of subheads

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① ②
④ ③
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primary emphasis ●
secondary emphasis ○

The subheads of the elements are:

NATURE
1. Environmental Analysis
2. Resources Utilization
3. Land Use, Landscape
4. Recreation Areas

ANTHROPOS
1. Physiological Needs
2. Safety and Security
3. Affection, Belonging, Esteem
4. Self-actualization, Knowledge and Aesthetics

SOCIETY
1. Public Administration, Participation and Law
2. Social Relations, Population Trends, Cultural Patterns
3. Urban Systems and Urban Change
4. Economics

SHELLS
1. Housing
2. Service Facilities
3. Shops, Offices, Factories
4. Cultural and Educational Units

NETWORKS
1. Public Utility Systems
2. Transportation Systems
3. Personal and Mass Communication Systems
4. Computer and Information Technology

SYNTHESIS
1. Physical Planning
2. Ekistic Theory

Each article is described by keywords, which are also used in the *Ekistic Index,* and by abbreviations referring to their illustrative content.

Keyword letter code

D = Diagrams
I = Illustrations
M = Maps
R = References
S = Statistics, Tables, Graphs
X = Simulation, Mathematical Models, etc.

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The iconography and circulation of the Atlantic ... p. 270
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NATO, USA, Canada, Europe; Past, Present, Future   I,M,R

The relevance of Jean Gottmann in today's world p. 295
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Latin American countries and their iconographies   p. 373
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Latin America; Past, Present, Future   M,R

The anthropocosmos model

Adapted version of model for EKISTICS

● — primary emphasis
O — secondary emphasis

The authors of the papers in all three double issues of volume 70 of Ekistics, coming from the broad fields of Geography, History and a wide range of social sciences in general, refer to Society. They focus on Anthropos – Jean Gottmann – and his life-long contribution, through concrete theoretical concepts, to the understanding of the nature and dynamics of urbanization, as well as the structure, function and evolution of Human Settlements Systems. They interpret these principles and emphasize their validity in large-scale Human Settlements – from Metropolis through Megalopolis to Eperopolis – mainly in high- and middle-income countries (less in low-income ones). They demonstrate the relevance of Gottmann's concepts in explaining current global complex phenomena of a social, political and cultural nature. They also identify a set of urgent desirable priority themes for further research, ranging from the clarification of epistemological issues among disciplines to defining ways for expanding the relevance of these principles to the full spectrum of Human Settlements, and bringing them to an explicitly operational level for use by decision makers.

Latin American countries and their iconographies p. 373
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Jean Gottmann. (*Source:* M.R. Perović, *Dialogues with the Delians,* Ljubljana Collection Sinteza, 1978, p. 105).

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Note

ACE : Athens Center of Ekistics
COF : "City of the Future" Research Project
COG : "Capital of Greece" Research Project
HUCO : "Human Community" Research Project

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EKISTICS (modern Greek: ΟΙΚΙΣΤΙΚΗ) is derived from the ancient Greek adjective *οἰκιστικός*, more particularly from the neuter plural *οἰκιστικά* (as "physics" is derived from *φυσικά*, Aristotle). The ancient Greek adjective *οἰκιστικός* meant: "concerning the foundation of a house, a habitation, a city or a colony; contributing to the settling." It was derived from the noun *οἰκιστής*, meaning "the person who installs settlers in a place." This may be regarded as deriving indirectly from another ancient Greek noun, *οἴκισις*, meaning "building," "housing," "habitation," and especially "establishment of a colony, a settlement or a town" (already in Plato), or "filling it with new settlers": "settling," "being settled." All these words grew from the verb *οἰκίζω*, "to settle," and were ultimately derived from the noun *οἶκος*, "house," "home" or "habitat."

The *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* contains a reference to an *oecist, oekist* or *oikist*, defining him as: "the founder of an ancient Greek ... colony." The English equivalent of *οἰκιστική* is *ekistics* (a noun). In addition, the adjectives *ekistic* and *ekistical*, the adverb *ekistically*, and the noun *ekistician* are now also in current use. The French equivalent is *ékistique*, the German *ökistik*, the Italian *echistica* (all feminine).